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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Trade unions, workers’ collective organisations, are facing tough times almost everywhere. 
Research on union strategies of revitalisation has largely focused on advanced industrialised 
countries thereby overlooking potentially interesting developments elsewhere. This thesis aims at 
contributing to fill this gap by widening the breath of empirical research and bringing in evidence 
from Chile’s large-scale copper mining sector. Chile and its copper sector are often heralded as 
prominent examples of the benefits globalisation can bring to developing countries but much less 
publicised has been the extent to which neoliberal policy has negatively affected workers and their 
organisations.  
 
The purpose of this thesis is to understand these challenges and to address the issues of in 
what ways, why, and how far workers and trade unions have effectively confronted their changing 
environments. More specifically, the thesis aims at analysing and explaining similarities and 
differences in the emergence, form, and outcomes of union strategy. 
 
The research is based on a comparative multi case study of nine union organisations and 
draws on semi-structured interviews with union leaders, senior managers, state officials, academics, 
and elite interviewees. This work employs a preliminary framework of analysis that conceives of 
union strategy as multi-dimensional and aims at explaining its changing nature by elaborating on 
Frege and Kelly’s (2003) social movement model of union strategic choice, thereby integrating 
structural determinants with purposeful agency.  
 
The thesis shows that since the early 1980s Chile’s labour regulatory regimes have been re-
designed to subordinate groups’ disadvantage, severely impacting workers and unions structure of 
opportunity. It distinguishes three groups. (1) Unions of core workers in union-accepting regimes 
have stabilised their situation by engaging in different forms of union-management co-operation and 
membership de-mobilisation. (2) Unions of core workers in anti-union regimes have developed 
successful organising campaigns and union-building strategies, transforming their original ‘union-
free’ status into a heavily unionised one. (3) Unions of contract workers in harsh anti-union regimes 
have developed militant ‘direct action’ strategies, becoming prominent nation-wide organisations. 
 
At its most general, the thesis argues that meaningful union strategic choice is possible, even 
in the most difficult of conditions, thereby contradicting claims that unions have become powerless, 
ineffective, and unnecessary organisations in the era of ‘globalisation’. It acknowledges the 
relevance of different strategic paths to union effectiveness but suggests that broadly defined 
militant types of unionism may be better placed to promote union revitalisation. It suggests that 
structural determinants are insufficient in explaining the form and outcomes of union choices, and 
that renewed attention must be paid to the social processes of collective action, in particular to the 
dynamics of micromobilisation. 
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1  
 
INT RODUCT IO N 
 
 
 
 
Let’s take a quite random selection of books, outside the field of industrial relations 
as such, but dealing with possible future socio-economic developments. Perhaps they 
are not particularly good books (…) but, anyway, best selling and much-discussed 
(…). What do they say about the role of trade unions in the ongoing social 
transformation process? Nothing! Trade unions are absent from the scene. They no 
longer seem to belong to the social actors able to influence the course of history as 
they did from the middle of the nineteenth century on. What is perhaps worse is that 
the need for trade unions as a social movement, implicitly or explicitly, seems 
challenged. 
(Leisink et al., 1996: 3) 
 
 
 
The decline of trade unions is one of the most significant contemporary socio-economic 
developments. In comparison with the 1960s and 1970s, trade unions’ presence in the 
world of work has been eroded, their involvement in the economy and the polity 
marginalised, and their role in regulating industrial relations in firms disputed (Fairbrother 
and Griffin, 2002; Heery et al., 2003). Even longstanding sympathetic commentators have 
argued that the labour movement is fading away as a major source of social cohesion and 
workers’ representation (Castells, 1997). Most visibly, union membership and density 
have declined significantly almost everywhere (ILO, 1997; Kuruvilla et al., 2002; Ross 
and Martin, 1999; Verma et al., 2002; Visser, 1995, 2006; Western, 1998; Zapata, 2004). 
This, in turn, has been associated with an increasing representation gap (Freeman and 
Rogers, 1999; Gollan and Markey, 2001), rising income inequality between and within 
countries (Brown et al., 2003; Katz and Darbishire, 2000), and the expansion of insecure 
forms of employment (Heery and Abbott, 2000). Last but not least, a ‘workerless’ 
globalisation discourse routinely portrays trade unions and worker collectivism as 
remnants of an old economic structure (Frege and Kelly, 2004; Kelly, 1998; Munck, 
2004a, 2004b; Phelps Brown, 1990). 
 
That trade unions are facing tough times in the era of ‘globalisation’ is hardly a 
controversial assertion. Debate starts when trying to identify the nature of current 
problems and establish the desirability and possibilities of a response. For simplicity, a 
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continuum between two extreme views can be distinguished. On one side, a globalisation-
centred view would argue that global forces such as intensifying international competition 
in product and labour markets emphasise the need for greater efficiency and productivity 
(Gollan and Markey, 2001). Governments and firms have been forced to adapt their 
industrial relations regimes along market logic lines, overwhelming workers and trade 
unions in the process (Tilly, 1995). 
 
This perspective emphasises trade unions’ external circumstances, particularly the 
growing hegemony of global capitalism and/or changes in unions’ current and potential 
constituencies. Globalisation is largely perceived as established fact despite serious 
‘setbacks’ -its recurrent financial crises and questioning by outsiders and insiders alike 
(Stiglitz, 2002)- and its challenges viewed as lying beyond the control of workers and 
their organisations. Simply put this view considers workers and unions as passive and 
ineffectual social actors unable to influence current developments. It operates, in other 
words, a premature closure of agency (Munck, 2000), and ignores or at best downplays, 
the possibilities of collective action. As Turner (2004: 3) has argued, ‘union strategies 
may matter, but they are either derivative of institutional frameworks or they are 
overwhelmed by opposing forces’. 
 
On the other side of the continuum, a union-centred view would acknowledge 
external difficulties but focus instead on trade unions’ internal circumstances, attempting 
to scrutinise the way and the extent to which unions’ own actions have impacted on their 
current fortunes. This view is also critical of the globalisation discourse. Rather than a 
predetermined process driven by diffuse market forces, this perspective largely views 
globalisation as a process of conflict over the re-organisation of the world economy (Cox, 
1996; Crouch and Pizzorno, 1978; Giles, 2000). New regulatory and production regimes 
are not seen as fixed or immutable, but contradictory and contested by labour (Fairbrother 
and Griffin, 2002). This perspective argues that rather than structural determinism, 
historical and comparative research suggests scope for choice, and consequently conceives 
of workers and unions as social actors having some discretion in how to react to their 
changing environments. 
 
This, of course, is a broad-brush description of some of the debates that have 
characterised this era, and between these two extreme views there is a variety of 
alternative positions. If anything, the distinction is useful in that a union-centred view can 
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be readily identified with the literature on union revitalisation. The borders of any stream 
of literature are difficult to define exactly and this is no exception. With ‘union 
revitalisation’ I mean to refer to scholarship that incorporates research on union strategies 
-arguably this literature’s main focus- but that goes beyond to include works not explicitly 
framed in such terms but that are nevertheless concerned with unions’ present situation 
from the study of unions’ ‘responses to globalisation’ to discussions on the ‘future of 
labour movements’. 
 
This broadly defined literature has gradually raised and revisited fundamental 
questions about the nature and prospects of trade unions in our societies. A review shows 
that three major concerns have dominated research in the last two decades. Early works 
dealt predominantly with union decline examining the causes of current difficulties and 
raising questions about the nature and determinants of union power (Kelly, 1998). 
Research on union strategies followed, aiming to understand and promote proactive 
strategies in a belief that unions can effectively influence contemporary developments 
(Turner, 2004). Research has begun examining the factors and dynamics that could 
explain the variety of union courses of action and outcomes in different socio-economic 
contexts (Frege and Kelly, 2003). 
 
Despite the significance of these questions, considerable empirical gaps remain. 
Although increasingly popular in recent years, research on union revitalisation has been 
relatively modest (Behrens et al., 2004; Frege and Kelly, 2003; Holst, 2008). As late as 
2003, Frege and Kelly (2003: 10) noted that ‘there is hardly any research on the different 
strategic choices made by unions’. The little research produced to date has been also 
limited by its choice of case studies, level of analysis, and starting point.  
 
Research on union revitalisation has largely focused on advanced industrialised 
countries thereby overlooking interesting developments elsewhere. An attractive, yet 
largely unexplored, site of struggle is developing countries and in particular what I call the 
new fault zones of the international economy. These can be simply defined as sites where 
global capital meets developing country labour, typically export-processing zones but also 
including the remote provision of services and extraction of raw materials. From the 
perspective of these fault lines, empirical research on union strategies has been almost 
nonexistent, and largely limited to the detached examination of ‘responses to 
globalisation’. 
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Most empirical work has also been conducted at national or firm level, and far less 
so at the increasingly crucial meso-level of the sector. For various commentators, sector-
specific factors above all are determining the shape of current industrial relations regimes 
(Katz and Darbishire, 2000; Locke, 1995; Roche, 2000; Streeck, 1999). Last, the great 
majority of research produced to date also presupposes the existence of relatively well-
established union organisations. Indeed, the term ‘revitalisation’ alludes to injecting life to 
an already existing entity. There are far less studies whose starting point is non-organised 
or loosely organised workers. This is particularly important for countries and industries 
with sizable dual labour markets. They resemble movements rather than organisations, the 
former understood in some readings as preceding the latter. This is especially relevant 
when discussing the need for trade unions and the alleged decline in worker collectivism 
(Kelly, 1998). 
 
 
Purpose and research questions 
 
My purpose in this thesis is to contribute to fill some of the empirical gaps identified 
above by examining three sets of research questions in Chile’s large scale copper mining 
sector, a prominent fault zone of the international economy. 
 
• First, what are the challenges facing workers and trade unions? An uncritical 
acceptance of the notion of ‘globalisation’ as the main cause of unions’ current 
problems is clearly unsatisfactory. There is a need for a more precise understanding 
of the ‘context’ in terms of what specific factors represent the strategic problem 
unions are responding to, and how these factors constrain and enable union action. 
 
• Second, what are workers and trade unions doing to deal with current difficulties? 
How successful have these strategies been? At one level this relates to examining 
the strategies and tactics being pursued, and the extent to which they are more or 
less effective. On closer examination however, the problem becomes not strategies 
per se but the types of trade unionism that may be emerging after three decades of 
global restructuring. Likewise, analyses of effectiveness must be distinguished 
from, and complemented with, discussions about the significance of strategies and 
types in advancing the revitalisation of organised labour as a whole. 
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• Third, what explains the adoption of particular strategies and the development of 
distinct types of trade unionism? What explains their success or failure? It is crucial 
to identify the key factors and dynamics involved in the emergence, form, and 
outcomes of union strategies and types of trade unionism. I am particularly 
interested in the analyses made by trade union leaders, and in the decisions and 
actions following these analyses. 
 
I intend to add to the breath of empirical research by bringing in evidence from 
Chile, a ‘prominent globaliser’ country and its successful large-scale copper mining 
sector. The case of Chile is interesting because it represents one of the world’s earliest, 
boldest, and arguably more successful experiments in neo-liberal economics, a precursor 
of what has become known as globalisation (Kurtz, 1999; Veltmeyer, 2004). Neoliberal 
restructuring transformed Chile’s highly-protected industrialising economy until the 1970s 
into an open, free-market economy based on commodity exports (Schurman, 2001; Silva, 
1993, 2007). Even globalisation-critic Joseph Stiglitz identified Chile as a neo-liberal 
success story in a region replete with neo-liberal catastrophes (Barr-Melej, 2004: 1).  
 
Less publicised however is the extent to which the so-called Chilean model owes a 
great deal of its success to an employment relations legal framework deliberately designed 
by the Pinochet dictatorship to curb trade union power by market mechanisms (Piñera, 
1990, 2007; Valenzuela, 1989). The Concertación, a centre-left coalition led by Christian 
Democrats and Socialists elected in 1990, backed away from any plan to radically change 
the legacy of the dictatorship and as a result Chile has been effectively ruled by an 
unbroken sequence of neoliberal administrations for over three decades. Although several 
rounds of labour reform (1990, 1993, 2001, and 2006) have encouraged pluralism and 
improved the level of social protection for the most vulnerable, the enjoyment of labour 
rights typically associated with advanced employment relations systems remains limited 
(Cook, 1998; Durán-Palma et al., 2005; Frank, 2002a, 2002b; Haagh, 2002; Taylor, 
2004). 
 
Chile’s large-scale copper mining sector (La Gran Minería) is particularly attractive 
for examining the impact of neoliberal restructuring on organised labour and union 
strategy. As the world’s largest copper producer and exporter, Chile is a key component of 
the global economy (Luna et al., 2004). La Gran Minería was restructured along 
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neoliberal lines in the early 1980s, transforming a nationalised industry into a 
transnational arena onto which massive amounts of foreign direct investment have poured 
ever since. Indeed, Chile has been voted the ‘world’s best place to do mining’ by 
conservative think tanks around the world and regularly features as international example 
of the benefits of neo-liberal institutional change (The Fraser Institute, 2006, 2007, 2008). 
But neoliberal restructuring has not necessarily reported benefits for workers and their 
collective organisations. Indeed, the ‘mining boom’ that has characterised the sector since 
the early 1990s has been largely ‘anti-worker’, entailing wide-ranging processes of 
rationalisation, outsourcing, and the imposition of anti-union labour regimes.  
 
The research is based on a comparative multi-case study of nine union 
organisations. Cases selected include four firm-level unions, two firm-level federations 
and three inter-firm unions of contract workers. These cases represent about 70% of all 
core workers, as well as the majority of the sector’s organised contract workers. The 
research draws primarily on semi-structured interviews conducted with senior union 
officials, employers, state representatives, and elite interviewees. Fieldwork took place 
between December 2003 and February 2004, November and December 2004, and June 
and August 2005. The information presented here has been updated continuously ever 
since. 
 
 In order to make this empirical contribution however, it was necessary to 
overcome, at least preliminarily, some persistent theoretical gaps. The most relevant of 
these remains the lack of an agreed framework to examine the experience of workers and 
trade unions across different contexts. More concretely, there is no established way to 
define, analyse, and explain union strategy, union power, or union effectiveness and 
revitalisation for that matter. 
 
Thus, when examining the challenges faced by workers and trade unions in La 
Gran Minería, I explore the changing nature of the political economy in which they 
operate at three levels: national, sector, and firm level. I examine the extent to which its 
constituent elements -socio-economic change, industrial relations institutions, and 
employer and state strategies- facilitate or repress the development of collective action.  
 
Next, in analysing the form and outcomes of union strategy, I suggest a preliminary 
framework of analysis based on the work of several authors (Boxall and Haynes, 1997; 
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Hyman, 1997; Hyman and Fryer, 1975). I define union strategy as the pattern of critical, 
deliberate, and emergent decisions about increasing trade union power, or the ability of 
trade unions to control and access resources and sanctions both material and ideological. 
The framework conceives of union strategy as multi-dimensional, involving relational and 
organisational choices.  
 
Last, in making the transition from analysis to explanation, I elaborate on Frege and 
Kelly’s (2003) social movement model of union strategic choice. Their model represents a 
sophisticated approach to the study of the factors and dynamics that explain union strategy 
and integrates structural determinants (socio-economic change, institutional context, and 
differences in employer and state strategies) with purposeful agency (union structures and 
framing processes). My reading however, attempts to bring the notion of mobilisation -
largely implicit in their model- back to centre stage (Kelly, 1998), and to draw more on 
the original social movement concepts employed to explain the emergence, form, and 
outcomes of collective action: political opportunities, mobilising structures, framing 
processes, and repertoires of contention (McAdam et al., 2001).  
 
It is my belief that by virtue of its choice of case study and analytical framework, 
this thesis can be seen as contributing to the more systematic study of the struggle of 
workers and unions in the new fault lines of the international economy. More generally, 
this work aims to help increasing our understanding of union strategies in a way that helps 
workers and unions to learn from each other and that encourages union revitalisation. For 
a Chilean audience, I write this thesis with an interest in advancing discussion and debate 
not only about, but also within the union movement. Ultimately, I aim to do justice to the 
general commitment that defines the field of industrial relations, one that Piore and 
Safford (2006: 321-322) summed up as one ‘to those actors and institutions that struggle 
to find a voice and provide a vehicle for the less powerful, the oppressed, the 
underrepresented and the socially stigmatised in industrial society’. 
 
 
Plan of the thesis 
 
The thesis is organised in four parts. Part I includes three chapters. In Chapter 2, Union 
Decline and Strategies of Revitalisation, I review the literature on union revitalisation. I 
introduce the nature and extent of union decline as well as its main interpretations. I then 
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consider some of the more prominent strategies unions are employing to cope with current 
difficulties. I briefly refer to their relatively disappointing results and present some of the 
main factors identified by the literature in explaining unions’ courses of action and 
outcomes. In Chapter 3, A Preliminary Framework of Analysis, I define union power and 
union strategy, and propose a multi-dimensional approach for their analysis. I suggest a 
way of examining the determinants and dynamics of union strategy based on a revision of 
Frege and Kelly’s (2003) social movement model of union strategic choice. In Chapter 4, 
Research Approach, I discuss the ontological, epistemological, and methodological 
aspects of my research. I make explicit my assumptions on the nature of trade unions, 
power and strategy, and show that a qualitative approach and a multi-case study research 
design are especially suitable for investigating them. I examine the various limitations of 
this thesis as well as the actions undertaken to deal constructively with these difficulties.  
 
In Part II, I investigate the transformation of Chile’s political economy of industrial 
relations and copper mining in order to contextualise the empirical findings that will 
follow in Part III.  I do this at two levels. In Chapter 5, The Transformation of Chilean 
Industrial Relations, I review how the national-level structure of opportunity for workers 
and trade unions has evolved in Chile between the dawn of the country’s ‘traditional’ 
industrial relations system and the imposition of neoliberal restructuring. Subsequently, in 
Chapter 6, The ‘Globalisation of La Gran Minería, I shift focus to the meso-level of the 
sector. Here, I review the evolution of the sector’s orientation, employer and state 
strategies, and institutional regimes since the establishment of the first ‘large-scale’ 
copper producer in 1904. I discuss the consequences of these developments for copper 
workers and the strategic approach of their organisations. I conclude by referring to 
Agacino et al.’s (1998) study of union strategy in the mining sector during the mid-1990s, 
the only piece of research available on this area, and one that constitutes the immediate 
antecedent of this thesis. 
 
Part III constitutes the empirical core of the thesis. By and large each of its three 
chapters has a similar structure so as to facilitate comparison among the cases. The 
presentation of each case study is organised toward the present and focuses on the 
transitions from one set of conditions and actions to another. I start with a brief exposition 
of workers and unions’ immediate structure of opportunity. I then examine the evolution 
of union strategy and collective action. Finally, I look at their outcomes in terms of 
membership, economic, political, and institutional dimensions.  
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In Chapter 7, Core Workers in Union-Tolerant Regimes, I examine three cases of 
union organisations that have engaged in different forms of labour-management co-
operation and made substantial efforts to demobilise their memberships. Before embracing 
Social Partnership, these unions were rightly seen as depositories of the adversarial 
‘classic copper unionism’ that characterised industrial relations in the sector until the 
mining boom. It is therefore important to take a closer look at the circumstances and 
decisions that have driven this significant change in the unions’ strategic approach. In 
Chapter 8, Core Workers in Anti-Union Regimes, I describe and analyse three cases of 
unions organised in greenfield transnational operations set up on a non-union basis but 
which became unionised in the course of the late 1990s and early 2000s. I am particularly 
interested in what may explain the otherwise unlikely emergence of collective action in 
the absence of major changes in opportunity structure neither at national nor at sector 
level. In Chapter 9, Periphery Workers in Harsh Anti-Union Regimes, I examine the 
situation of contract labour. These workers are often overlooked as their invisibility has 
become emblematic of the ‘Chilean miracle’. But although the weakest in theory, contract 
workers have managed to organise collectively and achieved significant gains in recent 
years, employing an interesting mixture of militant industrial and political strategies. 
 
Part IV draws the thesis to an end. In Chapter 10, The ‘Global Gran Minería’: 
Three Worlds of Work and Collective Action, I first present a cross-case analysis of each 
of the groups identified above. For each of them, I systematically analyse the similarities 
and differences observable between the cases in terms of the challenges they have faced, 
the form and outcomes of their strategic choices, as well as at the factors and dynamics 
that may be explaining them. I then introduce a cross-group analysis where I aim to 
provide for sector-level answers to the thesis’ research questions. Finally, in Chapter 11, 
Union Strategy in the Era of Globalisation- Some Answers? I summarise the key themes 
of the thesis, discuss how the findings and analyses of this study may be contributing to 
fill some of the empirical and theoretical gaps found in the literature.  

 11 
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Over the last three decades, scholarship on trade unions has gradually raised and revisited 
fundamental questions about the nature and prospects of trade unions in our societies. 
While early works dealt predominantly with union decline examining the causes of 
current difficulties and raising questions about the nature and determinants of union power 
(Kelly, 1998), current research on union strategies of revitalisation aims at understanding 
and promoting proactive strategies in a belief that unions can effectively influence 
contemporary developments (Turner, 2004).  
 
In this chapter, I present a review of this broadly defined literature on union 
revitalisation. I have organised it in line with the research questions that inform this study. 
In Section 2.1, I discuss the main challenges facing workers and unions in the era of 
globalisation from the perspective of ‘union decline’. I introduce the nature and extent of 
decline trends, the central factors that appear to be driving decline, and the main 
interpretations of current challenges. In Section 2.2, I review some of the most prevalent 
union strategies identified by research on union revitalisation. I do so by distinguishing 
between empirical studies and prescriptive arguments. I then move on to briefly discuss 
issues surrounding the outcomes and determinants of union strategic choice. Last, in 
Section 2.3, I summarise what I see as the main the limitations of the literature. 
 
 
2.1 Union power decline and challenges in the era of ‘globalisation’ 
 
What are the challenges faced by workers and trade unions in the era of globalisation? It is 
a familiar argument that in comparison with the 1960s and 1970s, trade unions’ presence 
in the world of work has been eroded, their involvement in the economy and the polity 
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marginalised, and their role in regulating industrial relations in firms disputed (Fairbrother 
and Griffin, 2002; Heery et al., 2003). Even sympathetic commentators argue that the 
labour movement ‘fades away as a major source of social cohesion and workers’ 
representation’ (Castells, 1997). While accepting some of the substance of this argument, 
it is necessary to examine more closely the main issues involved. In this section, I first 
look at the nature and degree of union decline trends. Next I review some of the central 
factors that may be driving decline. I then contrast ‘globalisation’ and ‘union-centred’ 
interpretations of organised labour’s current difficulties. 
 
Union power decline 
 
The phenomenon of union decline refers to the general erosion of trade union power and 
influence observed across the world since the 1970s. Union decline is usually discussed 
with reference to deteriorating proxy measures of union power such as union density, 
bargaining coverage, and strike frequency (Kelly, 1998). Among these, union density -the 
number of union members as a percentage of potential members- remains the most 
popular indicator (Visser, 2006; Western, 1998). Available evidence shows that union 
density has declined significantly across the world since the 1970s, both in the developed 
and developing world (ILO, 1997; Katz and Darbishire, 2000; Kuruvilla et al., 2002; Ost 
and Crowley, 2001; Ross and Martin, 1999; Verma et al., 2002; Visser, 1995, 2006; 
Western, 1998; Zapata, 2004).1 
 
These trends are not universal, uniform or unilinear, but greatly uneven both 
between and within countries. First, there is evidence of large variation in the direction of 
union membership and density changes. In some countries and sectors, union density has 
actually increased or remained largely stable (e.g. Nordic countries and public sector in 
most countries). Second, there are considerable differences in the pace and absolute 
change in union density experienced by declining countries. For example, while Australia 
and New Zealand recorded negative absolute changes of 27 and 33% of employed wage 
and salary earners respectively between 1970 and 2003, countries such as Italy and South 
Korea lost comparatively little with 1.5 and 3.3% respectively in the same period (Visser, 
2006).2 Third, there is a persistent and large variation in overall density rates among 
countries, and it is important to take these differences into account to put the differential 
impact of decline trends in perspective. Thus, for example, although Austria has suffered a 
pronounced trend towards deunionisation with a negative absolute change of 27% 
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between 1970 and 2003, its current rate of 35% remains nearly three times as high as that 
of the United States (12%), a country with an absolute loss of about 23% between 1954 
and 2006 (Visser, 2006).  
 
More fundamentally, general decline trends do not necessarily mean equivalent loss 
of union power as the relative importance of union density varies across countries. As the 
familiar comparison between France and the United States shows, union density is a 
strong power indicator in the latter but not in the former due to the existence of 
‘compensatory’ institutional arrangements (e.g. extension mechanisms). In effect, Frege 
(2006: 236) argues that ‘the meaning of union density levels can (…) only be understood 
if one takes a country’s specific industrial relations systems and its political and economic 
environment into account’. Furthermore, union density ‘tells us nothing about the quality 
of the ties between the organisation and its membership’ (Müller-Jentsch, 1985: 22). For 
these and other reasons, it has long been argued that union density is a limited indicator of 
union power across countries both in terms of its reliability and validity (Kelly, 1998). 
Therefore, to conclude that unions are declining everywhere based on union density 
statistics alone is, at best, largely premature. 
 
Collective bargaining coverage –the share of workers covered by collective 
contracts negotiated by one or more unions- is arguably a better indicator of union power. 
This is because bargaining coverage is closer than union density to measuring union 
effectiveness, in turn closer to measuring potential bargaining strength (Visser, 2006). 
Cross-national evidence shows that whereas bargaining coverage has decreased 
significantly in decentralised bargaining systems mirroring the decline in union density 
(US), the prevailing trend in European collective bargaining coverage has been one of 
stability. Only three countries report considerable changes: while the coverage rate has 
dwindled in Germany and Great Britain, it has increased in Denmark (Behrens and 
Traxler, 2002).  
 
Drawing exclusively on coverage data it appears certainly more difficult to 
conclude that unions are declining. But as with union density, arguments can be made to 
question the reliability (e.g. data sources, comparability, etc) and validity (e.g. role of 
extension mechanisms) of bargaining coverage as measure of union effectiveness. Indeed, 
similar arguments can be made about strike activity or any other indicator of union 
strength and efficacy (is a union going on strike a weak or a strong union?). This is neither 
UNION STRATEGIES IN THE ERA OF GLOBALISATION 
16 
to deny well-known current difficulties nor to say that these indicators are unimportant but 
to stress that union power -and union decline for that matter- is a rather complex 
phenomenon to define and to measure.  
 
Indeed, union decline trends have also been associated to more qualitative 
indicators of union power. For Hyman (1999b) for example, ‘the crisis of traditional trade 
unionism is reflected not only in the most obvious indicators of loss of strength and 
efficacy, but also in the exhaustion of a traditional discourse and a failure to respond to 
new ideological challenges’ These ideological challenges are reflected in an increasingly 
hegemonic ‘workerless’ globalisation discourse which routinely portrays trade unions and 
worker collectivism as remnants of an old economic structure (Frege and Kelly, 2004b; 
Kelly, 1998; Munck, 2004a, 2004b; Phelps Brown, 1990). 
 
Furthermore, union decline has been linked to phenomena including the structure of 
labour markets, macroeconomic and political indicators. Decline has been correlated with 
the growth of insecure forms of employment (Castells, 1997; Heery and Salmon, 2000; 
Patroni and Poitras, 2002; Standing, 1997), both in terms of ‘the threat to the conditions of 
existing union members through delayering, redundancy and privatisation, and the growth 
of a contingent workforce on the margins of the trade union movement’ (Heery and 
Abbott, 2000: 173). In turn, these trends have been linked with rising income inequality 
between and within countries (Brown et al., 2003; Gordon, 1996; Katz and Darbishire, 
2000), and challenges to the quality economic democracy (Frank, T., 2001; Putnam, 
2000). As ever, defining and measuring these phenomena as well as establishing clear 
links between them and union power in comparative perspective is far from 
straightforward. 
 
In sum, sweeping generalisations about the direction and significance of union 
power changes is not simple endeavour. This is why authors such as Frege and Kelly 
(2003) argue that from a comparative perspective is preferable to simply speak of 
problems rather than decline, avoiding in this way the need to classify proxy variables 
such as union density as indicators of union decline across countries. In other words, the 
nature of specific problems, as well as the degree to which they represent minor or major 
difficulties, are likely to differ significantly across countries and individual unions. But 
while speaking of problems may enlighten the nature and extent of union power in 
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individual cases, it appears less successful at explaining and interpreting the broad 
similarities observable across them. 
 
Explaining union decline 
 
Analogous problems of generalisation and simplification surface when exploring the 
factors that may be explaining union decline. Given that social phenomena rarely have 
just one cause, it is unsurprising that the literature on union decline has identified, 
analysed, and widely debated numerous potential variables. For simplicity, it is useful to 
distinguish between structural and agency factors on the one hand, and external and 
internal factors on the other. Cross-cutting the two dimensions suggested by these 
distinctions, results in decline explanations falling into four different types (Figure 2.1).  
 
Figure 2.1: Factors explaining variation in union power across countries 
 External factors Internal factors 
   
Structural factors Economic change 
 
Industrial relations institutions 
 
Union constituencies 
 
Union structure 
Strategic factors State strategies 
 
Employer strategies 
 
Union strategies 
 
Union leadership 
 
 
Explanations that rest primarily on external structural factors discuss the extent to 
which a harsher political, economic and institutional environment may be responsible for 
union decline (Hyman, 1999a; Petras and Veltmeyer, 2001). At international level these 
explanations typically allude to capital’s hyper mobility and the ‘race to the bottom’ thesis 
(Silver, 2003). At national level, they refer to structural changes in the economy and 
economic factors related to the business cycle, as well as the changing nature of industrial 
relations institutions. 
 
A further set of external factors typically involves the strategies and actions of 
employers and states, or ‘political explanations’ (Goldfield, 1989). Employers’ tougher 
stance toward unions has been documented worldwide -particularly since the ‘employer’s 
offensive’ of the early 1970s (Crouch and Pizzorno, 1978)- and associated lately with the 
expansion of multinational corporations (Cooke, 2006). Employers’ increasing 
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unwillingness to recognise trade unions as workers’ legitimate representatives has 
expressed in a wide array of practices, from sophisticated HRM union-avoidance 
techniques to harsh anti-unionism. A notorious case is that of the US where employer 
hostility has been identified as the driving force for union decline (Kochan et al., 1986; 
Logan, 2002, 2006; Turner, 2004). The strategies of governments in driving neo-liberal 
restructuring have been documented in a similar fashion. The free market and anti-union 
choices of Thatcher, Reagan, and Pinochet have become a blue-print for ‘globalisation’ 
for developed and developing countries, and have been propagated and reproduced across 
the world with the blessing of international financial institutions (Frenkel, 2006; Petras 
and Veltmeyer, 2001). 
 
Internal structural factors point to the changing nature and material circumstances 
of the constituencies which unions seek to recruit and represent (Hyman, 1999a; Visser, 
2002). They include theories emphasising structural changes in the composition of the 
workforce and the resulting rise in workers’ individualism and decline in class-
consciousness (Phelps Brown, 1990). From this perspective, union decline is explained as 
a consequence of decreasing ‘demand’ for union representation i.e. unions have lost 
members simply because fewer workers want to join (Visser, 2002). Crudely put, ‘the 
young worker thinks primarily of himself. We are experiencing the cult of the individual, 
and labour is taking a beating preaching the comfort of coalition’ (Pestillo, 1979: 33-34).  
 
Last, internal agency factors point at trade unions themselves as responsible for 
their decline. At one level this has to do with union strategy and policy. Farber and 
Western (2002) for example argue that union policies rather than the Reagan 
administration are to blame for the decline of American trade unions in the early 1980s. 
Similarly, Katz and Darbishire (2000) have emphasised American unions’ inability to 
organise workers in expanding sectors such as high-technology and services. At a 
different level, other authors have argued that trade unions, as any other social movement, 
face a life cycle of emergence, growth, decline, and extinction, and that trade unions may 
be entering their terminal phase (Boxall, 2008; Touraine, 1985). 
 
These four sets of explanations are not alternative. The challenge is therefore to 
sketch meaningful relationships between them, in order to yield a fuller understanding of 
union power decline. But as the notion of ‘problems’ as opposed to ‘decline’ discussed 
above implies, the relative importance of these variables is, of course, likely to be highly 
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specific to each country or individual union because in any given case, a highly specific 
constellation of factors is expected to emerge. Thus, cross-national variation may be 
reflecting relatively permanent differences in varieties of capitalism and level of economic 
development, or contingent national issues such as German unification, the end of 
apartheid in South Africa, economic transition in Central and Eastern Europe, or 
redemocratisation and neo-liberal restructuring in Latin America (Ost and Crowley, 2001; 
Riethof, 2004; Valenzuela, 1989; Zapata, 2004).  
 
Furthermore, even within the boundaries of national systems of industrial relations, 
variation is increasingly likely given the growing importance of meso-levels of industrial 
relations activity (Regalia, 2007). The problem of course is that explaining union decline –
particularly when defined in narrow union density terms- by reference to an ad hoc 
‘interconnection of causes’ may be correct with regard to a particular case, but ultimately 
not very helpful when attempting to generalise across cases.  
 
In sum, union decline is hard to define, measure and explain from a comparative 
perspective. For Kelly (1998), the key reason behind these difficulties is not just 
methodological or practical as it may appear in some readings, but more fundamental. 
Indeed, he has argued that this is largely due to the underdevelopment of the concept of 
power itself in the field of industrial relations. ‘There is no consensus on how the concept 
of power should be defined or measured; there is no agreed theoretical framework for 
studying its determinants; and consequently there is no consensus about precisely what 
has happened to union power (…) beyond the obvious general fact that it has declined’ 
(Kelly, 1998: 13). I will return to the concept of power in the next chapter. For now, it is 
instructive to review two broad sets of interpretations of decline trends and prospects for 
trade unions in our societies. 
 
‘Globalisation’ and interpretations of union decline 
 
That trade unions are facing hard times is hardly a controversial assertion. Debate starts 
when trying to identify the nature of current problems and establish the desirability and 
possibilities of a response. One way of examining alternative explanations and 
interpretations is by referring to the notion of globalisation. Globalisation, or the current 
expansion of neoliberalism on a world scale, presupposes a political economy 
undoubtedly different to that of the ‘short 20th century’ in which trade unions flourished 
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across the developed and parts of the third world. For simplicity, a continuum between 
two extreme views can be distinguished. Rather than two clearly demarcated positions 
however, these two ‘views’ reflect a simplification of current debates and between them 
there is a variety of alternative arguments. 
 
A globalisation-centred view would argue that global forces such as intensifying 
international competition in product and labour markets emphasise the need for greater 
efficiency and productivity, forcing governments and firms to adapt national systems of 
industrial relations and labour regimes along market logic lines, overwhelming workers 
and trade unions in the process. A familiar representative of this view is the ‘race to the 
bottom’ thesis, which argues that the hypermobility of productive capital has in effect 
created a single worldwide labour market where capital migrates wherever it finds better 
conditions for accumulation, typically from high to low wage countries. 
 
(In such market) all of the world’s workers are forced to compete. By moving (or just 
threatening to move) production “halfway around the world” (…) multinational 
corporations have brought the competitive pressure of an “enormous mass of 
unorganised workers” to bear on “the international labour movement”. As a result, 
labour’s bargaining power has been weakened and a “race to the bottom” in wages 
and working conditions has been unleashed on a world scale. 
(Silver, 2003: 3-4) 
 
Capital hypermobility is said to undermine state sovereignty because it threatens 
states with capital migration for maintaining social protection. Such pressures force 
governments to deregulate labour markets and withdraw from the industrial relations 
arena debilitating labour’s associational power. In other words, ‘globalisation threatens 
established labour rights through its undermining of state capacity to guarantee these 
rights’ (Tilly, 1995: 4). This perspective has much in common with that of Western (1998: 
3), who argues that ‘labour movements grow where they are institutionally insulated from 
the market forces that drive competition among workers’. In addition, hyper mobility of 
capital is said to weaken marketplace bargaining power as a result of a global glut on 
labour markets. Post-Fordist transformations in the organisation of production (vertical 
disintegration and subcontracting) are argued to undermine workplace bargaining power 
(Silver, 2003: 15-16). Furthermore, globalisation is seen as involving a major shift in the 
discursive environment -‘there is no alternative’- which has had a powerful demobilising 
impact on labour movements (Silver, 2003). 
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This view emphasises trade unions’ external circumstances. Globalisation is largely 
perceived as established fact despite being contested in recent years by outsiders (the anti-
globalisation movement) as well as insiders (Stiglitz, 2002). Moreover, globalisation 
challenges are viewed as lying beyond the control of workers and their organisations. 
Simply put this view considers workers and unions as passive and ineffectual social actors 
unable to influence current developments. It operates, in other words, a premature closure 
of agency (Munck, 2000), and ignores or at best downplays, the possibilities of collective 
action. As Turner (2004: 3) argues, ‘union strategies may matter, but they are either 
derivative of institutional frameworks or they are overwhelmed by opposing forces. 
Unions can adapt -to the institutions or the transformation, by collaborating with 
employers largely on management’s terms- but they cannot pursue innovative strategies to 
promote a worker-friendly transformation of their own’. 
 
On the other side of the continuum, a union-centred view would acknowledge 
external difficulties but attempts to scrutinise the extent to which unions’ own actions 
have impacted on their current fortunes. This view is also critical of the globalisation 
discourse. Rather than a predetermined process driven by invisible market forces, this 
perspective largely views globalisation as a process of conflict over the re-organisation of 
the world economy (Cox, 1996; Crouch and Pizzorno, 1978; Giles, 2000). New 
globalising regulatory and production regimes are not seen as fixed or immutable, but 
contested by labour (Fairbrother and Griffin, 2002).  
 
This view sees new possibilities for strategic intervention because of the 
contradictory nature of these developments (Hyman, 1999). This perspective tends to 
perceive historical capitalism as being characterised by recurrent dynamics, including the 
continual re-creation of contradictions and conflict between labour and capital (Silver, 
2003). In other words, ‘we should accept that globalisation may open doors for 
contestation as well as close off certain more traditional avenues. Nor should we forget 
that we cannot move back to a traditional terrain of struggle when history has moved on’ 
(Munck, 2000). In sum, this perspective argues that rather than structural determinism, 
historical and comparative research suggests scope for choice (Visser, 1996), and 
consequently conceives of workers and unions as social actors having some discretion in 
how to react to their changing environments. This view can be readily associated with the 
literature on union revitalisation that I review next. 
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2.2 Union strategies and outcomes 
 
What are unions doing –or should be doing- to respond to current difficulties? With what 
degree of success? The study of union responses to hard times can be readily associated 
with the emergent literature on union revitalisation. The borders of any stream of literature 
are difficult to define exactly and this is no exception. With ‘union revitalisation’ I mean 
to refer to scholarship that incorporates research on union strategies -arguably this 
literature’s main focus- but goes beyond to include works not explicitly framed in such 
terms but that are nevertheless concerned with unions’ present situation: from the study of 
unions’ ‘responses to globalisation’ to discussions on the ‘future of labour movements’. In 
this section, I present a cursory review of the most prevalent strategies found in the 
literature. I then consider their overall degree of effectiveness and revitalisation.  
 
Strategies: what are unions doing –or should be doing- to respond to hard times? 
 
Two broad approaches to the study of union strategies of revitalisation can be 
distinguished in the literature. Empirical studies focus on examining actual union action at 
different levels of analysis and can be seen as ‘assessments of what has been’ (Clawson, 
2005: 732). Prescriptive models of revitalisation are concerned with suggesting how the 
labour movement must change if it is to survive (Heery et al., 2004). Distinguishing 
between these two approaches is admittedly fuzzy in practice as the latter normally draw 
on the former, and most studies tend to involve elements of both. But I will maintain this 
distinction for the purposes of organising this section.  
 
Empirical studies are concerned with examining actual union action. Two types of 
empirical work can be discerned. One type can be conceived of as the study of ‘union 
responses to globalisation’. By this I mean to refer to studies that have documented the 
experience of organised labour since the late 1970s and that in my opinion conceive of 
union action in somewhat reactive, general, and detached terms. They typically describe 
the challenges faced by a specific national labour movement, the actions it has followed, 
and its outcomes in terms of indicators such as union density and bargaining coverage. 
These studies are more concerned with describing and analysing the changes rather than 
with drawing conclusions about union power and strategies. Illustrative of this kind of 
research is the ILO’s comparative research network on ‘trade union responses to 
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globalisation’ whose reports formed the bulk of the edited volume Organised Labour in 
the 21st Century (José, 2002).  
 
Another type of empirical work is that of ‘union strategies of revitalisation’. In 
contrast to the study of responses, research on revitalisation strategies conceive of union 
action in a proactive, purposeful, and engaged manner. This type of research explicitly 
aims at understanding and promoting new proactive strategies in a belief that unions can 
effectively influence contemporary developments (Turner, 2004). Perhaps the best known-
example of this type of research is Frege and Kelly’s edited volume Varieties of Unionism 
(2004b) where they explicitly define union strategies of revitalisation as ‘initiatives by 
unions that are reasonably substantial and which are intended as means for the 
achievement of specified union goals’. 
 
My reading of the literature indicates that while most research on trade unions 
conducted in developing countries centres on ‘responses’, the majority of recent research 
in developed countries has focused on ‘strategies’. A more comprehensive review could 
have compared and discussed both lines of research in depth. Nevertheless, due to the 
nature of the research questions that I aim to answer in this thesis, I will focus here on the 
literature on ‘strategies’. It is my belief that shifting the focus of research from ‘responses’ 
to ‘strategies’ can greatly improve its relevance for workers and unions in the developing 
world. 
 
Although increasingly popular in recent years, empirical research on union 
strategies of revitalisation has been relatively modest (Behrens, Hamann et al., 2004; 
Frege and Kelly, 2003; Holst, 2008). As late as 2003, Frege and Kelly (2003: 10) noted 
that ‘there is hardly any research on the different strategic choices made by unions’. This 
growing area of research has taken various forms. Behrens et al. (2004), distinguish 
between four types of studies based on whether the focus lies on a single country or 
multiple countries; and whether it analyses one particular strategy or a range of strategies. 
A review of this literature could follow an analogous fourfold structure but for reasons of 
space, I will focus instead on the five most prevalent strategies identified by Frege and 
Kelly (2003, 2004b): organising, social partnership, political action, union restructuring, 
coalition building, and international union action. 
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Union organising has drawn a great deal of attention in the United States, Great 
Britain and other Anglo-Saxon countries (e.g. Bronfenbrenner et al., 1998; 
Bronfenbrenner and Juravich, 1998; Fairbrother and Griffin, 2002; Gall, 2003). Union 
organising refers primarily to union efforts to recruit unorganised workers. The main 
rationale being that increasing the volume of resources devoted to the recruitment and 
organisation of new members, will enhance unions’ labour market power (Heery et al., 
2002). Nevertheless, organising as strategic approach encompasses a far wider variety of 
activities. 
 
At its most basic, organising refers to a change in union priorities, such that 
investment in recruitment becomes the primary objective and takes priority over the 
“servicing” of existing members. Beyond this, however, an “organising approach” 
denotes the “empowerment” of workers, in the sense of stimulating activism and 
strengthening trade unionism in the workplace in order that workers can resolve their 
own problems without recourse to external representation. Membership, it is 
believed, is best built and sustained by effective workplace organisation. Finally, at 
its more concrete, the term can refer to a set of specific organising techniques that 
can be deployed by trained organisers in dedicated organising campaigns. 
(Heery, 2002: 27) 
 
Likewise, as different national patterns of organising demonstrate, the nature of 
organising and of the activities it encompasses for that matter, is likely to be highly 
specific to each country (Heery and Adler, 2004). Organising the unorganised has featured 
prominently as union strategy in decentralised industrial relations systems where 
bargaining is closely tied to membership coverage, but less so in Continental European 
countries because of the presence in the latter of functional equivalents that allow unions 
to secure legitimacy, control resources, and represent their members (Heery and Adler, 
2004). 
 
Union organising is typically contrasted with a servicing approach where ‘workers 
are seen as consumers of such union services as advocacy in collective disputes and 
individual grievances, legal advice, and a range of non-industrial benefits. The union’s 
elected and appointed officials are the providers of these services, and their performance 
is judged by members in a kind of arm’s-length, calculative manner (…). The union is 
‘them’, not ‘us’ (Boxall and Haynes, 1997: 572) but the relationship between the two 
vary. Heery and Kelly (1994) for example, have identified three types of ‘servicing 
relationship’ between trade unions and their members. These are ‘professional unionism’ 
where members are seen as dependent on a group of expert representatives; ‘participative 
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unionism’ in which members are seen as potential activists and the union as facilitating 
activism; and ‘managerial unionism’, characterised by conceiving of members as 
consumers attracted by sophisticated servicing packages. 
 
Although it is widely accepted that strategic efforts based solely on servicing are 
unlikely to lead to union revitalisation, it is important to recognise the essential value of 
services for union members. Based on the Belgian case, Pasture (2004: 356) has argued 
that  
 
not only do services attract members, even more important is that they produce 
stability and continuity in the membership. The success of Belgian trade unions to 
retain and gain new membership is remarkable, particularly among “new” categories 
of workers such as, in particular, female employees. To be sure, aggressive, 
“modern” campaigns as well as effective collective actions to defend these workers’ 
working conditions explain that success but the services that they offer their 
members, among which the efficient and swift payment of employment benefits 
(notably more efficient than the public offices), were an important element as well. 
After all, services –if they complement and do not undermine public service- are 
helpful to the people, in particular where the State is not able (or willing) to answer 
their social needs. 
 
It is for these and other reasons that Boxall and Haynes (1997: 572) argue that 
proposing a simple dichotomy between servicing and organising is fundamentally flawed 
as ‘all unions maintain some member services which do not depend on continuous 
organising. Given this reality, unions are faced with a range of options for organising 
which complement their servicing activities’.  
 
Organising has also been contrasted with social partnership, or union-management 
cooperation. Fichter and Greer (2004: 71) define social partnership as ‘formally 
structured, ongoing relations of cooperation between unions and employers, whether at the 
national, regional, or sectoral level between unions and employer associations, or within 
enterprises between worker and management representatives’. Despite the vast amount of 
literature on social partnership, there is a great deal of debate as to whether and how 
partnership can help unions revive themselves.  
 
Kelly (2004) for example, has argued that the effective use of social partnership to 
encourage union revitalisation depends largely on the balance of power between the 
parties. He distinguishes two basic types of formal cooperation that reflect two 
fundamentally different power situations. 
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At one end of a continuum we can posit the existence of what we might call 
employer-dominant agreements marked by a balance of power favourable to the 
employer, and agenda that primarily reflects the employers’ interests and labour 
compliance rather than cooperation (…). At the other end of the continuum we can 
argue there are labour-parity agreements, where there is a more even balance of 
power. Consequently, any agenda for discussion is more likely to reflect the interests 
of both parties (…).  
(Kelly, 2004: 271) 
 
In other words, partnership ‘may be found where unions are weak and unable to 
mobilise members for collective action or conversely where unions are strong and 
employers have a powerful incentive to cooperate with labour’ (Frege and Kelly, 2004a: 
41). 
 
Partly as a result, the evidence linking social partnership and union revitalisation is 
weak, and most partnerships appear to conform to the employer-dominant type, tending 
instead to feed into the process of union decline. This is why Fichter and Greer (2004: 72) 
argue that social partnership must meet at least three criteria to further union 
revitalisation: ‘it must be institutionally embedded, integrated into a proactive union 
strategy, and pursue a broader social agenda rather than focusing on narrow union-specific 
issues alone’. Otherwise, they argue, social partnerships usually strengthen the 
interdependence between unions and specific firms, thus remaining particularistic, 
thwarting the embeddedness of partnership in a broader social environment.  
 
Political action has remained an important area of strategic union activity (Hamann 
and Kelly, 2003, 2004; Hamann and Martínez Lucio, 2003). Political action is designed to 
influence the state’s policy-making process and includes union involvement at many 
different levels of government. Three spheres of activity fall within the political domain: 
elections (candidate selection, participation in electoral campaigns, and voter 
mobilisation; independent or linked to political parties), legislation (initiating, supporting 
or blocking measures emanating from elected party representatives), and the 
implementation of policies (Hamann and Kelly, 2004).  
 
In seeking to influence the legislature and the administration, Hamann and Kelly 
(2004: 94) argue that unions can play a variety of different roles. ‘They can operate as a 
negotiating partner in a social pact with government; they may operate as a lobbying 
group; they may function as a social movement, using collective action such as general 
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strikes to pressure politicians; finally unions can act as litigants, using the courts to 
challenge the legality of government measures or actions’. 
 
Political action as union strategy is more likely to be found where there is a high 
degree of state regulation of the economy; but also to compensate for labour market 
weakness. The degree to which they succeed will depend heavily on the incentives for 
governments to negotiate with unions and therefore to constitute them as major political 
actors. In other words, union success may depend on the policies of the major political 
parties as well as on the attributes of the institutions of political power (centralised, 
decentralised political system; strong versus weak state or proportional versus non-
proportional voting systems) (Frege and Kelly, 2003). 
 
Union restructuring has been integral to revitalisation initiatives in recent years. 
Behrens, Hurd et al. (2004: 117-118) distinguish between three types of structural change: 
‘external structure’ comprises the boundaries of a labour movement; ‘union governance’ 
entails the analysis of union democracy, representation, and participation; and ‘union 
administration’ which focuses on union management and the allocation of resources.  
 
The authors also differentiate between three motivations that shape the three types 
of restructuring: aggressive (actions oriented to increase the political control of union 
leaders and/or extending the boundaries of the individual union), defensive (reactions to 
union decline that attempt to stabilise the union), and transformational (restructuring tied 
to substantive organisational change to increase union power), and argue that only the 
latter is likely to support union revitalisation. 
 
Transformative motivations are different in substance from those associated with 
merely aggressive or merely defensive restructuring. Internal changes of union 
government and union administration are pursued not to protect the vested interests 
of leaders and current members, but rather to engage all of the union’s constituents 
and prospective constituents in the change process. The goal is to reform the union’s 
governance and administrative machinery in order to address new strategic priorities. 
Similarly, whether it involves redefinition of the role of the confederation, mergers of 
individual national unions, or the creation of new union ventures, external 
transformative restructuring is motivated to augment the union’s strategic 
effectiveness. 
(Behrens, Hurd et al., 2004: 121) 
 
Research evidence shows that although there have been examples of structural 
change that meet the standard of transformative restructuring, ‘structural change in itself 
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does not hold great potential to drive revitalisation (and) without more substantial 
progress in the membership, economic, and political dimensions, (restructuring) will have 
little substantive impact’ (Behrens, Hurd et al., 2004: 132-133). 
 
Another union strategy that has drawn attention in recent years is coalition building. 
Frege et al. (2004: 138) define it as involving ‘discrete, intermittent, or continuous joint 
activity in pursuit of shared or common goals between trade unions and other non-labour 
institutions in civil society, including community, faith, identity, advocacy, welfare, and 
campaigning organisations’. These authors argue that unions engage in coalitions to 
advance a broad set of substantive goals, but that they do so primarily to access the 
resources controlled by their coalition partners. The latter include physical and financial 
resources, networks of communications, expertise, legitimacy, and the capacity to 
mobilise constituencies. 
 
Coalitions can be classified according to the nature of the relationship between 
unions and their coalitions partners. Three types can be distinguished: vanguard coalition 
where union goals predominate, common cause coalitions reflecting common interests, 
and integrative coalition where unions adopt their partner’s goals. Coalitions can also be 
described in terms of coalitions-of-influence and coalitions-of-protest depending on the 
degree of integration of the coalition into state policy.  
 
Research shows different national patterns of coalition building in terms of the level 
of activity (relation with partners) and its form (mobilising or influencing). These 
according to the authors reflect different contexts and union identities. 
 
The pressure to forge coalitions is strong where unions face hostile governments and 
employers, while the opportunity to use the tactic arises where civil society is 
strongly organised and the state is decentralised. A hostile context also encourages 
coalitions of protest, while the reverse is true where the state seeks to govern through 
dialogue with social partners. 
 
Where union identity contains a strong class element then there is both less resort to 
coalition and a preference for vanguard coalitions and coalitions of protest where the 
method is used. Where there is a strong social or partnership orientation, in contrast, 
coalitions tend to be integrative and to take the form of coalitions of influence.  
(Frege et al., 2004: 153) 
 
Last, international union action has been given a new emphasis in the era of 
‘globalisation’. Lillie and Martínez-Lucio (2004: 159) define this strategy as ‘a set of 
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transnational relationships of and between union organisations, rather than as the outcome 
of the revitalisation strategy of any particular national labour movement’. They suggest 
that current initiatives are taking place across six dimensions: union collaboration within 
transnational corporations, supranational bodies, shift in the ICFTU, formal and 
systematic to joint working within international sectors, mutual learning based on the four 
previous dimensions, and a broader, more inclusive, discourse of union internationalism. 
Notwithstanding increasing international collaboration, Lillie and Martínez-Lucio (2004: 
177) sustain that internationalism ‘reflects the struggle between different ways of 
regulating capital and labour and so international labour movement revitalisation is likely 
to be a long and difficult process during which unions and workers will remain at a severe 
power disadvantage vis-à-vis global capital’. 
 
In contrast to empirical studies, prescriptive arguments can be viewed as ‘guides to 
what might be’ (Clawson, 2005). Prescriptive arguments do, of course, draw on the 
growing body of evidence provided by empirical studies and a clear distinction between 
the two is largely artificial. Prescriptive arguments on strategies of revitalisation like the 
five presented in the previous section, usually revolve around how promising they appear 
for labour to reverse course given a particular set of circumstances. As such, these 
discussions are reminiscent of ‘best practice’ debates, and to the extent that they include 
issues of context, they resemble ‘best fit’ disputes. In addition to the alleged merits of 
particular strategies, prescriptive arguments have also discussed issues of integration of 
individual strategies or strategic coordination between them. Heery (2002), for example, 
has discussed the notion of segmentation of union strategy or portfolio management, 
where strategies of revitalisations typically seen as alternatives are conceived of as 
complementary, as in conceiving of partnership as the end-point of organising. ‘(…) A 
marrying of the two agendas therefore would link the object of representation and 
extending union influence over the management of the firm, with the process of 
strengthening worker organisation and capacity for collective action’ (Heery, 2002: 32-
33). 
 
Conclusions of this kind are not purely tactical. Indeed, these recommendations 
reflect explicit or implicit assumptions about the nature of trade unions and union power, 
as well as diagnoses as to what factors may be explaining their current state. In trying to 
make sense of the variety of prescriptive arguments available, Heery et al. (2004) have 
identified four distinct ‘models’ of union revitalisation. First, ‘societal models of 
revitalisation hold that unions must adapt to long-run changes in society and economy, 
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which require a ‘new unionism’, matched to the interests of a changing workforce’ (Heery 
et al., 2004: 3). Societal arguments argue that perhaps the main reason explaining the 
decline of trade unions is that labour movements across the world have privileged the 
representation of ‘male, full-time, blue-collar’ workers over others. Consequently, there 
have been calls for unions to widen their constituencies and integrate previously neglected 
groups of workers: women, minorities, migrants and immigrants (Liff, 2003; Wever, 
1998), and to redirect their attention to more general sets of interests that appeal to wider 
constituencies (Dickens, 2000; Liff, 2003; Voss and Sherman, 2003).  
 
Second, ‘institutional models, in contrast, suggest that the task of revitalisation is to 
adjust union activity to the structure of opportunity provided either by the institutions of 
industrial relations narrowly conceived or the broader institutional matrix of different 
“varieties of capitalism” (Heery et al., 2004: 3). A typical illustration of this model would 
refer to the meaning of union membership across institutional matrices. So, for example, 
organising strategies appear more suited for decentralised systems normally encountered 
in liberal market economies than for centralised systems usually found in coordinated 
market economies where widespread extension mechanisms offer a substitute for high 
membership in narrow constituencies. 
 
Third, ‘with organisational models, the task of revitalisation is internalised and is 
dependent upon changes in union government to allow more effective management, 
greater democratic participation or the expression of diverse interests’ (Heery et al., 2004: 
3). For example, it has also been sustained that to revitalise it is not enough for trade 
unions to merely organise and/or represent the interests of new categories of workers, but 
instead they must restructure and develop organisational structures ‘that are significant for 
involving new groups in active union membership and helping such members to clarify 
and develop their sense of identity and associated interests’ (Liff, 2003: 428). Union 
structures are seen as crucial devices in determining the nature of the relationship between 
leaders and members. Indeed, while unions need to be democratic (Pasture, 2004), to be 
effective, ‘rank-and-file democracy requires centralised coordination and articulation’ 
(Hyman, 2004: 343). This tension is not new and it has been argued that in order to 
revitalise trade unions should somehow facilitate its expression rather than suppressing it, 
striking a balance between the two. 
 
Union structures that sustain tensions between membership democracy and 
leadership control have the greatest potential to increase union strategic capacity. 
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Such structures combine relatively autonomous membership-controlled forums 
which encourage the representation of diversity and leadership accountability, with 
parallel leadership structures that allow central control over resources and contain the 
means for enforcing tactical unity amongst the membership.  
(Yates, 2004: 349) 
 
Finally, ‘actor-centred models emphasise the need to renew the population of 
leaders and activists occupying representative positions in unions, the underpinning belief 
being that unions can exercise strategic choice and that different choices will be made by 
representatives with different characteristics’ (Heery et al., 2004: 3). Also referred to as 
‘agency’ models, they point at leaders as the key strategic variable. It is the ‘who’ of trade 
unionism that makes the difference and gender, demographical, educational, and other 
characteristics are expected to explain different courses of action and their outcomes. 
 
Heery et al. (2004) argue that these four models need not to be contradictory. ‘Any 
satisfactory programme of research into union revitalisation’, they sustain, ‘must proceed 
at all levels (and) the real task of revitalisation for unions must embrace action at all 
levels’ (2004: 20-21). This is interesting for various reasons. The most obvious perhaps is 
that seeing the problem in this way allows us to move away from narrow ‘best practice or 
best fit’ union strategy debates. Another is that these four models roughly overlap with the 
four areas of challenges identified in the previous section: organisational models can be 
seen as responding to internal/structural challenges; actor-centred to internal/strategic; 
institutional to external/structural; and more controversially, societal to external/strategic. 
Thinking about challenges and strategies in this coherent way, has also the potential to 
accommodate prescriptive arguments that focus on the strength of the challenges faced 
and resources available. For Hyman (2004), for instance,  
 
A somewhat depressing conclusion might be that a sustained process of radical 
renewal requires two preconditions: a powerful external challenge, which 
demonstrates that established routines and presuppositions are no longer viable; and 
an internal organisational capacity sufficient to formulate and carry through new 
strategies. Unfortunately such a combination of external and internal supports for 
transformations is rare.  
(Hyman, 2004: 341) 
 
Most interesting of all however is that arguing for the task of revitalisation ‘to 
embrace all levels’ effectively means that we may be suggesting that in order to revitalise, 
unions and the labour movement more generally, must change in a direction and to such a 
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degree that, they should transform into something else. For instance, Leisink et al. (1996) 
have argued that, 
 
initially the feeling could prevail that unions were required to adapt to the change of 
economic circumstances without implying the need for a basic questioning of the 
established logic of trade union action. However, it is now hard to sustain the claim 
that this type of adaptive response along traditional lines would be sufficient (…). 
(Leisink et al., 1996: 1) 
 
Hyman (1997, my emphasis) has gone further to suggest that ‘what is normally conceived, 
as a crisis of trade unionism as such may be better understood as a crisis of a particular 
model of trade unionism, one based on what I have termed mechanical solidarity.’  
 
Outcomes: how successful have revitalisation strategies been? 
 
How successful have these ‘strategies of revitalisation’ been in increasing union 
effectiveness and promoting union revitalisation? While available evidence suggests that 
union strategies do make a difference in certain dimensions of union activity (Frege and 
Kelly, 2003, 2004b), research to date indicates that this wide array of strategies has not 
been reflected in broader union revitalisation let alone in real transformations of unions 
and labour movements (Clawson, 2005; Hyman, 2004; Kuruvilla et al., 2002). 
 
There is no contemporary union movement in the advanced capitalist world that has 
made a dramatic recovery, on the scale of Belgium, France, the United Kingdom, or 
the United States in the late 1940s and decisively raised its membership, as well as its 
economic and political power (...); nor is there evidence of a resurgent unionism, as 
in the earlier period, forcing its concerns onto the agenda of employers and the state, 
whether it be ambitious wage claims, welfare programmes, or labour market 
measures to maintain full employment.  
 
Indeed, the union movements of Europe and North America are still engaged in 
fighting defensive battles against welfare and labour market reforms and are still 
submitting modest wage demands that are only fractionally higher than the rate of 
inflation. (...) If some union movements have managed to halt the decline that began 
from around 1980 onwards, to date it would be hard to identify any that are making 
substantial and dramatic advances along one or more of our dimensions of 
revitalisation.  
(Kelly and Frege, 2004: 191) 
 
How can we explain this? Several arguments can be made here, the most obvious of 
which perhaps is that defining and measuring union success or failure is not 
straightforward. This is largely a reflection of the problems of definition, measurement, 
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and determinants of union power discussed in the first section of this chapter, but it is also 
an issue of distinguishing between assessments of union effectiveness and union 
revitalisation.  
 
Assessments of effectiveness tend to evaluate union strategic choice in terms of the 
expected outcomes of particular strategies (e.g. the success or failure of organising efforts 
in terms of membership gains). As a result, they tend to have a narrow focus and to centre 
largely on the short term, although there have been calls in recent years to enrich such 
type of assessments. For example, in assessing the effectiveness of organising campaigns, 
obtaining recognition may be an important indicator but one that, according to Simms 
(2007), must be complemented with indicators sustainability in the longer term. 
 
Assessments of union revitalisation tend to be broader, longer term, and 
transformational in nature. Behrens et al. (2004), for example, have proposed a model of 
labour movement revitalisation as regaining power along four spheres of union activity. 
Revitalisation along the membership dimension consists of increases in membership 
numbers, membership density, and a change in the composition of membership, thus 
embracing quantitative and qualitative elements. The economic dimension includes 
‘bargaining power, the ability to achieve wage and benefit improvements, and more 
broadly labour’s impact in the distribution of wealth’. The political dimension entails 
unions improving their effectiveness in influencing the policy-making process by 
interacting at all levels of government and in three areas of activity: elections, legislation, 
and implementation. Last, the institutional dimension addresses unions’ organisational 
structure and governance as well as internal dynamics.  
 
Seen in this light, revitalisation outcomes are by necessity long term and require a 
degree of transformation on the part of labour movements. This involves the important 
distinction, stressed by Behrens et al. (2004), between revitalisation as end-state and as 
process. Most commentators on union revitalisation tend to assume the former perspective 
and hence it is unsurprising that they shy away from assessing any particular labour 
movement as ‘revitalised’. From the latter perspective however, revitalisation may be 
occurring but it is an incomplete process.  
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2.3 Determinants: what explains the adoption of particular strategies? 
 
What explains the adoption of certain strategies and their outcomes? How can we explain 
the similarities and differences in union strategy across cases? Questions such as these 
reflect the inherent limitations of human activity, be it individual or collective. Indeed, the 
content and outcomes of union strategic choice do not necessarily reflect the preferences 
of trade union leaders and/or their members, and more often than not, what is perceived as 
a ‘rationally chosen’ course of action, can be seen at best, as a compromise between 
several competing factors. Nevertheless, it has not been until very recently that the union 
revitalisation literature has begun trying to understand the determining factors and 
dynamics explaining union strategic choice.  
 
A preliminary, but nonetheless comprehensive approach to the study of the 
determinants of union strategic choice has been provided by Frege and Kelly (2003, 
2004b). In their review of the comparative literature on union strategic choices, they 
highlight three possible determining factors: ‘institutional differences, identity differences 
and differences in employer, political party or state strategies’ (2003: 12). They argue 
however that these variables are not sufficient to explain variation between union 
movements because ‘union choices are also influenced by their internal structures and by 
framing processes’ (2003: 12). In so doing, they seek to incorporate the insights of the 
social movement literature since research on this field ‘has emphasised the importance of 
internal debates around organisational aims and methods and the ways in which issues are 
“framed” by different actors’ (2003: 13). Frege and Kelly (2003) sustain that rather than 
treating these factors as alternatives, it is more sensible to develop an encompassing 
framework to explore the interrelations between them (Figure 2.2).  
 
Social and economic change denotes trends in the structure of the economy and of 
labour and product markets. Short- and long-term economic changes as well as 
broader trends in the labour market (…). The institutional context of industrial 
relations comprises collective bargaining structures, legal and arbitration procedures 
and the political system, including corporatist institutions (…). State and employer 
strategies derive from the other key actors within the industrial relations system, (and 
vary) over time and across different countries (…).  
 
Union structures comprise the horizontal and hierarchical organisation of the union 
movement (centralised or decentralised, unitary or multiple-peak) as well as contacts 
among unions with other social movements (…). Framing processes, the procedural 
variable, are the ways in which unionists perceive and think about changes in their 
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external context as threats or opportunities. This variable also refers to the collective 
identity of the union movement, defined as the shared definition among its members 
of what the organisation stands for. 
(Frege and Kelly, 2003: 14) 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2: A Social Movement Model of Union Strategic Choice 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Frege and Kelly (2003: 13) 
 
 
The authors admit that their model is a ‘very preliminary attempt’ to build a 
framework for explaining cross-country variation in union strategies. They acknowledge 
for example that the role of internal dynamics and their interaction with structural 
variables remains unexplored. In my opinion however, the model’s main problem is that it 
is not entirely successful in capturing the richness of the social movement literature in 
explaining collective action. I will elaborate on this in the next chapter so suffice to say at 
this point that key notions such as mobilisation remain largely implicit, and other distinct 
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concepts (repertoires of contention and framing processes) appear conflated under one 
label (framing processes).  
 
Notwithstanding these and other limitations, the model represents a sophisticated 
approach to the study of the factors and dynamics that explain union strategy and 
integrates structural determinants (socio-economic change, institutional context, and 
differences in employer and state strategies) with purposeful agency (union structures and 
framing processes) in a way that, once again, reflects our reading of the challenges 
affecting workers and trade unions in the era of globalisation: both external and internal, 
as well as structural and strategic; and the models of union revitalisation discussed in the 
previous section.  
 
 
2.4 Limitations of the literature 
 
The literature on union decline and union strategies of revitalisation has gradually raised 
and revisited fundamental questions about the nature and prospects of trade unions in our 
societies. This brief review has shown that three major concerns have dominated research 
in recent years. Early works dealt predominantly with union decline examining the causes 
of current difficulties and raising questions about the nature and determinants of union 
power (Kelly, 1998). Research on union responses to globalisation and strategies of 
revitalisation followed, raising questions about the promises and limitations of union 
action. Lately, research has examined the factors and dynamics that could be explaining 
the diverse courses of action taken and outcomes achieved by unions in different contexts 
(Frege and Kelly, 2003).  
 
This review has also shown that despite the significance of these questions, 
important empirical and theoretical weaknesses remain. Empirical research on union 
strategies of revitalisation not only remains modest (Behrens, Hamann et al., 2004; Frege 
and Kelly, 2003; Holst, 2008) but limited by its choice of case studies, level of analysis, 
and starting point. First, research on union revitalisation has largely focused on advanced 
industrialised countries thereby overlooking interesting developments elsewhere. An 
attractive, yet largely unexplored, site of struggle is developing countries and in particular 
what I call the new fault zones of the international economy. These can be simply defined 
as sites where global capital meets developing country labour, typically export-processing 
zones but also including the remote provision of services and extraction of raw materials. 
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From the perspective of these fault lines, empirical research on union strategies has been 
almost nonexistent, and largely limited to ‘responses to globalisation’. 
 
Second, most empirical work has taken the form of either macro studies of labour 
movements at national level, or micro studies of individual organisations at company 
level. Unsurprisingly, the former appear to be more common in Europe and the latter in 
decentralised systems including the United States, Canada, and Australia. Far less 
research has been conducted at meso-levels, particularly at the level of the sector. For 
various commentators, sector-specific factors above all are determining the shape of 
current industrial relations regimes (Katz and Darbishire, 2000; Locke, 1995; Regalia, 
2007; Roche, 2000; Streeck, 1999). Last, the great majority of research produced to date 
also presupposes the existence of relatively well-established union organisations. Indeed, 
the term ‘revitalisation’ alludes to injecting life to an already existing entity. There are far 
less studies whose starting point is non-organised or loosely organised workers. This is 
particularly important for countries and industries with sizable dual labour markets. They 
resemble movements rather than organisations, the former understood in some readings as 
preceding the latter. This is especially relevant when discussing the need for trade unions 
and the alleged decline in worker collectivism (Kelly, 1998). 
 
Theoretically, there is no agreed framework with which to examine the experience 
of workers and trade unions across different contexts and gaps remain in several areas 
(Heery, 2003; Heery et al., 2004; Hyman, 1997, 1999c). First, there is no agreement on 
the nature and determinants of union power. This has led to contrasting ways of 
interpreting union decline trends and of conceiving of the prospects for trade unions in the 
current climate. Second, there is no agreed model to analyse and/or explain union strategy 
and its outcomes. The great majority of frameworks available are essentially descriptive 
or, at best, try to explain union strategy in an ad hoc basis. Furthermore, analytical 
frameworks available have largely focused on the relatively well-established labour 
movements found in advanced industrialised economies rather than on the far weaker 
forms of organisation prevalent in the rest of the world. From the perspective of the latter, 
these models are unable to reflect the diversity of material circumstances and sets of 
relations that characterise work and employment outside the realm of Western Europe, 
North America, and Australasia. Several commentators have thus called for the 
development a comparative framework for the analysis and explanation of changing union 
strategies (Beaupain, 1998; Boxall and Haynes, 1997; Cornfield and McCammon, 2003; 
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Frank, V., 2002; Frege and Kelly, 2003; Leisink et al., 1996; Lévesque and Murray, 2002; 
Murray et al., 2000). 
 
Before advancing any further, it is therefore necessary to make explicit how I 
propose to analyse and explain union strategic choice in the context of my research. In the 
next chapter I will introduce a framework of analysis that draws and elaborates on several 
of the works discussed here. 
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Although building a theoretical model is beyond the scope of this thesis, it is necessary to 
make explicit how I propose to analyse and explain union strategic choice in the context 
of my research. My objective in this chapter is therefore to introduce a framework of 
analysis that draws and elaborates on the work of several authors (Boxall and Haynes, 
1997; Frege and Kelly, 2003; Howell, 2005; Hyman, 1975, 1997b; Kelly, 1998; McAdam 
et al., 2001). 
 
This chapter is organised in four sections. I begin in section 3.1, by making explicit 
my assumptions on the nature of trade unions and union power, drawing in particular on 
the classic works of Hyman (1975) and Hyman and Fryer (1975). In section 3.2, I define 
union strategy and suggest a multi-dimensional approach for the analysis of its form and 
outcomes. In section 3.3, I suggest a way of examining the determinants and dynamics of 
union strategy by elaborating on Frege and Kelly’s (2003) social movement model of 
union strategic choice. Finally, in section 3.4, I sum up and assemble these ideas in the 
form of a preliminary framework of analysis. 
 
 
3.1 Some assumptions and definitions 
 
Trade unions 
 
At their most basic, trade unions can be conceived of as organisations for the 
representation of workers’ interests, and as such they involve several particularities 
relative to other organisations. First, Hyman and Fryer (1975: 160) sustain that in 
representing ‘workers’ response to the deprivations inherent in their role as employees 
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within a capitalist economy’, trade unions consolidate and mobilise the collective power 
of workers (Hyman, 1975). Trade unions are thus ‘first and foremost a source and medium 
of power and processes of power are central to their internal and external relations’ 
(Hyman and Fryer, 1975: 160).  
 
Second, trade unions shall be considered secondary organisations, in that ‘their 
existence and activity presuppose the existence of economic institutions employing wage-
labour’ (1975: 158). They cannot, in other words, be understood in isolation but 
embedded in relationships (Müller-Jentsch, 1985). It follows that the nature of trade 
unions is ‘socially embedded’. As Cornfield and McCammon (2003: 3) argue, 
 
trade unions engage in purposive action within the constraints and opportunities 
presented and determined by them in their relations and interactions with the other 
actors on whom they depend for resources and with whom they compete with worker 
allegiances. (...) As such, labour action, the purposive action of labour organisations, 
is socially embedded action in so far as it is embedded in, that is, constrained and 
facilitated by, the web of labour organisations’ relationships with workers, 
employers, and the state.  
 
Third, because they represent workers’ interests, unions imply a formal democratic 
character in their nature and activities. ‘The rationale of a union is that it pursues the 
interests of its members and is in the last resort controlled by them’ (1975: 157), involving 
a two-way process of control.  
 
Fourth, the definition of trade union goals is rather ambiguous in that ‘goals are 
shaped by their members in a manner which may change over time and vary from union to 
union’ (1975: 158). Furthermore, trade unions have to be seen as ‘agencies whose role in 
the aggregation of interests may also involve the re-distribution of gains and losses: not 
only between workers and employers but also among workers themselves’ (Hyman, 
1999). Crucially, ‘through their own internal processes of communication, discussion, and 
debate -the “mobilisation of bias”- unions can help shape workers’ own definitions of 
their individual and collective interests. Cumulatively, the outcomes compose the patterns 
of commonality and conflict among the interests of different groups and hence contribute 
to the dynamics of sectionalism and solidarity within labour movements’ (Hyman, 1999).  
 
Last, trade unions are part of the wider social relations of production and therefore 
must be studied in conjunction with their social and institutional context. 
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Because of the centrality of power and conflict to their functions and activities, there 
is only limited value –far less, probably, than in the case of other kind of 
organisation- in studying trade unions simply as “formal organisations” wrenched 
from their social context. To understand trade unions it is essential to analyse the 
environing institutions of power with which they interact: an adequate analysis of 
trade unions and trade unionism must also be, in large measure, an analysis of the 
political economy within which they operate. 
(Hyman and Fryer, 1975: 161) 
 
At this point it is also central to distinguish between the notion of trade unions and 
that of the labour movement. While in most industrialised countries the former largely 
refers to individual organisations, the latter encompasses ‘a complex of institutions, 
including political parties, trade unions, cooperative societies, research institutes, and 
community and welfare organisations’ (Wheeler 2002: 201-9 cited in Frege et al., 2004: 
137). To the extent that these two different types of collectivity involve different 
orientations, the distinction also refers to the ‘vested interest’ and ‘sword of justice’ 
debate, with trade unions mostly conceived of as interest organisations, and the labour 
movement seen as embodying a progressive conception of general interest.  
 
For Hyman (2004) however, rather than conceiving of unions and labour 
movements as different modes of collectivity, these notions refer to a dualism or tension 
within any form of worker collectivism. ‘A trade union is at one and the same time ‘a 
businesslike service organisation, operating a variety of agencies under a complicated 
system of industrial relations and an expression and vehicle of the historical movement of 
the submerged labouring masses for social recognition and democratic self determination 
(…) The union, as an institution, is thus in the grip of a very real contradiction’ (Hyman, 
2004). 
 
Power 
 
Notwithstanding the importance of the concept of power for the study of trade unions, 
Kelly (1998) has argued that it is a notion that remains largely underdeveloped in the field 
of industrial relations. This is a contentious assertion and, of course, not everyone agrees 
(e.g. Edwards, 2003). For authors like Morriss (2006), debates on the concept of power 
are not exclusive to the field of industrial relations but, on the contrary, can be seen as 
representative of other social sciences more generally. Kelly (1998) concedes that a 
notable exception to his claim is Hyman’s (1975) discussion of power. He defines power 
as 
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the ability of an individual or group to control his (their) physical and social 
environment; and, as part of this process, the ability to influence the decisions which 
are and are not taken by others. This ability, it is assumed here, is typically founded 
on a privileged access to or control over material and ideological resources. 
(Hyman, 1975: 26) 
 
Consequently, he argues with Fryer (1975: 160), ‘(...) the critical focus of any analysis of 
power must be the differential distribution of control over and access to resources and 
sanctions, both material and ideological’. 
 
This definition is important on various grounds. First, it is relevant because it 
provides the building blocks to construct a precise definition of union power and, by 
extension of union growth and decline. Thus for example, and paraphrasing Hyman and 
Fryer (1975), we can speak of union power decline as ‘the diminishing ability of trade 
unions to control their physical and social environment as well as to influence the 
decisions which are and are not taken by others, as a consequence of reduced trade union 
control over and access to resources and sanctions both material and ideological’. Second, 
it is important because it views power as a dispositional concept, that is, as a concept 
‘referring to an ability, capacity or dispositional property’ (Morriss, 2006: 13). In this 
way, it makes the crucial distinction between capacity and the exercise of power. This is 
significant because power resources are not realities, but capacities that have to be 
mobilised in order to come to be in actuality.  
 
Third, Hyman’s conception of power distinguishes between two aspects of power. 
Power for refers to power ‘as a resource used in the service of collective interests; (…) 
when individuals band together in order to increase their collective power’ (Hyman, 1975: 
26-27). In this sense, power for refers to ‘power to do something’ (the ability to control 
one’s environment/life). Power over refers to power over someone (or ability to influence 
others) and include the power of trade unions vis-à-vis that of employers and the state. The 
distinction is important because it breaks with Steven Lukes’ (1974, 2005) conception of 
power –perhaps the most popular definition of power among radical writers- and its 
almost exclusive focus on power over (Morriss, 2006). In his critique of Lukes’ work, 
Morriss (2006) shows how ‘power-over can scarcely encompass everything we 
understand as power in social contexts. Frequently we value power simply because 
enables us to do things we want to do: to have more control over our own lives.’ 
Furthermore, these dimensions allow us to differentiate between being powerless and 
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being dominated, a crucial issue when debating the possibilities of trade union action in 
the current climate. 
 
Last, Hyman makes a further distinction between objective and subjective power. 
Objective power refers to observable facts such as the material situation of the workers 
organised, including for example, their strategic importance, organisational power (what 
internal sources of power can unions mobilise?), economic power (which market forces 
play into the hands of unions?), and institutional power (which external sources of support 
can unions depend on?) (Visser, 1995). A similar categorisation is that of Silver (2003: 13, 
based on Wright, 2000) who distinguishes between associational power (‘the various 
forms of power that result from the formation of collective organisation of workers’ e.g. 
trade unions and political parties) and structural power (‘the power that accrues to 
workers “simply from their location in the economic system”). Structural power can be 
divided in two subtypes. Marketplace bargaining power results directly from tight labour 
markets, and workplace bargaining power results from the strategic location of a 
particular group of workers in a key industrial sector. Whereas the former can take various 
forms (possession of scarce skills on demand; low levels of unemployment), the latter 
pertains to workers in tightly integrated production processes where localised stoppages 
can cause disruptions on a wider scale. 
 
In contrast, subjective power considers ‘the manner in which workers perceive their 
situation and interests, and the solidarity and determination with which they pursue their 
objectives’ (Hyman and Fryer, 1975: 162-163). This is crucial as ‘workers who perceive 
no major conflict of interests with their employers are unlikely to organise effectively. 
Those who define their interests primarily in narrow sectional terms may succeed in 
winning improvements in relation to other groups; but the consequence may be division 
and disunity at a broader collective level (…) (Hyman and Fryer, 1975: 162-163). 
 
 
3.2 A multidimensional view of union strategy and outcomes 
 
The notion of strategy has remained largely undeveloped in the field of industrial relations 
(Boxall and Haynes, 1997; Frege and Kelly, 2003). Most works that employ the concept 
of strategy refer back to the management literature where strategy has several meanings 
(Boxall, 2008; Boxall and Haynes, 1997; Hyman, 1987). Three of these are especially 
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salient for the present discussion. First and foremost, strategy has been described as a 
framework of critical choices about the ends and means of an organisation (Child, 1972 
cited in Boxall and Haynes, 1997). More commonly strategy refers to formal plans to 
achieve specific goals, that is to say, they are consciously formulated and are seen as 
intended, purposeful, and precede action. Frege and Kelly (2004: 32) define union 
strategies largely in this sense, as ‘initiatives by unions that are reasonably substantial and 
which are intended as means for the achievement of specified union goals’. Alternatively, 
strategy has been described as a pattern in a stream of decisions, which are not necessarily 
conscious and can be read from action (Mintzberg, 1994).  
 
Rather than treating these meanings as alternative, they can be seen as aspects of 
the same phenomenon. Union strategy can thus be initially defined as a pattern of critical, 
deliberate, and emergent decisions about its ends and means. Boxall (2008) for example, 
defines union strategy as 
 
unions’ characteristic ways of interacting with their environments (…). Strategy is 
the pattern of critical choices about ends and means that we see unfolding in an 
organisation’s behaviour. As we observe trade unions over time, we can come to 
discern their typical intentions or goals and the resources they typically build or 
mobilise to try to reach these goals. 
(Boxall, 2008: 209) 
 
But because trade unions are conceived of as sources and mediums of power for 
subordinate groups, definitions should not shy away from acknowledging that these 
decisions are concerned, mainly and unavoidably, with power. Thus, drawing on Hyman 
and Fryer’s (1975) definition of power, I define trade union strategy as a pattern of 
critical, deliberate, and emergent decisions about increasing the ability of trade unions to 
control and access resources and sanctions both material and ideological. 
 
How can we conceive of these ‘critical, deliberate, and emergent decisions’? Heery 
(2003) argues that agency theories of trade unionism –and union strategies for that matter- 
have generally produced typologies. These, according to Heery (2003: 291) ‘set out the 
range of choices available to unions with regard to the form and content of interest 
representation’. In turn, a conventional way of organising typologies is in terms of 
dimensions. Union choices in a particular dimension are typically presented as 
dichotomous (e.g. servicing or organising; militancy or moderation). Nevertheless, union 
choices in any dimension of union activity must also be viewed as involving responses to 
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more permanent tensions, inherent to the nature of trade unions as organisations for the 
representation of workers interests. In other words, union strategic choice must be viewed 
as implying permanent dualities as well as contingent dialectics. 
 
Relational dimensions 
 
Strategy dimensions are normally thought of as relational dimensions. These are based on 
the relations unions establish with other actors in which different choices can be made, 
typically –but not exclusively- involving negotiating with employers and organising 
members. The notion of strategy dimensions is hence broadly consistent with the idea of 
trade unions as organisations embedded in power relationships.  
 
Union-member relations refer to the strategic choices made by unions in developing 
the relationship between the leadership and their members. Choices with regard to union-
member relations are more commonly associated with the servicing and organising 
models discussed in the previous chapter. Within each of these models there are 
significant choices to be made. But as Boxall and Haynes (1997: 572) have argued, ‘it is 
wrong to propose a simple dichotomy between servicing and organising because all 
unions maintain some member services which do not depend on continuous organising’. 
All unions must, in other words, deal with the tensions involved in providing services to 
their affiliates and simultaneously to mobilise their members to obtain such gains. It 
follows that the challenge resides on how to combine options for organising and servicing 
activities in a manner that would allow unions to enhance their power.  
 
Union-employer relations include relations with individual employers and 
managers at the level of the firm, as well as with employers’ associations. Choices within 
this dimension are typically associated with ‘adversarialism’ and ‘cooperation’ or 
‘militancy’ and ‘moderation’ (Kelly, 1996). Riethof (2004) has advanced a similar 
dichotomy between confrontation strategies, which include proactive wage demands, and 
defensive strategies that aim at job security and the maintenance of wages and conditions 
of employment. Taken to the extreme however, adversarialism and cooperation lead 
logically to impossible outcomes: destruction of, or incorporation by, the other party. This 
is why, rather than understand them as alternatives, it is important to conceive of union-
employer relations as involving an inherent tension between posing a credible threat to 
employers and simultaneously being seen as reliable bargaining partners (Hyman, 2000). 
The particular way in which a union resolves these tensions is intimately linked to the 
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balance of power between the parties and as a result a continuum between employer-
dominant and labour-parity agreements have been identified (Kelly, 2004). 
 
Union relations with the labour movement refer to a union’s degree of articulation 
with other worker organisations. This refers to the degree of articulation between unions 
through higher-level organisations (federations and confederations) which may include 
international action (Cooke, 2006; Moody, 1997), but also includes relations with workers 
and unions with whom they may have no organic relationship (Heery and Abbott, 2000) 
(contrast with ‘form as external structure’ below). 
 
Union relations with the state have been widely studied as the vast literature on 
corporatism demonstrates. For the purposes of this thesis I understand the state mostly as 
government, but also involving parliament and the judiciary, as these represent the most 
significant elements in determining unions’ institutional environment. Simply put, union-
state relations can be described with reference to the opposition between seeking to act as 
political insiders with privileged access to state machinery, or act as outsiders relying on 
mobilisation to influence government policy (Heery, 2003). 
 
The study of union relations with political parties is normally linked to the study of 
union-state relations. Nevertheless, there have been relatively few studies of union-
political party linkages and, even less typologies of such links (McIlroy, 1998: cited in 
Ludlam et al., 2002). Ludlam et al. (2002) have proposed a typology of union-party links 
that recognises four types: external lobbying, internal lobbying, union-party bonding, and 
union-dominance types. 
 
There are, of course, various other relevant dimensions of union activity, the 
prominence of which will vary greatly across different settings. These include union 
relations with social movements, international union action, communities and society. For 
some commentators, developing relations and building coalitions with such complex of 
actors and levels is crucial if unions are to achieve revitalisation (Frege et al., 2003, 2004). 
I will not discuss these dimensions here for reasons of space and but I will return to them 
in the next chapter where I discuss the particular choice of dimensions for this study.  
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Table 3.1: Examples of dimensions, tensions, and union strategic choices 
Dimensions Basic tensions and choices Assoc. revitalisation strategies 
   
Relational dimensions   
Union-Employer  Credible threat- 
Reliable bargaining partner 
Incorporation-autonomy 
Militancy or co-operation 
 
Union-Members  Servicing 
Organising 
Union-State Insider-outsider 
Incorporation-autonomy 
Political action 
Coalition building (coalitions-of-
influence and coalitions-of-
protest) 
Union-Labour movement  Restructuring-external structure 
Union-Political party Insider-outsider  
Incorporation-autonomy 
Political action 
Coalition building 
Union-Other actors  Coalition building (vanguard or 
common cause or integrative 
coalitions) 
   
Organisational dimensions   
Constituency Elite, core, periphery, excluded 
(Hyman, 1997) 
Open or closed (Undy) 
Private or public orientation 
(Hyman) 
 
Objectives Vested interest/Sword of justice  
Methods   
-Form Sectionalism or solidarity Restructuring-external structure 
-Capacity  Restructuring-union 
management 
-Democracy Leadership (bureaucracy) or 
Democracy 
Restructuring-union governance 
-Activism   
   
 
 
Organisational dimensions 
 
It is central to broaden our analysis to include dimensions which specify the range of 
choices available to trade unions as organisations. Hyman (1997b: 1) has argued that all 
trade unions must explicitly or implicitly answer three fundamental self-conception 
questions ‘whose interests they represent, which issues they embrace as relevant for the 
task of representation and what methods and procedures they adopt in undertaking this 
task’. Hyman’s (1997b) distinction between the whose, the what, and the how of trade 
unionism can be thought of as representing three ‘organisational’ strategic dimensions.  
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The ‘whose’ refers to choices of constituency which can be conceptualised in terms 
of representing elite, core, periphery, and/or excluded groups of workers. The ‘what’ 
entails the objectives or agenda of trade unionism, and refer to the range of worker 
concerns that the union seeks to address. These span from a ‘bread-and-butter’ agenda of 
collective bargaining over wages and conditions of employment, to concerns about 
workers rights, the politico-legal framework, and concerns addressing issues beyond 
employment such as the environment and the community (Hyman, 1997b). 
 
The ‘how’ or the methods of trade unionism refer to how interests are represented 
and entail four categories of organisational decisions: form, capacity, democracy, and 
activism (Hyman, 1997b: 519). First, choices of organisational form or external structure 
can be understood in terms of horizontal and vertical lines of inclusion. Whereas the 
former generally integrate workers according to labour market status (professional, other 
white-collar, craft, non-skilled manual), the latter combines them according to sector or 
employer (industrial and company unionism). Defined in this way, choices of form link 
with restructuring strategies, especially with regard to mergers.  
 
As external structure, organisational form refers to the degree of articulation 
between unions through higher-level organisations as in the ‘union-labour movement 
relations’ discussed above. The distinction is relevant depending on the type of union. 
While for a horizontally organised union the distinction is irrelevant (all relations are 
‘outside’), for vertically organised unions (i.e. firm/plant unions), the manner in which 
they approach their ‘inside’ relations (firm level) can be quantitative and qualitatively 
different from the way they work through their ‘outside’ relations (beyond the firm). 
 
Organisational capacity involves ‘the ability to assess opportunities for 
intervention; to anticipate, rather than merely react to, changing circumstances; to frame 
coherent policies; and to implement these effectively’ (1997b: 519). Hyman define these 
admittedly complex elements as intelligence, strategy and efficacy.  
 
Third, organisational democracy or internal structure (governance) refers to the 
dialectic between leadership (how much centralised coordination and articulation?) and 
democracy (how much localised autonomy and participation?). Differentiating between 
the democracy element of methods and the union-member dimension discussed above is 
difficult in practice. Analytically however, the distinction is useful because the union-
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member dimension allows us to refer specifically to the choices made in pursuit of 
enhancing or diminishing workers collective capacity (Hyman, 1997a). Finally, activism 
refers to the perennial dialectic between unions’ contradictory yet inseparable modes of 
action: mobilisation and compromise. Choices in this respect overlap again with relational 
dimensions as they involve a combination of choices with regard to union-employer and 
union-member dimensions. 
 
The strategic process: from tactics to strategies and types of unionism 
 
Thinking of union strategy in terms of dimensions is a useful organising device but there 
are wider implications that must be taken into consideration. First, just like institutions 
and processes in national industrial relations systems have resulted largely from choices 
made by actors at an early stage in the constitution of such systems, union strategies can 
also be seen as reflecting ‘founding strategic choices’ (Beaupain, 1998). Such founding 
choices emerge out of a complex mixture of conditions, reflect the balance of power at a 
particular point in time, and they tend to become the ‘backbone’ of an organisation’s 
strategic approach. They are hard to modify as they are largely ‘path dependent’, and the 
range of choices overtime tend to be limited by those founding decisions. There are points 
in time however, in which a particularly powerful combination of challenges, a ‘critical 
juncture’ render a current strategic approach unsustainable and open to significant change. 
In such circumstances, ‘path breaking’ choices can transform a union’s strategic approach. 
 
Second, although I have argued that in each strategic dimension there are 
meaningful choices to be made, this should not be understood as implying an exclusive 
correspondence between dimensions and choices. Social partnership may be primarily 
about union-employer relations but it is certainly not exclusively about it. In effect, social 
partnership as union strategy has long been debated precisely for the implications it has 
for other dimensions such as its impact on the relationship between representatives and 
represented (Oxenbridge et al., 2004) or between union insiders and outsiders (Heery and 
Abbott, 2000). It follows that decisions made in certain dimensions may have ascendancy 
over decisions in other dimensions.  
 
Third, as the relative importance of dimensions is largely a reflection of the 
changing locus of power across contexts and over time, it is therefore possible to speak of 
‘dominant’ tensions and dimensions of activity. This is especially important when 
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undertaking comparative research both longitudinal and transversal. For example, 
Regini’s (1992) distinction of three phases and three central issues in the evolution of 
Italy’s post-war union movement can be clearly accommodated within this approach. Just 
after the war, the relationship between unions and workers and collective mobilisation was 
the issue that marked union policy. During the 1970s, social concertation and the relations 
between unions, state, and employers were of major concern. In the 1980s, the search 
flexibility brought relations between labour and management to central stage. In the 
1990s, Regini (1992) argues, there was an unprecedented interconnection of challenges 
between the three previous foci.  
 
Fourth, as a corollary of the above, what particular dimensions to study, and indeed 
what precise actors within those dimensions to consider, cannot be assumed a priori. In 
effect, any choice of dimensions is therefore largely a methodological problem and likely 
to be highly specific to each case. Last, it is important to emphasise the difference 
between the analytical distinction of individual dimensions and their combination in 
practice. Boxall and Haynes (1997), for example, crosscut employer and member 
dimensions and choices to empirically derive different patterns of trade unionism. 
Furthermore, because the choices faced by trade unions do not solely reflect responses to 
current problems but answers to permanent tensions, focusing both on individual 
dimensions and broad strategic patterns may allow us to take the debate on union 
revitalisation a step further.  
 
What is at issue then, is not only how union strategies may contribute to increasing 
union power in a context of widespread decline, but also, how the evolution of their 
strategic configuration may or may not be reflecting the construction of new types of trade 
unionism. This is important in that allows research on union strategies to adopt a 
longitudinal/historical view –as opposed to a purely ‘tactical’ one- as well as to explain 
patterns of continuity and change in trade union action. I hence define a type of unionism 
(or model, pattern, or strategic orientation) as a relatively stable configuration of decisions 
within all significant dimensions of union activity. 
 
Conceptualising outcomes: effectiveness and revitalisation 
 
There is also the issue of how to measure union effectiveness and revitalisation in the 
context of a multidimensional approach to union strategy. Behrens et al. (2004: 20-23) 
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have proposed a model of labour movement revitalisation as regaining power along four 
spheres of union activity: membership dimension, economic dimension, political 
dimension, and institutional dimension. 
 
At one level, the dimensions of revitalisation identified by Behrens et al. (2004) can 
be linked respectively to the union-member, union-employer, union-state, and 
organisational dimensions identified in this chapter. However, this is not to say that there 
exists a unilinear relationship between them. Choices made in terms of union-member 
relations for example, can potentially affect all dimensions of revitalisation and vice versa.  
 
Furthermore, the indicators considered by Behrens et al. (2004) should largely be 
seen as suggestions because, just as with selecting what dimensions to research, deciding 
what indicators to consider is largely a methodological problem and as such likely to be 
highly specific to each case. Thus, for example, although union density as indicator of 
union power can be revealing in some cases (e.g. well-established union organisations in 
decentralised systems), it can be obscuring in others (e.g. unions organised as 
underground networks of activists or else national level organisations reliant on 
institutional).  
 
At this point, it is also important to clearly distinguish between strategic 
effectiveness and union revitalisation. Individual union strategies or particular 
configuration of strategies can be described as effective when satisfying at least one of the 
four dimensions of revitalisation identified by Behrens et al. (2004). For example, an 
organising strategy can be seen as effective when recruitment figures increase or 
recognition is achieved. But although effectiveness defined in this way can be seen as a 
prerequisite of broader union revitalisation, it is not a sufficient condition.  
 
To furthering revitalisation, union strategies and emerging models of trade 
unionism must also offer significant difference over the overall situation of particular 
unions and that of the labour movement more generally. Thus, for example, social 
partnership can be considered effective in stabilising the environment for insiders but, 
absent solidarity, partnership can hardly be described as leading to union revitalisation in 
a more general sense. I therefore employ union revitalisation to refer both to an ongoing 
process as well as to an assessment of a desired outcome, one that involves issues of 
solidarity and sustainability in a broader ‘labour movement’ sense. 
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In sum, conceiving of trade union strategic choice as multi-dimensional, and 
integrating relational and organisational dimensions encourages a more nuanced analysis 
of variation. It allows us to make a distinction between decisions in relevant dimensions 
(union strategies), and their combination (models of trade unionism), permitting the 
comparative study of union strategies across cases as well as their evolution over time. 
Furthermore, it offers a way to adapt assessments of union effectiveness to the 
particularities of each case, decoupling them from assessments of union revitalisation. 
This, nevertheless, does not take us far enough in explaining the similarities and 
differences in union strategies between and within cases. In the following section, I try to 
move on from description to explanation by identifying the main factors and dynamics 
that may account for union strategic choice. 
 
 
3.3 A social movement model of challenges, strategies and outcomes 
 
The content and outcomes of union strategic choice do not necessarily reflect the 
preferences of trade union leaders and members. In making the transition from description 
to explanation, I explore Frege and Kelly’s (2003) social movement model of union 
strategic choice. I argue that this approach would benefit greatly from drawing more from 
the social movement literature from where it originates. 
 
Boxes and arrows lost in translation 
 
Frege and Kelly (2003) argue that their model is based on a ‘classic model’ used in the 
social movement literature (McAdam et al., 2001). This is strictly speaking, incorrect. The 
‘model’ they refer to is instead a graphic representation of what is known as the ‘social 
movement classic agenda’, or the evolution of social movement thinking over the last 
three decades. By the late 1980s, social movement researchers began to emphasise the 
importance of a set of common factors in trying to analyse and explain the emergence and 
development of social movements and revolutions. By the mid-1990s this ‘emerging 
synthesis’ included three factors: the structure of political opportunities and constraints 
confronting the movement; mobilising structures or the forms of organisation (informal as 
well as formal); and framing processes or the collective processes of interpretation, 
attribution, and social construction that mediate between opportunity and action (McAdam 
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et al., 1996). A fourth factor, repertoires of contention, or the culturally encoded ways in 
which people act in contentious politics, was added in 2001 (McAdam et al., 2001).  
 
 
Figure 3.1: Classic Social Movement Agenda for Explaining Contentious Politics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: McAdam et al. (2001: 17) 
 
 
What Frege and Kelly (2003) essentially do is to make a model out of this agenda, 
replacing social movement concepts with industrial relations ones. This is evident from 
comparing Figures 3.1(above) and 2.2 (in previous chapter). There is nothing wrong with 
doing this except that, without the appropriate social movement theory background, their 
‘translation’ into industrial relations loses the explanatory power contained in the original 
social movement concepts. As I will elaborate in the remaining of this section, each and 
one of these concepts bring about valuable sets of ideas. For example, the idea of a semi-
detached ‘context’ in the field of industrial relations is very different to that entailed in the 
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action. Similarly, discussing ‘union structures’ is not necessarily equivalent to the formal 
and informal forms of collective organisation embodied in the idea of ‘mobilising 
structures’.  
 
Furthermore, the model loses explanatory power because the relations between 
these factors are not made explicit. What is actually happening within those unspecified 
arrows? The model loses the action categories of mobilisation and counter-mobilisation 
that social movement theorists have used to explain the dynamic relations among the 
factors and the form of collective action. In so doing, the model becomes unnecessarily 
static and devoid of conflict, to an extent alien to the idea of contentious dynamics 
underpinning the study of social movements. As it stands, the model may work well as a 
map of relevant factors, but far less so as the comprehensive explanatory framework that it 
could be should it incorporate more explicitly the insights of social movement theory. 
 
External challenges 
 
From ‘context’ to the structure of political opportunities. The importance of studying the 
wider political economy of industrial relations when investigating trade unions has long 
been recognised in the industrial relations literature (Hyman, 1975; Hyman and Fryer, 
1975). As Frege and Kelly (2003) indicate in their model, relevant contextual factors for 
workers and trade unions involve the policies and actions of employers and the state as 
well as industrial relations institutions. Mainstream industrial relations research has sought 
to explain the fortunes of trade unions on the basis of changes in the ‘context’ in which 
they operate. The problem however, is that this literature often conceives of the context in 
an overtly ‘systemic’, anodyne, and detached manner. Furthermore, there is no agreement 
on the specific role of contextual elements, the nature of the dynamic relations between 
them, or the meaning and implications of factors and dynamics as a whole. 
 
In contrast, the notion of ‘political opportunities’ employed in the social movement 
literature, is far more specific than a ‘semi-detached context’. It refers to the importance 
of the broader political system in structuring opportunities and constraints for collective 
action and the extent and form of the same (McAdam et al., 1996). McAdam et al. (1996: 
3) argue that in employing this concept ‘social movement researchers have tried to explain 
the emergence of a particular movement on the basis of changes in the institutional 
structure or informal power relations of a given political system. (From a comparative 
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perspective, they) have sought to account for cross-national differences in the structure, 
extent, and success of comparable movements on the basis of differences in the political 
characteristics of the nation states in which they are embedded’. Such a research agenda 
maps closely that of comparative research on union strategy.  
 
But what the concept of opportunity distinctively offers, both as static opportunity 
structures and as changing political environments, is a way of inquiring the ‘context’ in 
terms of the extent to which its constituent elements facilitate or repress the development 
of collective action. In other words, the notion of opportunity provides a description, as 
well as an explanation and an interpretation, of the role of contextual factors and the 
nature of their dynamic interaction. This is not to say that some industrial relations 
literature does not share the premises of the concept of opportunity. For the purposes of 
this thesis, I can think of three areas where ‘alternative’ industrial relations literature –in 
turn heavily informed by ‘mobilisation theory’, political science, and international 
political economy- closely maps the insights of social movement literature with regard to 
the nature of opportunity faced by trade unions. 
 
From state and employer ‘strategies’ to ruling groups ‘countermobilisation’. It has long 
been argued that the strategies of employers and the state bear a significant influence in 
the fortunes of trade unions (Kochan et al., 1986). There is considerable variation in the 
form, extent, and depth of national and firm regulatory regimes (Friedman, 1977; Gordon, 
1996; Hyman, 1987, 1997a; Streeck, 1987). Roy Adams (1993), for example, sustains that 
governmental policy toward unions and collective bargaining ranges from suppression 
through toleration to encouragement. Writing in 1993, he argues that in most 
contemporary countries, independent unions and free collective bargaining are, even if 
grudgingly, tolerated, and that states tend to choose toleration over repression largely 
because it is more effective. It does not follow however that the propensity of state and 
employers is to tolerate unions and collective bargaining. On the contrary, he shows, the 
propensity of employers, whether in the private or public sector, is to resist unionisation 
and collective bargaining, and to monopolise control of employment decision making 
(Adams, 1993: 286). Crouch (1982) for example, has classified employer strategies in 
resisting unionisation in terms of evil, fear, and sweet stuff. Unsurprisingly, policies of 
active encouragement are rare and occur ‘only in special circumstances’ (e.g. war effort). 
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It is evident from the above that ‘state and employer strategies’ is too neutral a term 
to describe the antagonistic relationship established between state and employers and 
workers and their collective organisations in the great majority of cases. This is why it is 
far more accurate to think about state and employers as ruling groups whose strategies and 
actions may facilitate or impede the development of collective action. Following Kelly 
(1998), ‘ruling groups may be said to engage in counter-mobilisation in order to change 
subordinate definitions of interests, to thwart the creation of effective collective 
organisation and to repress attempts at mobilisation and collective action’. 
 
Collective organisation has come under attack through employer decisions to reduce 
the numbers of, and facilities for, union stewards and in the extreme case to 
derecognise unions for collective bargaining. Antiunion laws have hindered the 
mobilisation of workers for collective action as well as the effectiveness of any 
action that does get organised. The concept of countermobilisation actually conveys 
the antagonistic relationship of employers towards collective organisation and action 
amongst their own labour forces (…)  
 
In a similar vein the capitalist state is understood primarily, though by no means 
exclusively, as a class agency whose chief function is to maintain and reproduce the 
conditions of capital accumulation. In so doing the state acts as a key agent of 
counter-mobilisation against organised labour, particularly through its repressive 
organs such as the police, the army and the intelligence services. This critical 
perspective is a far cry from the anodyne formulations of the state as legislator, as 
employer and as economic manager. 
(Kelly, 1998: 129) 
 
External dynamics 
 
From coordination to conflict. Frege and Kelly (2003) acknowledge the role of ‘socio-
economic change’ and ‘industrial relations institutions’ in their model. The problem is that 
they do not determine the nature of the relationship between them, and as the model 
stands, they appear largely as conceived of in terms of ‘mechanisms of coordination’, 
providing stability to the firm or system. In contrast, the notion of opportunity emphasises 
the conflictual nature of the relationship between actors. 
 
A way of conceiving of the political economy of trade unions in terms of 
opportunity and contention –and of exploring the relationships between employer and 
state strategies, socio-economic change, and industrial relations institutions for that 
matter- is that of Howell (2005). From a political science perspective, he stands explicitly 
against the varieties of capitalism approach and its overtly static focus on the firm, 
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stability, and coordination. Howell’s account focuses on the process of development, 
breakdown, and reconstruction of industrial relations institutions. Industrial relations 
institutions refer to ‘the set of conventions, norms, and rules which govern the relationship 
between management and labour, their bargaining over revenues and rights of control’ 
(Visser, 1996: 4). They are ‘socially constructed in the particular sense that they are a 
congealed form of class power: they reflect a particular moment of class power at the time 
of their construction’ (Howell, 2005: 23). Conversely, ‘creating or altering institutions 
involves conflict and struggles for domination between class actors’. For Howell, a 
comparative political economy capable of offering an adequate account of the institutional 
development of industrial relations is one that recognises three factors: economic growth, 
institutions structuring relationships between actors, ruptures and continuities.  
 
There are two linked processes here. ‘(F)irst, how economic change brings about 
change in institutions and, second, how institutions subsequently regulate and stabilise 
economic growth’ (Howell, 2005: 22). Howell argues (2005: 21-23) that industrial 
relations institutions rest upon a stable pattern of economic growth, the breakdown of 
which goes hand in hand with heightened levels of industrial conflict. This is because the 
transition from one pattern of economic growth to another will pose different sets of 
problems to states and industrial actors and shift the balance of class power and the 
economic interests of those actors. These problems are not easily resolvable using existing 
industrial relations institutions, triggering in turn their crisis and encouraging the search 
for new regulatory mechanisms. In this, states occupy a privileged position, having 
‘unique capacities both to narrate an authoritative interpretation of industrial relations 
crises (a discursive capacity) and to solve collective action problems for employers and 
unions (an institutional capacity)’ (2005: 21).3  
 
A process of reconstruction may involve the creation of entirely new institutions or 
the investing of new functions and meanings in existing institutions. Once in place, 
institutions become a part of the landscape of the workplace and the wider economy; they 
are difficult to dislodge and continue to influence the conduct of industrial relations well 
after the conditions of their original construction have passed. Howell argues that no 
pattern of economic growth has attached a fixed set of industrial relations institutions. 
That multiple regulatory forms are compatible with a given growth regime however, is not 
to say that states (or employers for that matter) are unconstrained in their policy choices. 
Howell (2003: 42) contends that states autonomy in particular is constrained by the failure 
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of existing institutions and intensification of industrial conflict, and by the strength, 
organisation, and influence of industrial actors, all of which limit the possible set of new 
industrial relations institutions.  
 
Appreciating the evolution of union opportunity in terms of the dynamics 
surrounding the development of industrial relations institutions has also implications for a 
better understanding of the some of the processes normally associated with 
‘globalisation’. On the one hand, the apparent convergence in policy responses across 
countries hides important differences in degree, direction and power of the national actors 
involved and it is therefore preferable to speak of ‘bunching’ of countries around certain 
policies rather than of universal trends (Howell, 2005). There is, therefore, nothing 
necessarily predetermined in this process, not least a convergence of institutions 
emanating from ‘global forces’. In a manner consistent with this view, Bamber, Lansbury 
and Wailes (2004a, 2004b, 2004c) explain the differences in changing patterns of 
industrial relations on the basis of the changing economic interests of workers and 
employers. They argue that these interests are likely to be decisive in understanding both 
the form and direction of institutional change, and that they, in turn, will vary according to 
the way countries are linked to the international economy (Wailes, 2000; Wailes et al., 
2003).  
 
On the other hand, although the above discussion may have implied that the 
national and firm levels are still the main levels of analysis, it is important to recognise 
that from the 1970s onwards, ‘this two-fold distinction has become difficult to hold not 
only because of the traditional subdivisions within these levels, but because of the 
emergence of new levels in which industrial relations take place, such as supranational, 
regional, global/international, sub-national, territorial, and multinational corporations’ 
(Regalia, 2007: 2). Accepting the existence of a plurality of levels requires as a result to 
empirically deconstruct the nature of opportunity and institutional development account 
presented above according to the different levels of analysis involved. This is because 
industrial relations regimes are likely to be highly specific to each case reflecting the 
power relations unions find themselves embedded in.  
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Internal challenges 
 
From union structures to mobilising structures. The influence of the structure of 
opportunity on the form and prospects of union strategy is not independent of the various 
types of union structures through which workers organise. Frege and Kelly (2003: 14) 
argue that union structures ‘comprise the horizontal and hierarchical organisation of the 
union movement (centralised or decentralised, unitary or multiple-peak) as well as 
contacts among unions with other social movements’. This is one of the elements of their 
framework more consistent with social movement theory. Social movement scholars refer 
to such organisational arrangements as mobilising structures, ‘those collective vehicles, 
informal as well as formal, through which people mobilise and engage in collective 
action’ (McAdam et al., 1996: 3). In this way, they focus on meso-level groups, 
organisations, and informal networks that comprise the collective building blocks of social 
movements and revolutions (McAdam et al., 1996). 
 
As it was the case with the work on political opportunities, the insights of social 
movement theory on the organisational dynamics of collective action can contribute to our 
understanding of the factors and dynamics of union strategy. It is important to distinguish 
two broad approaches (McAdam et al., 1996). On the one hand, ‘resource mobilisation 
theory’ focuses on mobilisation processes and the formal organisational manifestations of 
those processes (so-called ‘social movement organisations’ as opposed to ‘social 
movements’). Research in this approach has mostly focus on trying to describe and 
explain the form of particular social movements. On the other hand, the ‘political process 
model’ tradition dissents from resource mobilisation theory in the latter’s equation of 
social movements with formal organisation highlighting instead the critical role of various 
grassroots settings in facilitating and structuring collective action (Tilly, 1978). It is 
drawing on this tradition that Kelly has sought to apply the insights of ‘mobilisation 
theory’ to the field industrial relations. 
 
These two approaches and their contrasting emphases are not mutually exclusive. 
The distinction between formal and informal vehicles is however highly relevant in 
understanding union revitalisation since it redirects our attention from formal 
organisations –our typical understanding of what a union is- to the diversity of collective 
settings in which trade unions develop and the organisational forms to which they give 
rise. Furthermore, the existence of formal and informal mobilising vehicles is usually 
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intertwined and hence the boundaries of a union must be thought as highly permeable. 
Giving diffuse networks of activists or groups of unorganised workers the same 
ontological value than large union bureaucracies may allow us to develop more 
convincing arguments about the future of trade unionism.  
 
Internal dynamics 
 
From ‘union identity’ to micromobilisation and the social processes of collective action. 
The influence of opportunity and of the types of mobilising structures is not independent 
of the social contexts of interaction that constitute a social movement’s internal factors. 
Indeed, the last, and arguably most relevant, element in Frege and Kelly’s model is to 
underline the importance for trade unions’ of such internal factors and dynamics. Their 
model however is not entirely successful in advancing our understanding of the specific 
elements and processes involved because they aggregate them in a broadly defined 
‘framing processes’ black box which also includes ‘union identities and repertoires of 
contention’. These social movement concepts have specific meanings and have the 
potential to provide for a more methodical understanding of ‘internal factors’.  
 
Social movement theorists have long argued the importance of social dynamics in 
understanding the relationship between opportunity, mobilising structures, and collective 
action.  
 
If the combination of political opportunities and mobilising structures affords groups 
a certain structural potential for action, they remain, in the absence of one other 
factor, insufficient to account for collective action. Mediating between opportunity, 
organisation, and action are the shared meanings and definitions that people bring to 
their situation. At a minimum people need to feel both aggrieved about some aspect 
of their lives and optimistic that, acting collectively, they can redress the problem. 
Lacking either one or both of these perceptions, it is highly unlikely that people will 
mobilise even when afforded the opportunity to do so. 
(McAdam et al., 1996: 5) 
 
While the industrial relations literature has long argued the importance of the 
relationship between representatives and represented -and of the processes of interest 
definition and mobilisation that occur between them- the social movement literature adds 
to our traditional perspective on union organisations a more systematic analysis of the 
‘social context of interaction’ entailed in the relationship between leaders and members. In 
other words, the group context for constructing grievance, opportunities, and resources 
(McClurg Mueller, 1992). There are several lines of thought in this regard but I would like 
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to briefly refer to only four of them: micromobilisation, leadership, framing processes and 
repertoires of contention. 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Mc Adam’s Model of Collective Action  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Kelly (1998) 
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transformed. It also focuses on the way group loyalties and commitments to the movement 
and its organisations are reinforced’ (McClurg Mueller, 1992: 10). There are several 
models of micromobilisation. Perhaps the most popular among industrial relations 
scholars is McAdam’s, introduced by Kelly (1998) in Rethinking Industrial Relations. 
McAdam’s model of collective action highlights the roles of injustice, agency, identity 
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Collective organisation and activity ultimately stem from employer actions that 
generate amongst employees a sense of injustice or illegitimacy. Employees must 
also acquire a sense of common identity, which differentiates them from the 
employer; they must attribute the perceived injustice to the employer; and they must 
be willing to engage in some form of collective organisation and activity. This whole 
process of collectivisation is heavily dependent on the actions of small numbers of 
leaders and activists. 
(Kelly, 1998: 38) 
 
The prominent role of injustice in conditioning the occurrence of micro-
mobilisation is admittedly a contentious issue (Atzeni, 2009; Benford and Snow, 2000), 
but what I want to stress here is no so much what triggers the process, but to illustrate the 
complex of social psychological dynamics involved.  
 
Framing processes. Drawing primarily from the work of Erving Goffman and David 
Snow (Benford and Snow, 2000; Goffman, 1974; Snow and Benford, 1988; Snow et al., 
1986), social movement scholars employ the notion of ‘framing’ or ‘framing processes’ to 
conceptualise the ‘signifying work’ or ‘meaning construction’ that occurs in the process of 
interest definition. In Snow’s original conception, framing processes refer to ‘the 
conscious strategic efforts by groups of people to fashion shared understandings of the 
world and themselves that legitimate and motivate collective action’ (cited in McAdam et 
al., 1996: 6). A problem with the concept of framing however is that overtime has lost 
some of its original coherence as ‘recent writings have tended to equate the concept with 
any and all cultural dimensions of social movements’ (McAdam et al., 1996: 6). Although 
this is not the case with Frege and Kelly, their translation into industrial relations is not 
particularly useful either. They refer to framing processes as ‘the ways in which unionists 
perceive and think about changes in their external context as threats of opportunities’ 
(Frege and Kelly, 2003).  
 
As it can be appreciated, their definition accentuates the passive elements of the 
concept (‘perceptions’ instead of ‘conscious strategic efforts’), focuses exclusively on 
opportunity (as opposed to self-perceptions and associated processes of identity 
construction), and it does not establish a clear linkage between framing and collective 
action (framing matters insofar as it legitimates and motivates action). In order to be of 
theoretical and practical utility in explaining union strategy, framing activity should be 
conceptualised –as Snow does- in a way that denotes an ‘active, processual phenomenon 
that implies agency and contention at the level of reality construction’ (Benford and 
Snow, 2000: 614). Framing activity is ‘active in the sense of a dynamic, evolving process. 
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It entails agency in the sense that what is evolving is the work of social movement 
organisations or movement activists. And it is contentious in the sense that it involves the 
generation of interpretative frames that not only differ from existing ones but that may 
also challenge them’. It is in this context that framing theory and research –with its 
distinctions, for example, between diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational ‘core framing 
tasks’- can be of utility for the study of union collective action. 
 
Repertoires of contention. The final element, repertoires of contention, has been defined 
as ‘the culturally encoded ways in which people interact in contentious politics. They are 
invariably narrower than all of the hypothetical forms they might use or those that others 
in different circumstances or periods of history employ’ (McAdam et al., 2001: 18). 
Although Frege and Kelly (2003: 14) define them simply as ‘familiar ideas about union 
action’ or ‘well-worn behavioural patterns’ they convey the idea well when referring to 
the innovation or path dependency debate in union strategies. The concept of repertoires 
of contention are reminiscent of various industrial relations notions. These include 
Hyman’s (2001) trade union orientations of market, class, and society; Barley and 
Tolbert’s (1977, cited in Frenkel and Kuruvilla, 2002) ‘logics of action’ or ‘sense-making 
constructs that embody conventionalised understandings about what is appropriate, and 
reasonable, thereby shaping actors’ strategies (and that) in most cases can be seen as 
embodying ‘presentified’ pasts; and Müller-Jentsch’s (1985) notion of ‘traditions of 
association’. 
 
Trade unions have a history that is reflected in the “traditions of association”. The 
conditions under which they emerged, and particular key events, such as important 
strikes and breakthroughs in bargaining, usually form part of these traditions. The 
latter thus gain an importance of their own and can be absorbed into the union’s 
understanding of itself and used as social imagery models and as guidelines for the 
solving of present-day problems.  
 
A union that owes its past successes primarily to the use of the strike weapon is more 
likely to be prepared to fight in order to realise its aims than a union that owes its 
successes primarily to its willingness to compromise, its negotiating tactics and the 
like. Similarly, a union whose history has been characterised for battles on behalf of 
groups of skilled craftsmen is more likely to gravitate towards a policy geared 
towards occupational groups than a union that has been forced from the beginning to 
bring together under one roof heterogeneous groups of workers from different 
professions and with different levels of qualifications. 
(Müller-Jentsch, 1985: 26) 
 
 
UNION STRATEGIES IN THE ERA OF GLOBALISATION 
64 
3.4 A preliminary framework of analysis 
 
In Figure 3.3 (opposite page), I have tried to illustrate the main ideas presented in this 
chapter. At the centre of the model, there is the trade union conceived of as organisation 
for the representation of workers interests. Because trade unions’ central feature as 
representative organisations is their ‘powering character’ for subordinate groups, I have 
represented the union’s mobilising structure as establishing the connection between the 
leadership and membership. The nature and material circumstances of leaders and 
members, as well as the organisation’s structure, constitute the ‘group context’ (objective 
power), in which processes of interest definition and micromobilisation and take place. In 
line with research in social movements, I have highlighted the importance of framing 
processes and repertoires of contention in these dynamics (subjective power).  
 
Around a union with permeable boundaries, I have sketched a typical union 
structure of opportunity. The upper end of the figure illustrates the relations between 
unions and ruling groups, in this case, state and employers. The lower end of the figure 
depicts relations between unions and other actors that may, or may not, act in concert with 
trade unions in the pursuit of their goals (e.g. other unions and groups of workers, political 
parties, and the community). Both sets of relationships influence and are influenced by 
conflict between industrial relations actors and the resulting development of industrial 
relations institutions, a process in turn greatly influenced by the changing relationship 
between socio-economic change and interest definition.  
 
They also entail alternative types of dynamics. On the one hand, relations with 
employers and the state can often be seen as contentious (power over), entailing counter-
mobilisation (or facilitation) actions on the part of ruling groups, as well as mobilisation 
(or de-mobilisation) efforts on the part of unions. Similarly, relations with other actors 
may involve powering interactions (power for) where actors share their mobilising (or 
demobilising) capabilities.  
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Figure 3.3: A Preliminary Framework for Analysing Union Strategic Choice 
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Union strategies and models of trade unionism reflect the efforts of trade unions in 
working through these relationships. Their form and relative degree of success will vary 
on the basis of particular combinations of opportunity, mobilising structures, framing 
processes, and repertoires of contention. Because the framework is dialectic, it allows us 
to see union strategies and action influencing unions’ opportunity and vice-versa. 
Furthermore, because it focuses on contentious interactions, the model can serve to study 
times of change as well as of stability. 
 
No model can do everything however and this is no exception. As following 
chapters will demonstrate, this framework must be considered only a preliminary effort 
that requires further research. Employing this model in practice is no simple task. In the 
remaining of this thesis, I will explore such possibility for a particular group of workers 
and their organisations. There are several methodological issues that need to be addressed 
first and hence is to methods that I turn in the following chapter. 
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RES EA RCH APP ROACH 
 
 
 
 
 
 
My purpose in this chapter is to present the methodological decisions that have informed 
this research project. I have organised it in six sections of uneven length. In Section 4.1, I 
introduce the study’s research questions and research paradigm. Section 4.2 introduces a 
definition and main characteristics of the qualitative approach. In Section 4.3, I discuss the 
suitability of the case study as research strategy. The last three sections discuss specific 
methodological decisions and issues in terms of design (Section 4.4), methods (Section 
4.5), limitations (Section 4.6), and analysis, discussion, and closure (Section 4.6). 
 
 
4.1 Research questions and research paradigm 
 
All research, explicitly or implicitly, begins with the selection of a topic, definition of 
research questions, and choice of paradigm. Whereas the topic and research questions 
point to what the researcher is interested in studying, the paradigm refers to the framework 
of beliefs, values and methods within which the research takes place.  
 
Topic and research questions 
 
Closely mapping what I see as the main concerns of the contemporary literature on union 
strategies of revitalisation, the topic of this study can be briefly stated as ‘trade union 
challenges, strategies, and effectiveness in the era of globalisation’. I aim to examine three 
sets of research questions in Chile’s large-scale copper mining sector. 
 
(1) What are the challenges facing workers and trade unions? An uncritical 
acceptance of ‘globalisation’ as the main cause of trade union problems is clearly 
unsatisfactory. There is a need for a more precise understanding of the ‘context’ in terms 
of what specific factors represent the strategic problem unions are responding to, and how 
these factors constrain and enable union action. 
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(2) What are workers and trade unions doing to deal with current difficulties? How 
successful have these strategies been? At one level this relates to examining the strategies 
and tactics being pursued, and the extent to which they are more or less effective. On 
closer examination however, the problem becomes not strategies per se but the types of 
trade unionism that may be emerging after three decades of global restructuring. 
Likewise, analyses of effectiveness must be distinguished from, and complemented with, 
discussions about the significance of strategies and types in advancing the revitalisation of 
organised labour as a whole. 
 
(3) What explains the adoption of particular strategies and the development of 
distinct types of trade unionism? What explains their success or failure? It is crucial to 
identify the key factors and dynamics involved that may be explaining the emergence, 
form, and outcomes of union strategies and types of trade unionism. It is also necessary to 
try and establish the ingredients of success and failure of union action in order to engage 
in a serious discussion on what might help unions reverse course. 
 
Due to space restrictions, in the remainder of this chapter I will refer to these three 
sets of questions by the short hand of ‘challenges’, ‘strategies and outcomes’ and, ‘factors 
and dynamics’ respectively. 
 
Research paradigm 
 
Stating a topic of study is relatively straightforward but justifying the adoption of a 
particular research paradigm needs careful consideration. Guba and Lincoln (1994) define 
a research paradigm as  
 
a set of basic beliefs (…) It represents a worldview that defines for its holder, the 
nature of the “world”, the individual’s place in it, and the range of possible 
relationships to that world and its parts (…) The beliefs are basic in the sense that 
they must be accepted simply on faith (however well argued); there is no way to 
establish their ultimate truthfulness.  If there were, the philosophical debates (…) 
would have been resolved millennia ago.   
(Guba and Lincoln, 1994: 107-108) 
 
 The basic beliefs that define a particular research paradigm are evident by the 
responses given to three fundamental questions. (a) The ontological question: what is the 
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form and nature of reality? (b) The epistemological question: what can we know? (c) The 
methodological question: how can we know it? Before answering these fundamental 
questions however, it is necessary to make explicit how I conceive of trade unions and 
their strategies as objects of study. 
 
Conceiving of trade unions as sources and mediums of power for subordinate 
groups is broadly consistent with agency approaches to theorising trade unionism. Implicit 
here there is an understanding of trade unions as agents, as human agency can be viewed 
as a feature arising out from both individual and collective behaviour. The main attributes 
of human agency have been discussed for millennia and it is impossible to do justice here 
to the variety of existing perspectives. I have therefore decided to briefly describe the 
essential features of workers and trade unions as agents in terms of Giddens’s (1982) 
concepts of capability and knowledgeability. This is because these notions convey well 
how I conceive of them and not because of any particular predilection for Giddens’s 
(1982) broader set of ideas. 
 
Giddens (1982) speaks of human beings as ‘capable’ by referring to the 
philosophical theorem that action involves the possibility of ‘doing otherwise’. 
 
To be able to “do otherwise” is to be able to make a difference in the world, to 
influence a pre-existing course of events (either through actual behaviour or through 
refraining). I want to argue that this implies that the concept of action is logically 
involved with that of power: for power, in its broadest sense, is precisely the 
capability of “making a difference” to a course of events.  
(Giddens, 1982: 29-30) 
 
In other words, to be an agent is to have power and even the apparently more powerless, 
by virtue of their implication in social relations, has power.  
 
This, of course, does not mean that the capability of human agents is unrestricted. 
On the contrary, it is always bounded by the institutional contexts in which action takes 
place, but it should not be confused with such contexts. 
 
It is a major error to treat the structural features of social systems as coterminous 
with such bounds. This is the characteristic view that has supported the dualism 
between action approaches and structural approaches, and that has been so 
entrenched in traditionally established forms of social theory. The structural 
properties of social systems should rather be seen as both constraining and enabling, 
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in respect of human action; and the traditional dualism between action and structure 
has to be reinterpreted as a duality, in which structure is both the medium and the 
outcome of knowledgeably sustained social practices. 
(Giddens, 1982: 30-31) 
 
Complementarily, human beings can be seen as knowledgeable agents. 
 
By saying that human beings are knowledgeable agents, I mean that all of us know a 
great deal about why we behave as we do, and about the social conventions relevant 
to that behaviour (…) This “reflexive self-monitoring” of activity is an integral 
element of all human social encounters. The knowledgeability of human subjects, it 
is important to stress, is not limited to what people can say, if asked, about why they 
act as they do. This is the force of the adverb “tacitly” in the sentence above. The 
specific contribution of phenomenological approaches to social theory has been to 
make clear that tacit awareness of conventions, anchored in, yet making possible the 
continuity of, social practices, is fundamental to the knowledgeability of human 
agents. Such tacit awareness is, in Wittgenstein’s terms, knowledge of “how to go 
on” in the contexts of practical day-to-day life: it is what I call “practical 
consciousness”. 
(Giddens, 1982: 29-30) 
 
Viewing trade unions as knowledgeable and capable agents, can be illuminating in 
understanding the relation between (potential) union power and (concrete) union action. 
The notions of union strategy and mobilisation are crucial to explore what mediates 
between them. Both are relatively new concepts in the field of industrial relations. While 
the concept of strategic choice entered industrial relations from the business and 
management literature just over twenty years ago (Kochan et al., 1986; Kochan et al., 
1984), mobilisation made its way into the field from the social movement literature in the 
mid-1990s (Kelly, 1998). Looking at their disciplines of origin, strategy and mobilisation 
may be seen as involving incompatible frameworks of analysis. Within a broader 
‘strategic choice’ conception rooted in viewing unions as knowledgeable and capable 
agents, they can be seen as complementary concepts. On the one hand, mobilisation refers 
to ‘the ways individuals are transformed into a collective actor’ and ‘the process by which 
a group acquires collective control over the resources needed for action’ (Tilly, 1978: 69, 
67 cited in Kelly, 1978: 25). On the other hand, strategy refers to an agent’s, conscious or 
unconscious, planned or unplanned, discernible patterns of behaviour or models of 
acquisition of collective control over power resources. 
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Ontology, epistemology, and methodology 
 
Conceiving of trade unions and their strategies in this way has clear implications for 
answering the three research paradigm questions. There are two fundamental answers to 
the ontological question (what is the form and nature of reality?): either there is a real 
world out there that is independent from our knowledge or there is no real world but 
instead, a socially and discursive constructed ‘reality’. The two basic research traditions, 
positivism and interpretivism, reflect this two sets of beliefs respectively. In this study, it 
is possible to identify a real group of workers’ material circumstances and strategic 
position in the labour market by describing, say, levels of income and skill. But 
identifying this ‘real’ world cannot take us far not only because these categories are in 
themselves relative (to other groups of workers, to a particular time, or culture, etc) but 
because (I believe) there is no real link between ‘objective’ sources of power and the 
‘subjective’ processes that actualise them. In this sense, there is no real world out there; or 
rather, the reality of the world we are concerned with in this study -that of trade union 
power and strategy- is socially and discursively constructed.  
 
There are two basic answers to the epistemological question or basic belief about 
knowledge (what can we know?). For objectivists drawing on a positivist ontology, it is 
possible to acquire knowledge about the world without interference. In constrast, for 
relativists, there is no real world to observe, and observation is never objective but 
affected by social constructions of reality. From conceiving of workers and unions as 
knowledgeable and capable agents constructing their reality, it follows that acquiring 
knowledge about them in an ‘objective’ manner is simply not possible. This is, of course, 
further compounded by the researcher’s own processes of reality construction. Viewing in 
this manner the problem we are concerned with in this study undoubtedly reflects a 
subjectivist epistemological position. 
 
Last of the three fundamental question is the methodological question (how can we 
know?). There are two main methodological positions. Positivists usually use quantitative 
methods as research tools, as these are seen as rather objective and their results 
generalisable and replicable. They tend to look for (narrowly defined) explanations of 
behaviour, not for its meaning. In contrast, relativists try to understand social behaviour 
rather than to explain it. They focus on meaning, and usually employ qualitative research 
methods. I will discuss these in the next section. For now, suffice is to conclude that, 
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given my conceptions of the object of study, this research project has consequently been 
built upon an interpretivist ontology, subjective epistemology, and qualitative 
methodology. 
 
Easier said than done. By this I mean to say that although these answers appear to 
have numerous advantages over the default alternative (positivist-objectivist-quantitative) 
as well as being largely consistent among themselves, and with the beliefs of the 
researcher, there are unavoidable limitations inherent to them. I do not mean to refer here 
to methodological disadvantages (I will allude to them in a subsequent section), but to 
some basic ontological and epistemological issues. 
 
Consider for example the ‘double hermeneutic problem’ or the notion that reality is 
interpreted by the actors (e.g. the union leaders) and their interpretation is, in turn, 
interpreted by the observer (e.g. the researcher). Even if accepting that ‘objectivity’ as 
such is not a major concern as it would be for positivists, a ‘double’ interpretation is 
evidently less objective (reliable) than a ‘single’ one.  
 
I would also argue that depending on the nature of the object of study, each of these 
two interpretation rounds is subject to specific ‘distortions’. Take for instance the 
challenge faced by a researcher trying to explain a union’s particular course of action. Or 
in other words, attempting to scrutinise the knowledgeability of the actors involved (why 
did you do what you did?). At best, and leaving aside familiar socio-phychological 
distortions (self-congratulation, lying, consonance/dissonancy, contradiction, peer 
pressure, etc), we would expect a successful research project to obtain ‘reasons’ that 
individuals or groups give for their behaviour. But conceiving of knowledgeability in 
terms of reasons alone can be deceptive. 
 
Philosophers are prone to talk of (…) knowledgeability in terms of the “reasons” that 
individuals have for their conduct. However, this can be misleading, for it suggests 
that human conduct involves a string of discrete reasons aggregated together: and 
that every act has some definite reason attached to it. Rather than suggesting any 
such implication, I prefer to speak of the “rationalisation” of human conduct as an 
inherent feature of human behaviour. I do not refer here to the Weberian sense of 
“rationalisation”, or to the Freudian: by the rationalisation of conduct I mean that 
human agents chronically, but for the most part tacitly, “keep in touch” with the 
grounds of their activity, as a routine element of that activity.  
(Giddens, 1982: 29-30) 
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Speaking of rationalisation offers an avenue to understand, and certainly accept, the 
intrinsic contradictions and inaccuracies that actors will demonstrate when interpreting 
their reality. This is simply part and parcel of, and in my view the value of, conceiving of 
rationalisation as tacitly keeping in touch with the grounds of one’s activity, as a routine 
element of that activity. 
 
Given that issues such as these are built in the interpretations of reality given by the 
actors, it is unsurprising that these and other ‘distortions’ are also built in the observer’s 
meta interpretation. Let us return to the example of a researcher aiming to understand a 
union’s specific course of action. We know that, at best, we can only glimpse in -and must 
always accept- the rationalisation of human activity by the actors who construct the reality 
we are interested in knowing. But what do we do as researchers in comprehending and 
reporting such information? Most of the time, we do not acknowledge its essential 
unpredictability (hence, ultimately, inexplicability?). Take for example the ‘contingency 
factor’ idea. Drawing on March and Olsen (1979), Jensen et al. (1999) explain this issue 
well.  
 
[P]henomena today regarded as established social facts need not have been the sole 
and ineluctable outcome of a given social and institutional process. The world might 
have turned out otherwise. Or as March and Olsen emphasise, it is a mistake in the 
social sciences to presume that  
 
‘…what happened had to happen. The presumption is one of classical understanding. 
Because the objective is taking as explaining why a particular organisational 
(decision) outcome occurred, the observed event is treated as having an exceptional 
status relative to events that did not occur. Differences between the observed 
outcome and the alternative possible, but not realised, outcomes are seen as 
fundamental. In our judgement, this idea is a mistake. Substantial differences in final 
outcomes are sometimes produced by a small (and essentially unpredictable) 
difference in intermediate events leading to the outcomes… As a result, an 
interpretation of an event should include an interpretation of alternative events that 
could easily have occurred but did not.’ 
(March and Olsen, 1979: 20 cited in Jensen et al., 1999) 
 
Heery (2003) has referred specifically to this problem –though not in these terms- when 
researching union strategy. ‘If there is scope for trade union strategic choice, it follows 
that in a given context two or more equally plausible courses of action are available to 
union leaders’ (Heery, 2003: 295). In his view, industrial relations researchers have  
consistently avoided discussing those alternative courses of action. In others words, 
shouldn’t we give the latter the same ontological value that we give to the actual courses 
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of action? There are, of course, many other sources of ‘distortion’ affecting first and 
second order interpretations (e.g. notion of unintended consequences), but the simple 
notions of rationalisation and contingency factor illustrate some of the inherent difficulties 
associated with the interpretivist ontology and subjective epistemology I have chosen for 
this study.  
 
 
4.2 Qualitative approach 
 
There are numerous definitions of qualitative research. For clarity, a substantial number of 
them contrast quantitative with qualitative studies. According to Cresswell (1994: 2), for 
example, a quantitative study ‘is an inquiry into a social or human problem, based on 
testing a theory composed of variables, measured with numbers, and analysed with 
statistical procedures, in order to determine whether the predictive generalisations of the 
theory hold true’. Alternatively, he defines a qualitative study ‘as an inquiry process of 
understanding a social or human problem, based on building a complex, holistic picture, 
formed with words, reporting detailed views of informants, and conducted in a natural 
setting’ (Cresswell, 1994: 1-2). More extensively, Denzin and Lincoln (1994) define 
qualitative research as 
 
(…) multi-method in focus, involving an interpretive, naturalistic approach to its 
subject matter. This means that qualitative researchers study things in their natural 
settings, attempting to make sense of or interpret phenomena in terms of the 
meanings people bring to them. Qualitative research involves the studied use and 
collection of a variety of empirical materials case study, personal experience, 
introspective, life story interview, observational, historical, interactional, and visual 
texts-that describe routine and problematic moments and meaning in individuals’ 
lives.  
(Denzin and Lincoln, 1994: 2) 
 
It is evident from these definitions that qualitative research posses a series of 
specific characteristics. Michael Patton (1990: 40-41) systematised what he considered to 
be the twelve main characteristics of qualitative research and organised them in the 
following three groups. 
 
Design. Qualitative design strategies share the following three similarities in terms of 
design. (1) Naturalistic inquiry. This refers to studying real-world situations as they unfold 
naturally, in a non-manipulative and non-controlling manner. Qualitative researchers are 
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thus open to whatever emerges from their findings. (2) Emergent design flexibility. 
Qualitative researchers are also open to adapting their inquiry as understanding deepens 
and/or the situations under study change. (3) Purposeful sampling. Cases in qualitative 
research are selected because ‘they are “information rich” and illuminative, that is, they 
offer useful manifestations of the phenomenon of interest (...) (Sampling) is aimed at 
insight about the phenomenon, not empirical generalisation from a sample to a 
population’. 
 
Methods. Qualitative data-collection and fieldwork strategies display four main features 
with regard to methods. (1) Qualitative data. Methods including observations, document 
reviews, and interviews, focus on obtaining detailed, thick descriptions, depth, and direct 
quotations about people’s perspectives and experiences. (2) Personal experience and 
engagement. Qualitative researchers purposefully get close to the phenomenon under 
study, and acknowledge and value their personal experience and insights as critical to 
understanding it. (3) Empathic neutrality and mindfulness. In terms of the researcher’s 
mindset and attitude when collective data, qualitative research emphasises an ‘empathic 
stance’ in interviewing, that is seeking vicarious understanding without judgement 
(neutrality) by showing openness, sensitivity, respect, awareness, and responsiveness; in 
observation it means being fully present (mindfulness)’. (4) Dynamic systems. Qualitative 
researchers pay attention to the process under investigation. They assume change as 
ongoing regardless of their specific focus, and hence mindful of and attentive to system 
and situation dynamics. 
 
Analysis. The strategies of analysis employed by qualitative researchers share five major 
characteristics. (1) Unique case orientation. The main assumption that guides qualitative 
research is that each case is special and unique. ‘The first level of analysis is being true to, 
respecting, and capturing the details of the individual cases being studied’. (2) Inductive 
analysis and creative synthesis. Qualitative research is characterised by immersion in the 
details of the data to discover patterns, themes, and relations. ‘(It) begins by exploring, 
then confirming guided by analytical principles rather than rules, (and) ends with a 
creative synthesis’. (3) Holistic perspective. The phenomenon under study is seen as a 
complex whole system that us more than the sum of its parts. As a result, the relations and 
dynamics studied ‘cannot be meaningfully reduced to a few discrete variables and linear, 
cause-effect relationships’. (4) Context sensitivity. It places findings in a social, historical, 
and temporal context. It is ‘careful about, even dubious, of the possibility or 
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meaningfulness of generalisations across time and space; emphasises instead careful 
comparative case analyses and extrapolating patters for possible transferability and 
adaptation in new settings’. (5) Voice, perspective, and reflexivity. Complete objectivity 
being impossible and pure subjectivity undermining credibility, the focus of qualitative 
researchers becomes ‘balance’ or ‘understanding and depicting the world authentically in 
all its complexity while being self-analytical, politically aware, and reflexive in 
consciousness’. 
 
Limitations of qualitative research 
 
The process of qualitative research ‘often feel very untidy because it is harder to control 
their pace, progress, and end points’ (Easterby-Smith et al., 2002: 42). This is because 
gathering evidence can take a great amount of time and resources and because its analysis 
and interpretation may be very difficult. Whipp (1998) has identified three main problems 
of qualitative research: generalisation, induction, and mystery. Firstly, qualitative studies 
are often criticised for their concern with the particular at the expense of the general. In 
other words, it has been argued that the concepts and constructs derived from qualitative 
studies have hardly any relevance to other settings because they are based on a small 
scale. The latter is usually the case, but the size of the sample is not what necessarily 
allows a qualitative study to contribute to knowledge. In fact, qualitative theory building 
can benefit from highly specific conclusions because it is focused on meanings not in 
frequency. Secondly, since theory emerges from the evidence collected, it is sometimes 
the result of what Eisenhardt (1989 in Whipp, 1998) calls ‘creative leaps’, which are 
usually not reported and make difficult for other researchers to understand or ‘replicate’ 
the study and findings. Thirdly, the immersion of the researcher in their study and the lack 
of exposition of how evidence was collected, categorised, and analysed, tend to generate 
an ‘aura of mystery’ surrounding qualitative findings. The need for transparency in how 
sense was made from the raw evidence is therefore crucial in qualitative research.  
 
There are several strategies for undertaking qualitative research. They include 
phenomenology, ethnography, grounded theory, and the case study. There are significant 
differences between them but without exception, all share the twelve characteristics in 
relation to design, methods, and analysis as well as the three areas of limitations discussed 
in this section. In what follows, I focus on the research strategy chosen for this project: the 
case study. 
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4.3 Case study as research strategy 
 
The distinctive need for case studies arises out of the desire to understand complex social 
phenomena. As strategy it allows an investigation to retain the holistic and meaningful 
characteristics of real-life events. There are numerous definitions of case study. Goode 
and Hatt (1952: 331, my emphasis) defined case study as a ‘way of organising social data 
so as to preserve the unitary character of the social object being studied’ thereby 
underlining the strategy’s holistic perspective. Eisenhardt (1989: 534) defines it as ‘a 
research strategy which focuses on understanding the dynamics present within single 
settings’. In his classic definition, Yin (1984: 23) also emphasises the case study’s 
strength in accommodating multiple data sources and its sensitivity to context. He defines 
case study as ‘an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within 
its real-life context; when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly 
evident; and in which multiple sources of evidence are used’ (Yin, 1994: 13). Finally, 
Eckstein (1975: 81) refers to the case study as ‘trying to capture the whole, (being) 
intensive in nature, and open-ended and flexible at all stages of the research process’.  
 
Suitability of case study as research strategy for this study 
 
One way of exploring the suitability of the case study as research strategy is by looking at 
its advantages and disadvantages relative to other research strategies. That a particular 
strategy is relatively more or less advantageous that others depends, according to Yin 
(1984: 13), upon (1) the type of research question, and (2) the control an investigator has 
over the actual behavioural events, and the focus on contemporary as opposed to historical 
phenomena.  
 
(1) Type of research questions and types of case studies. Yin distinguishes principally 
between ‘what’, ‘how’ and ‘why’ research questions. A study’s emphasis or emphases on 
one or more of these types of questions should in turn lead to undertaking exploratory, 
descriptive, and/or explanatory types of case studies. 
 
There are two basic types of ‘what’ questions. Some ‘what’ questions can be 
described as exploratory. This type of question is a justifiable rationale for conducting an 
exploratory study, the goal being to develop pertinent hypotheses and propositions for 
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further inquiry. But this type of ‘what’ question is also an acceptable rationale for 
conducting a descriptive study. In this study, ‘exploratory what questions’ are evident in 
all three sets of research questions: challenges; strategies and outcomes; and explaining 
strategies and outcomes. That the research questions led us to conduct a largely 
exploratory and descriptive case study is hardly surprising given the current state of 
empirical research in Chile’s large-scale copper mining sector, with only one major study 
conducted since the beginning of the mining boom (Agacino et al., 1998). But although 
necessary, an exploratory/descriptive case study is not sufficient to address the remaining 
research questions. 
 
Indeed, a second type of ‘what’ question is said to take the form of ‘how many’ or 
‘how much’. While ‘exploratory what-questions’ favour case studies, questions such as 
these are more likely to favour survey or documentary analysis. Questions involving 
assessments of union success and failure normally favour this type of research (e.g. union 
membership and density statistics, data on collective contracts, industrial conflict, etc.). 
Although every effort has been made in this study to obtain and present reliable data in 
this regard, most of the evidence collected has been obtained from interviews, which, as 
we shall see below, could have serious limitations. But it is important to bear in mind that, 
rather than concentrating on ‘objective indicators’ of union effectiveness, this study aims 
to provide a more holistic, and admittedly more subjective, assessment on the possibilities 
and limitations of different types of emerging collective action. 
 
In contrast to ‘what’ questions, ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions are more explanatory 
and likely to lead to the use of case studies, histories, and experiments as the preferred 
research strategies. This is because such questions ‘deal with operational links needing to 
be traced overtime, rather than mere frequencies or incidence’ (Yin, 2003: 6). In this 
study, ‘how’ questions complement ‘what’ questions in the second set of research 
questions: strategies and outcomes. This is because these questions deal with ‘what’ 
strategies as well as with ‘how’ these strategies have emerged and evolved over time. In 
other words, they consider the content as well as the processes of union strategy.  
 
‘How’ and ‘why’ questions constitute the bulk of the third set of research questions: 
factors and dynamics. Here I am concerned with explaining the adoption of particular 
strategies and the development of distinct types of trade unionism, as well as with 
explaining their relative success or failure. In other words, in answering these questions, 
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the study aims at identifying the key factors and dynamics that may be explaining the 
differences in form, evolution, and outcomes of union strategy and types of trade 
unionism. The use of the verb may here is not casual, and underlines the qualitative 
character of this study i.e. being to develop pertinent hypotheses and propositions for 
further inquiry. 
 
(2) Extent of control over behavioural events and degree of focus on contemporary as 
opposed to historical events. In contrast to historical methods, case studies are preferred 
when the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within some real life context, and when 
the investigator has little control over events. 
 
The distinctive contribution of the historical method is in dealing with the ‘dead’ 
past, that is, when no relevant persons are alive to report, even retrospectively, what 
occurred. Nevertheless, histories can be done about contemporary events; in this 
situation, the strategy begins to overlap with that of the case study. The case study is 
preferred in examining contemporary events, but when the relevant behaviours 
cannot be manipulated. Experiments, in contrast, are done when an investigator can 
manipulate behaviour directly, precisely, and systematically. Thus the case study 
relies on many of the same techniques as a history, but it adds direct observation and 
systematic interviewing as sources of evidence.  
(Yin, 2003: 7) 
 
In sum, the case study strategy in its various forms (exploratory, descriptive, and 
explanatory) provides for a highly suitable strategy to investigate the issues raised by the 
research questions that guide this study. 
 
 
4.4 Research design 
 
I have previously discussed the main features of qualitative research in terms of design, 
methods, and analysis. I now turn to the specific decisions that have informed each of 
these areas in this study. While in this section I focus on research design, the last two 
sections of this chapter centre on research methods and analysis respectively. 
 
A research design is the logic that links the data to be collected (and the conclusions 
to be drawn) to the initial questions of a study. Every empirical study has an implicit, if 
not explicit research design. In the most elementary sense, the design is the logical 
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sequence that connects the empirical data to a study’s initial research questions and, 
ultimately, to its conclusions. 
 
A research design is much more than a work plan. The main purpose of the design is 
to help to avoid the situation in which the evidence does not address the initial 
research questions. In this sense, a research design deals with a logical problem and 
not a logistical problem. 
(Yin, 2003: 7) 
 
This is of critical importance and in order to avoid this problem, Martyn 
Denscombe (2007) has identified five necessary components of case study research 
design. 1) Research questions capture what the researcher is ultimately interested in 
answering. As I have discussed above, they can take the form of what, how, and/or why 
questions. But research questions do not necessarily indicate what the researcher should 
investigate in order to answer their questions. This is the role of the 2) study propositions. 
Theoretically informed propositions explicitly point to what should be studied in order to 
answer the research questions. The third element of case study research design is to make 
explicit the 3) Unit of analysis, or what the case is? Once the unit of analysis has been 
defined, researchers should be able to specify 4) the logic linking the data to the 
propositions, and 5) the criteria for interpreting the findings. This will depend of course 
on the theoretical state of the art in any given discipline or field of study. Although there 
are few prescriptions on how to realise the last two components, the research design 
should tell the researcher what is to be done after the data has been collected. 
 
Given that I have already introduced the study research questions in Section 4.1, 
and that the state of the art does not allow for an extensive consideration of components 
(d) logic linking the data to the propositions and (e) criteria for interpreting the findings, 
in what follows I centre exclusively components (2) study propositions and (3) unit of 
analysis. When discussing the former I refer to the framework of analysis that guides this 
study, and when examining the latter I refer to my choice of case study research design, 
definition of population, and selection of cases.  
 
Study propositions: a preliminary framework for analysis 
 
Denscombe (2007) argues that in covering the preceding five components researchers are 
forced to constructing a preliminary theory related to the topic of study. The role of theory 
development prior to the conduct of any data collection is an important point of difference 
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between case studies and other qualitative methods such as ethnography and grounded 
theory.  
 
For case studies, theory development as part of the design phase is essential, whether 
the ensuing case study’s purpose is to develop or test theory. (…) A good case study 
investigator should make the effort to develop this theoretical framework no matter 
whether the study is explanatory, descriptive, or exploratory. The use of theory, in 
doing case studies, is not only an immense aid in defining the appropriate research 
design and data collection but also becomes the main vehicle for generalising the 
results of the case study. 
(Denscombe, 2007) 
 
Theory development as part of case study research is crucial. However, it takes time and 
can be difficult (Eisenhardt, 1989). For some topics, existing works may provide a rich 
theoretical framework for designing a specific case study. But for other topics, the existing 
state of knowledge may be poor, and the available literature provides no agreed 
conceptual framework (Eisenhardt, 1989). In this study, several theoretical gaps were 
identified in the industrial relations literature; the most relevant of which was the lack of 
an agreed framework to define, analyse, and explain union power, strategy, effectiveness 
and revitalisation. 
 
Although the structure of this thesis may suggest otherwise, the research questions 
shifted before, during and after data collection had begun. Similarly, the theoretical 
concepts that sustain this study have changed throughout the duration of the project. 
Indeed, what was presented in Chapter 3 as a ‘Preliminary framework for analysis’ began 
to take shape only after data collection had concluded, and has kept evolving ever since.  
 
In what follows I briefly show the way in which I have ‘operationalised’ the study’s 
propositions (challenges, strategies and outcomes, and explanation of strategies and 
outcomes). By necessity, this ‘operationalisation’ is context dependent and to fully 
appreciate some of the decisions presented below, a rough knowledge of the population 
and cases selected is necessary. Should the reader be unfamiliar with them, I would advise 
them to previously examine these chapter’s eponymous sections. 
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Challenges 
 
The review of the literature on union decline pointed at four sets of factors resulting from 
crosscutting two dimensions: external/internal, and structural/strategic factors. What 
specific factors to consider in each cell is of course likely to be specific to each case study. 
In the present research, I distinguished a number of explanations for union power decline. 
These can also be seen as sources of challenge: socio-economic change, industrial 
relations institutions, state strategies, employer strategies, union constituencies, union 
structures, and union strategies (Figure 2.1 in Chapter 2). 
 
Socio-economic change. I mean to refer here to the politico, economic, and social factors 
that constitute the changing nature of the political economy in which trade unions operate. 
For reasons of space, the treatment of these variables can only be schematic and thus I 
refer to the changing nature of the Chilean political system (from parliamentary, to 
presidential, to authoritarian, and back to presidential), the economy both in terms of its 
orientation and role of the state (laissez-faire outward-oriented, import-substituting 
industrialisation inward-oriented, and neoliberal outward oriented), and social welfare 
(from market state-society relations to non-market, back to market relations). 
 
Industrial relations institutions. In this research, industrial relations institutions are mainly 
understood as ‘labour regulation’ and thus largely focuses on labour law. In Chile and in 
the rest of Latin America, legislation has been historically the main means for regulating 
the labour market and introducing change in industrial relations (Morgado, 1999). As 
Cook (1998: 312) has noted, ‘changes in the law (…) provide a good indication of the 
nature of change (and also), the negotiation and conflict that surround efforts to revise the 
labour law reflect a struggle to redefine the key institutions of industrial relations’. I am 
particularly interested in the degree to which these institutions have facilitated or 
repressed the development of collective action. 
 
State strategies. I am interested in the changing nature of governmental policy toward 
unions and the extent to which it facilitates or represses the development of collective 
action. I employ Adams’s (1993) threefold categorisation of governmental policy toward 
unions and collective bargaining: suppression, (grudging) toleration, and encouragement. 
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Employer strategies. Similarly, I look at the degree to which employer strategies facilitate 
or repress collective action. In addition to Adam’s (1993) categories, I draw on Crouch’s 
(1982) classification of employer strategies in resisting unionisation in terms of evil, fear, 
and sweet stuff. But because employers are the main actors in decentralised industrial 
relations systems, I consider necessary to broaden the notion of employer strategies to 
include a typology of employer regimes as well as their implications for job security. 
Hyman (1997a) combines Streeck’s (1987) two fundamental issues in employer policy to 
draw four basic types of employer regimes. ‘First, whether to attempt to exclude trade 
unions from the regulatory process or to seek to integrate them. (Second), he defines as a 
choice between the “extension of status” (integrating members as stakeholders of the firm) 
and a “return to contract” (seeking flexibility through disposability and hence increasing 
insecurity)’ (Hyman, 1997a). Combining these two choices gives four ideal employer 
regimes: regulated market, soft-HRM, bleak house, and micro-concertation (Figure 4.1).  
 
My review of the literature also showed that factors explaining union power are not 
exclusively external but include internal factors. I emphasised two main structural internal 
factors: union constituencies and union structures. While the definition of the latter is 
quite straightforward, I decided to employ Hyman’s (1997b) four ideal types of labour 
forces to analyse union constituencies. He combines two basic modes of employment 
regulation (individual and collective) and job security (high and low) to distinguish 
between autonomous, casual, protected, and endangered labour forces (Figure 4.2). This 
approach complements the typology of employer regimes introduced above.  
 
Figure 4.1: A Typology of Employer Regimes 
 Exclusion Inclusion 
Status Soft HRM Micro-concertation 
Contract Bleak house Regulated market 
Source: Hyman (1997a) 
 
Figure 4.2: Collective regulation and employment security 
  Dominant mode of employment regulation 
  Individual Collective 
Job security High Autonomous Protected 
 Low Casual Endangered 
Source: Hyman (1997b) 
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The strategic internal factors naturally refer to leadership and union strategy, the focus of 
this study. I will therefore not discuss them here but in the subsections below where I 
show how I operationalised union strategy and outcomes as well as factors and dynamics. 
 
Levels of analysis and historical periods. Each source of challenge was investigated at 
three levels of analysis and over four historical periods. The levels of analysis originally 
included five levels -international, national, industry, sector, and firm/union- but over the 
course of the research, and in the interests of brevity, the international and industry levels 
were dropped at the analysis stage and hence are not contained in sections of their own but 
integrated into sector level discussions. All levels have been defined in a traditional way 
and need no further explanation.  
 
Four historical periods were differentiated at national and sector level. A first 
distinction was made between before and after the imposition of neoliberal restructuring 
in Chile and its mining sector. I liken this distinction to ‘before globalisation’, and the ‘era 
of globalisation’ respectively. Two sub periods can be distinguished ‘before 
globalisation’. (1) Laissez-faire outward-oriented economics and the origins of Chile’s 
large-scale copper mining sector (ca. 1904-1932); and (2) Import-substituting 
industrialisation inward-oriented economics and the consolidation of the sector as 
commanding height of the Chilean economy (ca. 1932-1982).  
 
Similarly, two sub periods can be distinguished since the onset of globalisation. (3) 
Early neoliberal outward-oriented development and the mining boom (1982-1997); and 
(4) Current outward-oriented development and today’s Gran Minería (since 1997). 
Differentiating between the last two sub periods is fuzzy in practice given that the 
distinction refers to the state of research in the area rather than to any significant 
contextual shift. In effect, it reflects the publication of Agacino et al.’s study (1998), the 
only piece of research available on union strategy in La Gran Minería since the early 
1970s, which can be considered the immediate antecedent of this thesis. Crosscutting 
levels of analysis and historical periods led to twelve cells in which each source of 
challenge was investigated (Figure 4.3 opposite page). For reasons of space however, 
admittedly debatable decisions were made in terms of what to include and leave out when 
reporting findings and analyses (Figure 4.4 opposite page). 
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Figure 4.3: Researching challenges 
  Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 
  Ext Int Ext Int Ext Int Ext Int 
Structural         National 
Strategic         
Structural         Sector 
Strategic         
Structural         Firm/ 
Union Strategic         
 
 
 
Figure 4.4: Reporting challenges 
  Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 
  Ext Int Ext Int Ext Int Ext Int 
Structural National 
Strategic 
Chapter 5 Chapters 5, 10 
Structural Sector 
Strategic 
Chapter 6 Chapters 6, 10 
Structural   Firm/ 
Union Strategic   
Chapter 7 Chapters 7, 8, 9, 10 
 
 
 
Strategies and outcomes  
 
I defined union strategy as the pattern of critical, deliberate, and emergent decisions about 
increasing trade union power, or the ability of trade unions to control and access resources 
and sanctions both material and ideological (Hyman and Fryer, 1975). I distinguished the 
following relational dimensions. 
 
Union-Employer relations. Relations with employers include relations between the union 
and all levels of management, but particularly senior management. It considers relations 
with the ‘company’ at different levels: local (where the actual operations take place), 
regional and national headquarters, as well as relations with international headquarters if 
applicable. In the case of contract labour, they refer to relations with (senior) management 
of user and provider enterprises, again at local, regional, national, and international levels. 
‘Adversarialism’ and ‘cooperation’ were defined as the basic choices within this 
dimension. 
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Union-Member relations. Relations with members refer to the way in which unions 
develop their relationship with members and potential members. Choices within this 
dimension were associated with the servicing and organising models. 
 
Union-State relations. Although in this thesis the ‘state’ has been mostly understood as 
government, it also involves state agencies, parliament, and the judiciary. Union-state 
relations have been described in terms of unions seeking to act as political insiders with 
privileged access to state machinery, or act as outsiders relying on mobilisation to 
influence government policy (Heery, 2003). 
 
Union-Labour movement relations refer to a union’s degree of articulation with other 
worker organisations. This refers to the degree of articulation between unions through 
higher-level organisations including federations (e.g. FMC), confederations (e.g. CMCh) 
and international organisations (e.g. IMF) (see section on unit of analysis for more 
details). 
 
Union- Political party relations. Union relations with political parties constitute an 
inescapable element of industrial relations in Chile. Here I refer to formal and informal 
relations with the Communist, Socialist, and Christian Democratic parties, the three main 
parties historically linked with the labour movement as well as relations with loser 
‘political’ movements such as the Anarchist, Trotskyst, and ‘Workers’ Party’. Relations 
with political parties have been analysed in terms of their strength: external lobbying, 
internal lobbying, union-party bonding, and union-dominance (Ludlam et al., 2002). 
 
Union-Society relations. Unions can be said to establish relations with ‘society’. This is 
admittedly an ill-defined category but I decided to include it to capture Touraine’s notion 
of totality or ‘locating one’s own position within a conception of general interest’ 
(Hyman, 2001: 33). I defined various ‘loose indicators’ in this regard. One of them was 
the union’s position in relation to the ‘royalty’ debate, or the extent to which unions made 
this arguably society-wide issue part of their own struggle (see Chapter 6). Another had to 
do with the relations union have established with the local communities in which they 
operate. 
 
While relational dimensions entail what is usually understood as union strategy, 
organisational dimensions refer to variables that are normally considered structural. I 
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argued in the previous chapter that I view them as ultimately ‘strategic’ and hence the 
product of choice. In this project, organisational dimensions have been operationalised as 
follows. Choices of constituency have been examined in terms of representing core and 
periphery workers. I also refer to these groups of workers as ‘direct workers’ and ‘contract 
labour’ respectively. I defined union objectives following Hyman’s (1997b) fourfold 
distinction between ‘bread-and-butter’ agenda of collective bargaining over wages and 
conditions of employment, concerns about workers rights, the politico-legal framework, 
and concerns addressing issues beyond employment such as the environment and the 
community.  
 
The four categories of organisational decisions that constitute the methods of trade 
unionism were operationalised in the following manner. (1) Organisational form or 
external structure’s vertical and horizontal lines of inclusion in terms of firm-level unions 
and inter-firm-level unions respectively (see section on unit of analysis for more details). 
(2) Organisational capacity involves intelligence, strategy and efficacy. These are 
complex issues which assessment goes beyond the resources of this project. It is for this 
reason that an admittedly general and highly subjective assessment by the author has been 
provided in this regard in terms of high, medium, and low (3) Organisational democracy 
or internal structure or governance, refers to the relationship between the leadership and 
members in terms of the choices made in pursuit of enhancing or diminishing workers 
collective capacity (contrast with union-member relations). Here I looked at electoral 
procedures, degree of rank-and-file participation in decision-making, etc. (4) However 
defined, activism combines choices with regard to union-employer and union-member 
dimensions and always involves mobilisation and compromise. Because these aspects 
have already been covered, with activism I referred here solely to its degree aspect. Again 
in a highly subjective, albeit educated, ‘scale’ between high, medium and low. 
 
In terms of the outcomes of union strategy, a distinction can be made between union 
effectiveness and revitalisation. Union strategies or models of trade unionism can be 
described as effective when satisfying at least one of the four dimensions of revitalisation 
identified by Behrens et al. (2004). In the present study, they were defined as follows. 
Membership dimension included data on membership and density as provided by the 
unions. The economic dimension was looked at by reviewing the detail of collective 
contracts and the results of collective bargaining more generally. The political dimension 
entailed unions participation in the policy-making process by interacting at all levels of 
UNION STRATEGIES IN THE ERA OF GLOBALISATION 
88 
government. Last, the institutional dimension addressed unions’ organisational structure 
and governance, by looking at issues including reform of statutes and union election 
results. After realising that effectiveness along these dimensions could (should?) 
ultimately lead to alterations in the nature of employer regimes and labour forces, I 
complemented assessments of effectiveness with assessments in this regard. 
 
In contrast, union revitalisation, must also offer significant difference over the 
overall situation of particular unions and that of the labour movement more generally. I 
employ revitalisation as opposed to effectiveness to refer both to an ongoing process as 
well as to an assessment of a desired outcome, one that involves issues of solidarity and 
sustainability in a broader ‘labour movement’ sense. This did not necessarily mean being 
successful across all four dimensions but it referred to (a admittedly subjective) 
assessment the contribution of a particular organisation, directly or indirectly, to the 
general state of the Chilean labour movement 
 
Factors and dynamics 
 
The last set of concepts employed in this study is meant to help us explain phenomena that 
the previous notions helped us to describe and analyse. This is both important and 
challenging. It is important because although this is study is not explanatory per se 
limiting it to just describe reality would put in question the value of its contribution. It is 
challenging because the field of industrial relations has yet to produce a definite 
(paradigmatic?) framework of analysis which could help us explain these issues. More 
concretely, the field has been criticised for being very competent as passing extensive lists 
of factors as frameworks of analysis, but far less capable of establishing meaningful 
relations within them. 
 
Even when we have understood the main characteristics of an industrial relations 
system, we want an overall framework which tells us which variables are pertinent, 
at which level they should be examined, and what are the important relationships 
between them. (…) Yet, who takes the trouble to draw the revised model based on 
previous work and to see (…) how to fill the boxes and in which direction to place 
the arrows?  
(Beaupain, 1998: 243-244) 
 
Furthermore, Kelly (1998) has sustained that research in industrial relations is 
plagued with so-called ‘multifactor hypotheses’. 
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The multifactor hypothesis is perhaps the most common of all. Sometimes described 
as a model or framework, occasionally even a theory, it consists of the proposition 
that a given phenomenon or event is a complex function of many different factors 
whose relative importance is unknown. (...) It is difficult to think of anything that is 
not included in these ‘frameworks’ and consequently they entail the proposition that 
everything is important. Any piece of evidence could therefore be ‘fitted’ into such 
analytical frameworks and ‘accounted for’ but it is not clear what we would learn. 
Multifactor frameworks or models of this kind may be used as checklists for 
researchers but once they include everything but the kitchen sink they lose all 
meaning. 
(Kelly, 1998: 22-23) 
 
I tried to deal with these limitations by actively seeking to integrate the factors 
described in the previous sections in a meaningful and theoretically sound manner. In 
making the transition from description to explanation, I elaborated on Frege and Kelly’s 
(2003) social movement model of union strategic choice  drawing on the social movement 
and political science literatures. In a nutshell, I drew on the social movement concepts of 
political opportunities, mobilising structures, framing processes, and repertoires of 
contention (McAdam et al., 2001) as preliminary organising and explanatory devices. It is 
not my intention to repeat here what I discussed in the previous chapter but as Figure 4.5 
intends to show, social movement concepts can be employed to organise my ‘list of 
factors’ into three or four rather more manageable concepts. As research on social 
movements demonstrates, similarities and differences in the emergence, form, and 
outcomes of collective action can be explained by different combinations of opportunities, 
mobilising structures, framing processes, and repertoires of contention (McAdam et al., 
2001). But these combinations are not still images but are instead characterised by active 
and constant interaction between actors. While some of these interactions are between 
actors who are structurally antagonistic and involve ‘dynamics of contention’, others are 
between actors with potentially shared interests and may entail ‘powering dynamics’. It 
was therefore my intention to explore the contribution of the notion of mobilisation to 
explain these dynamics. It is mobilisation –and countermobilisation and demobilisation 
for that matter- that appears to fuel the development of industrial relations institutions, the 
actualisation of union power resources, the emergence, form, and effectiveness of union 
strategy and types of trade unionism. Mobilisation is therefore the notion that will 
tentatively inform the overall logic linking the data to the propositions, and the criteria for 
interpreting the findings. 
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Figure 4.5: Factors and dynamics 
 External factors Internal factors 
   
Structural factors Opportunity and Threat 
 
Economic change 
 
Industrial relations institutions 
 
Mobilising structures 
 
Union constituencies 
 
Union structure 
Strategic factors State strategies 
 
Employer strategies 
 
(Union strategy + leadership) 
 
Framing Processes 
 
Repertoires of contention 
 
   
Dynamics of contention Counter-mobilisation / 
Facilitation  
by ruling groups 
 
Power over 
 
Mobilisation / Demobilisation / 
Micromobilisation  
of subordinate groups 
 
Power for 
 
 
Type of case study design, population, unit of analysis, and cases selected 
 
Type of case study: comparative multiple-case study design 
 
Case studies can involve either single-case or multiple-case designs. The single-case 
design examines one single case only. This design is usually justifiable when the case 
represents ‘a critical test of existing theory, a rare or unique circumstance, a representative 
or typical case, or when the case serves a revelatory or longitudinal purpose’ (Yin, 2003: 
45). In contrast, when the same study contains more than a single case, the study has used 
a multiple-case design. Multi case studies examine multiple cases embedded within a 
larger case, that is, the cases share some attributions in common and are variants of some 
larger encompassing category. Multi case studies can be ‘illustrative’ or ‘comparative’. 
Whereas in the former the cases are taken to be normal cases representative of the broader 
category, in the latter the cases are examined in a comparative framework that allows for a 
more nuanced assessment of variation among the cases and processes or conceptual issues 
examined.  
 
The present study was based on a comparative multi case study design of nine cases 
of ‘copper unions’ embedded within the larger ‘Gran Minería’ case. Multiple-case 
RESEARCH APPROACH  
91 
designs have distinct advantages and disadvantages in comparison to single-case designs. 
While the evidence from multiple cases is often considered more robust, the more case 
studied the greater the lack of depth in any single case. It is also widely accepted that the 
conduct of a multiple-case study usually requires extensive resources beyond the means of 
a single student or independent research investigator. In this study, the familiar restrictions 
affecting individual doctoral-level research were augmented due to the choice of case 
study because a sizable part of the research involved the examination of illegal activities 
and sites located in remote geographical locations. I will return to these when discussing 
methods, informants, and issues of access. 
 
Population: Chile’s large-scale copper mining sector 
 
The selection of an appropriate population (or ‘larger’ case) is crucial not only because it 
defines the group of cases from which the sample is drawn but also helps to control for 
extraneous variation and to define the limits for generalising the findings. In this study, 
selected cases have been drawn from Chile’s large-scale copper mining sector.  
 
The choice of Chile is important in contributing to the breath of empirical research. 
This is because Chile is a prominent case in the study of the effects of neo-liberal 
restructuring in middle-income developing countries. On the one hand, Chile is widely 
considered a ‘prominent globaliser’ country (Elliot and Freeman, 2003), one of the 
world’s earliest, boldest, and arguably more successful experiments in neo-liberal 
economics, a precursor of what is now known as globalisation (Kurtz, 1999; Veltmeyer, 
2004). Chile’s approach closely resembles the one recommended by international 
financial institutions to developing countries and neo-liberal policies remain firmly been 
in place after more than three decades. On the other hand, Chile is part of the often-
overlooked group of small middle-income developing countries. These countries are 
quantitative and qualitative distinct from other developing nations. They are of course 
smaller than the up and coming developing nations of China, India, Brazil, and Russia, but 
they also differ in terms of their export base (largely primary), economic history 
(capitalist); and living standards (relatively high, albeit increasingly unequal). 
 
Complementarily, the choice of Chile’s large-scale copper mining sector (La Gran 
Minería) is significant in various respects. Chile is not only the world’s largest copper 
producer but La Gran Minería was restructured along neoliberal lines in the early 1980s, 
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transforming a nationalised industry into a buoyant transnational arena onto which 
massive amounts of foreign direct investment have poured ever since. Chile has been 
voted the ‘world’s best place to do mining’ by conservative think tanks around the world 
and regularly features as international model of the benefits of neo-liberal institutional 
change (The Fraser Institute, 2006, 2007, 2008). 
 
The denomination ‘large-scale copper mining’ (Gran Minería del Cobre) referred 
historically to the group of transnational corporations that dominated the sector since its 
inception in 1904: Anaconda, Kennecott, and Andes Corporations. The denomination was 
useful to distinguish (and to tax) more efficiently the large production volumes of these 
companies as opposed to those of companies belonging in the ‘small and medium copper 
mining’ sector (Pequeña y Mediana Minería del Cobre). After the nationalisation of these 
companies and the establishment of CODELCO in 1976, the term Gran Minería became a 
synonymous of CODELCO. With the arrival in masse of foreign operators since the mid-
1980s, its usage has turned slightly more complicated. On the one hand, statistics 
continued to make the distinction between large- and small-and-medium scales regardless 
of the actual volumes produced. Indeed, according to the way statistics are organised, the 
only ‘large-scale’ company proper remains state-owned CODELCO (1675 kMT from five 
mines), and Escondida (1255 kMT from one mine) although by all means the largest 
individual copper producer in the world, is considered ‘medium-size’ and so do all other 
remaining companies. On the other hand, common usage in popular and academic 
publications has broadened the meaning of the term to include CODELCO and all foreign 
and domestic operators producing more that 10 kMT (see Figure 6.1 and Table 6.1 in 
Chapter 6). 
 
Focusing on one sector within one country has several advantages. First and 
foremost, it allows to hold many national and industry characteristics constant and to 
examine those that vary between the cases, in this case the issue of union strategy. There 
are however various potential weaknesses in choosing La Gran Minería as population. 
One of them concerns its undisputable status as ‘exceptional’ sector of the Chilean 
economy. By and large, it is -and has been- the country’s most important economic sector. 
As a result, various exceptional idiosyncratic features that set copper workers and their 
organisations apart from the typical Chilean worker. The copper worker has been Chile’s 
‘archetypical proletarian’ and ‘model trade unionist’ since the dawn of the twentieth 
century. This privileged status however, has not been translated in a direct involvement 
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and commitment on their part with the rest of the labour movement, and copper miners are 
normally referred to as Chile’s ‘labour aristocracy’ (Zapata, 1975).  
 
In other words, because La Gran Minería is not representative, there are potential 
problems of generalisation. That is of course if generalisation were a concern in the first 
place. For the idea of generalisability holds little meaning in most qualitative research. 
Qualitative research underlines instead the importance of theoretical significance. I have 
already discussed how relevant La Gran Minería is for the purposes of studying the effect 
of neoliberal restructuring in strategic sectors in middle-income developing countries. But 
it is also important to recognise some advantages that are intimately linked to the case’s 
main perceived weakness i.e. its ‘exceptionality’. First, the fact that La Gran Minería has 
been a prominent fault line of the international economy for over a hundred years, has 
placed it at the forefront of socio-technological advances relative to other sectors of the 
Chilean economy and labour movement in a manner that mirrors, and ultimately makes it 
more comparable to, those found in developed countries and strategic sectors in other 
developing countries. Second, the current structure of the sector, featuring an old state-
owned company alongside new transnational operators, provides an ideal setting for 
studying the nature of workers and unions’ responses to globalisation. Last, in a country 
where the study of trade unions has been scarce, copper workers and unions have been, 
relatively speaking, widely studied. The existence of previous literature is an important 
advantage because it allows for longitudinal comparison.  
 
Unit of analysis and selected cases 
 
The unit of analysis was defined as the ‘copper union’ or union organisations of workers 
employed directly by, or labouring indirectly for, large-scale copper mining companies.  
Operationalising the unit of analysis in this way implies two important distinctions, which 
in turn, informed the selection of cases. 
 
A first distinction was made between two types of copper mining producers. On the 
one hand, ‘mining companies’ are copper producers that undertake the whole mining 
process (extraction, production, sales). On the other hand, ‘refineries and other producers’ 
typically deal with the end parts of the process. In this research project, the cases were 
selected from the former category only. A second distinction was made between the two 
main groups of workers that constitute these companies’ workforce. On the one hand, 
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‘direct’ or ‘core’ workers employed directly by mining companies. On the other hand, 
‘contract labour’ or periphery workers, who although work alongside core workers are 
formally employed by a third party. 
 
In line with the selection of the population, the selection of individual cases was not 
based on statistical but on theoretical sampling. This means that every case should serve a 
specific purpose within the overall study, and that each of them must be carefully selected 
so that it either a) predicts similar results (a literal replication) or b) predicts contrasting 
results but for predictable reasons (a theoretical replication) (citation). In this project, this 
meant that a closer look was necessary to differentiate among mining companies, and 
among organisations of core and periphery workers. The selection of cases covered all the 
following distinctions. 
 
My reading of research to date showed that the main sources of variance among 
mining companies appear to be the result of three variables: age (‘old’/before 1982 or 
‘new’/after 1982), type of ownership (state-owned or privately owned), and country of 
origin (national or foreign) (see Chapter 6). Additional sources of variance were examined 
in terms of extraction methods, production processes, and products, but ultimately not 
included in this study.4 Due to the decentralised structure of Chile’s industrial relations 
system, workers organise at the level of the firm that employs them. There are two basic 
structures at their disposal. The smallest –and most prevalent- is the firm-level union 
(sindicato de empresa). Any number of firm-level unions can coexist within a company so 
long as it has more than eight members. These unions sometimes establish formal 
relations between them under umbrella organisations called firm-level federations 
(federaciones de empresa). These organisations can be established with a minimum of 
three firm-level unions. Firm-level unions can also establish relations with peers outside 
the firm through federations (federaciones sindicales), which in turn can join 
confederations (confederaciones sindicales), which in turn can join centrals (centrales 
sindicales). The main form of organisation for core workers is the firm-level union 
because they bargain with the employer who they work for. In large companies firm-level 
federations are found. Based on these considerations, six cases of core worker 
organisations were selected (see Figure 4.6). 
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Figure 4.6: Core worker organisations: cases selected 
Union Type Mining  
company 
Old/New State-owned/ 
Private 
National/ 
Foreign 
      
FTC Firm-level 
federation (24 firm-
level unions 
affiliated) 
CODELCO Old   State-owned National 
      
FSA Firm-level 
federation (6 firm-
level unions 
affiliated) 
Sur Andes Old Private Foreign 
      
Sindicato 
Pelambres 
Firm-level union Los Pelambres New Private National 
      
Sind. 1 M. 
Escondida 
Firm-level union Escondida New Private Foreign 
      
Sindicato  
El Abra 
Firm-level union El Abra New Private and 
State-owned 
National and 
Foreign 
      
Sindicato 
Zaldivar 
Firm-level union Zaldívar New Private Foreign 
      
 
 
 
 
Although the basic form of firm-level organisation is the same for periphery 
workers, it is not the most important. In effect, the so-called inter-firm union (sindicato 
interempresa) has become their main form of organisation. In addition to this, it is 
important to differentiate between types of contract workers, particularly between 
montajistas (construction workers) and non-montajistas (mining and service workers) (see 
Chapter 6). The following three cases of periphery worker organisations were selected 
(Figure 4.7). 
 
 
Figure 4.7: Periphery worker organisations: cases selected 
Union Union type Features Type of worker 
    
SINAMI Inter-firm union National union Montajista 
    
SINTRAC Inter-firm union National union Non-montajista 
    
SITECO 
New CTC 
Inter-firm union 
Firm-level Confederation 
El Teniente 
CODELCO+ 
Non-montajista 
Non-montajista 
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4.5 Research methods 
 
A research method is an individual technique for data collection and analysis. The social 
constructionist approach to social science is typically associated with qualitative –as 
opposed to quantitative- methods. These include documents, archival records, interviews, 
direct observation, participant-observation, and physical artefacts. According to Van 
Mannen (1979: 520 in Cohen, 2003) however, ‘the label qualitative methods has no 
precise meaning in any of the social sciences. It is at best an umbrella term covering an 
array of interpretative techniques which seek to describe, decode, translate and otherwise 
come to terms with the meaning, not the frequency, of certain more or less naturally 
occurring phenomena within the social world.’  
 
The main strength of qualitative methods lies in their ability to look at how 
processes change over time, to understand people’s meanings, to adjust to new issues and 
ideas as they emerge, and to contribute to the evolution of new theories’ (Easterby-Smith 
et al., 2002: 42). Their main limitation however, stems from the low credibility that some 
researchers may give to knowledge based on ‘subjective’ opinions. Indeed, for Silverman 
(2000 in Easterby-Smith et al. 2002: 54) qualitative methods ‘are in danger of being 
dismissed as undisciplined journalism because there are few safeguards to prevent 
researchers, from picking evidence out of the mass of data to support their particular 
prejudices’. A way of dealing with this criticism is through methods that are transparent. It 
is crucial for researchers to explain how they ‘gained access to the particular organisation, 
what processes led to the selection of informants, how data was recorded, what processes 
were used to summarise or collate it, how the data became transformed into tentative ideas 
and explanations, and so on’ (Easterby-Smith et al., 2002: 54). 
 
Case studies typically combine qualitative methods such as archives, interviews, 
questionnaires, and observations. This is not to say that evidence for case studies may not 
come from quantitative methods. In fact, the case study’s unique strength is precisely its 
ability to deal with a full variety of evidence, be it qualitative or quantitative (Yin, 2003). 
In this study, I employed four qualitative sources of evidence: semi-structured interviews, 
documents, and to a lesser extent, questionnaires and participant observation. The 
emphasis put on each of these methods varied according to each set of research questions. 
Thus, for example, while the bulk of the evidence on strategies and outcomes came from 
interviews with union leaders, the majority of the information on union challenges came 
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from documentary and secondary evidence. Using multiple sources of evidence was 
intended in order to develop converging lines of enquiry and corroborating the 
information gathered (‘data triangulation’). 
 
Qualitative interviewing 
 
Interviews can be used for the collection of factual information, but they are better suited 
for the exploration of more complex phenomena. Qualitative interviewing in particular is 
most appropriate where the investigation focuses on the meaning of a particular 
phenomenon to the participants and individual accounts are required of how a particular 
phenomenon developed (Cohen 2003). In other words, when the purpose is ‘to gather 
descriptions of the life-world of the interviewee, (…) to see the research topic from the 
perspective of the interviewee, and to understand how and why they have comes to have 
this particular perspective’ (King, 1994 in Cohen 2003). It is important however not to 
simplify and idealise the complexity of interview situation assuming that interviewees are 
primarily competent and moral truth tellers acting in the service of science and producing 
the data needed to reveal their ‘interior’ (experiences, feelings, values) or the ‘facts’ of the 
organisation (Alvesson, 2003: 24). It is therefore imperative for researchers to act 
reflexively, making conscious and consistent efforts to view the subject matter from 
different angles, avoiding a single, favoured angle and vocabulary’ (Alvesson, 2003: 25). 
 
Choice of key informants. The selection of people to interview was based on non-
probability sampling. Given that the overall aim of the research was to delve in depth into 
a particular situation with a view to exploring the specifics –as opposed to produce results 
that are generalisable- the emphasis was on choosing key players in the field. People were 
chosen deliberately because of the position they held and because they had some special 
contribution to make. In this case this meant union leaders. As I have discussed 
previously, I view human action as arising from the sense that people make of different 
situations, rather than as a direct response to external stimuli. Focusing on union leaders 
and union leaderships allowed me to concentrate on what people, individually and 
collectively, think and feel, trying to understand and explain why they have different 
experiences (Easterby-Smith et al. 2002: 30). A list of all union leaders interviewed is 
presented in Tables 4.1 and 4.2. 
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There are of course obvious limitations on relying almost exclusively on union 
leaders, with a tendency to be self-congratulatory the most evident. Triangulating 
techniques were adopted to mitigate such drawbacks, the most important of which was 
interviews with managers, state officials, academics, and consultants (Tables 4.1 and 4.2). 
 
Access. While gaining access to core workers in union-tolerant regimes was relatively 
straight forward, obtaining interviews from workers in anti-union regimes and periphery 
workers was rather difficult as spying on unions has become a widespread practice in 
Chile. Access was achieved largely through personal contacts occupying key positions in 
unions, political parties, government agencies, and academia that arranged meetings in 
confidential locations (see more details in the next section). 
 
Types and formats. The research draws primarily on semi-structured interviews. In this 
type of interview, the interviewer has a clear list of issues to be addressed and questions to 
be answered, but in contrast to structured interviews, the interview dynamics are flexible, 
the answers are open-ended, and there is more emphasis on the interviewee elaborating 
their points of interest. The most common form of semi-structured interview is the one-to-
one variety involving a meeting between one researcher and one informant. The great 
majority of interviews in this project conformed to this format. A few group (two or more 
informants) and telephone interviews were also conducted (Tables 4.1 and 4.2). 
 
Timing, locations, venues, and length. Interviews took place between December 2003 and 
February 2004, between November and December 2004, and in June 2005. The great 
majority of them were carried out in the cities of Santiago and Rancagua. Visits to Calama 
and Antofagasta were conducted for networking purposes. The venues in which the 
interviews took place varied greatly among the cases and reflect a great deal the union 
situation in each. Meetings with core workers in union-acceptance regimes normally took 
place in company headquarters and in more than one occasion at the HR manager’s 
private office. Interviews with core workers in anti-union regimes were agreed in hotel 
restaurants and bars where informants would be staying overnight while on business in the 
capital. Encounters with contract workers were generally confidential and far less 
formalised as a result. They involved meeting in bars, cafes, train stations, as well as on 
the picket line. 
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Recording and transcription. All interviewees accepted to be recorded and required no 
anonymity after five years. In a couple of occasions, interviews could not be recorded due 
to faulty equipment and notes were taken instead. All interviews were transcribed, coded, 
and analysed with qualitative research software (Tams Analyser). 
 
 
Documents, questionnaires, and participant observation 
 
A systematic effort was made to corroborate and supplement the evidence gathered in the 
interviews by examining documents including government publications and official 
statistics, newspapers, letter and memorandums, police records, and websites. They 
proved useful although not always accurate or extent of bias. A questionnaire was 
designed and sent to the interviewees mid-way through the research to systematise factual 
information (2005), but the response rate was minimal and ultimately dismissed. Last, I 
had the opportunity to spend a couple of days with union leaders at SITECO, observing 
first hand some of the social dynamics that took place within the organisations. 
 
 
Specific limitations that affected this project 
 
Throughout this chapter I have referred to the limitations of my ontological  and 
epistemological assumptions, and methodological choices in terms of strategy, design, and 
methods. It is important however to signal here to the specific limitations that affected this 
project as a result of its choice of case study. The familiar restrictions affecting individual 
doctoral-level research were augmented in this case due to the following three factors. 
 
Geographical dispersion. The research involved the investigation of union activity in 
remote geographical locations. The mining sites to which the thesis refers to are spread 
across a region over 2000 kilometres long (Figures 6.2 and 6.3). Access to these sites is 
restricted and passes must be obtained from the company which routinely refuse them if 
the motive of the visit is union related. The nearest towns to these sites are, on average, 
one to two hours away by car. As my salary as doctoral researcher was simply not enough 
to cover the transportation and accommodation costs involved, I had to resort to stay in 
the capital Santiago and use every possible opportunity to meet informants there. 
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Employer repression and ‘confidentiality’. More often than not, gaining access to union 
leaders had to be cleared by a mutual trusted contact, a reflection of widespread employer 
repression and consistent use of anti-union practices. A telling indicator of the veracity of 
union claims in this regard is anti-union employers’ argument of confidentiality in 
industrial relations. An acquaintance of the author –former classmate and colleague- 
employed by BHP-Billiton and a ‘safe’ informant, apologetically refused any involvement 
with this research, however anonymous, with the words: ‘I cannot talk about it (company 
policy toward unions); I’m not meant to talk about it. Please understand, I could lose my 
job’ (Interviewee X, 2004). 
 
Illegal activities. A great deal of union activity in anti-union regimes is performed along 
the margins of the law. Illegal activities are widespread, from downing tools outside 
process of regulated collective bargaining, to picketing, marches, and sabotage. It is only 
natural that ‘a researcher coming from England’ would be received with suspicion. 
Indeed, what tables 4.1 and 4.2 do not show is the number of failed interviews: the 
countless occasions in which interviews did not take place. Previously agreed meetings 
were called off by mobile phone at the last minute in numerous occasions. This was not a 
reflection of disorganisation on the part of the interviewees but on the contrary a 
systematic process of making sure that I was indeed the one who I said I was! 
 
Working through these theoretical and practical restrictions dominated this research 
project, and this thesis must be seen as the outcome of continuous compromising between 
ends and means. 
 
 
4.6 Research analysis, discussion, and closure 
 
For Eisenhardt (1989) the analysis stage of case study research can be understood on the 
basis of two linked activities. Within-case analysis aims at gaining familiarity with the 
data and preliminary theory generation.  
 
Within-case analysis typically involves detailed case study write-ups for each site. 
These write-ups are often simply pure descriptions, but they are central to the 
generation of insight (Gersick, 1988; Pettigrew, 1988) because they help researchers 
to cope early in the analysis process with the often enormous volume of data. 
However, there is no standard format for such analysis. 
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The overall idea is to become intimately familiar with each case as a stand-alone 
entity. This process allows the unique patterns of each case to emerge before 
investigators push to generalised patterns across cases.  
(Eisenhardt, 1989: 540) 
 
In this study, within-case analysis involved detailed written accounts for each of the nine 
case studies. Interview transcriptions constituted the bulk of the material employed. The 
format of the analysis was informed by the interview guide (in turn constructed based on 
the research questions), and aided by qualitative analysis software (TAMS Analyser). 
Once this initial process was concluded for all cases and interviewees, it became possible 
to write an individual account for each case study using the same structure. The product of 
the nine individual within-case analyses is presented as findings in Chapters 7, 8, and 9. 
 
In contrast, cross-case pattern search is important to reduce the complexity 
resulting from a large number of in-depth cases, to be able to better deal with the 
conceptual implications of the findings. It forces investigators to look beyond initial 
impressions and see evidence through multiple lenses. In addition to the extensive use of 
triangulation, three tactical steps were taken in this study to look at the data in divergent 
ways and avoiding reaching premature conclusions.  
 
(1) Case grouping. The first tactic consisted on grouping the nine accounts into 
threes for comparison: old/core, new/core, and periphery. The product of this first tactical 
step is evident in the grouping of cases that resulted in Chapters 7, 8 and 9.  
 
(2) Within group cross-case analysis. The second tactic consisted on looking for 
within-group similarities coupled with intergroup differences in each of the three groups 
identified. This tactic forces researchers to look for the subtle similarities and differences 
between the cases. (Eisenhardt, 1989: 540). The product of this second tactical step is 
presented in the first part of Chapter 10.  
 
(3) Cross-group analysis. The third and last tactical step consisted on comparing 
between the (evolution of the) three groups of cases in order to provide for sector level 
answers. The product of this third tactical step is presented in the second part of Chapter 
10.  
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The last step in the highly iterative process of case study research is to compare the 
evidence from each case with the reviewed literature. ‘This involves asking what is this 
similar to, what does it contradict, and why’ (Eisenhardt, 1989: 544). The product of this 
enfolding of the literature is presented as ‘discussion and closure’ in Chapter 11.  
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THE TRANS FO RMATION O F CHILEA N 
INDUST RIAL RELAT IONS 
 
Evolution of Opportunity at National Level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The political, economic, and social transformations initiated by the Pinochet dictatorship 
(1973-1990) and continued by the Concertación governments (1990-present) have come 
to be seen as one of the most internally consistent –and arguably most successful- neo-
liberal models in the world. Although ‘transformation’ is an appropriate label to describe 
these changes, they also reflect permanent themes in the orientation of the Chilean 
economy, the regulation of labour, and the choices of the parties. In order to contextualise 
the findings that I will present in chapters 7, 8, and 9, it is therefore necessary to examine 
the evolution of the political economy in which the Chilean labour movement has 
developed since the nineteenth century. This is twofold. While in the present chapter I 
focus on the national level, in the following chapter I centre on the copper mining sector. 
 
I have organised this chapter into six sections that correspond to equal number of 
historical periods. By and large each of these sections follow a similar structure but the 
length and emphases among these sections vary. Thus, while sections 5.1 (1810-1932) and 
5.2 (1932-1976), deal concisely with the orientation of the economy, the nature and 
choices of industrial relations actors, as well as the main features of labour regulation, 
section 5.3 (1976-present), is more extensive and emphasises the main issues that have 
marked the evolution of Chilean industrial relations since the onset of ‘globalisation’. I 
review the politico-economic transformations introduced by the Pinochet dictatorship and 
the neoliberal revamp of industrial relations legislation; discuss the Concertación 
governments and concentrate on the issue of labour reform; and introduce the issue of 
outsourcing, Chile’s ‘new social question’. 
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5.1 Laissez- faire  outward oriented development (1810-1932) 
 
Chile declared its independence in 1810, after two and a half centuries in which the key to 
prosperity had been exports of minerals (gold, silver, copper) and, in a smaller scale, 
agricultural products (wood, wine, wheat). This reflected the well-documented division of 
labour between Spain, the imperial power producer of manufactures and capitals, and a 
captive colonial market, consumer of such products and supplier of raw materials. The 
successive export cycles of the colonial period (1541-1810) progressively linked the 
Chilean economy with more dynamic markets: the Viceroyalty of Perú first, then directly 
with Spain, and later with the emerging capitalist powers of North America.  
 
The early republic (1810-1880) 
 
Shortly after declaring independence, the new republic passed the Free Market Act of 
1811, confirming the country’s long standing ‘export vocation’ (Pinto and Salazar, 2002). 
But it took another eight years for the new republic to effectively attain independence and 
another decade and a half to achieve political and economic stability. 
 
The 1833 Constitution defined the basic political institutions that would set Chile 
apart from most of its Latin American neighbours: a democratic and stable presidential 
system that ensured the peaceful transfer of power every five years. The key to this was 
not only political of course, but it was possible thanks to Chile’s ability to produce a 
sustainable export-economy since the early 1830s. Key export sectors were mining and 
agriculture, and early industrial relations activity first appeared in these sectors. Indeed, 
Chile’s first ‘labour rebellion’ broke out in the Northern silver mining camp of 
Chañarcillo in 1833. The earliest of employers associations -the National Society of 
Agriculture (Sociedad Nacional de Agricultura, henceforth SNA)- was originally 
established in 1838 as a private ‘humanist’ institution that sought to collaborate with the 
authorities in the development of the country (Arriagada, 2004). 
 
By the 1860s, Chile was developing a modern albeit small industrial sector in its 
urban areas. As elsewhere, the adoption of the factory system turned declining artisans 
into urban workers facing harsh working conditions. These workers began to associate and 
formed political clubs, mutual insurance and friendly societies, night schools and choral 
and theatre groups. In the absence of legislation governing work and employment –the 
THE TRANSFORMATION OF CHILEAN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 
109 
only exception being the legal presumption in favour of masters in relation to domestic 
‘servants’- these organisations were born under the 1857 Civil Code that guaranteed 
ample freedom of association (Walker, 2002).  
 
The ‘Nitrate Republic’ (1880-1932) 
 
Although the period between 1830 and 1880 is generally considered one of political 
stability and relative prosperity, Chile’s excessive openness to international trade made it 
extremely vulnerable to international crises, such as the 1873-78 world recession. Indeed, 
for some commentators, the resulting economic and social crisis was a contributing cause 
behind the War of the Pacific (1879-1885) in which Chile annexed massive portions of 
Peruvian and Bolivian territory. The exploitation of this nitrate-rich land inaugurated an 
unprecedented cycle of prosperity and was crucial in the development of Chile’s labour 
movement.  
 
Bergquist (1986: 37) argues that although early trade unions flourished in the cities, 
‘the root of the distinctiveness of Chile’s labour movement lays in the special experience 
of workers in nitrate production’. Indeed, despite harsh employer and state repression, 
nitrate workers were remarkably successful in forming organisations capable of exerting 
important influence in political life. All of Chile’s early workers’ organisations were 
evident in this sector: resistance societies (sociedades de resistencia), mutual -or friendly- 
societies (sociedades de socorros mutuos), trade unions (sindicatos), and alliances of 
mutual societies and unions called mancomunales.  
 
These organisations reflected the two main ideological tendencies of the period. On 
the one hand, Anarcho-Syndicalists organised in resistance societies emphasising 
individual freedom, spontaneous grass-roots action and adamant opposition to both 
petitioning the state and to forming political parties to contest state power-. On the other 
hand, Socialists formed trade unions in order to promote collaboration with other classes’ 
progressive sectors and in this way to better position the working class. Socialists 
combined in electoral coalitions with parties that had reformist, nationalist aspects to their 
programs seeking to promote legislative solutions to working-class problems at the 
national level (Bergquist, 1986: 57-58).  
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Anarchists were initially much stronger than socialists in the nitrate regions and have 
been credited with organising much of the social conflict that challenged the laissez-faire 
and repressive era that followed the 1891 Civil War. 
 
Three decades of a strictly “free”, unregulated labour market followed (the Civil 
War), backed up by the use of secret agents to spy on unions and troops to break 
strikes. This first laissez-faire era saw an average of one regional general strike a 
year, and the consolidation of a radical labour movement dependent on combined 
political and trade union forms of action, whose more important historical reference 
point would hereafter be the massacre of hundreds (…) of passively protesting nitrate 
miners, wives and children by government troops at Santa María de Iquique in 1907.  
(Roddick, 1989: 196) 
 
After the events of Santa María de Iquique, a new wave of systematic state and employer 
repression was unleashed. In this period, unions’ concrete gains were fragile and largely 
dependent on the cyclical booms and slumps in the nitrate economy. But the social 
question had begun to influence policy making. Between 1907 and 1920, the state enacted 
primitive labour legislation including the regulation of Sunday rest (1907) and the ‘Chair’ 
Act of 1915 that mandated employers to provide chairs for all employees.5 Limited as 
they were, these pieces of legislation evidenced the limits of repression as well as the 
increasing power of organised labour.  
 
While Socialists and their early trade unions receded greatly, resistance and mutual 
societies were able to establish the first higher-level workers’ organisations. The Chilean 
Federation of Labour (Federación de Obreros de Chile, henceforth FOCH) was 
established in 1909 as mutualist organisation and the Chilean section of the anarchist 
International Workers of the World (henceforth IWW) was founded in 1919. Between 
1916 and 1919, FOCH and the IWW led an unprecedented wave of mass mobilisation and 
union organisation. 
 
In general however, the mobilisation-and-counter mobilisation pattern of the period 
saw waves of successful strikes followed by periods when unions virtually disappeared 
thanks to renewed government repression or the re-emergence of urban unemployment as 
mines closed and miners were deported south’ (Roddick, 1989: 190). In this context, 
Roddick (1989) argues, political parties became more important than trade unions in 
providing continuity and representation for the labour movement, and by the end of the 
First World War, the basis of adhesion to national trade union confederations was political 
loyalty. While supporters of the Democratic Party (Partido Democrático, 1897) and 
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Socialist Labour Party (Partido Obrero Socialista, 1912) were members of FOCH, 
followers of anarcho-syndicalism joined the IWW (Zapata, 2007). In 1921 FOCH joined 
the Third International and the Socialist Labour Party was re-established as the 
Communist Party of Chile in 1922.  
 
These and other events forced the Chilean ruling class to make concessions and 
adopt a new strategy of labour control. In 1924, President Arturo Alessandri presented 
congress with a Labour Code bill based on the founding principles of the ILO. The 
opposition to the Labour Code was fierce, and it was not until direct intervention by the 
military on 8 September, that Congress reluctantly passed seven separate acts but not the 
Code as a whole.  
 
These acts covered Contract of Employment for Blue-collar Workers (Law No. 
4053), Compulsory Health and Disability Insurance (4054), Industrial Accidents (4055), 
Arbitration and Conciliation Tribunals (4056), Trade Union Organisations (4057), 
Cooperative Societies (4058), and legislation on White-collar employees (4059) (Walker, 
2002). Various other separate pieces of legislation were passed between 1925 and 1931 in 
the midst of a progressive breakdown of the political system. These included Maternity 
Protection in 1925 (DL 442) and the establishment of Labour Tribunals (DL 2100) in 
1927. All these laws were later consolidated and revised in the 1931 Labour Code (DFL 
178) which also included new legislation covering agricultural work, home workers, and 
sea workers (Walker, 2002). 
 
While Socialists and Communists backed legalisation by accommodating and 
participating within its limits, anarchists kept promoting syndicalism free from regulations 
and the state. It is widely acknowledged that the late-1920s represented the beginning of 
the end for anarchist influence. As Bergquist (1986: 57-58) explains, ‘systematic 
repression and the failure of direct action, coupled with the growing success of socialist 
union-organising and electoral strategies in the north in the 1920s, led anarchist influence 
to give way slowly to that of socialist militants (whose) strategy appeared to be far more 
effective, and much less dangerous, to the Chilean working class than the 
uncompromising stance of the anarchists’. 
 
In contrast to the development of organised labour, the Nitrate Republic saw a far 
slower evolution in the nature of employer organisations. The main organisations of the 
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period were seen and saw themselves as technical organisations concerned with the 
development of agriculture, industry, or mining, providing training, publications, libraries, 
and statistics to their affiliates and the state. The Society for the Promotion of Industry 
(Sociedad de Fomento Fabril, henceforth SOFOFA) for example, was established in 1883 
following a petition from the chancellor to the SNA to create a new organisation to foster 
industrial progress. For its first forty years SOFOFA was widely perceived as a para-state 
‘organisation of gentlemen interested in industrial progress’ (Arriagada, 2004).  
 
Similarly, the Society of Nitrate Producers (Sociedad de Productores del Salitre) 
was initially established as a marketing organisation to stimulate international demand for 
nitrate. This, according to Arriagada, was only natural as ‘these organisations were part 
and parcel of a society where political and economic power were virtually 
indistinguishable. In this context, conceiving of these organisations as representatives of 
employers’ interests did not make much sense: before whom? What for?’ (Arriagada, 
2004). 
 
 
5.2 ISI inward-oriented development (1932-1976) 
 
The early 1930s mark a major rupture in Chile’s political economy and development of 
industrial relations, as the milieu of political, economic and social adjustments known as 
inward-oriented development began to consolidate on the basis of three pillars: import-
substituting industrialisation, the 1925 Constitution, and the 1931 Labour Code. 
Economically, Chile became the worst casualty of the world’s Great Depression with 
exports and imports decreasing 78.3% and 83.5% respectively between 1929 and 1932. In 
comparison, the world economy contracted ‘only’ by 25% (Pinto and Salazar, 2002). As 
elsewhere, the Great Depression abruptly ended Chile’s long affair with free market 
outward-oriented economics. In a few years, the Popular Front -a coalition of centrist 
‘radicals’ and communists elected in 1938- led the introduction of import-substituting 
industrialisation, a strategy designed to ‘developing industries oriented toward the 
domestic market by using trade restrictions such as tariffs and quotas to encourage the 
replacement of imported manufactures by domestic products’ (Krugman and Obstfeld, 
2003: 258).  
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Politically, the 1925 Constitution came into force in 1932 replacing a corrupted 
pseudo-parliamentary system with a presidential system. Most importantly, the new 
Constitution provided the broad political framework that would back the interventionist 
state and sustain the industrial relations legal framework contained in the 1931 Labour 
Code (Lucena and Covarrubias, 2006).  
 
The 1931 Labour Code explicitly recognised the power imbalance between labour 
and capital, and ‘reflected the belief that the state should intervene to protect the 
individual worker against employers’ (Cook, 1998: 313). Individual legislation in this 
period has been characterised as protective as well as extensive, highly detailed and 
containing numerous special norms (Cook, 1998; Mizala and Romaguera, 2001; Walker, 
2002). Protective legislation was evident in norms such as minimum wages regulating 
certain occupations (tarifados) and regulations governing dismissal, which from 1966 was 
not allowed without just cause.  
 
With regard to collective regulation, the Code was restrictive subjecting unions to 
the supervision of the state and instituted fragmented collective bargaining as the norm 
(Córdova, 1996). The code recognised two types of workers: blue- and white-collar 
workers (obreros and empleados) who were forbidden to join the same union, but had to 
organise in separate industrial and professional unions respectively. Separate social 
security schemes were created for different categories of workers. Public sector workers 
were not allowed to form unions or to negotiate although bargaining took place in 
practice. State intervention was particularly evident in the Ministry of Labour’s role in 
collective bargaining, from which unions had to secure permission before negotiating, 
supervised their finances, and run an obligatory conciliation service, which in turn, 
sanctioned the legality or illegality of strikes. No strike funds were allowed.  
 
For employers, these broad economic and social changes were experienced as a 
‘first major scare’ (Arriagada, 2004). The Great Depression eroded the basis of Chile’s 
laissez-faire pattern of accumulation and for the first time upper classes began losing 
control of the state apparatus, which would became the preserve of middle class 
professionals and a major employer on its own right. Moreover, the likely expansion of 
unionisation -and inspections by state officials particularly in the countryside- threatened 
centuries-old privileges and were not to be tolerated.  
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Arriagada (2004) argues that employers reacted to their first major scare in three 
different ways. First, employers transformed their original ‘humanist’ organisations 
(organizaciones de fomento) into associations (gremios), aiming to represent their 
interests before the state and other actors, and not simply to promote the development of 
their sectors. Second, they established in 1934 the Confederation of Commerce and 
Production (Confederación de la Producción y del Comercio, henceforth CPC), as top 
employers association uniting industry (SOFOFA) and agriculture employers (SNA). 
Third, the SNA founded a short-lived ‘Agrarian Party’ in view of the limited effectiveness 
of traditional oligarchic political parties -Liberals and Conservatives- to defend the 
interests of capitalists and landowners in Congress. 
 
But the united front between industrialists and landowners was largely artificial and 
as a result, the CPC was to play no major role throughout this period. Indeed, it became 
soon apparent that SOFOFA and SNA were to pursue very different courses of action. The 
conservative and powerful SNA chose to isolate the agricultural sector from social 
changes that, in their view, pertained exclusively to the cities. Between 1924 and 1967 for 
example, the SNA was remarkably successful in impeding the extension of trade union 
legislation -and indeed of social legislation in general- onto the agricultural sector and the 
countryside. SOFOFA on the other hand, had close links with the Liberals, and the 
association’s 1933 Plan de Fomento de la Producción reads like an early import-
substituting industrialisation manifesto in which industrialists ask for direct support of the 
state –through guaranteeing loans- to develop a domestic private industry. Unsurprisingly, 
the state related with each of these organisations separately and as a result the state and 
SOFOFA became natural allies while the SNA excluded itself from the transformations 
that were taking place. 
 
For the labour movement, adapting to its new ‘regulated’ condition was a 
remarkable challenge. On the one hand, Socialists and Communists identified with the 
Popular Front coalition and participated in government between 1938 and 1948. They 
formed the Workers Confederation of Chile (Confederación de Trabajadores de Chile, 
henceforth CTCH), soon to became Chile’s main labour confederation and committed to 
abide by the collective bargaining institutions of the 1931 Labour Code and observe 
‘social peace’ while in government. As a result, the new system of industrial relations 
began to settle and industrial conflict decreased considerably throughout the decade. The 
few strikes that had national resonance were denounced by the CTCH as the product of 
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anarchist desperation. ‘Trotskyites manoeuvres which, just like capitalists, try to drive 
workers to strike in order to unleash confusion, let sabotage loose, and favour unpatriotic 
plans’ (Barría, 1970: 12).  
 
On the other hand, anarchists were largely ineffective in avoiding the consolidation 
of their rivals’ ‘legal Marxist unionism’ as the dominant force within the labour 
movement. Anarchists created the Workers General Confederation (Confederación 
General de Trabajadores, CGT) to compete with the CTCH but by the early 1950s, the 
influence of the anarchist movement had nearly vanished from national-level 
organisations. Indeed, the CGT backed up the formation of the United Workers Central in 
1953 (Central Única de Trabajadores, henceforth CUT), effectively a merging of all 
major confederations after the dissolution of the CTCH (Ulloa, 2003). 
 
The main characteristics of the labour movement’s ‘classic strategy’ (‘classic 
unionism’ or ‘legal Marxist unionism’) began to crystallise after the formation of CUT. 
Organised labour’s ‘classic strategy’ was largely confrontational in relation with 
employers and favoured organisation at higher levels. Achieving a unified labour 
movement was a widely shared objective among workers and unions as channelling 
grievances through federations and confederations had socio-political visibility and helped 
to overcome weak bargaining power at company-level.  
 
Political parties performed an intermediary role between unions and the state in 
control of the industrial relations system. The diffuse differentiation between political 
parties and trade unions resulted in a loss of autonomy of the latter in relation to the 
former. For some commentators these actions represented an expression of class struggle, 
but limited to economic grievances and subordinated to political parties, resulting in a 
weak ‘autonomous politisation’ of the labour movement in contrast to the highly militant 
politisation of its leadership. For others, that labour strategies developed in this way was a 
mere consequence of legal restrictions, and the resulting overlapping of interests with 
parties of the left (Rojas and Aravena, 1999).  
 
That these and other characteristics are widely considered to represent the labour 
movement in this period should not obscure the fact that, as ever, the labour movement is 
neither a unified nor a static entity. Indeed, it has been argued that the restrictive character 
of the 1931 Labour Code ‘ultimately forced most of Chile’s labour movement into legally 
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differentiated boxes, bargaining under different preconditions and with different 
institutional horizons’ (Roddick, 1989: 203). Campero and Cortázar (1985) for example, 
characterise union strategies in the period 1932-73 based on two groups of economic 
sectors. On the one hand, small-and-medium enterprise sectors included manufacturing, 
construction, retail as well as the public sector. Trade union action in these sectors 
conformed largely to the classic strategy described above. In general, unions in these 
sectors aimed at establishing minimum working conditions, the observance of labour law, 
and a greater role of the state in the economy and labour relations. Political parties 
became, in turn, the backbone of this type of trade unionism.  
 
On the other hand, modern-monopolistic sectors included state enterprises (copper, 
steel, oil), public utilities (electricity, telecommunications, air and maritime transport), and 
some large private companies that developed as a consequence of import-substituting 
industrialisation. In these sectors, unions grouped about one third of total union members 
and tended to operate at the level of the firm, where their main objective was to improve 
pay and conditions of employment, as well as to influence work organisation and 
decision-making. Unions were ‘corporatist’ in the sense that they functioned well 
integrated to the firm’s bureaucracy, were moderated politically, and engaged with 
societal projects that included the modernisation of economic and democratic systems as 
pathways to social mobility (Campero and Cortázar, 1985). This was generally possible as 
these firms were modern, capital-intensive, operated in a protected market, and their 
labour force was highly skilled. Workers in these sectors enjoyed high bargaining power, 
had privileged access to the state apparatus, and partly as a consequence, did not tend to 
establish links with higher-level union organisations (Figure 5.1). 
 
 
Despite legally induced fragmentation, unions’ traditional indicators of union power 
as well as their participation in the polity increased throughout the period of inward-
oriented development. Union density grew from 21% in 1940 to its 29% historical peak in 
1973 (Table 5.1). Likewise, collective bargaining coverage rose to an average of 13.4% of 
the occupied workforce between 1965 and 1970, decreasing slightly to 11.3% between 
1971 and 1973 (Mizala and Romaguera, 2001). Likewise, the restrictions governing 
strikes were not obstacle for union mobilisation, as illegal industrial conflict increased 
heavily in the run up to Allende’s election. Between 1963 and 1973 the total number of 
strikes rose from 676 to 2230 and, the number of legal to illegal strikes in the private 
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sector (all public sector strikes were illegal) rose from 64 legal to 369 in 1963, to 21 legal 
to 1230 illegal in 1973 (Armstrong, 1979). 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Logics of union action in Chile, 1938-1973 
 Modern-Monopolistic SMEs, public sector, retail, 
and CUT 
Dominant logic of union action Firm-level industrial relations Federative trends with reference 
to sector and national policies 
 
Dominant union 
orientation/objectives 
Professional and socio-economic 
mobility 
Struggle to establish minimum 
working conditions, and 
improving life standards with 
reference to state action 
 
Union-employer relations Integration Exclusion and confrontation 
 
Union-political system Direct relations and with political 
parties 
Federations, confederations, CUT, 
and political parties 
 
Political parties Centre and left, both moderate Left, few centre, radicalism 
 
Global social projects (Union-
society) 
Social changes with emphasis on 
the modernisation of the economic 
system, and increasing social 
mobility 
Social changes with emphasis on 
substantive democratisation and 
with presence of strong anti-
capitalist trends 
 
Source: adapted from Campero and Cortázar (1985: 17, table 14, my translation). 
 
 
Table 5.1: Union Membership and Density in Chile, 1932-1972 (Selected years) 
Industrial unions Professional unions Agricultural unions Total 
Year 
Unions Members Unions Members Unions Members Unions Members Size 
1932 168 29442 253 25359 * * 421 54801 130 
1938 333 78989 599 46983 * * 932 125972 135 
1942 602 122408 991 71641 * * 1593 194049 122 
1946 591 148276 1115 103498 * * 1706 251774 148 
1952 639 155054 1343 128329 * * 1982 283383 143 
1958 781 161751 1547 143329 28 2030 2356 307110 130 
1964 644 148368 1236 128960 24 1652 1904 278980 147 
1970 1420 197196 2581 287326 580 143142 4581 627644 137 
1971 1585 211892 2890 338442 737 232160 5212 782494 150 
1972 1764 224664 3517 403831 837 226909 6118 855404 140 
Source: Frías (1993: 265) 
 
 
CUT played a decisive role in national politics particularly since 1964, when 
formally decided to support Salvador Allende’s bid to the presidency. The democratic 
election of Marxist President Allende and the Popular Unity coalition led by the Socialist 
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and Communist parties in 1970 represented the culmination of the political, economic and 
social adjustments that had developed since the 1930s. Popular Unity were committed to 
the so-called ‘Chilean Road to Socialism’ which involved an ambitious economic and 
social programme that included the creation of ‘social’ and ‘mixed’ areas of the economy 
alongside private enterprise, the nationalisation of copper mining, and the deepening of 
agrarian reform (Zapata, 2007).  
 
For employers, Allende’s ‘workers’ government’ quickly became their ‘second 
major scare’ (Arriagada, 2004). At first, large employers vociferously opposed Allende’s 
policies but did not effectively resist the reforms. Effective opposition to Allende came in 
turn, and in a far stronger fashion from small entrepreneurs (lorry drivers, taxi, buses, 
shop keepers). But as reforms deepened, a coalition of landowners, middle classes, as well 
as American corporations in Chile began a series of destabilising activities and an 
economic blockade (US Department of State, 2000; US Senate, 1975). Political 
polarisation and social conflict escalated rapidly ending in the coup d’état of 11 
September 1973. In this way, Chile’s ruling groups abandoned Latin America’s longest 
and strongest democracy and bid instead for a dictatorship that would ‘put an end to their 
insecurity regarding property rights, to discipline social movements, to end the 
“dictatorship of numbers” (the power of the masses), and to terminate a “democracy” that 
had crushed the essential liberties of creation, production, and accumulation of wealth, in 
the name of universal suffrage’ (Arriagada, 2004: 133, my translation, emphasis in 
original). 
 
 
5.3 Neoliberal outward-oriented development (1976-present) 
 
The Pinochet regime (1973-1990) and the imposition of neoliberal restructuring 
 
The military displayed an unprecedented level of brutality against Allende’s supporters. 
Not only all basic constitutional liberties were suspended but also all legal procedures –
even those appropriate to ‘state of siege in time of war’- were violated. As the National 
Congress was closed down and political parties were outlawed, thousands of left-wing 
activists and militants were arrested, tortured, executed or fled into exile (Comisión 
Nacional de Verdad y Reconciliación, 1991). Most labour rights were suspended 
indefinitely, and series of executive decrees severely restricted freedom of association, 
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suspended collective bargaining, abolished the right to strike, and allowed politically 
motivated job dismissals among other measures. CUT was dissolved and declared illegal 
in the first week after the coup and union leaders suffered persecution and in some cases 
assassination. For Remmer (1980), political and labour repression ‘constituted clear 
evidence of the regime’s principled rejection of the political, economic and social 
adjustments that had developed historically under Chile’s constitutional democracy’. 
Pinochet and the junta regarded themselves as the nation’s saviours and sustained that a 
strong hand was necessary to guide a material, institutional, and moral process of ‘national 
reconstruction’ (Sepúlveda, 2007).  
 
The regime began immediately to return nationalised property to their former 
owners and to privatise state property. This gave the military the initial and unconditional 
support of landowners, capitalists, and employers, some of whom participated directly in 
repressive activities (Cavallo et al., 2008). But the direct participation of employer 
associations in policy making was fairly limited at this stage largely because employers 
themselves did not have a clear idea –neither as institutions nor as individuals- of what to 
do with the economy. Furthermore, the unity between large employers (CPC, SOFOFA, 
SNA) and small-and-medium size employers that was achieved against Allende, quickly 
disappeared after Pinochet seized power. Large employers tried to influence the junta’s 
erratic economic management with policies that would favour their own sectors excluding 
small-and-medium employers because in their view, the leadership of the latter had 
dangerous ‘corporativist’ (nationalist as well as fascist) inclinations (Arriagada, 2004). 
 
After two years of policy indecision and failure, the so-called Chicago Boys 
approached the junta in a bid to stabilise and radically restructure the Chilean economy 
along neo-liberal lines. For them, the problem was not Allende but the whole state-led 
industrialising model. This resonated greatly with the military who viewed inward-
oriented development as fertile terrain for interest groups such as organised labour and 
employer associations to put pressure on the state through the monopoly of representation 
held by political parties, ‘corroding democracy’ as a result.  
 
For the neoliberals, the solution was to replace the interventionist state with the 
invisible hand of the market. Initial policies included draconian stabilisation programmes 
(so-called ‘shock therapy treatment’), privatisation, and the rapid, thorough liberalisation 
of capital markets, prices, and trade’ (Silva, 1996: 304). Simultaneously, the regime 
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granted privileges and subsides to foreign and domestic private capital willing to invest in 
sectors were Chile was seen as having a comparative advantage.6 
 
As a result, wages collapsed, unemployment soared, thousands of manufacturing 
jobs were lost, companies were closed, entire industries were weakened, and the social 
security system started to fall apart (Bronstein, 1997; Sznajder, 1996). In this way, the 
regime began to dismantle the model of import-substituting industrialisation and 
transformed Chile’s into an open free-market economy based on agro-extractive exports 
(Silva, 1993).  
 
As the economic situation improved in the late 1970s, Pinochet gained ascendancy 
over the junta and established increasingly tight links with the Chicago boys. The Chicago 
Boys, as Silva (1993: 546) explains, ‘were not just a castle like group of neoliberal 
technocrats as they are often portrayed. Many of the key figures had close ties to ever 
more powerful radical internationalist conglomerates that were gaining coherence through 
their corporate acquisition strategies. By embracing the Chicago Boys, Pinochet formed 
an alliance with ideologues and conglomerates that controlled the most dynamic sectors of 
the economy; as a result they were able to sustain radical neoliberal policies.’ In other 
words, although employer associations were formally excluded from policy making, large 
employers were in fact deciding on policy making behind the scenes and benefiting from 
obscure links with the regime. 
 
In 1978, Pinochet announced the regime’s socio-economic programme around the 
so-called ‘Seven Modernisations’. These aimed at extending neo-liberal restructuring into 
seven key areas of social policy: industrial relations, pensions, education, health, 
agriculture, justice, and regionalisation. According to liberal economist José Piñera -who 
between 1978 and 1982 designed the new industrial relations, pensions, and mining 
reforms- the Seven Modernisations would ‘create the basis of a new political, economic, 
and social reality’ (Piñera, 2007).7 Thus, neo-liberal thinking, originally embraced as a 
recipe for economic stabilisation became a global prescription for the organisation of 
society (Pinto and Salazar, 2002).  
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Neo-liberal revamp of industrial relations 
 
Although the junta proclaimed in its Declaration of Principles in 1974 its ‘intention of 
imposing authority and discipline in production and labour relations’ (Collins and Lear, 
1995: 27) there was no clarity as to how to do this in practice. Early policy indecision and 
differences within the junta led the military to pass but never put into force, the 1975 
Social Statute of the Enterprise, a corporativist piece of legislation designed by the Air 
Force. It was not until 1978, when the neo-liberals had already taken over core policy-
making areas, that the dictatorship’s re-regulation of labour began to take place.  
 
 
Table 5.2: Selected features of the 1978 Individual Regulation 
Hiring 
• Fixed-term employment contract for a period up to two consecutive years. 
• New contractual framework for children, apprentices, agricultural, and home workers. 
• Excludes independent workers from the application of labour legislation. 
• Eliminates the regulation of homework. 
 
Working conditions 
• Working hours calculated on an individual basis within the limits of a 48-hour week allowing broad 
flexibility to plan daily work timetable. 
• Employer authorised to modify up to 60 minutes of the agreed daily work time distribution. 
• Repealed regulations governing more favourable working hours applicable in certain specific sectors. 
• Permitted children less than 16 years of age to undertake night work in certain industries. 
• Extended exceptions to Sunday rest and legal holidays. 
• Abolished differentiated minimum salaries for blue-collar workers and minimum wages for white-collar 
employees. Instead established a national minimum wage and set its value at the level of the former 
minimum salary. 
• Minimum wage not applicable to workers under 21 and over 65 years of age. 
• Allowed salaries lower than minimum wage for apprentices, agricultural, and home workers. 
• Employer authorised to alter the nature and location of the services provided by the enterprise. 
• Employer allowed to determine when workers can take their annual leave.  
 
Dismissal 
• Freedom to lay off workers without a just cause but with compensation. 
• Compensation: one month’s salary for each year worked for the same employer, up to a maximum of five 
months. 
• Range of causes that do not allow for compensation. Political and National Security causes included. 
• Duty to reinstate unfairly dismissed workers abolished. 
• Abolished norms that required authorisation for collective dismissals (more than ten workers in a month). 
 
Sources: Código del Trabajo, adapted from Bronstein, 1997; Collins and Lear, 1995; Cook, 1998; 
Mesa-Lago, 2000; Morgado, 1999. 
 
 
The dictatorship’s re-regulation of individual legislation commenced in 1978 with 
Decree Law No. 2950 which derogated previous protective legislation, and continued with 
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the enactment of the Decree Law No. 2200 on Individual Labour Rights (Walker, 2002). 
This reflected the adoption of a neo-liberal model of labour market flexibility where 
flexibility is largely conceived as the capacity for downward adjustment of terms of 
employment, quantitatively through wage cutting and substandard contracts, and 
qualitatively as the restoration of managerial authority (Streeck, 1987). As indicated in 
Table 5.2, the regime encouraged atypical employment and the use of fixed-term 
contracts.  
 
It eased restrictions on the employment of apprentices and children, and increased 
the number of work categories excluded directly or indirectly from the application of 
labour legislation (independent workers, some agricultural workers) (Morgado, 1999). 
Second, it reinstalled employers’ unilateralism by repealing protective legislation on 
working conditions and work organisation. Third, it gave employers the right to dismiss 
workers without a just cause but with compensation. However, since the latter was modest 
and the range of acceptable causes was broad, new regulations allowed employers in 
practice to hire and fire workers at will.  
 
The area of collective labour relations was re-regulated according to the set of 
three acts better known as the 1979 Labour Plan (Table 5.3). Strictly speaking a ‘trade 
union plan’ (Piñera, 1990), it reflected the adoption of a market containment strategy for 
union control, which tries to weaken unions as bargaining agents and centres on 
preventing collective actions from having an effect on the labour market (Valenzuela, 
1989). First, Decree Law No. 2756 on Union Organisations established extensive 
restrictions on trade union organising and internal composition. It restricted the right to 
organise to the level of the individual enterprise or plant, and then only after a year of a 
business’s existence.  
 
It made affiliation to unions voluntary and permitted several unions within the 
same workplace while some large categories of workers were not granted organising 
rights (public and agricultural sectors, seasonal and temporary workers, among others). It 
banned the existence of national confederations (centrales sindicales) and severely 
restricted the functions of other higher-level labour organisations (federations and 
confederations). Unions’ functions, internal composition, and activities were subject to 
strict regulations and detailed procedures.  
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Table 5.3: Selected features of the 1979 Labour Plan 
Union organisations 
• Enterprise-level union organisation. 
• Voluntary union membership. 
• Multi-unionism permitted. 
• Party tickets’ eliminated. 
• National, inter-sectorial, and inter-occupational federations (centrales sindicales) prohibited. 
• Multiple affiliation to federations (federaciones sindicales) and confederations (confederaciones 
sindicales) prohibited. 
• No unions allowed in the first year of a business existence. 
• No organising rights in the public sector. 
• No organising rights for workers employed in the agricultural sector;  in the newly privatised pensions and 
health systems; and employed for less than six consecutive months. 
• Minimum number of workers to form a union. Firms with more than 25 workers: 25 workers and 10% of 
all workers. Firms with less than 25 workers: 8 workers and 50% of all workers. 
• Reduction of legal protection of union leaders. 
• Financing of unions must come exclusively as ‘voluntary contributions’ from affiliated workers. 
• Check off system prohibited 
 
Collective bargaining 
• Enterprise-level collective bargaining. 
• Federations and confederations are not allowed to bargain. 
• Collective bargaining forbidden in the first year of a business existence. 
• No bargaining rights in the public sector. 
• No bargaining rights for workers employed in the agricultural sector; in the newly privatised pensions and 
health systems;  for less than six consecutive months. 
• Numerous issues excluded from bargaining including ‘all matters that may restrict or limit the employer’s 
exclusive right to organise, lead, and manage the firm, and those external to the firm’. Collective 
bargaining restricted to wages. 
• Elimination of the floor (piso) for negotiated wages that guaranteed that wages could not be negotiated 
downward. 
• Unions are not the exclusive bargaining representatives of workers. Two or more workers can form ‘ 
bargaining groups’ which are allowed to bargain and sign ‘collective conventions’. 
• Collective contracts are not the exclusive outcome of collective bargaining. ‘Collective conventions’ 
(convenios colectivos) can be signed by unions or bargaining groups in a non-regulated process that does 
not allow for the right to strike and other elemental bargaining rights. 
• Limits the application of collective bargaining to those workers involved in negotiations. Prohibits the 
extension of collective agreements to non-union workers.  
• Minimum duration for collective contracts and conventions: 2 years. 
• If no contract is agreed it is decided on a ‘final offer selection’ based compulsory arbitration. 
 
Right to strike 
• Strikes are legal only as part of the collective bargaining process leading to collective contract. 
• Strikes restricted to a single workplace. 
• Strikes limited to a maximum of 60 days, after which workers could be dismissed without compensation 
(‘voluntary resignation’). 
• Striking workers entitled to individually dissociating themselves from the strike and to negotiate 
individually after 30 days. 
• Employer’s lockout and strikers’ replacement permitted. 
• The President of the Republic could decree a strike illegal if it was deemed to be a threat to National 
Security, the economy, and/or the well-being of the population. 
 
Sources: adapted from Bronstein, 1997; Collins and Lear, 1995; Cook, 1998; Mesa-Lago, 2000; 
Morgado, 1999. 
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Second, Decree Law No. 2758 decentralised collective bargaining completely by 
prohibiting its conduct at any level but that of the enterprise or workplace. Workers in 
several economic activities were not granted the right to bargain collectively and the Plan 
narrowed the matters subject to bargaining to wages only. Unions were stripped of their 
exclusive collective bargaining rights, since the Plan allowed two or more workers to form 
‘bargaining groups’ (grupos negociadores) with the sole purpose of bargaining and 
signing a collective agreement.  
 
The Plan established two modes of collective bargaining, a regulated and a non-
regulated one, that led respectively to two types of collective instruments: ‘collective 
contracts’ (contratos colectivos) and ‘collective agreements’ (convenios colectivos) 
(Montero et al., 2000). Whereas regulated collective bargaining took place according to 
detailed and strict procedures established in legislation and contemplated the right to 
strike, non-regulated collective bargaining neither considered procedural rules nor ‘was 
vested with even the minimal rights (traditionally) associated with collective bargaining 
such as the right to strike’ (Haagh, 2002: 103). The Plan prohibited the extension of both 
types of collective agreements to any employee not involved in the bargaining process.  
 
Third, Decree Law No. 2757 limited the right to strike by imposing numerous 
conditions to render it ineffective. A strike was legal only as part of a regulated collective 
bargaining process and solely if no new contract had been signed, among other 
requirements. Employers were allowed to lock employees out and to hire replacements, 
and after thirty days, any worker was allowed to resume work and bargain individually. Its 
maximum duration could not exceed sixty days, after which strikers were understood to 
have resigned voluntarily. 
 
Finally, yet importantly, this entire legal apparatus was built around the narrow 
notion of ‘enterprise’. Under Chilean labour law –but not under corporate or tax law- an 
enterprise, and an employer for that matter, is exclusively understood as ‘registered name’ 
or tax code (razón social). Workers are allowed to organise and bargain solely within the 
strict limits set by a particular registered name. The objective of such definition was to 
protect employers from collective bargaining taking place above the level of the firm. This 
of course has operated as an unfair advantage for business and as a threat to labour rights 
ever since because firms do not only operate with numerous registered names –hence 
fragmenting unionisation- but also because they tend to concentrate employment in 
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registered names formed only to manage personnel without assets or profits, hence 
debilitating collective bargaining. 
 
The late 1970s macroeconomic stability quickly turned into a short-lived economic 
boom partly fuelled by the abundance of inexpensive international credit. In parallel, the 
regime had begun working on a new political constitution. In the view of the military, the 
Constitution of 1925 ‘had been of no use in “protecting” Chilean democracy from 
Marxism and populist politicians’ (Valenzuela, 1997: 4). A new constitution, the so-called 
‘Protected Democracy Constitution’ (Constitución Permanente de la Democracia 
Protegida) was approved in 1980 by a plebiscite carried out under tight military control. 
According to regime officials, this new institutional order ‘would replace partisanship, 
ideological pluralism, and class conflict with national security, the harmonious 
integration of all sectors, and a depoliticised or technified society’ (Remmer, 1980: 284, 
emphasis in original).  
 
In practice however, the 1980 Constitution was also designed to perpetuate 
Pinochet in power, and defined a post-authoritarian ‘protected’ democratic system. 
Essentially, this meant the use of legal barriers to the re-emergence of the left, the creation 
of new political and social institutions that would replace organisational forms considered 
dangerous, and on setting limits to the exercise of popular sovereignty by the democratic 
majority (Kurtz, 1999; Valenzuela, 1997). 
 
The international debt crisis and the acute international recession of 1982 
threatened the stability of the regime and the neo-liberal model. The 1982 economic 
collapse with official unemployment figures reaching 17% and the dictatorship bailing out 
the entire banking system, provoked some adjustments to the neoliberal model and 
sparked widespread protests against the regime. After a protracted process of underground 
reconstitution, the labour movement led a vast protest movement against the regime that 
included students, the urban poor, and rural workers. Although the protests did not 
achieve the objective of free elections, the regime allowed some political activity to 
resume from 1983. This gave the opposition and the labour movement the opportunity to 
re-emerge as political actors, a process that culminated with the unification of the 
opposition under the Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia (henceforth 
Concertación), and the recreation of the CUT in 1988, this time as Central Unitaria de 
Trabajadores (Campero and Cortázar, 1985). By the mid-1980s, the economy had begun 
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to recover and initiated a long cycle of expansion that lasted until 1999. This period would 
later be referred to as the ‘Chilean miracle’.  
 
La Concertación (1990-2009) 
 
Chile held its first free presidential elections in nineteen years in 1989. The Concertación, 
a centre-left coalition led by the Christian Democratic and Socialist Parties, was elected 
and has remained in power for four consecutive periods since 1990. At the outset of the 
transition to democracy, there were reasons to believe that the labour movement would 
play an important role in social policy, and that the industrial relations legal framework 
would be submitted to significant reform. On the one hand, the opposition to Pinochet 
now in power had bitterly confronted the means and ends of his dictatorship. It had 
suffered brutal political repression and questioned the ‘predatory, dependent, and 
excluding’ character of the neo-liberal economic model. On the other hand, the CUT had 
become a key actor of the coalition in power and conditioned part of its support to passing 
major labour reforms (‘no democracy without labour reform’). Simultaneously, the early 
re-democratisation process saw a substantial increase in labour participation. Between 
1988 and 1991, union density increased from 10.4 to 15.1% of the employed workforce, 
the number of strikes grew by almost 50% and the participation of workers in strikes 
increased by 20% (Dirección del Trabajo, 2007b).  
 
Labour reform under the first three democratic governments. Labour reform under the 
democratic regime has been a major political issue and its process has proven to be a 
highly contested and ideologically charged one. Patricio Aylwin’s government (1990-
1993) sought to manage industrial relations through broad tripartite agreements negotiated 
at the national level among the government, CUT, and CPC. In this period, various laws 
were passed and later consolidated into the new 1994 Labour Code. Under the Eduardo 
Frei administration (1994-1999) the idea of tripartite agreements was abandoned by CPC 
and CUT. New reforms were proposed in 1997 but although they were the product of 
government-opposition consensus, the conservative Senate majority did not pass them. 
Again in 1999, reforms were blocked in the Senate. The government of Socialist Ricardo 
Lagos (2000-2005) passed the ‘2001 Labour Reforms’ intending to put an official end to 
the so-called ‘labour transition’ (Sanfuentes, 2000). This proved to be mistaken as 
arguably the main issue that Michelle Bachelet’s (2006-2009) has dealt with, has been 
precisely the rather unfinished labour transition. 
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Table 5.4: Main reforms of individual labour regulation, 1990-2001 
1994 Labour Code 2001 Labour Reform 
Hiring Hiring 
• Fixed-term employment contract maximum duration 
reduced to one year. 
• If work continues after fixed-term contract concludes, 
indefinite contract becomes due automatically. 
• Indefinite contract automatically replaces fixed-term 
contract after second renovation. 
• Workers employed discontinuously for twelve months 
over a 15-month period entitled to indefinite contract. 
• Establishes a range of fixed-term employment contracts 
where benefits, wages, and conditions are lower than those 
provided to ‘normal’ employees. 
• Added new forms of employment: E-work 
(teletrabajo) and Training Contract for Youths up to 
24 years of age. 
• Extended full-time employment rights to part-time 
workers (no more than 2/3 of normal working day). 
  
Working conditions Working conditions 
• Extension of the 48-hour week to the hotel and catering 
trade. 
• Maximum working hours and minimum rest periods for 
commerce, transportation, and fishing workers. 
• Night-time work prohibited for children under 18 years of 
age. 
• Workers entitled to a minimum of one Sunday a month. 
• Increased national minimum wage. 
• Introduced a national minimum wage for workers 65 years 
of age or older. 
• Increased family allowances, minimum pensions, and 
family subsides.  
• Created paid leaves for birth or death of a worker’s child 
and death of a spouse.  
• Extended maternity protections and improved working 
conditions for women. 
• Extended family obligations and rights to male workers. 
• Compulsory internal rules and procedures for firms 
employing more than 25 workers.  
• Matters related to health and hygiene must be part of the 
firm’s internal rules and procedures. 
• Employers must provide for adequate safety and hygiene 
working conditions. 
• Universalised the right to paid vacations to all workers.  
• Increased sanctions for employers’ labour violations and 
facilitated worker’s access to labour courts. 
• Reduces the working week from 48 to 45 hours 
distributed in five days (from 2005).  
• Hotel and catering trade exempted of the reduced 
45-hour week.  
• Especial working-time arrangements must be 
authorised by the Labour Office (Inspección del 
Trabajo). It requires the previous agreement between 
the employers and workers. 
• Workers entitled to a minimum of two Sundays a 
month. 
• Established a compulsory unemployment insurance 
system financed by the employer and the worker. 
• All firms employing more than 10 workers must  
have a internal regulations. 
• Employers must provide for food, shelter and 
transportation for seasonal agricultural workers 
when working far away. 
• Employers must provide for day care facilities for 
children of seasonal agricultural workers. 
 
  
Dismissal Dismissal 
• Discretionary dismissal replaced by statement of cause 
with exceptions (managers and home workers). 
• Increased the maximum compensation to one month’s 
salary for each year worked for the same employer, up to a 
maximum of eleven months, for contracts started after 
1981. 
• Incorporates the ‘necessities of the enterprise’ as just 
cause for dismissal. 
• Eliminates political and National Security as causes that 
do not allow for compensation. 
• Workers dismissed without a cause granted the right to 
appeal to labour courts 
• Unfair dismissal compensation equal to 120% of 
compensation. 
• Eliminates the ‘technical or working unsuitability of 
the worker’ as a just cause for dismissal. 
• Causes that do not allow for compensation can only 
be those related to the job. 
• Increased unfair dismissal compensation up to 200% 
of compensation. 
Sources: adapted from Bronstein, 1997; Cook, 1998; Mesa-Lago, 2000; Morgado, 1999; Dirección 
del Trabajo, 2001 and 2003a. 
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In her analysis of labour reform in Latin America, Cook (1998) distinguishes 
between flexible, pluralist, and protective types of possible changes in relation to the 
legislation being reformed. In general, one would expect that changes that respond to 
economic pressures and neo- liberal policies would tend to be consistent with flexible 
reforms, whereas changes that coincide with the re-establishment of democratic regimes 
would tend to move in a more pluralist and protective direction (Cook, 1998). Labour 
reform in Chile has taken a predominantly protective and, to a lesser extent, pluralist 
direction A closer look into the reforms however shows that many of the most emblematic 
changes have had provisions that have rendered them ineffective and contributed in this 
way to preserve authoritarian legislation largely unaltered.  
 
The reform of individual legislation has taken a protective direction in most areas 
while maintaining, and sometimes increasing, its already flexible character in others. As is 
evident fromTable 5.4 (previous page), the greater part of the reforms has focused on the 
establishment of statutory protections, which have included increases in the minimum 
wage, extension of maternity rights and the creation of an unemployment insurance 
system in 2001. The reforms have also increased the level of protection with regard to 
discrimination, working conditions and increase redundancy payments. Despite this, the 
flexible character of the 1978 legislation has been largely maintained with the 
continuation of the 'legislation concerning dismissal8 and creation of a range of new forms 
of employment contracts where rights, wages, benefits and working conditions are lower 
than those provided to ‘normal’ employees. 
 
The reform of collective legislation has taken a pluralist and protective direction. 
As can be observed in Table 5.5 (opposite page), the reforms have extended the right to 
organise, bargain collectively and strike to previously excluded groups of workers. The 
requirements to form unions, federations, and confederations have been reduced, and the 
existence of peak national organisations (centrales sindicales) has been permitted. The 
reforms have allowed collective bargaining to be conducted beyond the level of the firm 
and broadened the matters that can be subject of bargaining. In addition, they have set no 
time limit for strikes’ duration and prohibited in principle the hiring of striker 
replacements.  
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Table 5.5: Main reforms of collective labour regulation, 1990-2001 
1994 Labour Code 2001 Labour Reform 
Union organisation Union organisation 
• Re-established the right to organise national 
federations (Centrales Sindicales). 
• Reduced requirements to form federations (minimum 
of three unions) and confederations (minimum of five 
federations). 
• Allowed to organise unions in the first year of a 
business existence. 
• Extended right to organise to the public sector with 
exclusions. 
• Extended right to organise to workers employed in the 
agricultural sector; in the newly privatised pensions 
and health systems; and employed for less than six 
consecutive months. 
• Reduced minimum number of workers required to 
form a union. Firms with more than 50 workers: 25 
workers and 10% of all workers. Firms with less than 
50 workers: 8 workers and 50% of all workers. 
• Granted protection to union leaders, prohibiting their 
dismissal without approval by a labour court. 
• Established new rules and increased sanctions for 
employers’ unfair labour practices and facilitated 
access to labour courts. 
• Facilitates check off system. 
• Reduced further requirements to form 
confederations (minimum of three federations). 
• Extended right to organise to previously excluded 
public enterprises dependent from the Defence 
Ministry. 
• Established a promotional norm in firms with less 
than 50 workers allowing 8 workers to form a 
union and to complete the minimum requirement 
within one year. 
• Reinforces Labour Office’s (Inspección del 
Trabajo) attributions regarding unfair labour 
practices.  
• Unfairly dismissed workers for unfair labour 
practices allowed to choose between 
reinstatement or compensation. 
  
Collective bargaining Collective bargaining 
• Voluntary collective bargaining beyond enterprise 
level permitted if employers agree. 
• Allowed federations and confederations to bargaining 
collectively if employers agree.  
• No bargaining rights for public sector workers.  
• No bargaining rights for agricultural workers. 
• Issues excluded from bargaining reduced but 
maintained the clause about ‘all matters that may 
restrict or limit the employer’s exclusive right to 
organise, lead, and manage the firm, and those external 
to the firm’. 
• If benefits gained in a contract by the union are 
extended by the employer to non-union members, the 
latter must pay 75% of union contributions throughout 
the duration of the contract.  
• Introduced free mediation procedures. 
• Employer must provide the union with 
information about the firm’s financial situation 
and labour costs. 
• Introduced some procedural regulations to 
collective conventions. 
• Allowed agricultural seasonal workers to bargain 
collectively and to sign conventions. 
• Modified duration of collective contracts and 
conventions. Minimum: two years and maximum: 
four years. 
  
Right to strike Right to strike 
• Revoked the maximum of 60 days for strikes and set 
no time limit for their duration.  
• Striking workers entitled to individually dissociating 
themselves from the strike and to negotiate 
individually after 15 days.  
• Strikes can be automatically called off after 50% of 
striking workers returned to work. 
• Striker replacement permitted from day one of the 
strike if employer complies with certain conditions. 
• Striker replacement prohibited in principle unless 
employer does not comply with certain 
conditions. Among them, compensation payment 
to the union. 
Sources: adapted from Bronstein, 1997; Cook, 1998; Mesa-Lago, 2000; Morgado, 1999; Dirección 
del Trabajo, 2001 and 2003a. 
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Although the right to organise has been extended, the incentives for unionisation 
and maintenance of membership have remained low because collective bargaining has not 
been strengthened. In fact, the extension of organising rights has not been accompanied in 
all cases with the rights to collective bargaining and to strike action. Some large categories 
of workers, such as those in the public sector, are still not allowed to bargain collectively 
while others, such as agricultural seasonal workers, have been granted bargaining rights 
but only in their restrictive and limited non-regulated form, that is, the one leading to 
collective conventions that does not provide for information, protection or strike rights 
(Dirección del Trabajo, 2001).  
 
It could also be argued that the reforms have strengthened regulated collective 
bargaining by reducing the numerous issues excluded from bargaining stipulated by the 
1979 Labour Plan. However, they have left in place the latter’s most inclusive restriction 
banning ‘all matters that may restrict or limit the employer’s exclusive right to organise, 
lead, and manage the firm, and those external to the firm’ (Dirección del Trabajo, 2003a). 
In addition, the possibility of conducting collective bargaining beyond the enterprise level 
has been allowed, but only if employers agree. The reliance on employers’ consent 
questions the real significance of this change especially for workers in outsourced 
employment relationships.  
 
Most importantly however, the transition’s reforms have kept intact the key features 
of the 1979 Labour Plan that allowed the existence of competing types of collective 
bargaining (regulated and non-regulated), collective instruments (contracts and 
agreements) and representatives (unions and bargaining groups).  
 
Labour reform has not succeeded in strengthening the right to strike either. 
Measures such as the elimination of the maximum sixty days’ length for strikes have been 
‘compensated’ for by reducing from thirty to fifteen days the minimum number of days 
allowed for individual employees to dissociate themselves from the strike and to negotiate 
individually. Furthermore, while the 1979 Labour Plan allowed replacing strikers with 
little restrictions, the 1994 Code restricted this possibility to the satisfactory compliance 
by the employer with some minimum requirements. The 2001 reforms prohibited in 
principle the hiring of replacements unless the employer complies with virtually the same 
requirements stipulated in the 1994 Code, and pays a compensatory bonus to the union 
(Dirección del Trabajo, 2001).  
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In sum, although several rounds of reform (1990, 1993, 2001) have certainly 
encouraged pluralism and improved the level of social protection for the most vulnerable, 
the enjoyment of labour rights typically associated with mature employment relations 
systems remains limited. Indeed, it can be argued that the ‘deep structure’ underlying 
Chile’s legal framework displays remarkable continuity with that of the dictatorship, as 
the latter’s main features have remained in place and the principles upon which it was 
designed are still valid: a market containment strategy for union control and a neo-liberal 
model of labour market flexibility. 
 
Why? 
 
In an effort to account for the persistence of the authoritarian legacy in Chile’s industrial 
relations, it is necessary to examine at least the following three elements: the conservative 
nature of Chile’s transition to democracy, the continuity of the neoliberal economic 
model, and the strategies and increasing imbalance of power between capital and labour 
(Durán-Palma et al., 2005). 
 
At the outset of the transition, the leaders of the Concertación were greatly 
concerned with the viability of the newly elected government. Fearful of a backlash, the 
Concertación favoured a pacted and elite-led type of transition in order to secure 
democratic consolidation. Democratic elites sought political stability by exerting tight 
control over the transition process echoing Karl’s (1990 in Roberts, 1998: 119) assertion 
that ‘democratic stability is more likely, at least in the short term, when elites rather than 
masses are ascendant during the process of transition, and when they define the 
parameters of political and economic change through negotiated political pacts rather than 
the forceful imposition of any single actor’s political project’. This is particularly 
important in the case of organised labour because it has been shown that reactions of the 
labour movement in periods of re-democratisation may provide the pretext for a backlash 
by hard-line forces that still retain portions of state power (Valenzuela, 1989). 
Consequently, both the government and organised labour made substantial efforts to show 
restraint and to downplay mass mobilisation, favouring elite-negotiated political and 
social pacts.  
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The nature of the process of transition is key to understand the two key decisions 
that would later impact greatly in the process of labour reform (Durán-Palma et al., 2005). 
On the one hand, the establishment of democratic rule had to take place within the 
institutional framework designed by the dictatorship. The Concertación accepted most of 
the institutional ‘protections’ against the exercise of popular sovereignty stipulated in the 
1980 Constitution, thereby maintaining structural constraints on the possibility of systemic 
change. The compromises made as a result of Chile’s transition to democracy included the 
acceptance of a political system designed to over represent the Right and give dominant 
interests effective veto power over all relevant matters of state (Riesco, 2007; Valenzuela, 
1997).9 On the other hand, continuity in the economic model was seen as the most viable 
way to alleviate the concerns of employers and conservative sectors and induce their 
political and economic co-operation with the democratic government. 
 
In this context, the Concertación sought to manage industrial relations through 
Social Concertation, a strategy that ultimately delivered meagre results, particularly in 
respect of legislation, labour’s main objective, but more generally in terms of the 
government’s claim that concerted action among the state, capital, and labour would 
produce a fairer and more equal industrial relations system (Frank, 2004). The most 
important factors for the failure of social concertation were the strategies of actors 
themselves. First, for employers the return of democracy was perceived as a ‘third great 
scare’ (Arriagada, 2004). This was partly the result of the government’s (never realised) 
commitment to revise the obscure privatisation dealings that permitted large economic 
groups to ‘acquire’ substantial state property during the dictatorship (Monckeberg, 2001).  
 
But CPC and SOFOFA had never been as strong as they were at the beginning of 
the transition process. Indeed, employer associations had become prominent members of a 
powerful ‘extra-institutional circuit of power’ together with the military, and the political 
right. As key members of this formidable opposition, employer associations have 
established openly confrontational -and at times, plainly militant- relations with the 
government and labour. Employers’ staunch resistance to modify the existing industrial 
relations system has been usually accompanied by threats of unemployment, lack of 
confidence, and investment withdrawal, a process that has been amplified thanks to the 
control they exert over most of the ideological apparatus of the state including mass media 
and universities. 
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Another factor has been the inability-turned-unwillingness of the democratic 
governments to engage in social concertation and push for significant reform. In the early 
years of the transition process, compromise and moderation were considered by the 
government the only possible to achieve concessions from employers and the opposition 
since the Concertación did not hold the majority in the Senate. What is more, in order to 
avoid a visible conflictual relationship with employers and maintain their confidence, the 
Concertación established what Silva (1996: 311) refers to as the ‘business-state nexus’, ‘a 
system of close interaction and consultation’ with the CPC. This system transferred in 
practice the negotiation of major policy issues from the social arena to bilateral exchanges 
between the state and big business. As a result, the government compromised on most 
reforms that the business community felt were ‘excessively pro-labour’ before sending its 
proposals to Congress and certainly before discussing them with labour representatives 
(Silva, 1996). 
 
But this apparent inability of a pro-labour government to pass legislation because of 
its minority in the Senate, gradually turned into unwillingness. Indeed, the failure of social 
concertation and the limitations of labour reform cannot only be blamed on the fragile 
politics of the early transition process, but instead in the progressive identification of the 
Concertación with neoliberalism. While in the early days of the transition continuity in 
the economic model seemed to represent a significant concession to the opposition, 
important sectors of the coalition had already began to converge in some fundamental 
aspects with neo-liberal socio-economic thinking.  
 
By the time the Lagos administration achieved a small majority in the Senate for the 
first time since the restoration of democracy in 2001, the Concertación divided precisely 
over the issue of labour legislation. In the absence of any military threat or lack of 
majority, it was argued that job creation depended on maintaining the flexible character of 
labour legislation. In other words, the maintenance of the economic model by the 
Concertación has constrained the possibility of systemic reform inter alia in the area of 
employment relations because cheap and flexible labour with few rights to collective 
action are critical to the model, and have indeed been central to the recovery and 
expansion of Chilean capitalism (Taylor, 2004).  
 
The resilience of the model has also been the result of a weakened labour 
movement and its strategic choices. Due to its close ties with the Concertación, the CUT 
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gave priority to democratic stability and consolidation, showing restraint after the end of 
military rule so as to facilitate the transition. CUT abandoned their ‘classic’ strategy of 
class-based confrontation and adopted a more moderate strategy based socio-political 
lines. It engaged in social dialogue with the state and employers, and accepted the 
legitimacy of neo-liberalism in exchange for meagre labour reforms.  
 
Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, CUT has been unable to subordinate its 
political identification with the Concertación to the organisational needs of the labour 
movement, losing as a result the pre-eminent role it played in the past (Frank, 2004). 
Frank (2002) argues that the CUT’s problem was not only strategic but tactical as well as 
organisational. ‘Perhaps CUT’s failure was its unwillingness or its inability to become a 
risk taker, to throw its full organisational weight behind any action, confrontational, 
consensual, dangerous, whatever. Instead, CUT adopted a dual discourse (and few 
actions), swinging pendulum-like between open confrontation toward and cooperation 
with government and employers’ (Frank, 2002: 35-36).  
 
By the end of the decade, the CUT ended up a divided house at the top (Frank, 
2004) and, unable to speak for interests increasingly different from the historic ones, 
distanced heavily from the rank-and-file. Contrary to the pre-eminent role that the labour 
movement achieved before the coup, by the late 1990s organised labour’s ‘organic ties to 
political parties and the state have loosened, its access to the policy making has been 
narrowed, its organisational and political leverage has been diluted, and their ability to 
speak for a plurality of interests has diminished’ (Roberts, 1998: 126). Failed concertation 
at the top was matched with what Aravena and Rojas (1999) call a ‘negation of global 
strategies’ at the level of the firm. The great majority of firm-level unions in Chile seem to 
have turned into ‘survival mode’ and adopted this type of unionism, which has been 
described as having a mere utilitarian function, does not have a sense of totality, and the 
past occupies no place (Rojas and Aravena, 1999).  
 
There have been some exceptions of course. At higher-level, public sector unions 
including ANEF (public sector union), CONFENATS (national health service union), and 
Colegio de Profesores (teachers union) have all maintained a high profile of 
mobilisations, protests, and illegal strikes, and have steadily gained concessions since 
1990 (Frank, 2002).  
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Table 5.6: Union Membership and Density in Chile 1973-2006 (Selected Years) 
Year Total 
workforce 
Employed 
workforce 
Union 
members 
Density 
% total 
workforce 
Density 
% 
employed 
Total 
number of 
unions 
Number 
of active 
unions 
Average 
union size 
         
Allende         
1973 * 2923800 934335 * 32 6502 * 143.7 
         
Pinochet         
1974-79  * * * * * * * * 
1980 3650094 3251344 386910 10.6 11.9 4597 n/a 84.1 
1981 3700477 3271100 395951 10.7 12.1 3977 n/a 99.6 
1982 3657579 2943900 347470 9.5 11.8 4048 n/a 85.8 
1983 3731430 3216100 320903 8.6 10.1 4401 n/a 72.9 
1984 3814767 3268100 343329 9.0 10.3 4714 n/a 72.8 
1985 4246624 3537400 360963 8.5 9.7 4994 n/a 72.3 
1986 4312010 3862850 386987 9.0 10 5391 n/a 71.8 
1987 4425330 4001290 422302 9.5 10.6 5883 n/a 71.8 
1988 4656280 4285440 446194 9.6 10.4 6446 n/a 69.2 
1989 4805290 4463420 507616 10.6 11.4 7118 n/a 71.3 
         
Aylwin         
1990 4888590 4525530 606812 12.4 13.4 8861 n/a 68.5 
1991 4983890 4630670 701355 14.1 15.1 9858 7707 71.1 
1992 5199800 4877430 724065 13.9 14.8 10756 8323 67.3 
1993 5458990 5109290 684361 12.5 13.4 11389 7974 60.1 
         
Frei         
1994 5553830 5122760 661966 11.9 12.9 12109 7891 54.7 
1995 5538240 5174410 637570 11.5 12.3 12715 7505 50.1 
1996 5600670 5298680 655597 11.7 12.4 13258 7476 49.4 
1997 5683820 5380190 617761 10.9 11.5 13795 7446 44.4 
1998 5851510 5432350 611535 10.5 11.3 14276 7439 42.8 
1999 5933560 5404480 579996 9.8 10.7 14652 7057 39.6 
         
Lagos         
2000 5870890 5831460 595495 10.1 10.2 14724 7659 40.4 
2001 5936733 5401892 599610 10.1 11.1 15192 7410 39.5 
2002 6009029 5575946 618930 10.3 11.1 16310 8149 37.9 
2003      16987 8967  
2004      18047 9414  
2005      19082 9148  
2006      19883 9424  
Sources: Dirección del Trabajo (2007b: 10, Table 1), Dirección del Trabajo (2003b); INE, 2001; 
and Roberts, 1998. 
 
 
At the level of the firm, the so-called strategy of ‘trade union autonomy’ refers to 
the growing number of leaders and organisations who do not identify neither with CUT’s 
social cohesion strategy nor with the classic Marxist orientation of the ‘regulated’ Chilean 
labour movement (Rojas and Aravena, 1999). This model of unionism encourages modes 
of organisation that favour grassroots participation and mobilisation, autonomy from 
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political parties, relations with other social movements and segments of the community. 
Rather than a unified entity, in this loose movement coexist Trotskyites, Neo Anarcho-
Syndicalists, and former Communists among other groups. The strategy of trade union 
autonomy remains specific to certain economic sectors. 
 
Low incentives for unionisation and collective bargaining have rendered effective 
collective representation a rarity (Table 5.6). Union density as percentage of wage and 
salary earners in the private sector has declined from its post-dictatorship 21.1% peak in 
1992, to 14.8% in 2007 (Dirección del Trabajo, 2008a).10 In 2006, 67.7% of workers work 
in firms with no unions (Pulso, 2007). Membership to CUT has declined systematically 
from 75% of total union membership in 1990 to 60% in 2001 (Campero, 2001). 
Simultaneously, new, but less representative, unions have been established. In 1991, 9858 
unions had an average of 71 members whilst in 2001 there were 15134 unions with an 
average number of 40 workers. These figures contrast sharply with the 100 members an 
average union had in 1981 and the 144 they had in 1973. Moreover, an increasing number 
of unions have gone into ‘recess’, lacking a registered membership or directorate.11 In 
1994, 34% of unions went into recess, while in 1998 their number had increased to 49% 
(Montero et al., 2000).  
 
The percentage of workers engaging in collective bargaining in each year has 
declined from 10.1% in 1991 to a mere 6.1% in 2007 (Dirección del Trabajo, 2008b). 
Both the number of bargaining groups and collective agreements have increased relative 
to trade unions and collective contracts (Dirección del Trabajo, 2003b; Montero et al., 
2000). Moreover, the outcomes of collective bargaining have worsened with wage 
improvements ‘uncomfortably close to the level of inflation’ (Frank, 2002). Low levels of 
organisation and collective bargaining may help to account for the ‘stability’ and low 
levels of (official) industrial conflict observed during the transition. Only between 0.9 and 
1.7% of companies had strikes in 2006 (Pulso, 2007). But it is interesting to note that this 
involve a simultaneous decrease in the number of legal strikes and an increase in the 
number of illegal strikes in sectors allowed to bargain collectively (Armstrong and Águila, 
2002).  
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Outsourcing: Chile’s ‘new social question’ 
 
No other group of workers has come closer to symbolise the precarious state of the 
Chilean labour market than contract workers. With ‘contract workers’ I refer to workers 
employed in outsourced employment relationships. For the purposes of this discussion, 
outsourcing (subcontratación) refers to triangular employment relationships where a 
worker (‘contract worker’) employed by an enterprise (the ‘provider’) performs work for a 
third party (the ‘user’) to whom their employer provides labour or services (ILO, 2006).12 
The ILO (2006) distinguishes between two types of outsourcing: the performance of work 
and services on the one hand, and the supply of labour under commercial contracts on the 
other. Here I focus exclusively on the first type, and references to outsourcing herein 
should be taken to refer solely to the performance of work and services.  
 
 
Figure 5.2: Outsourcing in Chile 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Outsourcing relationships imply two types of contracts. While user and provider 
enterprises are linked to their respective workforces by employment contracts, they are 
linked with each other by commercial contracts. Although as a result there should be a 
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clear distinction between who is employing and managing whom, outsourcing can be far 
more problematic in practice. Indeed, an early ILO (1997a: 2) definition of contract 
labour encompassed ‘situations where the conditions of dependency on or subordination 
to the enterprise using contract labour are similar to those that characterise an employment 
relationship between the user enterprise and its employees’. When this occurs, argues the 
ILO (2006: 48), there is often a demand to equalise conditions of employment. This urge 
may be more pressing if work takes place in the user’s premises or worksites, alongside 
the user’s employees, and if both perform work of equal value’. 
 
Outsourcing in Chile has increased rapidly as large user enterprises have developed 
extensive networks based on the contracting out of work, services, and labour, provided 
by numerous small and medium enterprises. According to statistics of the National Labour 
Bureau, over half of all companies outsourced at least one function and the number of 
indefinite-term contracts relative to all other contracts of employment has decreased from 
88.2% in 1998 to 70% in 2006, and 65% in 2007 (Dirección del Trabajo, 2007a; Pulso, 
2007). In other words, 35% of all Chilean workers labour in outsourced employment 
relationships. But because Chile’s informal sector represents 36% of the labour force 
(Tokman, 2007), just about 45% of Chile’s workforce is employed in a typical 
employment relationship. Furthermore, the adoption of outsourcing has increased rapidly 
in recent years. While in the 1970s the number of contract workers was negligible in most 
economic sectors, one out of three miners was a contract worker in two out of three 
miners in 2004 (Echeverría, 2006). Similarly, the percentage of contract workers in the 
manufacturing sector increased from 32.8% in 1999 to just under 50% in 2006 (SOFOFA, 
2007).  
 
Employers normally justify their outsourcing decisions on the grounds of 
specialisation, arguing that ‘we keep core competences in-house and we outsource non-
core activities’ (Heikkilä and Cordon, 2002). Although this argument may be valid in 
some cases, it fails to explain the fact that the most frequent type of outsourcing in Chile 
is precisely that of core activities and functions. Indeed, recent data indicates that in 2006, 
and 32.6% of user enterprises employed contractors to perform core functions, a larger 
proportion than those employed to perform any other non-core task such as IT, security, or 
cleaning services. Furthermore, 54% of companies outsourced informally and 42% did it 
in the same establishment (Dirección del Trabajo, 2007a). Official figures show that in 
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2006, 43.6% of all provider companies acknowledge to have one client only, and 61.5% 
worked for one or two clients (Dirección del Trabajo, 2007a).13  
 
What these figures reveal is that more often than not outsourcing is used to 
intentionally disguise the employment relationship that de facto exists between user 
enterprises and contract workers. In concealing the employment relationship, user 
enterprises are not obliged to observe labour legislation with regard to contract workers as 
these are legally employed by a third party. Rather than specialisation, outsourcing is 
predominantly conceived of as managerial strategy to reduce labour costs by avoiding 
labour legislation while remaining in control of the employment relationship. This is 
because, more often than not, providers are simply ‘paper enterprises’ created under 
Chilean law’s particular definition of enterprise.  
 
As discussed above, Chile’s entire legal apparatus is built around the narrow notion 
of ‘enterprise’ linked to tax code or registered name. Workers can organise and bargain 
solely within the strict limits set by a particular tax code or registered name. Firms tend to 
operate with numerous registered names in order to fragment unionisation and weaken 
collective bargaining. On the one hand, firms disguising the employment relationship 
concentrate employment under registered names formed only to manage personnel 
without assets or profits, hence debilitating bargaining power of those employed by them. 
On the other hand, although the ban on conducting collective bargaining beyond the level 
of the enterprise was lifted in 2001, inter-firm bargaining can only take place on a 
voluntary basis, dependent in fact on the consent of employers. But this is again restricted 
in the case of temporary workers who are explicitly forbidden to engage in regulated 
collective bargaining. These and other elements of legislation –including for example the 
fact that Chilean law does not require employers to respect the principle of ‘equal pay for 
equal work’ (López, 2008)- constitute some of the legal restrictions in which contract 
workers operate.  
 
Unsurprisingly, outsourced employment has been generally characterised as 
precarious. First, the great majority of contract workers earn relatively low salaries. 59% 
of contract workers earned less than two minimum wages, or just over £200 per calendar 
month in 2006 (Banco Central de Chile, 2007; MIDEPLAN, 2007). Second, it is usual to 
observe significant differences in pay levels between direct and contract workers 
performing work of equal value. Caputo and Galarce (2007) for example, estimate that in 
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the state-owned mining sector direct workers’ earnings double or sometimes triple those 
of contract workers. A recent exploratory study of the forestry sector detected a pay gap of 
25% between core and periphery workers (Díaz et al., 2007). Third, contract work is 
normally performed in relatively unsafe working conditions (Bastías, 1988; De Laire, 
1999; Dirección del Trabajo, 2007a; Echeverría, 2006). The government concedes that ‘of 
all accidents, 6 out of 10 affect contract workers, even though contract workers only 
represent 3 out of 10 workers’ (Bachelet, 2006).  
 
Fourth, contract workers present very low levels of unionisation and collective 
bargaining is nearly nonexistent. Outsourced employment is usually disguised as 
temporary and/or independent work which makes it extremely difficult for workers to 
sustain permanent organisations within or between firms. In addition, the lawful 
possibility of conducting collective bargaining beyond the level of the firm is restricted in 
practice as it relies on employers’ consent. Finally, contract workers are seen and see 
themselves as second-class labour force: casual, badly paid, neglected, disposable, and 
ever available to buffer variations in supply or demand. In short, outsourced employment 
has come to symbolise Chile’s ‘rough end of the labour market’ (Heery, 2002: 27). This 
is, of course, a general description. A more nuanced characterisation will distinguish 
between types of workers, firms, and sectors, as I do in the next chapter in respect of 
Chile’s large-scale copper mining sector. 
 
 ‘Second class workers no more’? Contract labour mobilisation and the re-regulation of 
outsourcing (2006) 
 
Hitherto a largely invisible majority, contract workers in flagship commodity export 
sectors began solid mass mobilising drives in late 2005. Mass contract labour mobilisation 
during the presidential election campaign of December 2005, marks the beginning of 
popular and media references to the ‘awakening of Chilean workers’ and ‘emerging 
contract labour movement’ (movimiento obrero subcontratista). The term largely refers to 
the organisations and modes of action borne out of these mass mobilisations. Outsourcing 
became the hottest issue of the campaign thanks to the mobilisations of the Coordinadora 
Nacional de Trabajadores Contratistas (henceforth CNTCC) against state-giant 
CODELCO’s El Teniente Division.  
 
The strikers demanded better employment and working conditions but the violent 
character of their mobilisation, the heavy losses inflicted to the company, and the harsh 
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repression they suffered, obliged the candidates to make explicit their positions. 
Unexpectedly, the candidate of the right, mogul Sebastián Piñera publicly solidarised with 
the strikers in a populist intervention that proved very effective in disarticulating the 
government’s message that they were the legitimate representatives of the world of work. 
With two weeks left for a runoff between the candidates, the government reintroduced in 
Congress a Bill on Outsourcing dormant since 2001, in the hope that Piñera’s own MPs 
would contradict their candidate calling his bluff.14  
 
 
Table 5.7: Main Outsourcing Regulations in 2006 Outsourcing and Labour Supply Act 
 
Article 183-A. For a lawful outsourced employment relationship to exist, a contract worker must be 
dependent on and subordinated to the provider enterprise that legally employs them. If, on the 
contrary, a contract worker is neither dependent on nor subordinated to the provider they must be 
understood as employed directly by the user enterprise. 
 
Article 183-B. User enterprises jointly and severally liable for the salaries, pension contributions 
and redundancy payments of contract workers. 
 
Article 183-C. The law gives users the right to request information from providers about the 
fulfilment of their labour obligations either through certificates issued by the Labour Bureau or 
‘other suitable methods that guarantee the veracity of the information’  
 
Article 183-D. If a user enterprise does exercise its rights to information and withholding of 
payments, it will only be considered vicariously liable for such obligations. 
 
Article 183-E. User firms to adopt all necessary measures to protect the life and health of all 
workers labouring in their establishments, irrespective of their employment status. 
 
Source: Durán-Palma and López (2009) 
 
 
The politicised discussion unleashed by the mobilisations –and that in some 
analyses allowed the government to retain power- put an enormous pressure on newly 
elected President Bachelet to pass this important piece of legislation and, on CODELCO, 
to put an end to the contract question in the company. With regard to the latter, 
CODELCO and the CNTCC established a series of task forces to resolve the strikers’ 
grievances. The government, on the other hand, introduced several crucial amendments 
into the Bill in order to pass it as soon as possible. After a rocky legislative process, 
Bachelet (2006) promulgated the Outsourcing and Supply of Labour Act (Ley 20123, 
henceforth 'the Act') on 16 October 2006, claiming that it represented ‘a definite, decisive, 
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and clear step in terminating with the division between first and second class workers’. On 
the whole, the mobilisations appeared to have obtained more than what they had expected. 
 
The Act aimed at improving the protection afforded to contract workers in the 
outsourcing regime by introducing five new articles into the Labour Code (Table 5.7).15 
The Act establishes that for a lawful outsourced employment relationship to exist a 
contract worker must be dependent on and subordinated to the provider enterprise that 
legally employs them. If, on the contrary, a contract worker is neither dependent on nor 
subordinated to the provider they must be understood as employed directly by the user 
enterprise (Article 183-A).  
 
The Act makes user enterprises jointly and severally liable for the salaries, pension 
contributions and redundancy payments of contract workers (Article 183-B). In the past, 
user enterprises could only be held vicariously responsible for the actions of a provider 
(responsabilidad subsidiaria). Contract workers were required to sue their direct employer 
to pursue their claims, and were only allowed to sue the user enterprise if the direct route 
failed. Under the principle of joint and several liability (responsabilidad solidaria) 
however, a contract worker may file a lawsuit directly against the user enterprise and ‘all 
those who may be held responsible for their rights’ in case of default.  
 
The Act gives user enterprises the chance of avoiding joint and several liability if 
they keep provider companies in check. The law gives users the right to request 
information from providers about the fulfilment of their labour obligations either through 
certificates issued by the Labour Bureau or ‘other suitable methods that guarantee the 
veracity of the information’ (Article 183-C). If a provider is found in fault, the law allows 
the user to withhold payments to the provider in order to fulfil the latter’s obligations. The 
Act establishes that if a user enterprise does exercise its rights to information and 
withholding of payments, it will only be considered vicariously liable for such obligations 
(Article 183-D). Finally, the Act obliges user firms to adopt all necessary measures to 
protect the life and health of all workers labouring in their establishments, irrespective of 
their employment status (Article 183-E). 
 
Legal ineffectiveness and the expansion of mass contract labour mobilisation 
 
Despite government claims to the contrary, the 2006 Outsourcing and Supply of Labour 
Act has been ineffectual in ‘terminating with the division between first and second class 
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workers’. Although significant progress could have been made in some aspects (e.g. 
internalisation of contract workers), The Act failed to give the National Labour Bureau 
any additional powers to ensure compliance with the new legislation, and material 
resources have been insufficient. Non-compliance remains widespread, and enforcement 
largely ineffective. Piore and Schrank revealed that there were only 19 Labour Inspectors 
for every 100,000 workers, and while 47.3% of companies were visited by tax inspectors, 
only 11.3% of companies received labour inspections (2007: 22). The Act failed to correct 
the legal concept of ‘enterprise’ in respect of outsourced employment relationships. The 
Act did not attempt to regulate the outsourcing of core tasks and functions either, thus 
permitting user enterprises to function with 100% of outsourced personnel.  
 
Moreover, the Act avoided the crucial issue of pay inequality between direct and 
contract workers. In fairness however, regulating such issue was unlikely as Chilean law 
does not require employers to respect the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’ (López, 
2008). This latest round of labour reform as well as the limitations of the regulatory 
framework is to invite a sense of déjà vu. Indeed, Chile’s latest round of labour reform has 
shown once again the capacity of the neoliberal establishment to resist fundamental 
change in the field of employment relations. The Bachelet government, less identified 
with the model than their predecessors, has appeared incapable of reforming social policy, 
let alone ‘touching the basis of the model’ (Riesco, 2007: 13).  
 
The National Labour Bureau began a comprehensive plan of labour inspections 
immediately after the Act came into force on 16 January 2007. The Bureau detected 
numerous irregularities involving disguised employment relationships and, in a series of 
emblematic rulings, demanded user enterprises to internalise thousands of contract 
workers. While some employers conscientiously began to employ these workers, many 
others chose instead to challenge in court the Bureau’s competence to rule on such 
matters. In consonance with previous verdicts, the Courts of Justice upheld the position of 
employers arguing that the existence of an employment relationship cannot be determined 
solely based on an inspection visit, but must instead be the resolution of an Employment 
Tribunal. In so doing, the Courts began to render inspections ineffective, in practice 
stripping the Bureau of the authority to monitor and enforce the new law. These rulings 
oblige individual workers to file lawsuits against employers, which is evidently not the 
best route to ensure broad compliance, as the process is long, complex, expensive, and as 
such, beyond reach of most workers.  
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As the Bureau’s position was undermined and employer opposition to the Act grew 
stronger, a sudden wave of labour discontent and mass mobilisation began to engulf the 
country. It seemed that, for thousands of contract workers -particularly in some of the 
most emblematic export-sectors of the ‘Chilean miracle’- enough was enough. The most 
prominent of these mobilisations began taking place in the forestry and copper mining 
sectors, and have extended onto salmon farming and fruit-processing industries. 
 
Contract labour mobilisation revealed the determination of thousands of vulnerable 
workers to mobilise outside the law to achieve what legislation does not provide for. 
Unions of contract workers in these sectors did not confine themselves to demand new 
legislation, or to try to engage in firm-level negotiations, which they had got painfully 
used to lose. Instead, they chose to organise contract workers across provider enterprises 
and to put direct pressure on user enterprises outside formal institutional channels. 
Contract labour mobilisation has had wider repercussions within and without the sectors 
involved, not least the passing of new labour legislation. It is the first time since the return 
of democracy that rank-and-file labour mobilisation appears to be main drive for changes 
in Chilean industrial relations. Although still early to establish the long-term significance 
of these mobilisations, they suggest a promising re-construction of union organisations as 
effective social actors employing militant forms of collective action, and indicate that a 
qualitatively different period in Chile’s industrial relations may be emerging. 
 
I will return and expand on these issues in chapters 9 and 10, where I will show 
that far from being an unexpected development, mass mobilisation of contract workers has 
been in the making for more than 20 years. At this point however, suffice it to say that 
while the neoliberal establishment has so far been able to resist challenges from above by 
employing constitutional prerogatives and relying on the hegemony of the ruling elite (e.g. 
labour law reform), it has appeared far less prepared to contain the direct challenge 
represented by subordinate forces mobilising outside institutional channels. Indeed, from 
symbolising the losers or victims of the ‘Chilean miracle’ the so-called ‘contract labour 
movement’ (movimiento obrero subcontratista) has come to represent in the hearts and 
minds of many, a way forward for an otherwise terminally ill Chilean labour movement. 
 
In conclusion, Chile’s political economy has been greatly transformed over the last 
30 years. Political repression, economic restructuring, and labour re-regulation along neo-
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liberal lines have severely undermined workers and unions’ structure of opportunity. After 
several rounds of reform, labour legislation has maintained –though tamed- its highly 
flexible and restrictive character. It is also possible to observe recurrent themes and 
patterns of continuity with preceding historical periods with regard to the orientation of 
the economy, the regulation of labour, and the choices of the parties. In effect, parallels 
can be made between the current neo-liberal era and previous laissez-faire eras in terms of 
outward-oriented development, repression and market-power regulated industrial 
relations, with ISI representing a historical exception. Union strategies at national and 
sector levels have evolved accordingly, revealing a ‘marked tendency to déjà vu’ 
(Roddick, 1989: 195). In the next chapter, I will try to show how this succession of 
ruptures and continuities has affected the political economy of Chile’s copper mining 
sector. 
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THE ‘GLO BALIS AT IO N’ OF  
LA GRAN MIN ERÍA  
 
Evolution of Opportunity at Sector Level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chile is the world’s largest copper producer and exporter. Its large-scale copper mining 
sector (La Gran Minería) was restructured along neoliberal lines in the early 1980s, 
transforming a nationalised industry into a transnational arena onto which massive 
amounts of foreign direct investment have poured ever since. In order to complement the 
national-level analysis presented in the previous chapter, I examine here the evolution of 
La Gran Minería and the development of its labour movement since the early 1900s  
 
This chapter is in five sections, the first three of which are chronological. Section 
6.1 (1904-1925) traces the early development of Chile’s large-scale copper sector and the 
emergence of illegal copper unionism. Section 6.2 (1925-1982) briefly refers to the 
consolidation of the Traditional Gran Minería and development of legal copper unionism 
(1925-1950) and Classic Copper Unionism. Section 6.3 (1982-present) discusses the 
neoliberal restructuring of the sector by the Pinochet dictatorship and the Concertación 
governments leading to the transformation of the sector into today’s ‘Global Gran 
Minería’. In the last two sections of this chapter I elaborate on the main implications of 
this last period. In Section 6.4, I discuss the main implications of the also called ‘mining 
boom’ paying particular attention to the consequences of outsourcing. I conclude with 
Section 6.5, where I briefly review Agacino et al.’s (1998) research on union strategies in 
the mining sector in the mid-1990s, a study that can be considered the direct antecedent of 
this thesis. 
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6.1 Early development and illegal copper unionism (1904-1925) 
 
Copper has been mined in Chile for centuries.16 For some time after independence, Chile 
became the main world producer and exporter but it was Britain, with superior smelting 
technology, that controlled more than three-quarters of the world copper trade in the mid-
1800s. By the late 1890s, Chilean production was marginal, a consequence of exhaustion 
of its high-grade deposits and the ‘nitrate fever’ that drew away investment. But as new 
mining and smelting techniques were developed in the United States in the early 1900s, it 
became technically possible and economically viable to process low-grade ores, like the 
ones found in the major copper deposits of Chile, North America, and Australia 
(NYMEX, 2008).  
 
Chile’s large-scale copper mining sector was born as a direct result of this process 
with the arrival of major American mining companies to exploit three immense copper 
deposits. Braden Copper Company (henceforth Braden), property of the Guggenheim 
family, arrived in Chile in 1904 to mine El Teniente, to this day the world’s largest 
underground mine. The Chile Exploration Company followed suit and began building 
Chuquicamata in 1910, the world’s largest open pit mine until the mid-1990s. Andes 
Copper Mining Company (henceforth Andes Copper) started constructing Potrerillos in 
1920. El Teniente, Chuquicamata, and Potrerillos began production in 1912, 1915, and 
1927 respectively (CODELCO, 2006). In 1915, the Guggenheims incorporated Kennecott 
Copper Corporation (henceforth Kennecott) and merged Braden into it, giving the latter 
possession of El Teniente (Kennecott Copper Corporation, 2009). In 1923, the Chile 
Exploration Company was acquired by Anaconda Mining Company (henceforth 
Anaconda), which already controlled Potrerillos through its subsidiary Andes Copper. 
 
This process was accompanied by the formation and development of highly 
cohesive and solidary copper mining communities, where the boundaries between life and 
work were often blurred. Employer strategies and policies are central elements in 
understanding the early formation of Chile’s copper mining communities because as 
companies moved onto their production cycles, issues of workforce retention became 
prominent (Finn, 1998; Klubock, 1998; Zapata, 2002). Various studies have documented 
the efforts of Kennecott and Anaconda to reduce labour turnover by encouraging miners –
most of them former rural workers- to form and settle with their families in purpose-built 
company towns (Chuquicamata, Potrerillos, and Sewell in the case of El Teniente) 
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(Garcés, 1999). While at work miners shared highly homogeneous (and dangerous) 
working conditions, life outside the mine was also greatly standardised with the company 
providing for all needs, disciplining family life, and becoming the de facto authority in the 
company towns (Latcham, 1926). The fact that these companies were also foreign added 
an important element of national identity to those communities (Zapata, 2002). 
 
During the first two decades of the twentieth century, governmental policy toward 
workers and unions was suppressive and employer strategies were characterised by harsh 
repression. Early worker organisations were not only illegal, but ineffective and short-
lived and, collective action was fragmented and sporadic, consisting primarily of 
spontaneous strikes. The first strike in La Gran Minería took place in El Teniente in 1911, 
one that inaugurated in copper mining the well-known pattern of strikes, repression and 
unpredictable outcomes that characterised the ‘heroic phase’ (1900-24) in the 
development of Chilean trade unionism (Barría, 1970). The divide between Anarchists 
and Socialists/Communists that characterised the Nitrate Republic was far less evident 
amongst copper workers. Socialist and Communists organisers rather than Anarchists 
began to organise copper workers as early as 1910. A Chuquicamata Mining Union 
(Unión Minera) was established in 1913 but disappeared shortly afterwards, as did various 
other organisations including the 1920 Federal Council in El Teniente, and a Mining 
Industrial Council in Chuquicamata in 1924, all of which disappeared after employers 
fired the totality of their members and sympathisers (Barría, 1970).  
 
 
6.2 Traditional Gran Miner ía  and classic copper unionism (1925-1982) 
 
Consolidation as transnational industry and Early Copper Unionism (1925-1950) 
 
The decades between the 1920’s and 1940’s saw the consolidation of the sector as 
American-owned industry and, as elsewhere in the country, the situation of organised 
labour began to change significantly with the promulgation of early labour legislation in 
1924, particularly the Union Organisations Act (Law No. 4057). In addition, Chile’s 
politico, economic, and social development in the late 1920s and early 1930s, proved 
greatly beneficial for the development of copper workers as actors with national influence. 
The 1925 Constitution guaranteed ample democratic rights, the 1931 Labour Code 
established a solid system of industrial relations, and the state became the centre of  
inward-oriented economic activity particularly since 1938. Although copper mining was 
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not a state enterprise, early interventionist policies allowed copper to take over nitrate as 
main source of hard currency, tax, and employment. 
 
Early Copper Unionism (1925-1950). The first union to be established in the sector 
was the Sewell and Mine Union (1925) in El Teniente. Braden workers organised three 
other ‘industrial’ (blue-collar) unions in El Teniente in this period: Rancagua Union 
(1925), Caletones Union (1926), and Coya y Pangal Union (1929). Anaconda workers 
formed two industrial and one ‘professional’ (white-collar) union in Chuquicamata: 
Industrial Mine Union and Plant Union (1930), and Union of Copper Employees (1931) 
respectively. Andes Copper workers at Potrerillos began to organise in 1932. Union 
organising in copper mining continued at a rapid pace throughout the 1930s, and by the 
end of the decade, copper workers had managed to organise nearly all the potential 
workforce (Barría, 1970). Copper unions established the National Mining Federation in 
1938 (Federación Industrial Nacional Minera, henceforth FNM) aiming to group all 
mining unions including nitrate and coal. The FNM joined the CTCH shortly afterwards 
and, in line with the confederation, committed to the collective bargaining institutions of 
the 1931 Labour Code. Thus, collective contracts became for decades to come the main 
regulatory mechanism of life and work in mines and mining towns (Zapata, 2002). 
 
The rapid organisation of copper workers and their acceptance of early industrial 
relations institutions did not mean of course that employers relaxed their repressive stance. 
As result, early copper unionism evolved into a militant industrial strategy heavily reliant 
on structural power. It was characterised by adversarial union-management relations built 
around collective bargaining and private sanctions. The content of grievances was linked 
to bread and butter objectives, and members were expected to mobilise periodically in 
order to force employers to give in to their demands. 
 
The Second World War and its aftermath had severe consequences for copper 
unions. Chile, as most of Latin America, became part of the United States sphere of 
influence during the Cold War which impacted greatly on national politics. In 1946, the 
CTCH split into two rival confederations, one Socialist and another one Communist. Just 
two years later, the same coalition that had got elected and governed with the Communist 
Party expelled Communists from government and declared the party illegal. Chile’s 
version of McCarthyism, the infamous 1948 Permanent Defence of Democracy Act (Law 
No. 8989) or ‘Damned Act’ (Ley Maldita), inaugurated a new cycle of repression of 
THE GLOBALISATION OF  LA GRAN MINERÍA 
151 
unions and union leaders, which severely affected and dispersed copper workers and their 
organisations between 1947 and 1951. 
 
Road to Nationalisation and Classic Copper Unionism (1950-1971) 
 
The Second World War also had important consequences for the relationship between the 
state and the industry. The conflict brought an unprecedented high demand for copper, a 
key element in the manufacture of military equipment. However, before, during, and after 
the war, the American government controlled the commercialisation of copper, fixing its 
price at artificially low levels. Chile lost huge amounts of revenue, and consensus grew 
stronger on the need for the state to increase control over mineral resources.  
 
In the early 1950s, the state began taking the first steps toward increasing control 
over the copper industry. The 1951 Washington Agreements between the Chilean state 
and the American companies allowed the former to control 20% of copper production 
(CODELCO, 2006). Complementarily, Law No. 10225 of 1952 allowed the Central Bank 
to purchase and sell the totality of copper production. A Ministry of Mining was created in 
1953 (DFL No. 16 and DFL No. 231) and in 1955 the government announced the New 
Deal Act (Ley del Nuevo Trato, Law No. 11828), a new legal framework that would 
regulate the relations between the state and copper companies through lower taxes in 
exchange for increases in production. The Copper Department (Departamento del Cobre) 
was created in the same year as the state agency with the authority to oversee and 
participate in copper international markets (CODELCO, 2006).  
 
Increasing state intervention in the economy was consistent with inward-oriented 
development, and in this context, the state’s approach to unions moved from repression to 
incorporation in economic development, particularly in strategic sectors. Copper workers 
became acutely aware of their structural power within the Chilean economy and in order 
to tap effectively on this source of bargaining power, they began a process of re-
unification which led to the illegal establishment in 1951 of the National Confederation of 
Copper Workers (Confederación Nacional de Trabajadores del Cobre, henceforth 
CNTC). Just a few months after its foundation, the CNTC led a successful industry-wide 
strike, and was able to obtain significant gains from employers and the government. 
Within a few years, the CNTC had consolidated its structure and became an important 
national-level actor. Objectives related to the defence, strengthening, and 
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institutionalisation of the trade union as organisation, progressively began to supplement 
its previously nearly exclusive economic grievances.  
 
Copper unions obtained special privileges from the state, increasing their 
associational power significantly. Notably, the 1955 New Deal Act mandated a 
commission to design a body of law ‘with special norms that would regulate work and 
relations between capital and labour in La Gran Minería’ (Law 11828, art. 22 cited in 
Barría, 1970: 18, my translation). As a result of this mandate, the government 
promulgated in 1956 the Copper Workers Statute (Estatuto de los Trabajadores del 
Cobre, Decree Law 313). The Statute legalised the CNTC, granted copper miners some 
economic concessions, included regulations of working conditions in the mines, 
indexation of salaries, and other measures to stimulate companies to invest in social 
housing and other social activities. More importantly, the Statute established a special 
industrial relations framework for copper mining (Barría, 1970). By the mid-1950s, union 
density in the sector was well above 60% on average, second only to the state-owned 
sectors of gas, water, and electricity (Agacino et al., 1998). The New Deal, the Copper 
Workers Statute, and the CNTC singled out copper workers as special actors within the 
labour movement and in their relations with the state. With the state becoming the main 
intermediary between the now industry-wide unions and their transnational employers, 
copper workers’ main challenge in this period was to access and put pressure on the state. 
It is within this institutionalised framework that Chile’s ‘classic’ copper unionism began 
to emerge.  
 
Classic Copper Unionism. With this I mean to refer to the nature of union strategy and 
industrial conflict that characterised copper mining between the 1950s and early 1970s. 
While early copper unionism was characterised by adversarial collective bargaining 
between individual employers and trade unions, the now legalised CNTC became the 
unique bargaining force across all major copper mines. The government –now the central 
purchasing and commercialising power for copper and industrial relations arbitrator- 
became a central industrial relations actor. The CNTC would put pressure on the state to 
intermediating between the unions and their transnational employers. It did not take long 
however for the CNTC expected to access and bargain directly with the state, bypassing 
individual employers, and political strategy began to supplement industrial strategy. 
Copper unions developed a strong clientelist relationship with political parties, in which 
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the latter provided for an effective vehicle for accessing the state in exchange for securing 
electoral positioning among the rank-and-file (Zapata, 2002). 
 
Clientelism is crucial not only to understand the mechanics of the sector’s highly 
institutionalised industrial relations system, but also the various illegal and violent strikes 
that overwhelmed it periodically (1938, 1940, 1942, 1951, 1966). As Zapata (2002) has 
shown, the nature of industrial conflict in copper mining has been one of ‘pure and simple 
unionism’ rather than a heavily ideological one. Although mass strikes had political 
connotations, these did not imply an alignment of union and party objectives. Indeed, the 
content of copper workers grievances has largely been linked to the defence, 
strengthening, and institutionalisation of the trade union as organisation (fuero, 
indexation, collective bargaining regulation), rather than to implementing the 
ideologically informed positions of political parties. Last, their integration with the rest of 
the labour movement was limited. This included relations with the FNM and CUT in 
which the presence of the CNTC, though active, was neither committed nor prominent 
enough. Classic Copper Unionism in its mature form would become largely political, and 
relations with the state and political parties represented an equal or more important sphere 
of union activity than relations with individual employers and members.17 
 
In 1964, the Christian Democrats won the presidency and announced a US$ 500 
million expansion programme (Convenios del Cobre) which included the doubling of 
output to more than one million tons by 1970, substantial government participation in 
copper production and exploration, the tripling of Chilean copper refining capacities by 
1970, considerable state control over sales, and the opening of all world markets 
(including the Soviet Union) to Chilean copper (Gedicks, 1973). The CNTC demanded to 
participate in the elaboration of such policies with little success although it achieved a 
series of salary increments and social benefits after calling major strikes and bargaining 
directly with the state.  
 
In 1966, the government promulgated the Chilenisation Act (Law 16425), a radical 
new economic policy in agreement with copper companies, and reformed the Copper 
Workers Statute. The Chilenisation Act permitted the creation of mixed societies between 
the state and foreign companies. In 1966, the state purchased a 51% controlling interest in 
Braden Copper and committed itself to the expansion of El Teniente, while Kennecott 
retained managerial decision-making authority. Chile reduced the tax rates on the 
companies as well as providing a 20-year guarantee on these tax rates. Although the 
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original 1964 agreements did not include Chilenisation of Anaconda but rather Anaconda 
agreed to expand its output by 53% between 1965 and 1970, by 1969 the state had 
acquired a 51% interest in the two largest Anaconda mines: Chuquicamata and El 
Salvador (Gedicks, 1973). The Copper Department was transformed in 1968 into the so-
called ‘Copper Corporation’ (Corporación del Cobre, Law 16425), a state agency to 
manage the production and commercialisation of the Chileanised copper mines.  
 
In contrast to the extended and romanticised view of Chilenisation process, the high 
prices paid for overvalued companies, excessive tax reductions, and meagre increases in 
production output, meant that American companies, and not the Chilean state, were better 
off after the deal. ‘Hanson's American Letter’ used by investors in the US summed up the 
results of Chilenisation as follows: ‘No government of the extreme right, in an agreement 
previously signed, had ever dealt with North American firms with the kind of generosity 
shown by the Frei government. Its excessively favourable treatment lacked so much 
balance and justice and was so, so prejudicial to Chilean interests that it almost provoked 
hilarity in Washington’ (Gedicks, 1973: 13-14).18 
 
The Chilenisation process ended in full nationalisation on 11 July 1971 when 
President Salvador Allende achieved solid congressional approval to take over La Gran 
Minería. Congress voted unanimously to amend the 1925 Political Constitution, allowing 
the state to nationalise the properties of the three largest copper companies in Chile: 
Anaconda (Chuquicamata and El Salvador), Kennecott (El Teniente), and Cerro 
Corporation (Andina), the latter having started operations in 1967.  
 
The 1971 Large-scale Copper Mining Nationalisation Act (Nacionalización de la 
Gran Minería del Cobre, Law No. 17450) allowed the state to legally expropriate La 
Gran Minería by abolishing the old colonial doctrine of ‘mining freedom’ (‘libertad de 
minas’), which recognised miners the right to treat their mines ‘as though they were their 
own’. The mining freedom doctrine recognised the state’s inherent authority over mining 
resources as a consequence of territorial sovereignty but prevent it to use or enjoy mining 
deposits which were owned by whomever discovered them (Ibáñez, 2003).  
 
In contrast, the 1971 Nationalisation Act introduced a royalist doctrine of mining 
wealth (‘doctrina regalista’), which established the state’s patrimonial authority over 
mining resources (Ibáñez, 2003). Nationalisation allowed the state to decide the 
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organisation, operation and administration of the companies. It also established that the 
faculty to dispose of rights or to operate a mining concession could only be exercised on 
new deposits that were not already being mined or authorised by law. The nationalised 
companies began to be managed by ‘collective societies’ (sociedades colectivas), which 
were in turn coordinated by the state’s Copper Corporation.  
 
The processes of Chilenisation first and nationalisation second were ambivalently 
received by copper workers. Although Allende was the official candidate of the CUT as 
well as of the Socialist and Communist Parties, copper workers had a series of conflicts 
with the Popular Unity government as well as with pro-Allende labour movement. Copper 
miners supported the political projects of the parties of the left as long as the latter were 
willing to support their grievances in the industrial relations sphere, largely ‘the defence 
of the union’ (‘la defensa del sindicato’), but clashed when these affected their 
prerogatives. 
 
Nationalisation and Classic Copper Unionism within CODELCO (1973-1982) 
 
Two years after the nationalisation of copper mines, a US-backed coup d’état installed 
General Pinochet’s in power. Political repression was particularly harsh against copper 
workers and managers of the nationalised companies. Numerous union leaders, Socialist 
and Communist members, as well as Popular Unity administrators -notably David 
Silberman, Chuquicamata’s Communist general manager- were among the thousands 
executed, imprisoned, tortured, exiled, and ‘disappeared’. Controlling copper miners and 
weakening their organisations was also attempted by eliminating the 1956 Copper 
Workers Statute as part of the 1978-79 new labour regulations.  
 
Although one of the first actions of the dictatorship was to return all sorts of 
nationalised property to private hands, it did not reverse the nationalisation of La Gran 
Minería. Indeed, in 1976 the regime passed Decree Laws No. 1349 and 1350 formalising 
the creation of a state-owned mining company, CODELCO (Corporación Nacional del 
Cobre de Chile) that would integrate the nationalised companies in one large mining, 
industrial and commercial corporation (CODELCO, 2006). This was partly the reflection 
of the power of a substantial sector of the armed forces that identified with nationalist 
ideas. Keeping La Gran Minería in public hands was also a pragmatic political and 
economic stance due to the huge revenues obtained from copper, the enormous political 
importance of La Gran Minería, and CODELCO becoming the Armed Forces’ main 
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source of funding through the Confidential Copper Act which established that CODELCO 
would annually transfer to the Armed Forces the equivalent of 10% of its gross sales.  
 
Classic copper unionism within a nationalised industry and CODELCO (1971-
1982). The transformation of the state into employer in its own right presented the copper 
labour movement with a new challenge, as the strategies for putting pressure on private 
employers and accessing the state as intermediary were no longer appropriate. 
Furthermore, the tensions associated with the state’s new role took a completely different 
shape during the Socialist government of Allende and the Pinochet dictatorship. Whereas 
the main challenge in the former case was incorporation, in the latter was repression. In 
both cases however, the predominant union objective was the defence of the union as 
organisation and the prerogatives of copper workers. In both cases however, what 
predominated was the defence of the union as organisation and the prerogatives of copper 
workers. As a result, Classic Copper Unionism began to evolve back into a largely 
industrial strategy.  
 
 
6.3 The ‘Global Gran Miner ía’  (1982-present) 
 
Pinochet and the re-regulation of La Gran Minería 
 
Despite the advance of neoliberal reforms across the Chilean economy, Pinochet’s 1980 
Constitution ratified Allende’s royalist doctrine of mines, and granted the state ‘absolute, 
exclusive, inalienable, and imprescriptible domain over all mines…’ (Agacino et al., 
1998: 35, my translation). This reflected the internal disagreements between the neo-
liberals and the army on the one hand, and the nationalists and the air force on the other 
(Cavallo et al., 2008).  Labour and pensions neo-liberal reformer, José Piñera was swiftly 
called by Pinochet to solve this problem. In his words, 
 
It was expected that (a new Constitution) would also re-establish traditional property 
rights in the mining sector. To the surprise of many however, an unexpected 
disagreement within the (military) government led to the 1980 Constitution failing to 
clearly establish the nature of mining rights. The day after the approval of the new 
Constitution, mining employers began to urge for reforming the constitution either 
via an unusual ‘mining plebiscite’ or via a law interpreting the Constitution. (…) It 
was to resolve this crisis that I was appointed Minister of Mining on 29 December 
1980. 
(Piñera, 2002b) 
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For Piñera the challenge was essentially to draft a constitutional law, which would 
provide for ‘firm’ mining property rights, without modifying -or weakening the legitimacy 
of- the 1980 Constitution. Piñera’s 1982 Mining Concessions Constitutional Law (Ley 
Orgánica Constitucional de Concesiones Mineras, Law No. 18097) established a ‘full 
concession’ regime as a solution. The nature of the concession right as well as the main 
terms on which the concession-holder would hold the concession right included: a) same 
protection as private property rights; b) any act of expropriation has to be fairly 
indemnified (paid in cash and must reflect the entire reduction in the owner's net worth, 
equivalent in the case of an exploitation concession to the present value of its future net 
cash flows); c) the concession-holder is not subject to ‘use it or lose it’ clauses; d) 
concessions have indefinite duration; and, e) the creation, continued existence and 
termination of a concession are in the hands of the Judicial Branch, not the Legislative 
Branch or the Executive (Piñera, 2002a, 2002b).  
 
In addition to this law, the Mining Code -a separate body of legislation governing a 
number of procedural issues- was passed in 1983 (Código de Minería or ‘Ley Piñera’). 
Both bodies of law represent a fundamental break in the historical evolution of mining 
policy and reversed the doctrine that led to nationalisation (Ibáñez, 2003). It is also 
important to view mining re-regulation as yet another building block of the 
comprehensive neo-liberal edifice built by the military regime. Thus, while new mining 
laws opened access to mineral resources, other regulations guaranteed no discriminatory 
treatment to foreign direct investment, restored managerial prerogative, and weakened 
labour organisation.  
 
The CNTC, renamed Federación de Trabajadores del Cobre (FTC) to reflect its 
new role as firm-level federation after the establishment of CODELCO, reacted 
dramatically to the combined threat of the 1979 Labour Plan, the cumulative erosion of 
their real wages and the loss of many of their confederation’s special legal privileges. The 
FTC began to explore the possibilities of an alliance with urban workers and played an 
important role in the Coordinadora Nacional Sindical, a loose trade union federation 
tapping the political networks of communists, socialists, and left-wing Christian 
Democrats, which itself had long-standing links with one of the unions in the El Teniente 
mine’ (Roddick, 1989: 183). The first large scale protests against the Pinochet regime 
were organised by the FTC paving the way for the restoration of democracy (Zapata, 
1980, 1986). While national union density levels dropped to single figures in the early 
UNION STRATEGIES IN THE ERA OF GLOBALISATION 
158 
1980s, density in copper mining remained between 60 and 70% throughout the 
dictatorship. 
 
 
La Concertación and the copper lobby 
 
I argued in the previous chapter that the democratic governments have largely 
consolidated the political, economic, and industrial relations legacy of the Pinochet 
regime. With regard to mining policy however, the Concertación has not only maintained 
but also deepened the legacy of the dictatorship. This is, in a nutshell, what ‘Chileans have 
been doing right’. This has largely taken the form of low-key but high impact legislation 
in several areas of public policy passed with minimal debate in parliament. A few 
examples should suffice.  
 
First, just a month after the inauguration of the new democratic government in 
1990, a tax reform bill that increased VAT and income tax was passed with the agreement 
of all political parties. The stated objective of such bill was to address the social deficit 
accumulated during military rule. However, the ‘small print’ of this uncontested set of 
new regulations contained no less than three measures that favoured mining companies 
explicitly and substantially. There are various technicalities involved that are far better 
explained elsewhere (Alcayaga, 1999, 2005; Ibáñez, 2003; Luna et al., 2004), but 
essentially Law No. 18985 a) facilitated the acquisition of Chilean-owned mining property 
by transnational corporations, b) eliminated the hitherto de facto 4% royalty on all mining 
operations, and c) provided for mechanisms to ensure company profits would remain 
artificially low in order to avoid income tax. If the Pinochet regime reversed Allende’s 
doctrine on mining ownership, with these modifications the Concertación set the clock 
back decades before Allende in terms of taxation. 
 
Second, Law No. 19137 of 1992 allowed for deposits owned and identified by 
CODELCO but not yet in production to be transferred to transnationals. Between 1996 
and 2000, CODELCO transferred more than 300,000 hectares of concessions to 
transnational corporations. Third, in the same year, Chile and Argentina signed an 
agreement on ‘economic complementarity’ in order to ‘use in partnership the natural 
resources along the Andes.’ This agreement was the first of a series of steps that 
culminated in 1998 with the signing of a Mining Treaty between the two nations. Fourth, 
new environmental legislation was enacted in the 1990s but its character has been 
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extremely (Verdugo, 1998). A UN study conducted specifically to assess environmental 
legislation in the copper sector states that Law No. 19300 on Environmental Protection 
‘has subordinated environmental regulation to economic development, for which in turn 
mining exploitation is fundamental’ (Berríos, 1997: 24, my translation). 
 
Last, in 2005, the government passed the misleadingly called ‘Royalty II Act’. A 
royalty –or tax on output- has been the most effective way of taxing mining companies 
across the world, and Chile is the only major mining country without one. As political 
pressure mounted from some sectors of the public in the early 2000s to end this situation, 
a royalty bill was introduced and blocked in congress by the right (‘Royalty I’). As 
pressure continued, a second bill was introduced and passed in 2005. But the so-called 
Royalty II is, first of all, not a royalty but a simple tax. Technicalities aside, the new law 
taxes mining companies 5% on their operational results -not on their sales or output, hence 
allowing them to declare losses- while simultaneously reduces their income tax threshold 
from 42 to 35%. Simple arithmetic shows that the state is losing 2% as a result (Alcayaga, 
2005). As in the area of industrial relations, the Royalty II shows the Concertación’s usual 
ability to claim that it has done something while quite the reverse is true.  
 
In view of the above it is unsurprising that Chile has been voted the ‘world’s best 
place to do mining’ by conservative think tanks around the world. Canada’s Fraser 
Institute has consistently ranked Chile top-class in almost all categories in its annual 
survey (2006, 2007, 2008). As they state: ‘we hope that this survey and companion index 
will encourage policy makers to create fair, stable, and consistent regulatory frameworks 
in which mining companies, as a proxy for other industries, can operate without 
experiencing what appears to be institutionalised bias’ (The Fraser Institute, 2002: , 
emphasis added). For other commentators however, rather than institutionalised bias, what 
this and other surveys are all about is to advance a neo-liberal political agenda. For Kuyek 
(2003) for example, ‘it is clear from the survey that a vote for mining-friendly policy is a 
vote against fair taxation, against collective bargaining, against environmental protection, 
against aboriginal land rights and against protected areas’. 
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6.4 Implications of the ‘Mining Boom’ 
 
As a consequence of a business-friendly institutional framework (labour, mining, tax, 
environment), nearly perfect natural conditions (ore quality, geography, climate, 
proximity to the sea, water availability), material infrastructure (roads, ports, electricity), 
and the quality of its mining labour force, Chile has experienced an unprecedented and 
prolonged ‘mining boom.’ The boom has been comprehensive in scope but for the 
purposes of this thesis, suffice is to briefly examine the following five areas: structure of 
ownership, production levels, value added of exports, tax revenues, and in a separate 
subsection, the core and periphery divide. 
 
Re-transnationalisation. From a nationalised industry in the early 1970s, today’s Gran 
Minería is mainly constituted by transnational corporations (TNCs). TNCs returned to the 
sector in the early 1980s, taking over medium-size operations sold off by the dictatorship 
(e.g. Exxon and Disputada de Las Condes in 1978). BHP Billiton’s Escondida was the 
first major mine developed from scratch under the new regulations in 1990. A succession 
of operations followed which include Candelaria, Cerro Colorado, and Quebrada Blanca 
in 1994, Zaldívar in 1995, El Abra –a joint venture between CODELCO and Cyprus 
Amax- in 1996, Collahuasi and Lomas Bayas in 1998, Los Pelambres in 1999, El Tesoro 
in 2001, and Spence in 2006. Unsurprisingly, for Debrott (2002) the industry’s 
restructuring of ownership can only be described as one of re-transnationalisation (Figure  
6.1 opposite page). 
 
Overproduction and falling price. The world’s copper production has increased 
significantly as a consequence of the proliferation of transnational mining companies in 
Chile: from the 532,000 metric tonnes (MT) produced in 1960, through the 708 MT 
produced in 1971 and 1,588,000 MT in 1990, to over 5,360,000 MT in 2006 (35.2% of 
world’s copper mine production) (COCHILCO, 2007; Debrott, 2002). Whereas in 1987 
CODELCO was responsible for 77% and TNCs for 23% of all copper produced in Chile, 
in 2006 CODELCO produced 31.2% and TNCs 68.7% (COCHILCO, 2007) (see Table 
6.2 at the end of this chapter). For several commentators this situation has been one of 
overproduction, in turn responsible for the worldwide price collapse of copper observed 
in the late 1990s and early 2000s (Caputo, 1996; Caputo et al., 2001; Caputo et al., 2000).  
 
The effect of the mining policy was significant and - as predicted by economic 
theory, Chile finally proved Jagdish Bagwhati's theorem of Impoverishing Growth 
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(1957) - overinvestment in mining, attracted by the huge ground rent that typically 
exceeds one fifth of copper sales, so massive; that Chile by itself gloated the world 
market with copper, busting world prices by half even before demand started to 
dwindle after 2000.  
(Riesco, 2003: 6) 
 
The thesis of overproduction has been strongly denied by the government (Cartagena, 
2000), although CODELCO itself has restricted output tin several occasions to 
compensate for low prices. 
 
 
Figure 6.1: La Gran Minería over the twentieth century 
 1904-76 1976-1982 1982-present 
Old mining Anaconda 
Chuquicamata 
Kennecott 
El Teniente  
Andes 
Potrerillos 
El Salvador 
Andina 
CODELCO 
Chuquicamata 
El Teniente 
El Salvador 
Andina 
CODELCO 
Div. CODELCO Norte 
Chuquicamata 
Radomiro Tomic (1997) 
Div. El Teniente 
Div. El Salvador 
Div. Andina 
 
National TNCs   Antofagasta 
Los Pelambres 
Michilla 
El Tesoro 
 
Foreign TNCs  Exxon Minerals 
Disputada de Las Condes 
Anglo-American 
Sur Andes 
Mantos Blancos 
BHP-Billiton 
Escondida 
Cerro Colorado 
Candelaria 
Collahuasi 
Barrick Gold 
Zaldívar 
Phelps-Dodge/CODELCO 
El Abra 
 
Quebrada Blanca 
Spence 
 
 
Decreasing value and involution on the value added of exports. ‘Exports of copper 
roughly doubled in volume from 1995 to 1999, while the value of exports declined and 
government income declined from about half of exports in 1989 to five per cent in 1999’ 
(Riesco, 2003: 6). In other words, during the 1990s the state received less income from 
copper than it did during the 1980s, when CODELCO produced half of what it did in the 
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1990s. This is an extremely important issue as copper prices have an immense impact in 
the Chilean economy. CODELCO is said to be ‘Chile’s best business ever’ with tax 
revenues between 1971 and 2003 representing more than all taxes paid by all private 
companies over the same period (Alcayaga, 2005). While in a low price year like 1999 
CODELCO’s contributions represented US$ 269 million and 1.9% of fiscal revenue, in a 
high price year like 2006, contributions reached US$ 8.3 billion and 22.1% of tax revenue 
(COCHILCO, 2007). A linked debate has to do with the type of final product being 
exported. This is because although more copper has been produced, less copper has been 
refined in Chile. In fact, most new exports have been of copper concentrate (30% pure 
copper) rather than of greater value-added copper cathodes (99% pure copper) (Lagos, J. 
F., 1999). Furthermore, while most TNCs produce more concentrate than cathodes, the 
opposite is true of CODELCO.19 
 
Increasing tax evasion and decreasing tax revenue. CODELCO’s importance contrasts 
with that of new transnational corporations. In effect, only Escondida and Mantos Blancos 
pay taxes, while all others have consistently declared losses (Alcayaga, 2005). However, 
Escondida’s tax bill is minimal when compared to CODELCO’s and Mantos Blancos has 
paid taxes on two years only. This is a direct consequence of the tax regulations put in 
practice by the Concertación as these two companies are regulated by a different tax 
regime. There are various forms to avoid taxes (transfer prices, parent companies’ high-
interest rates, massive ‘losses’ in future markets, consultancy payments to parent 
companies, etc). Although admittedly a low-price decade, it is estimated that between 
1991 and 2002, Chile lost at least US$ 2 billion in tax revenue. For some authors however, 
the current situation should improve in the future as companies settle their initial costs 
(Lagos, G. and Torrens, 2000), but most remain unimpressed (Alcayaga, 1999, 2005; 
Caputo, 2000; Comité de Defensa del Cobre, 2008; Lavandero, 1999; Luna et al., 2004; 
Riesco, 2001, 2002, 2004) which goes to explain the government’s semi-U-turn with its 
‘Royalty 2’ initiative. 
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Figure 6.2: Approximate locations of mines (A)  (Regions I, II, and III) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: based on several sources including Consejo Minero (2003, 2004) 
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Outsourcing and the core and periphery divide 
 
In spite of the proliferation of new mines, the total number of workers employed in La 
Gran Minería has declined slightly from 37,476 workers employed in 1987 to 34,403 in 
2006 largely due to the implementation of new production processes and technology 
(COCHILCO, 2007). The most evident effect of neoliberal regulations and the mining 
boom in copper mining employment has occurred in its composition.  
 
Since the early 1980s, there has been a simultaneous decline in the number of direct 
jobs and a significant increase in the number of atypical forms of employment, 
particularly that of outsourcing. There are no disaggregated statistics for copper mining, 
but statistics for the mining sector as a whole (Table 6.1), show that while in the 1970s the 
number of contract workers employed in mining was negligible, one out of three miners 
was a contract worker in 1988, and two out of three miners were contract workers in 2004 
(Echeverría, 2006). This has been especially evident in the case of CODELCO. While the 
number of direct workers employed by CODELCO has decreased from 24,000 in 1989 to 
17,936 in 2006, the number of contract workers has increased from 1,371 to just under 
30,000 between the same years (CODELCO, 2007).  
 
The phenomenon of outsourcing emerged in Chile as direct product of the 
dictatorship’s re-regulation of labour in the late 1970s. Until then, companies –and mining 
companies for that matter- were not allowed to outsource core tasks and functions, or to 
pay contract workers less than what direct workers receive (see previous chapter). 
Scrapping these and other regulations was crucial in making Chile’s labour market and 
mining sector highly flexible. For old mining companies outsourcing represented a 
straightforward way to ‘get rid of the grease’, which resulted in thousands of direct jobs 
lost and direct workers re-employed as contract labour. For new companies flexible 
outsourcing regulations allowed to design ventures presupposing minimal direct 
employment. The terms core and periphery are used here to refer to these two groups 
because working and employment conditions between direct and contract workers differ 
greatly. 
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Figure 6.3: Approximate location of mines (B) (Regions III, IV, V, VI and Metropolitan) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: based on several sources including Consejo Minero (2003, 2004) 
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Core workers. Core workers are typically equated with CODELCO workers, as they have 
long been considered Chile’s ‘labour aristocracy,’ with employment and working 
conditions well above the national average. They are broadly seen as a privileged group, 
thanks to their public status, strategic weight on the economy, and the strength of their 
organisation, the Federación de Trabajadores del Cobre (FTC). In Frank’s words, they 
inhabit mining’s ‘old world’. 
 
The “old world” is one where the state is the predominant employer and where 
unions or federations have a long relationship with the state, and perhaps with 
management in charge of the company. Most workers here enjoy a permanent 
contract and good employment protection and the union has a long tradition of 
collective bargaining and strikes. Importantly, by resisting (further) privatization, the 
union also demonstrates that it wants this old world to survive. For that reason, most 
unions are part of a federation or confederation, and are likely affiliated to CUT. 
Union members tend to be familiar with each other, for years they have worked side 
by side in the same company, they reside in the same community, and they go to the 
same pub. In short, the old is a well-structured place with a long history. 
(Frank, 2002: 44) 
 
It is however mistaken to associate core employment to old mining in general, or to 
CODELCO in particular because direct workers employed by transnational corporations 
share many of the ‘privileges’ normally associated with ‘old mining’ workers -a proper 
contract of employment being the main one. 
 
Periphery workers. Likewise, Frank (2002) describes the ‘new world’ as one of insecurity, 
where the great majority of workers are temporarily employed as contract labour. With the 
exception of some groups of highly skilled workers, employment and working conditions 
for contract workers in the mining sector are precarious. Differences in pay between direct 
and contract workers are stark. While a typical worker employed by CODELCO takes 
home between £900 and £1200 pcm, a standard contract worker takes home £250 pcm on 
average, but many of them work for the minimum wage (Caputo and Galarce, 2007). 
Contract workers suffer significantly more accidents than core workers (Echeverría, 
2006), work longer and unsocial hours (De Laire, 1999a, 1999b), present low levels of 
unionisation and collective bargaining (Agacino et al., 1998; González, 1998), and their 
subjective experience of work is one of precariousness and abandonment (Abarzúa, 2008). 
Workers in the ‘new world’, says Frank,  
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(…) move frequently from one location to another, often earn less money, face 
tougher collective bargaining, and their contracts are less enforced. Though possible 
in theory, in practice, workers in this world have little chance of being able to move 
into the old world. Though equally structured, the worker in the new world is often 
less familiar with the employer, and often sees and works with new colleagues. 
Unlike many of the old world unions, these new unions have only recently created or 
joined a federation, or even CUT. In short, the new world is unfamiliar and tends to 
remain so unless workers decide to unionise. 
(Frank, 2002: 44) 
 
The periphery of copper mining employment is far from homogeneous. It is therefore 
necessary to distinguish between types of services outsourced, contract workers, and 
provider firms. 
 
 
Table 6.1: Number of Direct and Contract Workers in Mining, 1975-2004 
Year Direct Workers Contract Workers Total 
1975 74782 0 74782 
1976 75535 0 75535 
1977 72967 0 72967 
1978 67369 0 67369 
1979 64746 0 64746 
1981 59777 0 59777 
1982 54206 290 54496 
1985 63926 3174 67100 
1990 74508 10751 85259 
1995 54938 27300 82238 
1996 51166 34737 85903 
1997 51284 41976 93260 
1998 48839 47738 96577 
1999 46186 38031 84217 
2000 46621 39476 86097 
2001 44794 48418 93212 
2002 45056 54633 99689 
2003 42457 57437 99894 
2004 44341 68120 112461 
Source: Echeverría (2006: 48, Table 10) 
 
 
Services outsourced. Mining companies hire contract workers to perform a broad variety 
of activities. A useful categorisation is that of CODELCO, which distinguishes between 
the outsourcing of services, ‘investment’, and operational tasks. The ratio between these 
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three groups varies greatly depending on a company’s strategy and mining cycle. In the 
case of CODELCO (2006) for example, it is 28%, 45%, and 27% respectively. The 
outsourcing of services and investment tasks involve non-core functions. Services include 
transportation, catering, security, and cleaning services, and ‘investment’ tasks consist of 
the one-off building of mines, or other major infrastructure projects.  
 
The outsourcing of operations is far more problematic as it often involves a blurring 
between core and non-core tasks. Operational tasks include mining development, 
tunnelling, and other continuous functions that although may not be directly linked to 
extraction or processing or mineral resources, are nevertheless essential -sine qua non- for 
the business. Unsurprisingly, most abuses of outsourcing legislation occur in this area. 
Relative to other sectors however, the use of outsourcing to disguise the employment 
relationship has represented less of a trend in the mining sector. Mining companies with a 
particularly poor record in this regard such as CODELCO have an estimated 15 to 20 
percent of their workforce in disguised employment relationship. 
 
Types of contract workers. These three sets of tasks can also be associated with three 
distinct types of worker. Service and operations contract workers (henceforth also referred 
to as non-montajistas) are relatively low skill employed in ‘permanent short-term’ 
contracts. Permanent because of the continuous nature of these activities, and ‘short term’ 
because of the artificial temporary nature of their (rolling) contracts of employment. These 
workers tend to be local workers that live and work in the same geographical area. 
Industrial assemblage contract workers (or montajistas) tend to be high skill, work on a 
temporary basis, and away from where they reside for long periods. Whereas service 
contract workers generally have not mining background (relatively young, and in the case 
of services, female workforce), a substantial number of operations contract workers are 
former core workers. Industrial assembly workers are, on the other hand, mostly 
construction workers. As this research will show, these workers have also organised in 
different types of organisations, and pursued different strategies, achieving different 
degrees of success.  
 
Type of firms and the ‘outsourcing chain’. Although provider companies are normally 
small firms that make use of legal provisions that attenuate the demands of labour 
legislation, in the mining sector the size of provider enterprises vary greatly. Indeed, the 
very distinction between user and provider is a relative one, depending on a company’s 
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position in the outsourcing chain. A large transnational corporation (e.g. Balfour-Beatty) 
is a provider enterprise for a large transnational mining user enterprise (e.g. BHP Billiton), 
and simultaneously a user enterprise for several other provider firms. These are normally 
three to four ‘medium-size’ provider firms, that are in turn, subcontractors relative to 
BHP-Billiton. These ‘medium-size’ provider firms are also the user firms of several 
hundreds small-size provider enterprises (sub-sub contractors relative to BHP-Billiton). 
As a general rule, it can be said that the farther away from the original commercial 
contract, the worse the employment and working conditions of workers, and the greater 
the economic vulnerability and likelihood of default of provider companies (Figure 6.4). 
 
 
Figure 6.4: The Outsourcing Chain 
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6.5 Union strategy in the ‘Global Gran Miner ía ’: the PET Study (1998) 
 
How have copper workers responded to the challenges posed by the neoliberal 
restructuring of the sector and the mining boom? Why? With what degree of success? 
These are of course some of my central research questions, but as with most research, few 
questions have never been asked before. Indeed, researchers associated with the Economy 
and Labour Programme (PET) touched upon some of these questions in their study 
Labour and Transnational Capital: Mining Development in Chile (Agacino et al., 1998). 
Published in 1998, their research is the only piece of research available to date that looks 
at the development of union strategies in the modern mining sector. Although their focus 
is more extensive than mine -the mining sector as a whole-, their research can be seen as 
the direct antecedent of this thesis. This is partly because their study relies heavily on 
evidence from La Gran Minería.  
 
The PET study identified four types of union strategy in the new mining sector 
based on crosscutting two dimensions: type of worker (direct or contract workers), and 
type, ownership, and strategy of company involved (user or provider; state-owned or 
multinational; anti-union or union-acceptant) (Figure 6.5).  
 
First, the PET study described union strategy by direct workers of state-owned 
enterprises in terms of ‘Classic State Unionism’. Unions such as FTC (formerly CNTC), 
they argued, have always demonstrated a high level of commitment to the state, first as 
intermediary and later as employer, which has resulted in ‘a type of corporatist union 
action, chiefly oriented to preserve the privileges of a public enterprise’ (Agacino et al., 
1998: 189). In their view, this type of unionism has flourished in state-owned enterprises 
like CODELCO and ENAMI because organisations such as these have historically been 
more tolerant to union organisations and more likely to accommodate union demands in 
collective bargaining. 
 
Second, Agacino et al. (1998) categorised union strategy by direct workers in the 
new multinationals as ‘Weak Unionism’. They described their emerging organisations as 
‘weak and focused exclusively on economic grievances’ but failed to give any further 
details about their strategic approach, other than linking it with the type of action 
promoted by the Chilean Confederation of Miners (Confederación Minera de Chile, 
CMCH). ‘Weak Unionism’ is presented as the direct result of multinationals’ harsh anti-
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union regimes deep and showcased as prime example of the impact of neoliberal 
restructuring in workers’ associational, market, and workplace power.  
 
Third, they described union strategy by contract workers labouring (indirectly) for 
state-owned user enterprises as ‘Weak and Fluctuating Unionism’. The main priority of 
this type of unionism was to improve working and employment conditions. But again, the 
authors do not provide any further information about what this type of action actually 
entails in strategic terms other than illustrating it with the example of SITECO, a union 
that has organised contract workers labouring for CODELCO’s El Teniente division since 
the late 1980s. Last, they refer to union strategy by contract workers operating in the 
context of multinational corporations as ‘Emerging Unionism’. They discuss SINAMI, the 
union of high-skilled construction workers, as prime example of this type of unionism. 
They described their objectives as economic as well as institutional (typically 
campaigning for labour reform), their organisation as strong at national level but weak at 
firm level, and their bargaining strategy as militant ‘direct-action’. 
 
 
Figure 6.5: The Heterogeneity of Copper Workers 
 Direct Employees 
(Standard employment relationship) 
Contract Workers 
(Atypical employment relationship) 
 
Classic state unionism (FTC, ENAMI): 
economic and institutional objectives (defence 
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exclusively economic objectives  
 
Emerging unionism (SINAMI and other 
sporadic organisations), economic and 
institutional objectives (labour reform) 
  
Private 
TNCs 
 
Employer strategy: anti union practices 
 
User and provider employers: anti union 
practices 
 
Source: Adapted from Agacino et al. (1998: 222), my translation. 
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Although admittedly a ‘series of preliminary annotations’ and consequently framed 
as a set of hypotheses, a number of initial observations can be levelled at the PET study. 
Some of the most important ones can be loosely organised around my research questions. 
First, the study appears to be excessively black and white when differentiating between 
the ‘good’ labour regimes of state-owned companies and the ‘bad’ ones of multinationals. 
Second, the study does not clearly establish what the researchers understand by ‘union 
strategy’ as the analytical basis upon which their four-type categorisation is unclear. 
While a type is described based on their dynamics (‘traditional’), others are depicted in 
terms of their perceived strength (‘weak’), content (‘economic’), or evolution 
(‘emergent’). This of course makes comparative analysis among the types a rather difficult 
task. Partly as a consequence, the study includes no systematic assessment of the 
outcomes of these strategies in terms of union effectiveness, let alone revitalisation. Last, 
there is little attempt at explaining why the four different types of workers and union 
organisations identified have followed such diverse courses of action. These are just some 
of the gaps that I intend to fill with my research. I will return to the PET study in Chapter 
10 where I will discuss the way in which my thesis builds on and expands Agacino et al.’s 
work (1998). 
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CORE WO RKERS IN  
UNIO N-TO LERANT REGIMES 
 
 
Case I - Federación de Trabajadores del Cobre (FTC) 
Case II - Federación Sur Andes (FSA) 
Case III - Sindicato Los Pelambres 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In this first chapter of findings, I examine three cases of union organisations that have 
engaged in different forms of labour-management co-operation and made substantial 
efforts to demobilise their memberships during the 1990s. Before embracing Social 
Partnership, these unions –and the companies to which they belong- were rightly seen as 
depositories of classic copper unionism and the traditional adversarialism that 
characterised industrial relations in the sector until the 1970s. It is therefore important to 
take a closer look at the circumstances and decisions that have driven this significant 
change in the unions’ strategic approach. It is important to bear in mind however, that each 
of these three cases is a ‘special case’ in its own way. State-owned CODELCO is the 
world’s largest copper producer and the chief employer in the sector. Sur Andes is the most 
prominent example of ‘old mining’ owned by a foreign transnational corporation. Los 
Pelambres is the only example of a major copper producer wholly owned by Chilean 
capitalists. 
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CASE I 
 
Federación de Trabajadores del Cobre (FTC) 
 
 
 
 
 
CODELCO: company background 
 
CODELCO (Corporación Nacional del Cobre de Chile) was established in 1976 as an 
autonomous mining industrial, and commercial company owned by the Chilean state to 
manage the large American copper companies that comprised the ‘old’ Gran Minería 
nationalised in 1971: Anaconda (Chuquicamata and El Salvador), Kennecott (El Teniente), 
and Cerro Corporation (Andina). CODELCO was founded on the basis of the Corporación 
del Cobre, the state agency that hitherto had coordinated the management of the 
nationalised companies. CODELCO can be rightly seen as the repository of Chile’s 
traditional large-scale copper mining industry and the history of the former cannot be fully 
understood without referring to the latter (Figure 7.1). 
 
Figure 7.1: From the American Gran Minería to CODELCO (1990-present) 
1900-71 1976 Present 
 
Braden Copper Co. / 
Kennecott Copper Corp. 
El Teniente (1904)* 
 
Chile Exploration Co. / 
Anaconda Mining Co. 
Chuquicamata (1910) 
 
Andes Copper Co. 
(Anaconda Mining Co.) 
Potrerillos (1927-) 
El Salvador (195) 
Andina (1970) 
 
 
CODELCO 
El Teniente 
Chuquicamata 
El Salvador 
Andina 
 
CODELCO 
Div. El Teniente 
Div. CODELCO Norte 
-Chuquicamata 
-Radomiro Tomic (1995) 
Div. El Salvador 
Div. Andina 
Div. Ventanas** 
Div. Talleres** 
Notes: *start of production in brackets; **Not mining divisions 
 
CODELCO is the world’s largest copper producer. In 2008, it produced 11% of the 
world’s copper, controlled 20% of the world reserves, and represented 16% of Chile’s total 
exports (Table 7.1). In the same year, CODELCO sales reached US$ 14 billion, generating 
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profits in excess of US$ 5 billion, and handed over to the treasury nearly US$ 7 billion 
including taxes (CODELCO, 2009). CODELCO operates through four mining divisions 
(Figure 7.2). CODELCO-Norte which integrates Chuquicamata and Radomiro Tomic 
since 2002, El Teniente, Salvador, and Andina. Non-mining divisions include the Ventanas 
smelter and the Talleres metal mechanic division. In addition, CODELCO participates in 
important mining operations in partnership with foreign private sector operators including 
El Abra with Phelps Dodge (49%, see case V) and Agua de la Falda (49%). CODELCO is 
led by a board of seven directors. The board is chaired by the Minister of Mining, and 
includes the Chancellor, three representatives of the President, and two representatives of 
workers and supervisors (Presidents of the FTC and FESUC unions respectively) 
(CODELCO, 2009). 
 
CODELCO workers have long been considered Chile’s ‘labour aristocracy,’ with 
employment and working conditions well above the national average. They are broadly 
seen as a privileged group, thanks to their public status, strategic weight on the economy, 
and the strength of their organisation, the Federación de Trabajadores del Cobre (FTC, 
formerly known as Confederación Nacional de Trabajadores del Cobre, CNTC). In recent 
years however, the number of direct workers employed by CODELCO has decreased from 
24,000 in 1989 to 16,778 in 2006, although their number has begun increasing again 
totalling 19,300 in 2008 (Table 7.2). Conversely, the number of contract workers has 
increased from 1,371 in 1989 to just under 38,000 in 2008, 23,000 of whom are permanent 
contract workers (CODELCO, 2009).  
 
FTC: Unions’ background and founding choices 
 
Just like the origins of CODELCO cannot be separated from the history of La Gran 
Minería, the genesis of union organisations operating in the company today can be traced 
back to the first legal unions established in the big three American companies in the 1920s. 
I have already discussed the emergence and evolution of these organisations in the 
previous chapter and therefore will not consider this here. It is important however to 
reiterate the main features of the so-called ‘classic copper unionism’, or the pattern of 
union strategic choices that evolved in the sector between the 1950s and early 1970s. This 
is because this type of unionism is the immediate predecessor of current strategies. Classic 
copper unionism, as embodied by the National Confederation of Copper Workers 
(Confederación Nacional de Trabajadores del Cobre, CNTC), developed in parallel to the 
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increasing role of the state in copper mining from the 1950s onwards. While the 
government became the central purchasing and commercialising power for copper as well 
as chief industrial relations arbitrator, the CNTC became the unique bargaining force 
across all major copper mines. In practice, this transferred collective bargaining –hitherto 
conducted between individual foreign employers and company-and-plant-level trade 
unions- onto the national arena where the CNTC would put pressure on the state to 
intermediating between the unions and their employers.  
 
 
Table 7.1: CODELCO, selected figures in US$ millions (2004-2008) 
 2004   2005   2006   2007   2008 
Turnover  8.204  10.491  17.077  16.988  14.425 
Profit before tax  3.301  4.901  9.215  8.460  4.970 
Hand over to treasury  3.009  4.442  8.334  7.933  6.829 
Total assests  8.833  10.739  13.033  15.186  13.707 
Pasivo total 5.961  7.798  8.505  10.442  9.831 
Patrimonio  2.872  2.941  4.528  4.744  3.876 
      
Source: CODELCO (2009) 
 
Figure 7.2: CODELCO Divisions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: CODELCO (2006) 
 
CODELCO Chile 
El Teniente 
Division 
CODELCO Norte 
Division 
Chuquicamata 
El Salvador 
Division 
Chilean state 
Andina 
Division 
Ventanas 
Division 
Radomiro Tomic 
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In order to access the government however, unions entered “clientelist” relations 
with political parties which, in exchange for electoral support, facilitated access to, and 
negotiations with, government authorities (Zapata, 2002). This was largely an instrumental 
relationship. Copper miners supported the political projects of the parties of the left insofar 
as the latter were willing to support their grievances in the industrial relations sphere but 
clashed when these affected their prerogatives (Zapata, 1975, 1986). 
 
The nature of industrial conflict in copper mining was therefore far less ideological 
than usually perceived. On the one hand, the content of copper workers grievances was 
largely linked to the defence, strengthening, and institutionalisation of the trade union as 
organisation (‘la defensa del sindicato’). On the other hand, the integration of the CNTC 
with the rest of the labour movement was limited. This included relations with the FNM 
and CUT in which the presence of the CNTC, though active, was neither sufficiently 
engaged not prominent enough.  
 
The processes of nationalisation under Allende and establishment of CODELCO 
under Pinochet began to change the form, rather than the substance, of copper unions’ 
‘classic strategy’. Most evidently, the state became the Gran Minería’s actual employer 
instead of the big-three American companies. This had palpable consequences for 
employer and state relations both under Allende’s workers’ government and Pinochet’s 
anti-labour dictatorship.  
 
Although the types of challenge presented by both were different, they were largely 
perceived as threatening copper workers’ privileges. The CNTC first and FTC second, 
engaged in conflictual relations with the state as employer. On the one hand, the 1972 
strike in El Teniente is said to have helped (willingly or not) to bringing down Allende 
(Zapata, 1975, 1986). On the other, the first large scale protests against the Pinochet 
regime were organised by the FTC in the early 1980s, in a process which is normally 
credited with having paved the way for the restoration of democracy (Zapata, 1980, 1986). 
In other words, copper unions remained committed, first and foremost, to the defence of 
the union. No matter who was in power, they aimed at putting direct pressure on the state –
normally by means of strike action- and engaged in clientelist relations with political 
parties insofar as they were perceived as useful in securing their aims. 
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Table 7.2: Employment at CODELCO (31st December, 2004-2008) 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
      
Direct workers  16.778  17.880  17.936  18.211  19.300 
Permanent contract workers 
(operations and services) 
19.929  24.951  24.028  26.210  23.171 
Investment contract workers 
(assemblage and construction)  
8.683  12.601  8.620  17.079  15.627 
      
Source: CODELCO (2009) 
 
 
FTC: Critical juncture and path-breaking strategic choices (1990-present) 
 
The return to democratic rule in 1990 brought about a series of challenges for CODELCO 
and the FTC. During the dictatorship, the costs of the company had increased significantly, 
partly a reflection of divestment by the military. For the new management appointed by the 
Aylwin government, the company’s main problem had to do with its over staffed. The 
Noemi administration began a comprehensive process of ‘authoritarian’ rationalisation in 
which 4,000 workers were made redundant in the period 1990-1993.  
 
Although the FTC reacted firmly against these policies, its actions were largely 
ineffective in influencing, let alone, preventing them. From the perspective of workers and 
their organisations, the democracy they had fought so long for became a huge 
disappointment. From the perspective of the company, these adjustments were absolutely 
necessary in order to reduce costs and increase competitiveness, preventing in turn the 
privatisation of CODELCO. 
 
At its 1993 National Congress, the FTC resolved to renew its pressure on the 
company in order to defending jobs and fighting for labour stability. More concretely, the 
FTC declared ‘we oppose dogmatic and unilateral policies on outsourcing; we demand 
investment to finance the expansion of CODELCO; we will fight to replace authoritarian 
and top-down industrial relations with democratic and participative ones; we demand 
transparency throughout the company; and we will define a strategy against the 
privatisation offensive (FTC, 1993c: 1, my translation). In the same document, the FTC 
called a 30-minute strike for 3 May 1993. 
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Although official union documents present this strike as a ‘determining event’ in the 
history of the company, they do not openly discuss the reasons for its importance. 
Interviewees on the other hand, openly acknowledge that the main reason for this was 
rather the failure of such action. 
 
In 1993 we called a strike to protest against CODELCO’s outsourcing and 
privatisation policies. We mobilised for 30 minutes. People say that such action has 
been the most pathetic strike in copper workers’ history (…) And its true. Truth hurts. 
But we could not have mobilised them for longer. They simply would not go on 
strike.  
(Espinoza, 2004) 
 
Indeed, far more important than the fact that the strike allowed the FTC to resume 
talks with management and achieved a partial slowing of redundancies (FTC, 1993a), 
interviewees agree that the strike was crucial for the FTC to begin changing significantly 
its approach to union-employer and union-member relations.  
 
It was tough to face that our preferred weapon (the strike) was not as effective any 
longer. Confrontation as trade union strategy was not delivering. We began to realise 
that we were never going to advance our interests through confrontation. We 
concluded that with confrontation management would get their way and we would 
stay behind. 
(Álvarez, 2004) 
 
FTC: Union-employer relations 
 
On 2 September 1993, four months after the May strike, the FTC and CODELCO agreed 
on a common statement of principles. In the Commitment with the Future and 
Modernisation of CODELCO-Chile, the FTC and CODELCO declared that their main 
objective was to turn CODELCO into a highly efficient and competitive state-owned 
enterprise in the international copper markets (FTC, 1993b).  
 
More specifically, the FTC and CODELCO agreed on carrying out a joint-and-swift 
diagnosis exercise about the current situation of the company. They also agreed on giving 
priority to the issue of redundancies and outsourcing by designing and implementing a 
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system of voluntary redundancies. But the signatories also agreed on the possibility of 
outsourcing new areas in the future (FTC, 1993b: 1-2). 
 
The agreement represented an important step forward in the relations between 
management and labour. Nevertheless, the Noemi administration was leaving together with 
the first Concertacion governments in a few months, and therefore the FTC began 
concentrating its efforts on the Concertación’s new candidate for the period 1994-1999. Its 
main objective was to continue and deepen what they saw as the way forward for 
CODELCO and feared that a new administration would dismiss such ‘eleventh-hour 
agreement’. 
 
These fears proved largely unfounded. On the one hand, the new management team 
had worked on their own modernisation proposal, which featured in President Frei’s 
election manifesto and that coincided broadly with the FTC’s. On the other hand, just 
before Eduardo Frei assumed the presidency of the republic on 11 March 1994, it was 
revealed that rouge future market trader Juan Pablo Dávila had lost about US$ 200 million 
in deals. The Davilazo put enormous political pressure on Frei to consider the privatisation 
of CODELCO. But it was the combination of these factors that actually triggered the first, 
and most significant, experience to date of labour-management cooperation the country.  
 
The Initial Partnership Agreement (La Alianza Estratégica Originaria, 1995-2000). Juan 
Villarzú assumed as the CODELCO’s new CEO in March 1993 and immediately ratified 
the Commitment with the Future declaration (FTC, 1994). According to Villarzú, ‘faced 
with the enormous threat of privatisation, it emerged the possibility of a broad agreement 
to challenge it. The FTC had done their homework and had a proposal. We (the new 
management) had another one. So we met and began discussing each other’s plans. It 
didn’t take long for us to craft a common proposal’ (Villarzú, 2002: 2). 
 
A formal partnership agreement (Alianza Estratégica) was signed on 13 September 
1995 to cover the entire Frei administration (1995-1999). The fundamental objectives of 
this first partnership agreement reflected the main commitments signed in 1993. These 
included (1) to make CODELCO an efficient and competitive state-owned enterprise, 
maximising its profits and contributions to the Chilean state in the mid- and long-term; (2) 
to ensure the implementation of an investment plan that guarantees the viability of the 
mining business and related activities in a competitive and environmentally sustainable 
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way, nationally and internationally; and (3) to acknowledge that human resources 
constitute CODELCO’s most important asset to achieve this development strategy (FTC 
and CODELCO, 1995). 
 
The agreement also included a series of concrete and ambitious objectives that 
included reducing costs in US$ 0.10, increasing productivity by 50%, production by 
500,000 tons, as well as the commitment to transfer 100% of all profits to the treasury. 
These were laid out in a bid to convince the government to invest the US$ 3 billion that 
labour and management considered necessary to modernise the company (Villarzú, 2002).  
 
From the perspective of the above objectives, the outcomes of the initial partnership 
agreement were highly successful (Espinoza, 2002, 2004; Silva, P., 2004a; Villarzú, 2002). 
Production costs were reduced by more than US$ 0.20, productivity increased by 84% as a 
result of voluntary redundancies and production increases, which in turn rose by 500,000 
tons, and CODELCO contributed to the treasury an average of US$ 2 billion annually. In 
addition, real salaries increased significantly, the number of accidents was reduced 
substantially, and investment in training doubled from US$ 5 to US$ 10 million (Villarzú, 
2002). 
 
Notwithstanding these successes, FTC sources and documents (Álvarez, 2004; FTC, 
1997) show that they had come with a hefty price tag for the union. An FTC assessment of 
the nature of partnership at CODELCO conducted in 1997, found and warned that the  PA 
‘had not reached the membership base’ and that the overwhelming majority of workers did 
not feel represented by the agreement (FTC, 1997). Furthermore, as voluntary 
redundancies reached about 10,000 by the end of 1999, and the union found itself 
increasingly unable to justify its labour-management cooperation stance. ‘This was not 
easy for us because we’re meant to defend labour stability. In my opinion however, hadn’t 
we done what we did then, maybe 20,000 would have been laid off or the company could 
have disappeared’ (Espinoza, 2002). 
 
The Second Partnership Agreement (Proyecto Común de Empresa, 2000-2006). 
CODELCO and the FTC agreed on the above diagnosis and by the year 2000 had crafted a 
new proposal to renew and improve their agreement. The new administration took power 
in March 2000 and President Lagos named Juan Villarzú as CODELCO CEO for a second 
term. 
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In contrast with the elite character of the Initial PA, the process that led to the 
Second PA sought to actively involve workers, supervisors, and managers in its design. 
Indeed, after months of participative design, the company came up with a so-called 
‘Enterprise Common Project’ ‘trying to bring the interests of all stakeholders together’ 
(FTC et al., 2000). A key feature of the Second PA was the intention to implement a 
participative style of management in CODELCO but this was aborted a few years later 
(Estévez, 2002). In addition the new PA tried to establish a ‘Competitiveness and Labour 
Stability Protocol’ (Protocolo de Estabilidad Laboral con Competitividad) between the 
parties in order to prevent more large-scale voluntary redundancies, but of course, most of 
them had already been made in the previous years. In other words, the second PA did not 
change dramatically the terms of the first agreement. ‘We had to counter the perception 
that the PA had served to lay off some 10,000 people’ (Álvarez, 2004). 
 
 
Table 7.3: Chronology of Partnership Agreements between CODELCO and FTC 
Administration Aylwin 
1990-93 
 
Frei 
1994-99 
 
Lagos 
2000-05 
 
Bachelet 
2006-2010 
 
CEO Noemi Villarzú (94-98) 
Lima (98-99) 
Villarzú Arellano 
Original name  Alianza Estratégica Proyecto Común de 
Empresa 
Alianza Estratégica 
Fase III 
  Initial Partnership 
Agreement 
Second Partnership 
Agreement 
Third Partnership 
Agreement 
     
 
 
The Second PA included far more ambitious goals than the initial agreement. The 
main ones consisted of doubling the value of the company in six years and a commitment 
to increase the contributions to the treasury to US$ 1.5 million annually, assuming a 
copper price of US$ 0.92 per pound and an investment programme worth US$ 4.3 billion 
(Villarzú, 2002). 
 
At the time of research -2004- it became increasingly clear that these goals would 
not be achieved. For some this had to do with the Asian crisis, for others it had to do with 
the real –as opposed to the espoused- nature of the PA. It is interesting to note that while 
the ‘official’ FTC and CODELCO interviewees stood firmly behind the agreement and 
‘blamed’ external factors for its difficulties (Álvarez, 2004; Espinoza, 2002, 2004; Muñoz, 
2003; Silva, R., 2004b), disgruntled union leaders, former managers, consultants, and other 
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interviewees, referred to the PA in terms short of corruption (Calderón, 2004; Estévez, 
2004; Fuentealba, 2004; Jorquera, 2004).  
 
A prominent representative of the latter view is Rafael Estévez, CODELCO’s 
former senior vice-president of Human Resources between 2000 and 2002. For Estévez 
(2004), CODELCO’s PA can be described as a copular agreement between two people –
Villarzú and Espinoza- who are very aware of what the other one is looking for. While 
Villarzú needs to provide a steady flow of cash to the treasury, Espinoza has to deliver 
increasing benefits to FTC members. As he explains, the key is ‘social peace’. 
 
(…) The real partnership differs greatly from the written one. Strictly speaking, 
Villarzú and Espinoza have developed this ‘two-powerful-guy alliance’, instrumental 
to keep each other’s cohort of interests happy. 
 
(…) Villarzú’s success depends on social peace. He knows that he cannot afford to 
have conflictual relations with the unions because if he does, he will not deliver the 
cash the government is counting on, and he will be removed.  
 
This is why he kills off all conflicts. How does he do it? With money of course. 
Everything can be bought at the right price and CODELCO and Villarzú buy 
everything. This is not only about preventing mass strikes when bargaining a contract 
–which does happen of course- but about buying individuals.  
 
So say for example, if an influential union official begins questioning the PA, 
Espinoza goes up to Villarzú to sort him out. Villarzú asks what to do and if Espinoza 
suggests giving the guy a house (…). Villarzú will probably decide to give him a 
house and problem solved. This is how it works.  
(Estévez, 2004) 
 
Furthermore, Estévez argues that most of the publicised ‘successes’ of the PA have been 
largely apparent. This is particularly the case when analysing the dubious efficiency gains 
obtained from the large-scale redundancies of the 1990s. 
 
In 2000, I conducted a study that showed that CODELCO’s payroll bill had actually 
increased after the 10000 redundancies. How is that possible? Well, because Villarzú 
had to keep the ones that stayed happy and he did that by putting money on the table. 
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(…) In other words, the real alliance is about how to share the state’s money between 
us: management and employees. Nobody cares much because copper is such a good 
business, and no matter how much is wasted, there always will be lots left to hand 
over to the treasury anyway. 
(Estévez, 2004) 
 
At the time of writing, CODELCO and FTC have renewed their Partnership Agreement in 
roughly similar terms to those of the Second PA. The simply named ‘PA Phase Three’ is 
meant to regulate employer-labour relations during the Bachelet administration (2006-
2010). 
 
 
FTC: Union-member relations and organisational dimensions 
 
Union-management co-operation in the form of Social Partnership has influenced union 
choices in all other dimensions of union activity. The FTC’s definition of its constituency 
evidences a strictly private orientation to interest representation. From having been the 
historical representative of ‘all copper workers across La Gran Minería’, the FTC displays 
today a strictly private orientation to interest representation, speaking only for 
CODELCO’s direct blue-collar workers and making no attempt, neither in practice nor 
discourse, to articulate a broader set of interests such as those of permanent contract 
workers labouring for CODELCO. 
 
In developing its relations with members, union choices can be readily identified as 
servicing the membership. Union leaders see members as consumers of union services and 
relations continue to be largely characterised by clientelism albeit with a different shape. 
Indeed, as a result of the PAs, less and less is asked from members in return, particularly in 
terms of mobilising in order to obtain such services.  
 
It is very hard to try and mobilise people that are completely into consumerism (…) 
This is not the 1960s or 1970s… Before, the employer was ‘el gringo’, or the dictator, 
so it was easy for us to bang on that and mobilise them. Now it’s very different. Of 
course you want and are meant be militant in assembly, but mobilising for real is a 
completely different story. 
(Espinoza, 2004) 
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The FTC’s agenda of representation has concentrated on supplementing ‘bread and 
butter’ objectives with a qualitative agenda framed around participation and employee 
development.  
 
The organisational form of trade unionism at CODELCO has not changed 
significantly since 1976 when as a result of the establishment of the company, the 
industry-wide confederation CNTC turned into a firm-level federation, and firm-level 
organisations turned into local unions. While the degree of member participation in local 
unions varies greatly, the principle of leadership predominance is evident in union 
democracy and governance at federation level. Because of the federation’s highly 
centralised structure, members and local unions have a very limited scope in shaping the 
priorities of the FTC (Figure 7.3). 
 
Partly as a result of the above but also the reflection of a key undeclared feature of 
the FTC’s commitment to ‘social peace’ whilst the duration of the Partnership 
Agreements, the FTC’s degree of articulation with other unions and groups of workers 
within CODELCO has restricted significantly. Relations with ‘independent’ trade unions, 
especially with the increasingly prominent Sindicato Minero de Chuquicamata, are 
virtually nonexistent. A similar situation is evident in the relations established with trade 
unions where CODELCO has minority stakes (e.g. El Abra, see Case V). FTC’s statutes 
allow such unions to join the federation, but the FTC recognises that it has consistently 
ignored the concerns of these organisations. 
 
There are unions that are not 100% CODELCO, they have different contracts and 
employers. FTC should stick with unions that are 100% CODELCO, otherwise 
unions like the ones from El Abra are left out. When they require our support, we 
marginalise them because the FTC doesn’t consider them important and doesn’t really 
care about them. El Abra have done their utmost to be heard, for their grievances to 
be considered at least. But the FTC tricked them; they affiliated them only to leave 
them behind. 
(López, 2004) 
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Figure 7.3: FTC Organisational Structure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Predictably, FTC’s relations with contract workers at CODELCO are poor if not 
nonexistent. FTC signed a tripartite co-operation agreement with CODELCO and the 
National Labour Bureau to enforce labour legislation within provider enterprises labouring 
for CODELCO (Convenio de Cooperación Técnico-Laboral, 2002). In line with similar 
agreements signed in other companies (e.g. see next case), the FTC’s position can only be 
described as ‘semi-managerial’ because of the shared monitoring responsibilities assigned 
by such agreement to labour and management alike. Although presented by union 
interviewees as evidence of their ongoing commitment to contract workers, for the latter 
the agreement is plainly meaningless. ‘We haven’t signed anything, nobody asked us 
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anything, and we haven’t got anything out of it’ (Fuentealba, 2004). If anything, contract 
labour unions see the agreement as one more illustration of the FTC’s u-turn on its 
founding principle of industry-wide solidarity (see Case IX).  
 
Out of the sixteen FTC national union officials, only the four Communist ones have 
objected to the federation’s policy on contract labour but even in their case, solidarity 
is limited to lending us their ballroom for an assembly, and nothing else. 
(Jorquera, 2004) 
 
As we were busy protesting, our FTC colleagues, representatives of the working 
class, were begging CODELCO’s CEO to get rid of us: “get them killed Sir, that’s all 
you’ve got to do”  
(Pérez, 2004) 
 
A less sanguine but equally damaging impression is that of former CODELCO HR 
vice-president, Rafael Estévez. ‘The FTC cannot care less about contract workers for the 
very simple reason that if they were to represent them, Espinoza would cease to be the 
president and he’d never allow that to happen because his basis of power is the clientelist 
relations he has established’ (Estévez, 2004). For Espinoza however, keeping the 
federation shut to outsiders has to do was keeping CODELCO in the hands of the state. ‘If 
you open up the FTC and lose control of it, CODELCO automatically becomes vulnerable 
to privatisation. This is why I have not allowed other unions to join in (Espinoza, 2004). 
 
FTC: Relations beyond the level of the firm 
 
FTC interviewees admit that since signing the PA, the FTC has ‘turned into itself’. ‘It is 
hard to leave the company, it is a very absorbent world’ (Álvarez, 2004). Relations with 
the rest of the labour movement have become increasingly restricted as a result. In 2003, 
unions of the major private sector operators established the Chilean Federation of Miners 
(Federación Minera de Chile, FMC) (See Chapter 8). There have been talks between the 
FTC and FMC to establish a formal alliance through an ad-hoc confederation but the so-
called ‘mega-union’ initiative has failed largely because of FTC’s intransigence (IMF, 
2004). Julio Ramos, president of the FMC at the time of research, argues that  
 
(i)t is obvious that our bargaining power would skyrocket if all three organisations –
FTC public sector; FEC private sector; and CTC contract labour- were to join forces 
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in a broad industry-wide confederation. But FTC refuses because they’re locked in 
their Partnership Agreement. Besides, Espinoza wouldn’t get elected and he won’t 
accept that.  
(Ramos, 2004) 
 
 
Table 7.4: FTC Strategic Choices 
 CNTC (1953-1993) FTC (1993-present) 
   
Constituency Core 
Gran Minería copper workers 
Core 
CODELCO blue-collar 
workers 
Objectives Bread and butter 
Gran Minería nationalisation 
Bread and butter 
Avoiding CODELCO 
privatisation  
Workplace rights/ security/ 
career 
Form 
-Inclusion principle 
Until 1976: Industry-level confederation 
Horizontal inclusion 
 
Since 1976: Firm-level federation. 
Vertical inclusion 
Firm-level federation 
Vertical inclusion 
 
-Degree of 
articulation at firm-
level 
High High 
Capacity High High 
Democracy Leadership predominance Leadership predominance 
Activism Militancy  Moderation  
Employer relations Confrontation 
Limited scope of engagement 
Offensive objectives 
Co-operation and compromise 
Wider scope of engagement 
Defensive objectives 
Member relations Organising 
Mobilisation 
Servicing 
Demobilisation 
Labour movement 
relations 
-Degree of 
articulation at higher-
level 
High at industry level 
Medium at national level 
Nonexistent at industry level 
Low at national level (CUT) 
IMF member 
State relations Outsider Insider 
Political party 
relations 
Extensive Extensive (Socialist Party) 
Society relations Engaged Limited 
   
 
 
 
At FTC they readily admit that ‘initiatives such as forming a large confederation with the 
private sector unions and contract labour organisations have not prospered because we 
(FTC) haven’t done our bit’ (Álvarez, 2004). Likewise, despite being a prominent member 
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of CUT on paper, FTC acknowledges that their participation is largely formal and limited 
to paying dues. 
 
The FTC does not feel represented by CUT with its emphasis on the public sector, 
labour reform, and minimum wage negotiations. But this is reciprocal. The rest of the 
labour movement still sees the FTC as representing a privileged group, the familiar 
notion that copper workers are the labour aristocracy. This was much easier to deal 
with during the dictatorship as the enemy was the same and very strong.  
(Álvarez, 2004) 
 
In terms of the FTC relations with the state and political parties, the FTC remains a 
highly politicised organisation. The FTC began building a strong relationship with the 
opposition to Pinochet in the late 1970s, particularly through the Socialist and Christian 
Democratic parties. Relations became stronger with the establishment of the Concertación 
in the late 1980s and have remained close ever since, with the Socialist Party the most 
prominent of all political parties represented in the FTC. After nearly two decades of 
Concertación administrations, the FTC can rightly be seen as insider in its relations with 
the state primarily as employer but also as legislator. In so doing, the FTC has traded off 
its previous nationwide appeal for advancing the interests of its members only. 
 
 
As a result of the above, the FTC’s conception of general interest and its position 
within Chilean society have narrowed and weakened respectively since the early 1990s. In 
view of the FTC however, their actions have always been consistent with the most 
important issues faced by the country and the sector.  
 
In the past, we fought for many years for the nationalisation of copper mining, which 
we achieved in the early 1970s. Next, during the dictatorship we put up a political and 
social fight to return to democratic rule. Today, we have got a clear vision as to how a 
state-owned enterprise has to compete in this globalised world. 
(Espinoza, 2002) 
 
FTC: outcomes 
 
Predictably, for the FTC the outcomes of union strategy have to be seen in light of the 
shared objectives between CODELCO and the federation. Union leaders highlight some of 
the results discussed above in terms of cost cutting, increases in production, and the fact 
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that CODELCO remains in the hands of the state. They also argue that the PA has 
deepened representative and direct participation, and that outcomes for workers have been 
very positive overall. This is despite significant job losses ‘because this union represents 
employees, not former employees (and) those who left, did so voluntarily’ (Espinoza, 
2004).  
 
At the time of research, the FTC represents nearly 99% of CODELCO’s direct 
workers (Espinoza, 2002). This of course should not obscure the fact th422at the 
federation’s membership has declined ostensibly from about 27,000 members in 1990 to 
today’s 17,000. Despite periodic threats to Espinoza’s control of the FTC, the 
overwhelming majority of union leaders have been re-elected since the early 1990s. The 
union remains tightly controlled and, thanks to its insider position, the FTC remains a 
strong organisation in terms of bargaining and political power. The federation’s current 
institutional vitality is of course far more questionable. 
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CASE II 
 
Federación Sur Andes (FSA) 
(Ex Federación Disputada de Las Condes) 
 
 
 
 
 
Sur Andes: company background 
 
Disputada de Las Condes (henceforth Disputada) was established in 1916 to operate the 
Los Bronces mine discovered in 1867. French mining group Peñarroya acquired Disputada 
in 1952. Five years later, Peñarroya took over the El Soldado mine and the Chagres 
smelter -first mined in 1842 and built in 1917 respectively- from Du M’Zaita, also from 
France. After a 15-year gap consequence of the Second World War, production resumed in 
1960 and Los Bronces, El Soldado and Chagres were integrated as Disputada divisions.  
 
In 1972, a year after the nationalisation of the Chilean copper industry, Peñarroya 
sold Disputada to the mining State agency ENAMI. The company remained in the hands of 
the state for six years until the military regime sold it in an international bid to Exxon 
Minerals for US$ 100 million. At the time, most oil companies were diversifying their 
interests away from oil, and Disputada became Exxon’s first venture in base metals.  
 
As a subsidiary of Exxon since 1978, Disputada developed from a relatively small 
operation to join the ranks of the Gran Minería as successive expansions of its mining and 
smelter divisions increased production to nearly 300,000 tonnes in 2006 (COCHILCO, 
2007). Disputada increasingly became perceived as a company with an exemplary quality, 
environmental, and health and safety record, receiving several awards.20 Furthermore, it is 
has been widely argued that at the core of Disputada’s success an exemplary management 
of industrial relations (Frías, 2001). A modernisation programme launched in the early 
1990s significantly reduced costs and formed the basis of partnership agreement and 
participative management model.  
 
Nevertheless, Disputada’s carefully crafted ‘model company’ image began to be 
actively contested in the late 1990s. On the one hand, critics pointed at Disputada’s 
appalling record as tax payer (Ibáñez, 2002; Riesco, 2004). Huge financial losses declared 
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every year that allowed Exxon to pay no taxes for 25 years. From the ranks of the labour 
movement on the other hand, Disputada’s partnership agreement has been dismissed as 
mere example of union incorporation, and its unions as yellow and co-opted organisations 
(Labraña, 2003).  
 
In May 2002, Exxon left the base metals industry and sold Disputada to Anglo 
American plc for US$ 1.3 billion. Anglo American is a FTSE top 20 company and a major 
mining and natural resources corporation which employs about 185,000 employees 
worldwide (Anglo American, 2006). Its copper interests are principally located in Chile 
where it arrived in 1984 to operate Compañía Minera de Mantos Blancos (henceforth 
Mantos Blancos), which includes the Mantos Blancos and Mantoverde mines In addition 
to Sur Andes and Mantos Blancos, Anglo American has a 44% stake in Compañía Minera 
Doña Inés de Collahuasi (Figure 7.4).  
 
Since taking over Sur Andes in 2004, Anglo American has largely continued the 
production and labour regimes established by Exxon, and the management of industrial 
relations has remained in the hands of former Disputada executives. At the time of 
research, Sur Andes has 2100 employees -800 of which are managerial staff- and 1365 
permanent contractors. The mine works 8-hour shifts and a four-day on, four-day off roster 
system. 
 
FSA: unions’ background and founding choices (1950s-1980s) 
 
Trade unions in Disputada were established in the late 1950s as the company resumed 
production following a 20-year interruption due to the Second World War. The model of 
trade unionism that developed in Disputada between 1960 and 1990 can be broadly 
described as classic copper mining unionism, albeit with some significant differences. 
Union-employer relations conformed to the pattern of ‘traditional adversarialism’ found in 
pre-1973 La Gran Minería, but in a far more moderate version. Old management was 
portrayed as ‘authoritarian in the sense of monopolising all decisions’ (Suazo, 2004) (but) 
‘relations were never not too bad’ (Sandoval, 2004) and overt conflict was rare. In line 
with classic copper unions, relations with members were largely based on a basic ‘bread-
and-butter’ servicing model and their integration with the rest of the labour movement was 
limited. In contrast, Disputada unions began breaking their ‘clientelist’ relations with 
CORE WORKERS IN UNION-TOLERANT REGIMES 
199 
political parties in the early 1980s, and displayed little interest in influencing state policy 
or engaging with the broad societal changes of the decade (Riquelme, 2004).  
 
 
Figure 7.4: Anglo American plc and Minera Sur Andes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Based on Anglo American (2006) and information provided by unions. 
 
 
Today there are six blue-collar unions in Sur Andes which together enjoy almost 
universal membership: Sindicato No. 2 Los Bronces, Sindicato MSA Los Bronces, 
Sindicato Fundición Chagres, Sindicato Gerardo Rivera, Sindicato No. 3 El Soldado, and 
Sindicato Gerencia. There is no union of supervisors. Since 2001, all six unions are 
affiliated to the Federación de Sindicatos de Trabajadores Minera Disputada de Las 
Condes (henceforth Sur Andes Federation), originally established in 1967. 
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FSA: critical juncture and path-breaking strategic choices (1990-present) 
 
By the late 1980s the mining boom was just beginning to unfold. New foreign-owned 
mines were under construction and soon entering their production phase. As in the case of 
CODELCO, Disputada’s production costs were among the highest in the industry, at about 
US$ 1.10-1.15 per pound. With world copper prices were at historically low levels, cost 
minimisation processes were becoming increasingly familiar in the industry. In the view of 
the company’s new CEO appointed in 1989, the company’s viability depended chiefly on 
the reduction of those costs Furthermore, for him adversarial industrial relations did not 
represent the way forward to achieve the company’s competitiveness (Salinas et al., 2002; 
Suazo, 2004). It was in this context, that he made the unusual decision of inviting the 
union leadership to participate in a joint diagnosis exercise on the future of the company. 
As then HRM Corporate Manager recalls,  
 
inviting the unions to participate appeared to be rather revolutionary for a private 
company, because the strategy of most is simply to get rid of unions. Even without 
engaging in anti-union practices, they do all in their power not to have unions to the 
extent that having them is seen as utter failure. 
(Conde, 1997: 241, my translation) 
 
Although most official accounts of the process however focus on the company’s 
external circumstances, it is likely of course that other concerns played a role in choosing 
this course of action (Conde, 1997; Frías, 2001; Salinas et al., 2002). It is reasonable to 
speculate for example that mass redundancies and a repressive stance towards unions 
would have proved costly in the long-run, not only because of the direct impact of overt 
conflict in production but also on the company’s already fragile position within Exxon. In 
contrast, relations with the unions were good enough, and fear of unemployment was 
running high among workers. 
 
From the perspective of the unions, the company’s opening was ‘difficult to believe 
at first as Exxon was not particularly renowned for its industrial relations’ (Riquelme, 
2004). Alternative courses of action were nevertheless perceived as fairly limited. Indeed, 
refusing to participate was not seen as a viable option as Exxon ‘could very well have got 
upset, close down the mine, and leave the country. Instead management gave us the chance 
to co-operate and we took it’ (Suazo, 2004).  
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Rather than discussing alternatives, unions admit, engaging in cooperation involved 
a process of self-persuasion. Interviewees recall three main reasons (Riquelme, 2004; 
Sandoval, 2004; Suazo, 2004). First, union leaders felt they had no choice but to engage in 
labour-management dialogue in order to avoid mass job losses. Second, accepting 
management’s invitation was argued for as providing long-demanded spaces of 
participation from where to pursue their claims. Last, management’s opening was viewed 
as consistent with broader changes occurring at national and international level. ‘You have 
to remember all this happened when we were returning to democracy, the Berlin wall had 
just fallen, and somehow, participation was not an alien topic, it was a new scenario, 
maybe it was time to do things in a different way’ (Sandoval, 2004). 
 
FSA: union-employer relations 
 
Continuous improvement (1990-1995). The ‘Joint Diagnosis Exercise’ consisted of a 
series of meetings and seminars between management and labour that extended for over a 
year. Interviewees indicate that as a result of the exercise, both sides concluded that the 
way forward for the company was to introduce the philosophy of, and practices associated 
with, continuous improvement. An official version of the process shows that both sides 
‘expected that the savings and improvements in work practices would eventually translate 
into a real improvements in salaries, quality of working life, as well as company’s 
competitiveness, and profitability’ and ‘agreed to continue working together towards a 
long-term co-operative industrial relations model, based on mutual respect, trust, and 
integrity’ (Salinas et al., 2002: 2).  
 
The extent to which the diagnosis was genuinely ‘joint’ is however open to question. 
This is because for management, the nature of the invitation was essentially instrumental 
and the reasons given for it largely pragmatic. As a former HRM Corporate Manager 
argued, ‘our aim was to transform the company and the best way to do so was to use the 
leaders we already had, and these leaders were our union officials (…) Thus, in order to 
achieve company competitiveness, the CEO asked union leaders to transform themselves 
in agents of change’ (Conde, 1997: 241, my translation and emphases).  
 
Employing union leaders for company purposes required substantial management 
efforts to change their definitions of interests through the extensive use of training. Union 
leaders acknowledge that in the process they became progressively identified with 
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management and increasingly saw both sides as sharing the same situation and objectives. 
Difficulties were attributed to external, stable and uncontrollable ‘market forces’ (‘New 
operations had production costs well below ours. We had one of the highest production 
costs of the industry’). The rationale for embracing continuous improvement and engaging 
in co-operation with management was framed around the superior commonality of 
interests between capital and labour. 
 
(Thanks to the training) we understood that (continuous improvement) was the way 
forward (...) There were things hard to assimilate though, like moving from job 
stability to job employability (...) 
(Sandoval, 2004) 
 
Union-management relations’ ultimate objective is to realise the company’s vision: to 
be a leader in the mining industry, profitable, and contributing to the quality of life of 
its employees. (…) We realised that (management and unions) were pointing in the 
same direction. We both had to sell the model to our respective constituencies. 
Management had to sell it to our shareholders, and we had to sell it to the rank-and-
file. 
(Riquelme, 2004) 
 
‘Selling of the model’ to the rank-and-file entailed a ‘process of behavioural and 
cultural change’, which involved in turn another ‘intense programme of education and 
training’, which included modules such as: ‘Understanding the Business’, ‘Becoming a 
Change Facilitator’, ‘High-performance Teams’, and ‘Knowledge Management’ (Salinas 
et al., 2002: 2). Union leaders played a prominent role in this programme joining senior 
management as trainers and facilitators. The process entailed an active re-construction of 
workers’ interests in employer terms, as well as of the high costs of not taking active part 
in continuous improvement. Interviewees declared that their main argument revolved 
around the notion that job stability (later employability) was the consequence of a 
competitive and profitable enterprise, and that the latter was in turn the result of an 
adequate labour force. But, ‘we were not good enough. We were getting old, we had 
behavioural problems (alcoholism), so we knew we had to do something or leave’ (Suazo, 
2004). Framing the costs of refusing to participate (or to take early retirement) in terms of 
mass lay-offs proved effective was resonant with the experience of workers, as the country 
was just recovering from the recession and mass unemployment of the early 1980s. 
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Partnership Agreement (1996-present). Interest reconstruction and intensive company-
wide training on continuous improvement took place between 1990 and 1995 in what is 
today known as ‘partnership’s learning phase’. This period also involved parallel steps 
towards the construction of a ‘special union-management co-operation model’ (Salinas et 
al., 2002: 1). On the one hand, the union’s traditional strategy of confrontation and 
proactive wage demands in collective bargaining began to gradually be replaced by a 
defensive strategy focused on the maintenance of jobs and market-level wages. Collective 
contracts gradually departed from the industry standard ‘bread and butter’ two-year 
contract to include safety incentives (1989 and 1991), agreed new working practices 
(1993), and extend their duration to three years. On the other hand, basic information and 
consultation schemes at representative were set up in parallel to direct participation 
initiatives, which included teamwork and quality circles.  
 
But it was not until 1996 that co-operative industrial relations formally became a 
Partnership Agreement (Alianza Estratégica) with the signing of a joint declaration of 
principles. The ‘1996 Building the Future’ declaration established six pillars: long-term 
trust relationship; company’s profitability and workers’ quality of life as objectives shared 
by management and the unions; union-management teams at corporate, divisional, and 
process level; bi-annual pay review according to market survey conducted by unions and 
management; cost reduction and safety incentives; and a unique six-year collective 
agreement (Salinas et al., 2002: 2-3).  
 
In switching over to collective agreements –as opposed to collective contracts- the 
unions opted for ‘unregulated’ collective bargaining. Thus, the unions have acted as 
‘bargaining groups’ and have given up their right to strike among other protections (see 
Chapter 5). The duration of the agreements has been extended to six-years, and their 
number has been reduced from six (one per union) in 1996, to one unique agreement in 
2001. From the perspective of management, these arrangements make sound business 
sense as, for example, there is ‘no longer need to interrupt production every two years with 
contract negotiations’ (Conde, 1997: 244). Interviewees argue that this is also the case 
from the perspective of workers and unions because of the inflexibility of regulated 
collective bargaining on the one hand, and the flexible nature of the agreements signed on 
the other. 
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It is true that the (1996 Collective Agreements) earned us more boos than cheers. We 
were the first union in the country to sign a six-year agreement. They called us traitors 
and the like (…). But regulated collective bargaining is designed to work against you 
and to create conflict. (…) 
 
When we bargain we take three months and not 15 days to reach an agreement. 
We’ve got no pressure to call a strike if things don’t go our way. I don’t think we’ve 
lost bargaining power due to this, not at all. (…)  
 
Our agreements are also flexible in that every two years there is a joint pay review, 
and if we are under the market rate, salaries must be increased. In the same way, if 
there are work practices that need to be modified we change them. Flexibility goes 
both ways. 
 (Sandoval, 2004) 
 
FSA: union-member relations and organisational dimensions 
 
Union-management co-operation has greatly influenced union strategic choices in all other 
dimensions of union activity. In terms of constituency, Sur Andes unions have firmly 
maintained a strictly private orientation to interest representation. Unions have chosen to 
stick with Sur Andes’ core workers and have made no attempt, neither in practice nor in 
discourse, to speak for a broader set of interests such as those of permanent contract 
workers labouring within their own company.  
 
In developing worker relations, Sur Andes unions have made choices firmly based 
on the servicing model. Based on notions of increased individualism, members are largely 
seen as consumers of union services, and the leadership as professional providers (or 
intermediaries) of such services. They describe the unions’ agenda of representation as 
involving three main objectives: ensuring a positive economic result for members, solving 
day-to-day problems –‘small things’ such as food and transportation-, and providing short 
and long term services that the company fails to offer. 
 
We have decided to concentrate on issues not covered by the company. The company 
is concerned about the business and with a collective agreement with 70% of support 
(...) has no further interest in developing welfare. (...) People tend to think that 
because mining companies have salaries above the national average, miners have no 
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welfare problems. This is wrong. We’ve got social problems too (...). That’s why we 
provide our members with health insurance, dental clinic, social worker, etc. 
(Riquelme, 2004) 
 
Sur Andes unions have also supplemented quantitative ‘bread and butter’ objectives with a 
qualitative agenda which they refer to as ‘long-term’ services, a series of initiatives which 
include training in transferable skills ensuring in this way the long-term employability of 
their members and improving their quality of life (Sandoval, 2004). 
 
 
Figure 7.5: Current trade union structure at Sur Andes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Information provided by unions. 
 
 
Little is asked of members in return. The principle of leadership predominance in 
union democracy has combined with employer-dominant co-operation and servicing in 
diluting Sur Andes’ (admittedly low) activism and collective capacity. Members have been 
effectively de-mobilised for almost 20 years and have a very limited scope in shaping the 
priorities and programmes of their unions and federation. The principle of leadership 
predominance is evident in union democracy and governance. Member participation is 
limited to paying union dues, commissions, and to vote in elections, as there are no 
structures for continuous rank-and-file participation (Riquelme, 2004; Sandoval, 2004; 
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Suazo, 2004). This, of course, contrasts remarkably with the importance unions have given 
to participation in their dealings with employers. 
 
Leadership predominance has been further increased as a consequence of increasing 
firm-level inter-union articulation and centralisation. Labour law restricts Sur Andes 
unions’ choice of organisational form to firm-level unions (sindicato de empresa), in 
which unions can only affiliate employees working for the same firm (vertical inclusion). 
Since the early-1990s, unions at Sur Andes have engaged in a continuous process of 
articulation through the Sur Andes Federation, originally established in 1967.  
 
The Federation is a firm-level umbrella organisation in charge of ‘coordinating the 
relations between (local) unions and the company in corporate-level issues, as well as 
relations with the community, the government and Members of Parliament’ (Sindicato 
MSA, 2006; Sindicato No. 2 Los Bronces, 2005). The Federation has a Directorate made 
of six directors, each representing a local union (Figure 7.5). Each federation director 
belongs to their local union directorate, and is appointed to this position by their fellow 
directors without consulting the membership. Although by law collective bargaining 
remains formally a private matter for each local union, the Federation is the instance where 
most ‘corporate-level’ issues are dealt with, hence it can be rightly considered the 
workforce’s representative before management and in its relations with actors beyond the 
level of the firm. Indeed, in 2001 the last of the six unions joined the Federation, and 
bargained and signed the common 2001-2007 Collective Agreement. 
 
It can also be argued that union-management co-operation has deepened Sur Andes 
unions’ tradition of sectionalism. Union relations with contract workers labouring at Sur 
Andes have been similarly weak. ‘I see the relations with contract workers as parallel 
worlds that meet from time to time, when a contractor has mass redundancies or safety 
problems. I believe we have a debt here, a responsibility that we haven’t assumed’ 
(Riquelme, 2004). If anything, union policy in this respect has followed their employer’s 
position rather than being rooted in solidarity principles.  
 
For Anglo American, contract workers have the same value as we do, and should be 
treated equally. We have taken on board this message but there is little we can do. 
(…) We can try and help respecting the law: the rights of association, collective 
bargaining, safety standards, and so on, but to ask for more is not realistic.  
(Suazo, 2004) 
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Consequently, just like FTC, Sur Andes unions have signed a tripartite Co-operation 
Agreement with the company and the National Labour Bureau to co-operate in the 
enforcement of labour legislation by contract companies (Convenio de Cooperación, 
2003). Far from being an example of solidarity however, the agreement was Anglo 
American’s initiative, and its importance argued for in terms of the benefits for the 
company. The agreement ‘(is the right thing to do) mainly for legal reasons, to try and 
protect the company from the likely economic problems derived from vicarious 
responsibility in case of contractors’ default on their obligations with their employees’ 
(Sandoval, 2004). In respect to establishing links with other Anglo American unions, there 
have been conversations with unions at Mantos Blancos but at the time of research no 
significant progress had been made. 
 
 
Table 7.5: Sur Andes Unions Strategic Choices 
 1960-1990 1990-present 
   
Constituency Core workers  
Sur Andes direct workers 
White and blue collar 
Core workers  
Sur Andes direct employees 
Largely blue collar 
Objectives Bread and butter Bread and butter 
Workplace rights/ security/ 
career 
Form 
-Inclusion principle 
6 Firm-level unions 
Vertical inclusion 
6 Firm-level unions 
Vertical inclusion 
-Degree of articulation at firm-
level 
 
Moderate/High 
Some unions affiliated to firm-
level federation 
High 
All unions affiliated to firm-
level federation 
Capacity High High 
Democracy Leadership predominance Leadership predominance 
Activism Militancy  Moderation  
Employer relations Confrontation 
Limited scope of engagement 
Offensive objectives 
Co-operation and compromise 
Wider scope of engagement 
Defensive objectives 
Member relations Servicing 
Low mobilisation 
Servicing 
Demobilisation 
Labour movement relations 
-Degree of articulation at 
higher-level 
No formal relations 
Sectionalism 
No formal relations 
Sectionalism 
State relations Autonomy Autonomy 
Political party relations Apolitical Apolitical 
Society relations Nonexistent Nonexistent 
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FSA: relations beyond the level of the firm 
 
Union-management co-operation and private orientation to interest representation have 
greatly influenced union strategic choices deepening ‘company egoism’ in the remaining 
dimensions of union activity. Despite Sur Andes unions formally declaring solidarity ‘as a 
fundamental pillar of interpersonal relations, the organisation, and the contribution to the 
national and international labour movement’ (Sindicato No. 2 Los Bronces, 2005), neither 
the unions nor the federation are affiliated or have any formal links with national or 
international higher-level organisations. The two main reasons for what they refer to as 
‘our biggest weakness’ (Riquelme, 2004), have to do with the perceived over reliance of 
most other unions on higher-level organisations, and fear to endanger their special 
relationship with the company with ‘false solidarity’. As they explain, 
 
When you start forming federations and confederations to take care of your own 
problems, you are actually creating more problems. Needing a federation to help you 
in collective bargaining or to solve your health and safety problems is evidence of 
your incompetence as a union and your powerlessness before your employer.  
(Sandoval, 2004) 
 
We have demonstrated to be mature enough to manage certain issues. (For example) 
when we do our remuneration surveys we ask companies how much they pay and 
sometimes you realise their own unions has no access to that sort of information. 
Companies trust us because we have been loyal with the information they have given 
to us. Why? Because when Zaldívar’s CEO is telling his workers that they are the best 
paid in the sector and is not true we keep quiet. Other unions have asked us for the 
data but we wouldn’t release it to anyone. This is not about solidarity; it is about them 
having to create their own spaces of participation with their employers. 
(Sandoval, 2004) 
 
Finally, the consolidation of company egoism is evident in terms of relations with 
the state, political parties, and society. First, ‘we have no links with the government’ 
despite claiming to have direct access to the National Labour Bureau, the unions admit to 
have developed a relationship largely ‘marked by contingencies’ in which they have not 
gone beyond using state services. Second, Sur Andes unions proudly define themselves as 
‘apolitical’ ‘in a country where (all unions are) obedient to whatever the party tells them to 
do’ (Sandoval, 2004). The prevalence of party politics, they explain, has played an 
important role in discouraging them from establishing relations with other unions.  
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Last, union policy reflects a fairly limited if nonexistent conception of general 
interest. When asked about the unions’ position in the royalty debate as well as 
Disputada’s poor tax record, interviewees were greatly defensive and company interests 
prevailed over all others.  
 
(The royalty) is not an attack on our company only but on all investors. There is 
nothing worse than having something one day and losing it the next. And that is how I 
figure investors feel when they change the rules of the game (…). The HR manager 
made a presentation for us about the royalty. The company is against the royalty and 
asked us to give them our support. We argued that we didn’t have an opinion.  
(Suazo, 2004) 
 
FSA: outcomes 
 
As in the case of the FTC, for union leaders the outcomes of union strategy have to be seen 
in light of the shared objectives between management and labour. Union leaders point first 
and foremost to the ‘spectacular’ cost reductions achieved since 1990, from US$ 1.10 in 
1990 to US$ 0.60 in 2002, without major job losses, improving the quality of work life, 
and maintaining particularities for the industry such as the 8-hour shift and a four-day on, 
four-day off roster system.  
 
They also argue that the Partnership Agreement has deepened representative and 
direct participation. Indeed, at the time of research, partnership and participative 
management are considered to be two sides of the same coin. Union leaders declare that 
management is open to influence in ‘all’ areas, although in most of them final decisions 
remain with management (‘there is no-codetermination, far from it’). In terms of direct 
participation, work began to be reorganised around three types of teams in the late 1990s: 
natural management teams, process improvement teams, natural work teams, which were 
overseen by a higher-level union-management team known as the Quality Board, but 
reorganisation took a step further with the introduction of self-managed teams in the early 
2000s (Frías, 2001; Salinas et al., 2002). Although participation structures at Sur Andes 
cannot be consider examples of full worker participation, they can be seen as advanced 
examples of employee involvement in the Chilean mining industry. 
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Union leaders argue that although the nature of union-management co-operation at 
Sur Andes seems to be marked by an agenda that primarily reflects employer’s interests, 
outcomes for workers have been very positive and do not reflect concession bargaining in 
disguise. ‘Workers care about the money, and in this sense, we’ve done well. Most people 
are convinced about this (…). As a consequence of the bi-annual pay reviews we got pay 
increases of 5.7% the first time, then 3.3%, at a time when the price of copper had 
plummeted’ (Sandoval, 2004). In addition to real wage increases, they argue that 
partnership and participation have yielded a better quality of life, increased job stability, 
training and increased employability, as well as increased motivation and commitment for 
their members (Salinas et al., 2002: 3-4).  
 
Last, leaders argue that the unions have become stronger organisations in this 
context (‘Ten years ago they told us we were dead, and we’ve proved them wrong’) with a 
combined membership coverage that has remained at nearly universal level (99%) for 
almost two decades, and union leaders consistently re-elected since co-operation began in 
the early 1990s. This rosy picture is vehemently contested by key figures in the Chilean 
labour movement. For the President of the Mining Confederation, Moisés Labraña, ‘all of 
what they say may be true, but you cannot give up rights just like that, or sleep with 
management in such way. For me, this bunch was co-opted very early on. They are a lost 
cause’ (Labraña, 2003). 
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CASE III 
 
Sindicato Los Pelambres 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Los Pelambres: company background 
 
Los Pelambres was discovered in the rural Choapa province in the 1920s, but it was not 
until the late 1960s that highly profitable mineral resources were identified by state 
agency ENAMI. In 1978 ENAMI sold the deposit to ARCO-Anaconda, a US-based 
transnational joint venture. In 1986, Chilean-controlled Antofagasta Holdings plc –owned 
by the Luksic family- acquired ARCO’s share and formed Compañía Minera Anaconda. 
In order to operate the deposit, Anaconda associated with LG International (Korea) and 
Midland Bank (UK), and formed Compañía Minera Los Pelambres (CMLP). CMLP 
completed the construction of the underground mine in 1990 and began production as 
medium size producer.  
 
Five years later, in 1995, Antofagasta Holdings –also property of the Luksic group- 
became CMLP’s sole owner. Antofagsta announced its intention to transform Los 
Pelambres into a major state-of-the-art copper producer and to this effect sold a 40% stake 
to two Japanese consortia in late 1997.21 The new joint venture was named Minera Los 
Pelambres (henceforth Los Pelambres) and was, and remains, the only large-scale mining 
development realised with a majority of domestic private capital. 
 
Mining development began in 1998 with the construction of a new open pit mine. 
Los Pelambres started production two years later and with it its ‘second mining exercise’. 
By 2006 the company had become the world’s fifth-largest copper producer 
(COCHILCO, 2007). In its short history, Pelambres has also been widely recognised as a 
model employer receiving several awards in various areas of activity including industrial 
relations, health and safety, quality, as well as special architectural prizes for the quality of 
its camp accommodation.22  
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Antofagasta Holdings -renamed Antofagasta plc in 1999-, is structured in three 
business divisions: mining, transport and water (Figure 7.6). Antofagasta Minerals, the 
mining division, is one of the world’s largest low-cost copper producers. In addition to 
Los Pelambres, it owns and operates the Michilla and El Tesoro mines, with a total 
production of 476,500 tonnes in 2006 (COCHILCO, 2007). The transport division 
operates an extensive rail network servicing northern Chile’s mining region, whilst the 
water division operates a water distribution concession in the same region (Antofagasta 
plc, 2006)  
 
At the time of research, Los Pelambres employs 518 direct employees -340 workers 
and 178 supervisors- and about 1500 permanent contract workers -900 working in 
operations and 600 in services- the highest ratio of all companies in this study. The mine 
works 12-hour shifts and a seven-day on, seven-day off roster system. Two trade unions 
organise about the totality of core workers. There is no union of supervisory staff. 
 
Los Pelambres: critical juncture and founding strategic choices (1998-present) 
 
Antofagasta Holdings’ decision to transform the hitherto small-scale exploitation of Los 
Pelambres into a state-of-the-art large-scale copper producer represents the most 
important event in the company’s short history. In 1996, Antofagasta’s CEO and main 
shareholder Jean-Paul Luksic declared his intention of transforming Los Pelambres into a 
‘world-class model of mining exploration and human resource management’ (Luksic 
(1996) cited in Puelles, 2002). 
 
The process involved identifying best practice across the industry and headhunting 
managers and supervisors from leading competitors. At the time, Sur Andes (then 
Disputada de Las Condes, see Case II) was perceived as leading the industry in several 
areas, including industrial relations and personnel management. A significant number of 
senior managers and supervisors were recruited from Sur Andes, including those to be 
responsible for mining, operations, and human resource management. It is widely agreed 
among industry insiders that Los Pelambres was able to recruit the best people in the 
sector. 
 
Under a largely renewed management team, Los Pelambres began constructing a 
more cost-efficient open pit mine in 1998, in a process that would last until early 2000. In 
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parallel, the company started to introduce new management strategies and production 
technologies. The transition between the so-called first (1990-98) and second (2000-
present) mining exercises can be rightly considered a critical industrial relations juncture, 
as these differ in almost every respect and, crucially, involved a revamp of the company’s 
approach to labour relations. 
 
 
Figure 7.6: Antofagasta plc and Minera Los Pelambres 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Antofagasta plc (2006) 
 
 
Los Pelambres: union-employer relations 
 
Project phase (1998-99). Best practice in the area of human resource management was 
identified with the experience of Sur Andes which, in Jean Paul Luksic’s view, essentially 
entailed integrating workers as key stakeholders (Luksic (1996) cited in Puelles, 2002). As 
with mining and operations, Los Pelambres hired senior HR managers from Sur Andes, 
including those directly involved in the latter’s adoption of Social Partnership. Based on 
the experience of Sur Andes and on their own commitments, Los Pelambres’ human 
Antofagasta plc 
Minera  
Los Pelambres 
Minera  
El Tesoro 
Minera  
Michilla 
Antofagasta-Bolivia 
Railway 
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resource management strategy during the project phase (1998-99) involved a series of at 
least four major commitments. 
 
First, the company committed itself to employ a 100% Chilean workforce. Second, 
instead of hiring-and-firing to fill in the new jobs demanded by the new mining exercise, 
Los Pelambres committed to retrain as many workers as possible. Third, the company 
pledged to provide the best possible working conditions in the sector for direct and 
contract workers alike. Last, the whole transformation process was to be carried out 
respecting and integrating union organisations and their leaders. Although these 
commitments were received at first with a fair degree of scepticism by the leadership and 
rank-and-file alike, the unions acknowledge that management delivered on them. 
 
At the beginning, of course, we didn’t believe anything of this ideal world. 
Employers would always promise grand things to their employees and not deliver 
them. Indeed, employees would end up worse off than they were before these major 
changes. 
(Puelles, 2002) 
 
Senior management’s commitment to reconverting as many employees as possible 
derived into an intensive process of training largely led by former Sur Andes managers. 
Supervisors and workers were trained in new technologies as well as in multi-level 
teamwork for nearly two years. The company established the so-called ‘University of the 
Holistic Centre’ (Universidad del Centro Holístico) where workers were trained for 
months in subjects as diverse as Human Relations and First Aid. Training and with it the 
preservation of jobs would turn out to be a key element in inducing the workforce 
cooperation with new management. 
 
Likewise, Los Pelambres was able to quickly deliver in terms of working 
conditions. The company’s camp accommodation has been recognised worldwide, and 
their two hotels are considered an industry benchmark. In contrast to the insidious 
differences between direct and contract workers existing in CODELCO for example, both 
types of workers in Los Pelambres have access to first quality accommodation including 
single rooms with in-suite bathroom, a luxury beyond the reach of most workers in this 
study. 
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Last, unions were effectively considered workers’ legitimate –albeit non-exclusive- 
representatives and their co-operation was actively sought after throughout the process. At 
the time of course, Sur Andes was also the only case of Social Partnership in Chile’s 
private mining sector and based on their experience. Insiders argue that a key management 
figure in importing such approach into Los Pelambres was Nelson Pizarro, former Senior 
Operations Manager at Sur Andes. According to various interviewees, Pizarro was able to 
make a solid business case for union recognition and co-operation –as opposed to the 
political and/or participatory approaches of Cases I and II. ‘For him, is far better to have 
strong unions to deal with. He used to say to me “you can organise grievances (…) I 
rather talk to you than to 500 workers”. He knew that once we (the leadership) are on 
board, more than half of the problem is solved’.  
 
It is important at this point to clarify the state of the unions before and during the 
project phase. During the first mining exercise (1990-98), the majority of workers in Los 
Pelambres were affiliated to one union organisation. This union, and its president in 
particular, played an important role in terms of the negotiations that led to the training and 
reconversion of most miners. For reasons that I have been unable to elucidate however –
interviewees did not want to refer to this issue- the president’s leadership was successfully 
challenged by concentration plant workers just before the start of the project phase. As 
CMLP ended its legal existence so it did its single union.  
 
A few months after Minera Los Pelambres was formally established and the project 
phase began (1998-2000), the ousted president formed a new ‘Mine and Port Union’ but 
concentration plant workers did not feel identified with his leadership and refused to join. 
Indeed, eight months afterwards, and coinciding with the inauguration of the new 
Concentration Plant, workers from this area formed their own ‘Concentration Plant 
Union’. Despite their initial difficulties, both unions managed to work in concert from the 
beginning as they bargained together –but signed separately- their first collective contracts 
in early 2000, just as the company was initiating its large-scale operations (April).  
 
Second mining exercise (2000-present). Building on the successful Project Phase, 
management made substantial efforts to ‘imprint the new company, now in production, 
with a particular style of industrial relations’ (Sepúlveda, 2004). Modelled in the Sur 
Andes experience, the company confirmed a co-operative management of human 
resources and industrial relations ‘as one of our business’ core strategic pillars’. This 
‘style’ is formally and informally referred to as Social Partnership (Alianza Estratégica), 
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but both management and labour interviewees admit that theirs is not a ‘proper’ 
partnership as in Sur Andes or CODELCO (Ibarra, 2004; Sepúlveda, 2004). 
 
On the one hand, and in contrast to the other cases presented in this chapter, labour-
management co-operation in Los Pelambres did not develop as a result of external threats, 
or by either party approaching the other one in a bid to reformulate their relationship. 
Instead, co-operation was part and parcel of management’s ‘best-way’ approach to 
develop the company. In view of the unions,  
 
This idea of ‘partnership’ was built into company policy from the beginning. The one 
that came up with the idea was the then HR manager, Erwin Contreras, former Sur 
Andes. His successor, Fernandois -also fished out from Sur Andes- followed suit. 
Our CEO same thing. (…). So partnership is company policy. It’s nothing them or us 
proposed or both parties agreed on. It’s not written anywhere.  
(Ibarra, 2004) 
 
On the other hand, and partly as a result, there is no consensus as to what Social 
Partnership in Los Pelambres entails, or ought to entail, in practice. For the unions, their 
‘partnership’ is significantly less developed than in CODELCO or Sur Andes to deserve 
such label. For them, this is particularly evident in terms of nonexistent formalisation and 
little participation, both direct and indirect. 
 
I have a different concept of what a partnership entails. I come from Sur Andes 
where you do have a very participative partnership in place, where the unions have a 
direct input in decisions (…) My aim is not to participate in cost control or 
production decisions, but in topics such as employee involvement, occupational 
health, pensions, and training we should be greatly involved. When I arrived here 
everybody was talking about partnership, but I just couldn’t see it, nobody knew 
where it was or what it meant (...) There is still loads of talk about partnership but to 
be honest, this is not a very open ‘partnership’, is not that participative. There is a 
partnership in the sense of having good relations but workers are not very involved in 
decisions.  
(Ibarra, 2004) 
 
Union leaders admit that under these circumstances, they had little to choose from. 
In their view,  
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the challenge for us was to adapt to this model and to understand that we already had 
good relations with the company (…). The simple truth is that you get more and 
better things with a good relationship (...) the alternative, confrontation, is not good 
for us workers. Co-operating you may get something but with confrontation we 
always lose out in the end. 
(Ibarra, 2004) 
 
In concrete terms, union leaders argue that the main reason for supporting collaboration 
was their perception of the company’s commitment to their workforce. ‘At a time when 
copper prices were at their lowest, workers that anywhere else would have been fired, 
were instead retrained, kept their jobs, their unions, etc.’ They acknowledge however that 
‘there is no such thing as a commitment to labour stability at Los Pelambres “if you need 
to go you’ve got to go”. Labour stability is seen as resulting from a successful business, 
evidencing the familiar argument of co-operative pursuit of competitive success. 
 
For management, ‘social partnership’ is not an appropriate label either. As 
Antofagasta’s top HR director explains, there is rather a ‘collaborative’ approach to 
industrial relations. 
 
Our industrial relations are based on a slogan of collaborative industrial relations. 
This is not to say we are partners. In a business world, partners are understood as 
“non-solidary partners” in the sense that if I lose, we all do. But that is something 
quite hard to do with your employees, especially when you live in a social and 
economic context that prevents you to make such concept of partnership a reality.  
 
I do not really believe in the concept of social partnership. What I do believe in is in 
a collaborative approach to managing industrial relations. I would say that this is the 
essence of our industrial relations system. 
(Sepúlveda, 2004) 
 
Unions’ objectives and strategies in collective bargaining can be described as 
defensive and moderate respectively. Even though the bargaining process that led to the 
first collective contracts in 2000 did not take place in the context of ‘partnership’ both 
parties describe it in hindsight as ‘highly cordial’. The concrete terms of such agreements 
however were largely insubstantial (‘a bad negotiation’). Improving the contracts in 2002 
and 2004 was relatively easy considering the low floor provided by the previous one and 
better copper prices. Nevertheless, unions’ objectives have remained consistently modest. 
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We presented the company a rather ground-to-earth collective contract project. We 
didn’t ask for too much. (…) Our objective was to adjust our salaries to the market. I 
think we are pretty much on the average of the mining sector excluding CODELCO 
of course. 
(Ibarra, 2004) 
 
In their view, the outcomes of co-operation have been overwhelmingly positive 
regardless of their ‘average’ pay levels which, in any case are far higher than those of any 
other firm in the rural area where Los Pelambres is located. Furthermore, union leaders 
argue that there is more to co-operation than remuneration in these contracts. One 
important area is that of direct participation where they claim ‘we have managed to put 
pressure on the company to implement some semi-autonomous work teams after the last 
negotiation’ (Ibarra, 2004). 
 
Los Pelambres: union-member relations and organisational dimensions 
 
In developing relations with members, union choices can be readily identified with the 
servicing model and members are largely seen as consumers of union services. Both 
organisations have encountered difficulties in trying to sell their ‘product’ to ‘young 
inexperienced’ workers and to ‘differentiate it’ from what the company provides. 
‘Typically, they’d say “why should I join a union if I’m employed by the best employer in 
the region?” Both unions have conducted information campaigns to show potential 
members the advantages of signing up as well as the unfairness to fellow workers of being 
a free rider. 
 
At the time of research, union choices in respect of organisational dimensions seem 
consolidated. The unions’ choice of constituency is restricted to workers employed 
directly by Los Pelambres. They seek to represent two sub-constituencies: miners on the 
one hand, and plant and port workers on the other. The unions have not sought to expand 
at the expense of one aother, or to represent other groups of workers, although they have 
supported contract workers’ organising drives (see below). The agenda of representation 
of both organisations is very similar. As with the other cases in this chapter, unions have 
supplemented ‘bread and butter’ objectives with a qualitative agenda framed around 
participation and employee development. Labour law restricts the unions’ choice of 
organisational form to firm-level unions (sindicato de empresa).  
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There is an ever-increasing degree of articulation between the two organisations, 
although merging efforts have been unsuccessful to date. Writing in 2002, the 
Concentration Plant Union’s secretary argued that ‘we’ve shown the capacity to work 
together and the time has come to merge into one single organisation’ (Puelles, 2002). 
Two years later no concrete steps had been taken on this direction as a consequence of 
‘legal reasons, differences between the contracts, that sort of thing’ (Ibarra, 2004). With 
regard to organisational democracy, it can be said that the principle of leadership 
predominance has prevailed over rank-and-file participation, even though the unions have 
conducted some initiatives to involve members in union affairs (e.g. advertising posts in 
union commissions). Finally, the unions’ degree of activism has remained unavoidably 
low both within and without collective bargaining.  
 
In terms of the unions’ degree of articulation with other Antofagasta unions, 
attempts have been unsuccessful to date but it remains a shared aspiration by both unions.  
 
This has been wholly our fault. Mea culpa! We once talked to Tesoro about it but our 
realities were very different. Same thing with Michilla but we did not follow up. I 
believe we should work together though. I admire them at Sur Andes because they 
have a Federation, but I’m sure if something like that would work for us. 
(Ibarra, 2004) 
 
In stark contrast with the situation at CODELCO and Sur Andes, unions at Los 
Pelambres have actively engaged with unions of contract workers. They have sponsored 
the formation of trade unions in contractor companies providing technical assistance and 
guidance in several organising drives. At the time of research, six provider companies had 
been organised with the help of core workers.  
 
Union relations with contract workers have been facilitated by management’s own 
approach to contract workers and companies. On the one hand, it is company policy to 
provide for the same working conditions, and health and safety standards to direct and 
contract workers, providing in this way a space (and legitimacy) of interaction between 
them. ‘We don’t even call them contract workers but “collaborators” (…) They live in the 
same Hotel, enjoy the same single rooms, canteen, food, safety equipment, transportation, 
and sport facilities than our workers’ (Sepúlveda, 2004). On the other hand, management 
argue they have established an ‘external’ partnership with contract companies in parallel 
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to their internal alliance with employees. This entails long-term relations with providers, 
which allow Los Pelambres to demand high standards in the providers’ relations with their 
employees. 
 
We expect from our contractors an excellent performance, which translates in 
adequate standards, policies, procedures, and records in health and safety, 
environmental protection, and quality of products and processes. Moreover, (it 
translates in) complying with their contractual obligations with their employees, and 
commercial obligations with their own providers (subcontractors), as well as in 
complying with the commitments established with Los Pelambres in terms of 
deadlines, quality, after-sales service, and prices. 
(Minería Chilena, 2003) 
 
For management this makes sound business sense because ‘out of 2000 Pelambres 
employees, 1500 are contract workers. We are therefore a very vulnerable company if 
things go wrong. Stoppages are way more expensive than fines as the totality of our 
production has already been sold’ (Sepúlveda, 2004). Likewise, union solidarity 
demonstrates high doses of pragmatism and resonates with management’s position. 
 
In these companies labour problems are widespread. (…) When providers abuse their 
workers they tend to approach us for advice. So we listen and help them out. 
Management have never said or insinuated anything against this. They know that this 
people are going to be for or against us at some point. So you have to have a 
relationship, talk to them. 
(Ibarra, 2004) 
 
Los Pelambres: relations beyond the level of the firm 
 
Unions’ relations with the labour movement have been limited to joining the Metal and 
Auto Workers Confederation (CONSFETEMA), in turn affiliated to the International 
Metalworkers Federation (IMF). Neither the unions nor CONSFETEMA is affiliated to 
CUT. The Concentration Plant Union joined CONSFETEMA in early 2000 and the Mine 
and Port Union joined two years later, after the first directorate had been replaced. The 
latter had unsuccessfully proposed to join the Communist-led Confederación Minera de 
Chile (CMCh). Union leaders argue that joining CONSFETEMA had to do with the way 
they conceive of the role of higher-level labour organisations. 
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We need advice, training and so on so we looked for an organisation where politics 
was not involved, that’s why we didn’t join the CMCh. (…) I see CONSFETEMA’s 
role as advisors in collective bargaining. They do other things to, like running 
seminars, but I only participate in the ones that I consider useful. 
(Ibarra, 2004) 
 
CONSFETEMA and the IMF embody modern and professional trade unionism, 
looking for partnership and consensus with employers.  
(Puelles, 2002) 
 
 
Table 7.6: Los Pelambres Unions Strategic Choices 
  (2000-present) 
  
Constituency Core 
Los Pelambres direct workers 
Objectives Bread and butter 
Form 
-Inclusion principle 
Firm-level unions 
Vertical inclusion 
-Degree of articulation at firm-level High 
Capacity Medium 
Democracy Leadership predominance 
Activism Moderation 
Employer relations Co-operation and compromise 
Wider scope of engagement 
Defensive objectives  
Member relations Servicing 
Demobilisation 
Degree of articulation at higher-level 
/ Labour movement relations 
 
Limited articulation 
CONSFETEMA 
State relations Autonomy 
Political party relations Apoliticism 
Society relations Nonexistent 
  
 
 
Unions at Los Pelambres have not established relations of significance with other 
actors beyond the level of the firm. Relations with the state are limited to participating in 
activities organised by the Regional and National Labour Bureau, and unions declare to 
have no intention to directly influence the legislative, or any other polity-level processes 
(Ibarra, 2004; Puelles, 2002). As in the case of unions at Sur Andes, politics in general 
and relations with political parties in particular, are said to play no relevant role in the life 
of the unions, and no discussion on this topic took place during the interviews. A similar 
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picture can be appreciated in the unions’ conception of general interest and relations with 
wider society where no significant actions have been taken with regard to labour reform, 
royalty initiatives, environmental issues, or problems with local communities. 
 
Los Pelambres: outcomes 
 
As in the previous two cases, union leaders view a great deal of the outcomes of union 
strategy against the background of the shared objectives between management and labour. 
First and foremost they take pride of having become the world's fifth-largest producer, and 
to work in the only mining company among the top ten ‘best places to work’ in Chile. 
 
In terms of organisational outcomes, union density at Los Pelambres is nearly 
universal at 98%. Despite their original differences, union organisations have been able to 
work co-ordinately and bargained almost identical collective contracts. This has been 
partly the result of a renewal and subsequent confirmation of new leaderships. Today, 
both unions are directed by leaders who either had no union membership during the first 
mining exercise or who arrived from Sur Andes during the second mining exercise. Since 
2004 and both directorates have been re-elected in their entirety (Puelles, 2002: 4). 
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Case VI – Sindicato Escondida 
Case V – Sindicato El Abra 
Case VI - Sindicato Zaldívar 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The second group of cases corresponds to core workers employed by three of the most 
prominent greenfield transnational operations established in the 1980s and 1990s, owned 
and managed by foreign mining groups. All three cases are important copper producers 
and belong to major international players. BHP-Billiton’s Minera Escondida operates the 
world’s largest open pit mine and is the second world producer after CODELCO. At the 
time of research, El Abra was a joint venture between CODELCO and Phelps Dodge 
Corporation (now part of FCX), and Zaldívar was owned by Placer Dome (today property 
of Barrick Gold Corporation). In contrast to the previous group of cases, these companies 
are highly homogeneous and have evolved in a remarkably similar way. Workers at these 
companies enjoy above-average employment and working conditions, although less so 
than those enjoyed by CODELCO copper workers. After several years labouring within 
‘union-free’ labour regimes, workers in these companies began solid and successful 
organising drives in the late-1990s. This chapter examines their story. 
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Case IV 
 
Sindicato Escondida 
 
 
 
 
 
Escondida: company background 
 
Minera Escondida (henceforth Escondida) operates the world's largest copper open pit. 
Escondida produces copper concentrate and cathodes from two open pit mines (Escondida 
and Escondida Norte) located within 5 kilometres from each other (BHP Billiton, 2009). 
The Escondida deposit was discovered in 1981 by a joint venture between Minera Utah de 
Chile Inc. and Getty Mining (Chile) Inc. Rights to the ore deposit have since subsequently 
transferred to the current owners: BHP Billiton (57.7%), Rio Tinto plc (30%), Jeco 
Corporation -a Japanese holding led by Mitsubishi Corporation (10%), and International 
Finance Corporation (IFC) -a World Bank subsidiary (2.5 percent) (BHP Billiton, 2006a, 
2006b) (Figure 8.1). 
 
Figure 8.1: BHP-Billiton’s Minera Escondida 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Minera Escondida (2006) and BHP Billiton (2006a) 
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BHP Billiton, Escondida’s controlling company, is an international player in the 
resources industry formed from a merger between BHP Limited and Billiton plc in 2001. 
BHP Billiton’s base metals division is indeed one of the world’s top producers of copper, 
silver, lead and uranium, and a leading producer of zinc. BHP Billiton has seven primary 
operations around the world, three of which are located in Chile: Escondida (58.5%), Cerro 
Colorado (100%), and Spence (100%). 
 
The construction of the mine was initiated in August 1988. Although commercial 
production began in 1990, Escondida was officially inaugurated on March 14, 1991 (BHP 
Billiton, 2009). Subsequent expansion phases have increased production from the original 
320,000 to today’s more than 1,200,000 metric tons of fine copper annually (COCHILCO, 
2007). 
 
At the time of research in 2004, Escondida employed 2539 direct workers and 2143 
contract workers. By 2006, employment had increased to 2951 and 2786 respectively 
(BHP Billiton, 2006b). Terms and conditions of employment are possibly the best found 
among comparable large-scale transnational operators (Ramos, 2005; Urzúa, 2004). The 
mine works 12-hour shifts and a seven-day on, seven-day off roster system. In line with 
new foreign operators, Escondida’s approach to industrial relations has been described as 
militantly anti-union but also characterised by the implementation of union-avoidance 
HRM practices (Agacino, 2004; Agacino et al., 1998; Lara, 2004; Sierra, 2004; Siri, 2004). 
 
Sindicato Escondida: union background (1993-1999) 
 
Three years after Escondida began its production phase, and ‘after a series of “clandestine” 
activities because the word “union” was not welcome in the company’ (Sindicato No. 1 
Escondida, 2009: , emphasis in original), just over a hundred workers established the first 
and only trade union that has existed in the company. The Sindicato No. 1 de Trabajadores 
Minera Escondida was founded on 19 December 1993 ‘to improve a whole range of things 
because, aside from the money, there were a series of issues about which we demanded 
change’ (Sindicato No. 1 Escondida, 2009). 
 
The development of trade union activity was extremely difficult at the time. The 
union was the very first one established in the new foreign-owned greenfield operations, its 
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directorate had no previous experience, and union density was so low -just above 10%- 
that the possibility of bargaining a new contract was beyond the means of the union.  
 
Most importantly, the company’s systematic use of anti-union practices weakened 
the union further. These included the harassment of union leaders, members and potential 
members, including offers of supervisory jobs for officials and overt threats of dismissal to 
members. Despite this, union membership increased steadily and by 1996 it reached a peak 
of 416 workers (20%) (Sindicato No. 1 Escondida, 2009). 
 
In the same year, production bonuses began to decrease significantly as a result of a 
new way of calculating them and lower copper prices. This threatened levels of income 
and the union committed itself to bargain a new contract within a year. This decision 
proved a severe blow to the organisation. Employer repression increased before, during, 
and after the first collective bargaining process.  
 
The 400 workers that constituted the union at the time were threatened consistently 
before bargaining began. The company employed all sorts of cons to weaken the 
union and scare workers off which in the end made lots of members to leave the 
union. 
(Troncoso, 2005) 
 
As a result, the union lost 40% of its members in the run up to the negotiations but 
still decided to go ahead. Collective bargaining began in March 1997 with 242 members 
(24%). The process was very confrontational and union members walked out for 15 days. 
Their actions were largely ineffective however. Indeed, with the first collective contract 
union members an important number of benefits whereas non-union members were 
rewarded by the company with an attractive new benefit package. By the end of 1998 
union membership had dropped to just 94 workers, a mere 6% (Sindicato No. 1 Escondida, 
2009). 
 
For today’s directors, employer repression played an important role in such poor 
outcome, but so did union mismanagement. 
 
The union managed the whole process disastrously. First of all, directors tricked the 
membership. They told us, for example, that the union had over 700 members out of 
1700 but the actual number was 272. Then, they approached the process in an 
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unnecessarily confrontational way. They just didn’t know whom they were up 
against. Finally, they made the union go on a strike that didn’t make any sense, one 
that, on the one hand, caused no harm whatsoever to the company –they used strike 
breakers-, but that on the other, began killing the image of the union: the union were 
liars, incompetent and useless. People felt really cheated and began to leave the union 
straightaway. 
(Troncoso, 2004b) 
 
To make matters worse, the company immediately began an aggressive campaign to 
‘kill the union off’ blending repression and ‘sweet stuff’ (Troncoso, 2005). Post collective 
bargaining repression included the dismissal of 84 mine operators for actual and suspected 
union activity. ‘Although only 15 of the 84 were actual union members, the company had 
been informed that the remaining 60 were planning to establish a new union’ (Fornazzari, 
2004).   
 
In parallel to repression, the company began implementing sophisticated HRM 
techniques, the most prominent of which was the establishment of the ‘Communication 
Channel’ (Canal de Comunicaciones, since 2001 renamed Forum), ‘a communication 
vehicle that involves selected worker representatives at all levels of the company and that 
meets every three months (…) to discuss matters that affect the future of Escondida and 
workers’ interests’ (Minera Escondida, 2002: 38, emphasis added). 
 
In sum, the 1993-1999 period saw the succession of three largely ineffective 
directorates, union mismanagement, the bargaining of one disastrous contract, relentless 
employer repression, and the introduction of ‘competing’ non-union employee 
representation. By the end of 1999, the union was in the brink of collapse, seen and seeing 
itself as a weak organisation with its days counted’ (Fornazzari, 2004; Troncoso, 2004b). 
 
Sindicato Escondida: critical juncture and path-breaking choices (2000-2003) 
 
The fate of the union began to change in 2000 with the election of a completely new 
directorate. Interestingly, the union’s new directors had never actively participated in the 
union before and, one of them was not even a union member until he bid for office. In their 
view, the key for a successful organisation was, first and foremost, union re-building 
(construcción sindical), as union effectiveness could not be achieved without ‘decent 
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membership numbers, serious union management, and union consciousness (conciencia 
sindical)’ (Troncoso, 2004b).  
 
But before work on union building could begin, the new directorate had to prepare 
for their first collective bargaining process as the contract signed in 1998 was due to expire 
in May 2001. Due to their lack of experience, the union’s low membership (143, 8%), and 
the knowledge that the company would once again try to break the union before and after 
negotiations, directors make the crucial decision to negotiate early (negociación 
anticipada). Early collective bargaining allows for contract negotiations to take outside the 
rigid time frames imposed by the regulated collective bargaining format but does take 
away important union rights, such as the right to strike. On this occasion however, 
directors considered that ‘success in modest objectives was better than failure in offensive 
objectives’. Another strong reason to negotiate early was that due to low copper prices the 
production bonus paid in January was being reduced significantly and any modification 
achieved to the way it was calculated before that could prove significant in terms of 
income.  
 
After weeks of negotiations, the union achieved most of their objectives and signed 
a new 30-month contract in December 2000, four months before the end of the previous 
one.  
 
We managed to get back into the contract all the benefits we had lost in 1998. So in 
this sense, it was back to square one. But we also managed to sign this clause in 
which the company commits itself to extend all the benefits given to non-unionised 
workers to union members. This was very important for us because until then the 
company had been fighting unionisation by giving incentives to people not to join, 
typically in the form of ‘chicken bonuses' (bonos gallina). 
 (Troncoso, 2004b) 
 
Once the contract was signed the union could focus all its energies on rebuilding the 
union. The union immediately began an aggressive recruitment strategy under the banner 
of ‘more membership more power’ (a más afiliación más poder). Initial work started on a 
confidential and door-to-door basis. Directors argue that potential members did not only 
fear management repression but also distrusted the union ‘as institution’. 
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Union consciousness was, and it is still, very weak. Members join the union because 
of the benefits they get, not because they believe on the labour movement or because 
it is their right to do so. It was a painstaking to try and talk to young workers one by 
one, to their families… It took a great deal of effort. 
(Troncoso, 2004a) 
 
From the 143 members the union had in 2000, by August 2002, union membership had 
increased to 510. The directorate was re-elected and thanks to the increase in membership 
the union could elect two more directors (5 in total).  
 
But as they acknowledge, ‘union consciousness’ was not enough. Indeed, for most 
workers it was not even the main issue. Thanks to the door-to-door visits, directors realised 
most workers would simply join if only the benefits of joining surpassed the costs. 
Numerous workers would complain that they could not even afford union dues because of 
how indebted they were. At the time, individual debt levels ranged between £ 7,000 to 
18,000.  
 
In November 2001 the union began a series of negotiations with a local bank and the 
company to renegotiate the debts of employees. Talks with the bank led to a consolidation 
of all debts into one, the payment of which would be automatically deducted from a 
worker’s salary (hence making effective the upper legal limit of 15% deduction per debt). 
The company on the other hand, committed to make such deduction only from a worker's 
basic salary, and not from income derived from bonuses. Until then, monies were taken 
from the total, hence leaving little disposable income.  
 
The system was timely implemented in March 2003, as new contract negotiations 
were due in August. The main objective of the recently re-elected directorate was to 
bargain a good contract in 2003. ‘We took this contract as our last chance to save the 
union. If we failed after all we had done for the last two years the union was dead’ 
(Fornazzari, 2004). Debt renegotiation proved a crucial as it attracted a great deal of 
interest and in less than five months the union more than doubled its membership: from 
just over 500 to 1346 workers (77%).  
 
As the union grew increasingly confident it had the sufficient membership strength 
to put pressure on the company, it began to take precautions to sustain a very likely long 
strike. When the negotiations began, all members that had opted into it had one debt, freed 
CORE WORKERS IN ANTI-UNION REGIMES 
231 
up their benefits, and nothing to pay until four months later. This allowed the union to 
collect a one-off due of £200 that would help the union to sustain a 15-30-day strike. 
Another agreement between the union and another bank also gave all members an 
automatic credit line from day 30 onwards. 
 
In addition to their own training, directors hired a team of five advisers, three 
solicitors and two business graduates to elaborate their contract proposal. More 
importantly, the union devoted a great deal of resources in training the membership in 
what collective bargaining meant and what was expected of them in terms of collective 
action. This also entailed involving the workers’ families.  
 
We organised a show in Antofagasta for the wives and the children. The idea was to 
create some sort of union consciousness in our families, to tell them about the process 
we were about to face, and to explain to them that we could need their support at 
some point if the bargaining turned nasty or we went on strike.  
 
It was a complete success. 4500 people attended. Our lawyer explained all about 
collective bargaining in 45 minutes and then the show began. We hired some Rojo 
Fama Contra Fama stars (popular reality TV show). The wives understood it all. 
(Fornazzari, 2004) 
 
In contrast to the previous bargaining process, this one took place under the 
regulated format. The company rejected the union’s contract proposal and negotiations did 
not achieve progress. The union recommended not to accept the employer’s offer and 
workers voted overwhelmingly to go on strike (98%). The strike was scheduled to begin 
seven days later with the morning shift. The company presented a second offer just 10 
minutes before the strike was due to begin. The union recommended accepting it. The 
morning shift voted at 10 and the afternoon shift later that day, which meant the company 
was effectively paralysed for about 10 hours. 
 
In the view of directors, the new contract was a complete success: 13% increment 
over three years, new benefits, a substantial ‘end-of-conflict bonus’, among other 
outcomes. They argue that the union consolidated as organisation and ‘the company began 
to respect us at last’ (Troncoso, 2004a). But they also acknowledge that ‘not everyone was 
happy. The flipside of all we did during those two years is that we created so many 
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expectations. Many members felt we could have gained significantly more if we had push 
just a little extra’ (Troncoso, 2004a). 
 
Sindicato Escondida: union-employer relations 
 
The aftermath of the third collective bargaining process can be described as a period of 
consolidation of the union’s strategic choices. In terms of union-employer relations, 
adversarial relations have predominated. Despite of the union’s increasing importance, the 
company has continued to promote non-union representation through HRM techniques. In 
the opinion of leaders, a weakened union is better for this purpose than no union at all. 
 
We always thought the company wanted to destroy the union, but we were mistaken. 
Their policy is rather to weaken it and to favour non-members because they need to 
cover their backs here and abroad against accusations of anti-unionism. So the can 
say, “There is a union, and everybody is free to join, but workers themselves don't 
want to”. 
(Troncoso, 2004b) 
 
At the time of research, the union was considering extending militant action outside 
collective bargaining as an additional way of counter-acting employer, now disguised, 
anti-unionism. 
 
In terms of putting pressure on the company (outside collective bargaining) we don’t 
want to limit ourselves to litigation. It is true that we have sued them for anti-union 
practices, the check-off system, and other issues, but we are developing new forms of 
pressure. The idea is to try and incentive our membership to mobilise when the time 
comes. This doesn’t necessarily mean walking out, but it can take the form of small 
disruptive action like closing the gates, stop the buses, etc.  
(Troncoso, 2005) 
 
Since then, the union’s degree of activism has increased within and outside 
collective bargaining. The fourth collective bargaining process ended with a long and 
successful strike in August and September 2006. It attracted an unusual degree of 
international attention, with the Financial Times running 119 stories about it (Riesco, 
2007), and The Economist referring to it as ‘a worrying precedent’ (2006). 
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The union has also been able to successfully mobilise outside collective bargaining 
–chiefly through demonstrations in the city of Antofagasta- to force the company to 
implement the terms of the collective agreement as well as to demanding better conditions 
of employment. A prominent example were the mass mobilisations that took place in 
February 2005 to negotiate a new collective health insurance plan (Plan colectivo de 
salud) (El Mercurio de Calama, 2005). 
 
 
Table 8.1: Sindicato Escondida Strategic Choices 
 Escondida 
  
Constituency Core – Escondida blue-collar workers 
Objectives Bread and butter 
Form 
-Inclusion principle 
Firm-level (Sindicato de empresa) 
-Vertical principle 
Degree of articulation at firm-level High 
Capacity High 
Democracy Leadership predominance 
Activism Militant bargaining 
Employer relations Adversarialism 
Limited scope of engagement 
Offensive objectives 
Member relations Servicing 
Spurts of mobilisation 
Labour movement relations  
–Degree of articulation at higher level 
FMC 
-Medium 
State relations Outsider 
Political party relations Nonexistent 
Society relations  
  
 
 
 
Sindicato Escondida: union-member relations and organisational dimensions 
 
Adversarialism in union-employer relations has in turn influenced union strategic choices 
in all other dimensions of union activity. In developing worker relations, the union has 
made choices that combine organising and servicing activities. On the one hand, most 
members are largely seen as consumers of union services. On the other hand, members are 
expected to mobilise in order to obtain those services. The union’s agenda of 
representation is largely limited to short and long-term bread and butter objectives. 
 
The principle of leadership predominance is evident in union democracy and 
governance. The great majority of leaders elected in 2000 have remained in power 
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indicating both continuous membership support and a tight grip on union governance and 
policy. In fact, several modifications including the extension of directorate’s office to three 
years, were introduced to the union’s statutes in 2004, (Sindicato No. 1 Escondida, 2004b, 
2004c). 
 
In line with legislation, the union has maintained a private orientation to interest 
representation, limiting its constituency to core workers employed by Escondida, and the 
union’s choice of organisational form to firm-level unions (sindicato de empresa). 
 
Nevertheless, the union has attempted to speak for a broader set of interests such as 
those of permanent contract workers labouring for Escondida. The union has actively 
sponsored the creation of unions of contract workers labouring in the company, including 
transportation and cleaning services. They explain their active support on two grounds. 
 
This has been partly because (contract workers) have directly approached us for help. 
They normally have no previous union experience and we have learnt a bit these 
years. But we also help them because the policy of the CMCH [N.B.: to which the 
union was affiliated at the time of research] is to organise contract workers in a bid to 
make contract labour more and more expensive, so that companies decide to 
internalise those workers. 
(Troncoso, 2004a) 
 
Sindicato Escondida: relations beyond the level of the firm 
 
The Escondida union has developed an active profile beyond the level of the firm, 
particularly at sectoral level. At the time of research, the union was affiliated to the CMCH 
(Confederación Minera de Chile). Although Communist-led, CMCh is a moderate and 
declining higher-level organisation, historically identified with the coal mining industry 
shut down in the early 1990s.  
 
In 2003 however, Escondida and other private sector unions established the Chilean 
Federation of Miners (Federación Minera de Chile, FMC) (Federación Minera de Chile, 
2003), with three major objectives in mind: solutions to sectoral problems, a vehicle for 
influencing the state and the transnational mining employers affiliated with the Mining 
Council (Consejo Minero), and solidarity in collective bargaining (Sindicato No. 1 
Escondida, 2004a). 
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In the case of the strike at El Abra, we wanted to influence the National Labour 
Bureau, the government, and the mining council so they would put pressure on the 
company to compromise [See next case]. In solidarity with them, we stopped all 
coaches to and from work for 10 minutes. Not much you may think but it showed 
them that the FMC was not a bluff but that links actually existed and were effective. 
 
During 2004 and 2005, meetings were held between the FMC and the FTC 
representing CODELCO workers, to explore the possibility of cooperation between the 
two organisations, but no formal agreement has been reached since then (IMF, 2004; 
Sindicato El Abra, 2005b). 
 
 
Figure 8.2: Sindicato Escondida: Union Density Evolution 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Information provided by union directors in interviews, questionnaire and website. 
 
 
This degree of activity contrasts greatly with the inexistence of links at national and 
international level. The union has never been affiliated to CUT largely because it is 
considered an irrelevant and highly politicised organisation. Other than an informal 
meeting with unions from Tintaya, a BHP-Billiton operation in Perú, no attempt has been 
made to establish international relations. 
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In line with all private sector unions in this study, the union has not established 
formal or informal relations with political parties.  
 
Unions should use party politics to advance their interests, but we shouldn’t allow 
political parties to use unions to advance theirs. We cannot do party politics when 
working for the union. If you do, you lose sight of what unions are for in the first 
place: organisations exclusively design for the defence of workers rights.  
(Fornazzari, 2004) 
 
This has not meant however, that the union has not taken a ‘political position’ in various 
issues thereby demonstrating a wider conception of general interest. During the 2006 strike 
for example, the Escondida union publicly called for the copper industry to be taken back 
into state ownership (Riesco, 2007). In 2007, it publicly supported the struggle of contract 
workers across the industry. 
 
 
Sindicato Escondida: outcomes 
 
Escondida’s union is today considered the most important worker organisation in Chile’s 
private copper mining sector. In terms of the membership dimension, the union has 
achieved almost universal representation with a density of over 90% in 2004. More 
importantly perhaps, the union has been able to successfully engage its membership and 
mobilise it within and without collective bargaining. Partly as a result, the union has 
increased its economic leverage and Minera Escondida has come to (reluctantly) accept the 
union as bargaining partner. The union’s organisational structure, governance, and 
dynamics show that Escondida union has increasingly strengthened along institutional 
lines. In contrast, the political dimension appears largely underdeveloped, as the union 
remains an outsider in terms of its relations with government actors, parliament, and 
political parties.  
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Case V 
 
El Abra 
 
 
 
 
 
El Abra: company background 
 
Sociedad Contractual Minera El Abra (henceforth El Abra) was established in 1994 as a 
joint venture between CODELCO (49%) and Cyprus Amax Minerals (51%, henceforth 
Cyprus). Cyprus acquired the interest in El Abra for a payment to CODELCO of US$ 330 
million, and the commitment to invest US$ 1,05 billion in the construction of the mine and 
processing plant. Cyprus Amax had been established in 1993 through the merger of Cyprus 
Minerals Company and Amax Inc., becoming the largest US-owned mining company at 
the time. For its then CEO, El Abra was ‘the centrepiece of Cyprus Amax Minerals’ 
copper strategy into the 21st century and the key to our production goal of more than one 
billion pounds of copper annually’ (Ward, 1994).  
 
Figure 8.3: SCM El Abra 2004 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Phelps Dodge (2006) and CODELCO (2006) 
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The mine began commercial production in August 1996. Two years later, Cyprus was 
acquired by Phelps Dodge Corporation, then the world’s second-largest copper producer 
after CODELCO. Phelps Dodge operated in two divisions at international level, Phelps 
Dodge Mining Company (PDMC) and Phelps Dodge Industries (PDI) (Phelps Dodge, 
2006). In addition to El Abra, the PDMC division had two other copper mines in Chile: 
Candelaria and Ojos del Salado (Figure 8.3).  
 
In 2000, El Abra entered a transition zone between oxide (leachable) and sulphide 
(non-leachable) ores in the open pit. This resulted in lower copper extraction than planned, 
reducing production, increasing costs and reducing profitability (Infomine, 2000). 
Problems continued and worsened, and production only returned to design capacity in the 
mid-2000s, and by 2007, El Abra produced 166,000 metric tonnes of copper (Freeport-
McMoRan Copper & Gold, 2009). 
 
At the time of research, El Abra employed 860 direct workers and about 1500 
permanent contract workers. Terms and conditions of employment were, and have 
remained, similar to comparable large-scale transnational operators. The mine works 12-
hour shifts and a seven-day on, seven-day off roster system. Under Phelps-Dodge, El Abra 
developed a ‘union-free’ approach to industrial relations driven by a desire to individualise 
them as much as possible employing sophisticated HRM practices (Lara, 2004), but also 
by using militant anti-union tactics (Ramos, 2004a).  
 
In March 2007, Phelps Dodge Corporation was taken over by and merged with 
Freeport-McMoRan Copper and Gold Inc (FCX). As a subsidiary of FCX, Phelps Dodge 
became Freeport-McMoRan Corporation and FCX became in turn the largest publicly 
traded copper company in the world. El Abra’s current ownership structure is 51% FCX 
and 49% CODELCO (Freeport-McMoRan Copper & Gold, 2009).  
 
Sindicato El Abra: critical juncture and path-breaking choices 
 
El Abra began commercial production in 1996. Workers report to have been very satisfied 
with their employment and working conditions at the time.  
 
Cyprus Amax wanted to have the best in Chile. They invested US$ 1 billion in new 
technology, they wanted to have the highest quality personnel and pay and treat them 
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well. They had this “open door” policy so you could have direct contact with any 
executive at any time. They had a flat hierarchy with few supervisors and autonomy 
and responsibility were given to workers to manage and look after themselves.  
 
We were happy and committed to the company. We were amongst the highest paid in 
the industry. We could live anywhere across the country, because we had a 7x7 roster 
system, the company would pay the plane tickets, and we had a great hotel in the 
camp.  
 
We bought into all this stuff completely and never thought we needed a union. 
(Ramos, 2004c) 
 
But in early 1998, circumstances began to change. Various extraction and 
processing problems began to unfold and prevented El Abra to reach its design capacity of 
125,000 metric tonnes. Cyprus was facing additional difficulties due to low commodity 
prices that brought copper’s price down to historically low levels. In this context, it was 
rumoured that Cyprus was planning on replacing the 7x7 roster with a 4x4 roster. Back 
then, 70% of workers did not reside in Calama –at 80 kilometres away, the nearest city to 
the pit- and a change in roster would make commuting across the country unfeasible. 
 
This particular issue -then framed as Cyprus’ ‘attempt to change the rules of the 
game’- triggered in 1998 the formation of the El Abra union (Sindicato de Trabajadores de 
El Abra). Relative to other cases in this chapter, the organising campaign to form the union 
was to some extent unremarkable in the sense that it took workers just one ballot to form 
the union. This was partly the result of the universal threat to employment conditions 
posed by the alleged change in roster, but perhaps more importantly because Cyprus did 
not effectively challenge the organising drive. Either way, the union was established with 
an initial density of 40%. 
 
Tough beginnings (1998-2003). Barely a few months after the constitution of the union 
however, Cyprus Amax was taken over by Phelps Dodge Corporation. This proved to be a 
critical juncture in terms of the company’s labour regime. As acknowledged by Phelps 
Dodge HR Director for Southamerica, if until then Cyprus’ labour regulation had been 
characterised by a soft HRM approach to individual workers and a tolerant stance toward 
the new union, Phelps Dodge brought with them a hard HRM approach and a harsh anti-
union regime (Lara, 2004). 
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Assuming that the new owners would try to materialise the rumoured changes in 
roster and other employment and working conditions, the union’s main objective was to 
transfer Cyprus’ voluntary advantageous terms and conditions into an enforceable 
collective contract with Phelps Dodge as soon as possible. With a density of 46% the union 
began its first collective bargaining process in September 1999. But as they recall, 
 
It was a terrible negotiation. The union was inexperienced and mismanaged. It was 
led by three directors who were not from Calama. They were never on site at the same 
time. The union was heavily indebted. Copper was at its lowest price -62 cents... All 
wrong.  
 
Phelps Dodge threatened with layoffs and the union gave up on almost everything it 
had been set up to defend in the first place. We lost air travel and tens of workers had 
to relocate to Calama with their families. The company closed the hotel in the camp 
for ‘health and safety reasons’ and we began commuting 160 km daily by coach, 
unpaid of course (...) 
(Ramos, 2004c) 
 
Union leaders estimate that losses amounted to 20% of overall income and benefits. 
Results were so disappointing that are said to have paved the way for yet another 
disastrous negotiation two years later. 
 
Before that however, El Abra encountered serious extraction and production 
problems in 2000. The mine unexpectedly entered a transition zone between oxide 
(leachable) and sulphide (non-leachable) ores in the open pit. As a result, some sulphide 
ore was placed on leach pads resulting in lower copper extraction than planned, reducing 
production, increasing production costs and reducing earnings (Infomine, 2000). Although 
production was expected to return to budgeted levels in a few months, problems continued 
and worsened in 2001 with a failing SX-EW plant (BN Americas, 2001), which resulted in 
severe ‘quality issues’ in 2002 (BN Americas, 2002). 
 
Meanwhile, a union crisis -brewing since signing the 1999 contract- broke out only 
two months before the beginning of the second collective bargaining process in September 
2001. A widespread perception among the rank-and-file that directors had not prepared 
properly for this round of negotiations and here were not up to the job ended in the 
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membership formally requesting the directorate’s resignation in an open assembly. 
Eventually the president of the union survived but the other two directors were replaced 
and took office just 45 days before negotiations were due to start. 
 
To make matters worse, management mounted a wide-ranging anti-union campaign 
in the run up to negotiations, threatening to make compulsory redundancies and/or close 
down the mine.  
 
The General Manager told us, and published in the local newspaper (El Mercurio de 
Calama), that due to the production problems and economic circumstances the union 
had to be prepared to compromise and give concessions. His ultimatum was “ either 
you sign this contract or we close down tomorrow; or else I’ll fire 50 of you to 
balance the books and will publicly blame you”. I couldn’t bear the thought of 50 of 
us shown the door, and we were very aware that Phelps Dodge closed down Ojos del 
Salado after a ‘successful negotiation’ (...) 
 
We didn’t know anything about how to bargain. We undertook some training and we 
prepared a contract proposal. Of course they wiped us up. Just like with the first 
contract, we lost instead of gaining anything. We wanted to call a strike but with 
what? We had no money, members had given up... But at least they understood that 
this second round was lost from the start and that to an extent it was everybody’s fault 
for not having kept an eye on directors till the last minute. 
(Ramos, 2004a) 
 
On this occasion, workers lost about 10% of overall income and benefits relative to 
what they had before forming the organisation. In other words, down 30% since Cyprus 
was taken over. The only positive aspect, they admit ironically, ‘is that we signed a three-
year contract which, in hindsight, eventually allowed us to start rebuilding the union’ 
(Ramos, 2004a). 
 
But internal problems continued. One of the directors presented his resignation only 
to establish a second union in the mine, the San Lorenzo Union, in January 2003. The 
organisation continued losing money and, a few months later, in yet another open 
assembly, the remaining directors presented their resignation to the membership. Members 
only accepted the resignation of the president –widely seen as corrupt and incompetent- 
and urged the remaining three directors to remain in charge of the union. The new 
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directorate called a by-election to complete the two vacancies and formally assumed in 
August 2003. 
 
Path breaking choices (2003-present). The election of the new directorate represented a 
critical juncture for the union and, as demonstrated later, also for the San Lorenzo union. 
With two years to go for the next bargaining round, the directorate decided to prepare for 
the negotiations with plenty of time. But after carrying out a SWOT analysis exercise, the 
union developed a more encompassing strategic plan that considering rebuilding the union 
as organisation and to re-establish relations with significant actors. In terms of rebuilding 
the union as organisation, the plan considered three main aspects.  
 
First, to improve union management by ‘professionalising’ the directorate’s activity. 
This essentially meant to get the organisation’s finances in order and back in the black by 
opening a bank account for the union, naming a permanent commission of members tasked 
with monitoring union spending (Comision Revisora de Cuentas), and by cancelling the 
various consultancy contracts signed by the previous directorate. Second, to make the 
organisation more attractive to members and non-members by increasing the number of 
consumer benefits offered to affiliates, particularly in terms of discount agreements with 
local shops and services including health care, dentistry, and coach travel. Third, to 
improve the quality of internal communications with affiliates and to ‘steadily but surely 
(sic) introduce issues of class, solidarity and nationalism’ in the membership. As in other 
cases in this chapter, the great majority of members but especially non-members were 
described as ‘young’, ‘apathetic’, ‘with no class consciousness’.  
 
There are 30 years of history here. Since the coup the military were telling us they 
were an authoritarian government capable of eliminating any focus of resistance to 
“the model”. Obviously one of the foci of such resistance was the labour movement. 
What they did was to behead, to drown, and to crush all social movements. First they 
did it physically: eliminating leaders and members, jailing, torturing them. But their 
second job was to educate the nation against unionism. It was no longer necessary to 
join a union, everything could be solved talking... So young people –myself included- 
grew up amidst fear, repression, and adoctrinated for 30 years in this mentality (…). 
We used to discuss the royalty problem with some of them and they didn’t have a 
clue... Once they understood the problem they’d get back at us saying “that’s fine, but 
that problem is the government’s, not yours. Your job is to defend us”.  
(Ramos, 2004c) 
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In order to reach out to these workers and to promote internal solidarity, the union 
set up regular meetings with the membership, a website, and launched a magazine 
newsletter. 
 
The idea was to create class and union consciousness in the membership. For 
members to see beyond their individual problems, and to believe in a capable, 
efficient, and strong labour movement. We have banged on the idea that there is a 
whole social environment around us, a country, which merits our concern.  
(Ramos, 2004c) 
 
Last, and subordinated in part to the achievement of the previous three objectives, 
the union began an active organising campaign. Boosting membership levels was not only 
crucial in terms of the financial health and perceived strength of the organisation, but a key 
indicator of the success of the union in introducing class in their struggle. 
 
In terms of rebuilding relations with meaningful actors, the union focused on three 
fronts. I will return to these in the next section. Internally, the new directorate was able to 
develop a working relationship with the San Lorenzo union. Despite the bitter disputes that 
led to the split in 2003, the organisations began working together in their relations with 
their employer. In terms of the latter, the union decided to begin putting pressure on 
CODELCO and on the state more generally instead of only focusing on Phelps Dodge. 
Simultaneously, and in order to build broader support in this regard, they began re-
establishing relations with local authorities, MPs, etc. Last, in May 2004 they founded the 
Chilean Federation of Miners (Federación Minera de Chile, FMC) together with unions of 
six other transnational operators. 
 
 Negotiations for the third collective contract began in October 2004. This time 
around, the combined membership density of the two unions was %. After two weeks of 
fruitless negotiations, the unions overwhelmingly rejected management’s final offer and 
voted for industrial action. Last minute negotiations failed to break the deadlock and the 
strike began on 5 November driving the mine to a halt. Phelps Dodge employed 
replacement workers immediately but without observing minimum legal requirements. The 
unions denounced this move to the Regional Labour Inspection. The RLI upheld the 
position of the unions and police were sent in to the mine to expel the strike breakers and 
seal off facilities. But 24 hours later, the RLI reversed its ruling and referred the matter to 
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Calama’s Employment Tribunal and in so doing allowed Phelps Dodge to resume work 
employing replacements. 
 
In view of the Inspection’s u-turn, the unions decided to block the mine’s access 
road to impede strike breakers going in. As the road to the mine is private property, anti-
riot police intervened and arrested numerous union members. But the strikers were 
determined to keep picketing and stayed for four days in the desert in a makeshift camp. 
As the strike entered its second week, the unions kept blocking the road and regular 
clashes with police continued. The idea behind staying in the desert was ‘first, to have all 
members at hand and in this way to try and prevent members going back to work, and 
second, to sensibiliser other sector unions to support us. Not a single FTC union supported 
us, but Escondida did. This is significant because miners can be quite cold people, minding 
their own business only. Indeed, escondida workers are said to be the coldest of us all, but 
there you are. They twice stopped buses in solidarity with us’. 
 
But maintaining the morale of the membership in the desert became increasingly 
difficult. ‘About 10% of the membership had ever been on strike. They are all young. It 
was hard to keep them motivated. By day 10 they began to crack’. Eventually, the unions 
decided to transfer their struggle to Calama. ‘Once we decided to leave the camp, we sang 
the national anthem to the police and marched all the way into Calama’.  Protests and 
marches in the city continued for four days. Although members would go back to their 
homes at night they would not return to work. But on day 15 of the strike, 30 workers quit 
the strike, and on day 16, 20 more left. It was then that union directors decided to ‘double 
the stakes’ and, as the strike commenced its third week, four leaders began a dry hunger 
strike. ‘We had to shock our members to get their support as well as the wider community. 
We managed both and prominent congressmen lent their support to strikers’. The strike 
finally ended after 22 days when union members accepted management’s last offer. 
 
The third contract improved terms and conditions significantly relative to the 
previous one but in absolute terms still fell short of the conditions originally set by Cyprus. 
Despite their ‘victory’, or rather, precisely because of it, the unions were not in the mood 
for celebration. 
 
Everybody knows Phelps Dodge are tough. Candelaria had 18-day strike  and the 
union only managed to maintain they had in the first place. Ojos del Salado had a 
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tough strike too, but their union managed to get something. But as you know, Phelps 
Dodge was not going to let that happen and closed the mine a month later as it had 
threatened. They couldn’t do it in our case, I reckon, simply because of their 
association with CODELCO and the government’s intention to kill off a conflict that 
escalated well beyond their initial calculations. 
(Ramos, 2004b) 
 
Rather, union leaders summarised the positive and negative outcomes of their third 
collective bargaining process in the following way. 
 
The most positive outcome was to rediscover the membership as a committed group 
of people, willing and able to mobilise for their rights. Sensibilising our colleagues in 
other private sector mines to mobilise for us was also a very positive and somewhat 
unexpected result. The negative side of it all was of course to experience how the 
system actually works. The other negative was to realise once again how awful this 
company is, their threats, their racism. 
(Ramos, 2004b) 
 
 
Sindicato El Abra: union-employer relations 
 
The years since the end of the third collective bargaining process can be described as a 
period of consolidation of the unions’ path-breaking strategic choices. Union-employer 
relations have remained adversarial. Despite of the union’s increasing positioning as a 
relevant actor in company life, Phelps Dodge has continued its antiunion stance though 
now openly framed as a benign ‘union-free’ approach. As it’s Director of Human 
Resources for South America explains, 
 
 the philosophy behind a union-free (sic) approach to industrial relations, is to become 
such a good employer that workers won’t need to have a union (...) all our HRM 
systems embody this idea.  
(Lara, 2004) 
 
Union leaders argue that in such context, there is little the unions can do in order to 
achieve their objectives, let alone in terms of improving relations, other than mobilising. 
Indeed, the unions’ degree of activism has increased considerably within and outside 
collective bargaining since 2004. Paradoxically perhaps, this has been accompanied by the 
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unions embracing the partnership discourse, in a way somewhat reminiscent of the 
‘mobilising for partnership’ argument. 
 
As the unions have risen to prominence, we have had more and more conflicts with 
management. We have developed several strategies to improve relations... not to be 
friends or anything like that, but to try and build something positive for everybody. 
We offered them a Partnership Agreement (Strategic Alliance). We told them: “we 
are happy to commit ourselves again to the company as long as you commit to us, 
solving our housing, social, and health problems. But nope, they don’t care. If things 
remain the same we’ll have to mobilise again as our only weapon is to mobilise. 
(Ramos, 2004b) 
 
 
Sindicato El Abra: union-member relations and organisational dimensions 
 
Adversarialism in union-employer relations has in turn influenced union strategic choices 
in all other dimensions of union activity. In developing worker relations, unions at El Abra 
have made choices that combine organising and servicing activities in a similar manner to 
Escondida union. Members are largely seen as consumers of union services but expected to 
mobilise in order to obtain those services. 
 
In terms of organisational dimensions, the unions have maintained a private 
orientation to interest representation, limiting its constituency to direct workers employed 
by El Abra, and the unions’ choice of organisational form to firm-level unions (sindicato 
de empresa). The unions’ agenda of representation is largely limited to bread and butter 
objectives. Despite their private orientation and narrow agenda of representation, unions at 
El Abra have attempted to articulate a broader set of interests, playing, for example, an 
active role in supporting the struggle of contract workers in their company, La Gran 
Minería, and beyond (Sindicato El Abra, 2005a). The principle of leadership 
predominance is evident in union democracy and governance. As in the case of Escondida, 
the great majority of leaders elected in 2003 have been continuously re-elected. 
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Table 8.2: El Abra unions’ strategic choices 
 El Abra (2003-) 
  
Constituency Core - El Abra blue-collar workers 
Objectives Bread and butter 
Form 2 firm-level unions (Sindicato de empresa) 
-Inclusion principle Vertical inclusion 
-Degree of articulation at firm-level High 
Capacity Medium 
Democracy Leadership predominance 
Activism Militant bargaining 
Employer relations Adversarialism 
Limited scope of engagement 
Offensive objectives  
Member relations Servicing 
Spurts of mobilisation 
Labour movement relations  Affiliated to FMC 
–Degree of articulation at higher level Medium 
State relations Outsider 
Political party relations Apolitical 
Society relations Engaged 
  
 
 
Sindicato El Abra: relations beyond the level of the firm 
 
Two distinct periods can be distinguished in the relations established between El Abra 
unions and actors beyond the level of the firm. These coincide with the path-breaking 
strategic choices described above. Until 2003, both unions were affiliated to the FTC –the 
firm-level federation of CODELCO workers (See Case I)- as the latter’s statutes allowed 
unions of companies in which CODELCO had participation to join the Federation. The 
unions joined the FTC in the belief that by influence CODELCO they would have more 
leverage against Phelps Dodge. This proved illusory in practice and in 2003, both unions 
left the FTC and together with six other private sector unions including Escondida and 
Zaldívar established the Chilean Federation of Miners (FMC) (Federación Minera de 
Chile, 2003).  
 
This shift also reflected the evolution of the unions in their relations with the state. 
While until 2003 these were largely nonexistent, establishing the FMC had not only to do 
with inter-union solidarity in collective bargaining but with actively influencing state 
policy toward the mining sector. 
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Reality hits you sometimes. I always assumed that the role of the state was 
paternalistic if you like, protective of its citizens. But this state doesn’t care about 
them let alone its workers. What it cares about is how to keep business happy and to 
improve employment statistics. It doesn’t matter if jobs are low quality jobs. What 
matters to them is the level of unemployment. I also realised that the government is 
no longer interested in getting involved in industrial relations. They have become an 
exclusively private problem between employers and employees, with a hands-off state 
confined to administering the system. 
 
It is clear that we must influence the state, not as an individual union but as part of a 
broader social movement whose leaders are convinced that, in order to gain spaces in 
Chile, you must mobilise if necessary. 
(Ramos, 2004b) 
 
It is unacceptable that when the government and parliament legislate and discuss 
mining sector policy, their sole interlocutors are the transnational corporations 
associated with the Mining Council. We, the workers in these companies, are not 
consulted because we are fragmented in dozens of union organisations without a 
(higher-level) organisation that could represent us all not just as valid interlocutor but 
also as a strong actor to help us resolve our particular and sector-level grievances. 
 (Sindicato El Abra, 2003) 
 
Unions at El Abra have shown a broader conception of general interest than any 
other private sector union. Largely as a reflection of CODELCO’s stake in the company, 
they have engaged in a series of wider debates, questioning for example the social and 
economic viability of CODELCO’s joint ventures with private sector operators (Sindicato 
El Abra, 2004), CODELCO’s use and abuse of contract labour (Sindicato El Abra, 2005a), 
and argued the moral superiority of imposing a royalty for la Gran Minería (Sindicato El 
Abra, 2003). 
 
In contrast with all this activity, the unions have no formal or informal links with 
political parties. In line with most organisations in this study, they perceive political parties 
as interfering rather than contributing actors. ‘We reject the utilisation of trade unions by 
political parties. We all have our political beliefs, but they cannot be the “be it all” when 
making a union decision. We are better off without them’ (Ramos, 2004a).  
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This is not to say that politics in a broader sense are absent from union dynamics in 
El Abra. At least at discursive level, the unions have embraced a conception of unionism 
with a broader sense of general interest than the other two cases in this chapter. But this is 
framed along historical labour movement choices rather than in party politics terms. 
 
We have grown convinced that Chilean unions have become mere social workers 
instead of organisations for the defence of worker rights. What do unions do? They 
try to obtain the largest number of benefits for their members, they do not oppose lay-
offs but try to improve redundancy payments, and they engage in collective 
bargaining every two or three years. 
 
We want to build a different unionism. We like to see ourselves as not being afraid of 
conflict, going to jail, hunger strike, etc. I think that what unite us is the idea that we 
have got to go back to the basics, to unearth the values of Recabarren and Laferte. 
They are our main reference because trade unionism was born out of inequalities, 
injustice, and bad faith on the part of capital for whom there is no such thing as 
enough.  
(Ramos, 2004b) 
 
 
Figure 8.4: Sindicato El Abra Union Density Evolution 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Information provided by union directors in interviews, questionnaire and website. 
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Sindicato El Abra: outcomes 
 
After five difficult years, the fortunes of unions at El Abra union began to change as a 
result of path breaking strategic choices. The unions have achieved almost universal 
representation with a combined density of over 85% in 2004. More importantly perhaps, 
the union has been able to successfully engage its membership and mobilise it within and 
without collective bargaining. The unions’ organisational structure, governance, and 
dynamics remain the traditional ones for the sector. In terms of relations with actors 
beyond the level of the firm, the unions have been able to engage with peer organisations 
and state actors as well as promoting an inclusive vision of society, maintaining their 
independence from political parties.  
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CASE VI 
 
Zaldívar 
 
 
 
 
 
Zaldívar: company background 
 
Compañía Minera Zaldívar (henceforth Zaldívar) was established in 1992 as a joint 
venture between Outokumpu (Finland) and Placer Dome (Canada). After a brief period of 
underground exploitation, construction of the open pit was terminated in 1994 and 
commercial production began in 1995. In December 1999, Placer Dome acquired 
Outokumpu’s share in US$ 251 million and became Zaldívar’s sole owner. At the time of 
research, Placer Dome was one of the world’s largest mining companies. It had interests 
in 16 mining operations in seven countries and employed a total workforce of more than 
13,000. Contrary to all other companies in this study, Placer Dome’s core business was 
not copper but gold, and it first arrived in Chile in 1991 to operate gold and silver mine La 
Coipa (Placer Dome, 2006a). In 2006, Placer Dome was taken over by Barrick Gold 
Corporation, today known as Barrick (Barrick, 2009; Barrick Gold, 2006; Placer Dome, 
2006b). 
 
Zaldívar produces nearly 125,000 metric tons of copper annually, 98% of which is 
in the form of cathodes. In 2004, Zaldívar employed a workforce of 712 direct employees 
and approximately 560 permanent contractors. Terms and conditions of employment are 
similar to comparable large-scale transnational operators. The mine works 12-hour shifts 
and a seven-day on, seven-day off roster system. Zaldívar’s approach to industrial 
relations has been driven by a desire to individualise them as much as possible employing 
sophisticated HRM practices and militant anti-union tactics (Lara, 2004; Sierra, 2004; 
Siri, 2004).  
 
Sindicato Zaldívar: critical juncture and founding strategic choices (1998-present) 
 
In 1995, two and a half years after the company was established, and following an 
investment of US$ 574 million in constructing the mine, the first cathode was successfully 
produced in early June and commercial production started in November. Workers report 
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to have been highly satisfied with their jobs, the conditions of which were largely 
attributed to the foreign origin of the company. 
 
We used to enjoy working here (…) One who has worked in foreign companies 
before, knows that the conditions they have at the beginning are very good for 
workers (…) They even showed us models of the houses they were going to build for 
us. 
(Silva, 2004) 
 
But it did not take long for some ‘worrying’ events to take place. Most of them had 
to do with a perceived deterioration of working conditions and career expectations. In 
1998, the company modified working week affecting annual leave negatively, working 
overtime with no compensation had become common practice, housing benefits were not 
going to materialise, salary increments had been halted in 1997, and career development 
was perceived as nonexistent.  
 
Dissatisfaction with working conditions quickly led way to a deeper sense of 
grievance when Zaldívar announced in 1998, the launch of the so-called ‘Labour 
Committees’ (Comités Laborales). The company’s official answer to discontent was well 
received at first as it was supposed to be a way for employees to ‘raise issues and freely 
express their views and raise issues to management’. However, the Committees soon 
turned into a huge disappointment. ‘I believe this is one the greatest harms they have done 
to us. We had high expectations, but even things both parties would agree on wouldn’t 
materialise’. To their inefficacy were soon added accusations that the committees had 
simply been put in place to prevent the formation of a union. This helped to strengthen the 
idea of a union because people realised the Committees were just a facade to show they 
had good communications with their employees. The company’s official slogan is: “our 
strength is based on good communications” but it was a strategy for people not to feel the 
need of a union (Urzúa, 2004). 
 
Under the circumstances, it was just a matter of time before some workers would 
‘break their promises’ and ‘switched on’ into activists. ‘When I joined Zaldívar, I 
promised not to participate in a trade union. Then it was a different company, where 
workers were respected, had a good salary… It was very different’ (Urzúa, 2004). For 
these leaders the company was good; the problem was the Chilean administration. Chilean 
managers were the ones to blame for the worsening of working conditions. ‘As they got 
CORE WORKERS IN ANTI-UNION REGIMES 
253 
promoted, they got rid of everything, that you shouldn’t give people too much, that people 
don’t need this and that….’ (Silva, 2004).  
 
The progressive undermining of Chilean management authority was actively 
constructed and framed by activists as being also harmful for the company. Zaldívar was 
suffering an ‘exodus’ of qualified workers thanks to the ‘bad administration’ of 
‘incompetent and corrupt’ Chilean managers, who would ‘manipulate’ the working week, 
‘provoke mass redundancies’, ‘have their own business inside the firm’, ‘brag to be union 
busters’ and ‘lie about labour rights’, in order to progress in ‘their’ careers (Silva, 2004; 
Sindicato Zaldívar, 2008; Urzúa, 2004). 
 
Although in retrospect it may seem that the climate was ripe to form a trade union 
since 1998, the process took about two and a half years to complete. A first organising 
campaign was carried out in late 1998 by a handful of enthusiasts but fell short of 
obtaining the 10% statutory quorum required. In mid-1999, and following the company’s 
announcement of a restructuring process that would result in 60 job losses, a second 
fruitless ballot was called. Again, the turnout was not large enough to get the 10 % 
statutory minimum. The main cause of failure appeared to be management repression. 
‘Workers would say yes, that they would turn up for the vote, but they wouldn’t. They 
were very scared’ (Silva, 2004).  
 
Union activists sought advice from neighbours Escondida union -at the time deeply 
engaged in a process of union building (see Case IV in this chapter)- and with their help, a 
completely new organising strategy was devised. First, all organising activity began to be 
carried out confidentially. In practical terms, this meant to hold underground meetings, 
secret fundraising events, and other undisclosed activities. Second, organisers identified 
likely union supporters and approached them individually, normally at their own homes, 
to begin forming a small but solid core of voters to achieve the statutory quorum. Third, in 
order to maintain the ‘invisibility’ of the previous two activities, the legal paperwork was 
entrusted to officials at Escondida who had an established relationship with the Regional 
Labour Office (Sindicato Zaldívar, 2006, 2008). 
 
Six months later, in July 2000, a third ballot was carried out but lost by a single 
vote largely because ‘numerous people were off –and away as workers live scattered 
throughout the country- and many safe votes could not be cast’. Officials with the 
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Regional Labour Bureau advised activists to call a fourth ballot immediately, but this time 
to carry it out in seven different cities simultaneously. The strategy paid off and on the 
20th of August year 2000, the union was established under the name of Sindicato No. 1 de 
Trabajadores Compañía Minera Zaldívar. It was officially formed ‘to defend workers, 
make the company respect labour legislation, to support and strengthen workers’ 
(bargaining) position, and to improve labour conditions insofar as is possible’ (Sindicato 
Zaldívar, 2006, 2008). 
 
Sindicato Zaldívar: union-employer relations 
 
Following the constitution of the union, newly elected directors made three crucial 
decisions informed by the experience of Escondida in the areas of union-employer and 
union-member relations. On the one hand, the union decided not to bargain a new 
contract. It is customary for newly formed unions in Chile to try and take advantage of the 
momentum achieved during the organising campaign and bargain a contract immediately. 
But as they explain, they were in a very weak organisational position due to their low 
membership. 
 
Generally, the first thing unions do is to go and bargain, and they always bargain 
disastrously bad ending up with a worse contract than they had in the first place (…) 
This is typical. It happened to Escondida, Cerro Colorado, not to mention El Abra… 
So how could have we, with 85 members, bargained well? Can you imagine us going 
on strike? 
(Silva, 2004; Urzúa, 2004) 
 
On the other hand, directors decided not disclose their membership to management. 
Leaders were certain that management would not modify its anti-union stance despite 
facing a legally constituted trade union, and, if anything, repression was expected to 
increase further particularly in the form of layoffs. Partly as a consequence, the union 
decided to follow a rather passive form of recruitment. Instead of taking advantage of the 
momentum achieved in the ballot, new members would approach the union in view of its 
achievements. ‘An organisation that seeks to (grow) and stand by itself must achieve and 
(show) results’. ‘Pure and simple’ results would thus generate trust and attract young, 
individualist, consumerist, and sceptical workers. These workers would in turn make the 
organisation grow and eventually respected by the employer. Only then, collective 
bargaining would be attempted. 
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As expected, anti-union practices escalated during the first year. Directors report to 
have been constantly harassed and persecuted, and that management made a habit of 
constantly interfering with union activities and harassing union directors. The above 
decisions proved effective in coping with post-organising repression but left the union 
with several problems. One of the downsides of confidentiality for example, was that the 
union could not ask the employer to automatically deduct union dues having to rely on 
(slim) voluntary contributions for the entire first year. More fundamentally, how could the 
union become a stronger organisation without increasing membership? How was the 
union supposed to ‘achieve results’ without engaging in collective bargaining?  
 
In this context, the union decided to initiate work on the ‘external front’. Leaders 
first approached the La Coipa union in a bid to put up a united front against their common 
employer. The unions could not agree on a strategy and the initiative failed. A more 
promising course of action was to approach the Labour Bureau’s Regional Inspection 
Office to request inspection visits to control the company’s compliance with labour 
legislation. This was seen as a relatively simple and inexpensive procedure that could 
effectively influence company policy without having to directly engage directly with 
management or to rely on union membership. Indeed, the union’s first action was to file a 
complaint against the company’s new holiday policy just two days after constitution, and 
‘three months later the company had changed its policy’.  
 
The union also decided to take the company to court and filed lawsuits for anti-
union practices, unfair dismissals, and other matters. Although the outcomes of some of 
these actions were meagre, ‘using’ the Regional Inspection Office and to lesser extent the 
courts represented an effective way to deal with a militant employer. Not the least because 
taking the company to court helped to establish a relationship between the parties. ‘Until 
then we had no relation with management, for them we didn’t exist at all. (…) At least in 
terms of the relationship with the company, things started to get better the second year’. 
 
At the end of the first year, union density had doubled rising to 20%, and the union 
was confident enough to disclose its membership and start collecting union dues in 
September 2001. But it was a relatively minor incident that allowed the union to show 
‘direct’ results and boosted union membership. 
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In January (2002), they sacked two of our members because one of them was with a 
hangover. (…) The paramedic accused him of being drunk. Scared, he got his mate 
in trouble too. You can’t be with a hangover at work, we know that, but to accuse 
someone of being drunk at work is a different thing, you’ve got to prove it, and they 
didn’t have any evidence. So we built our case from there. They sacked them anyway 
but at least we got £15,000 in compensation for them. This meant our people finally 
started to realise what the union could do for them. 
(Silva, 2004) 
 
A month later, union membership reached 256 members (34%) and kept rising 
steadily until 300 (40%) in June. Increasing membership and the fact that the union had to 
call elections in August 2002, made the directors to present the employer with a draft 
collective contract in June 2002. The negotiation took place under the regulated format. 
The process was heavily influenced by a modest mandate (‘not to lose anything’) and by 
the experience of others (‘most first contracts at the time would end up with the unions 
losing instead of gaining benefits’). The union’s contract proposal was quickly achieved 
with the employer’s first offer. The union recommended accepting the offer but the 
majority of members rejected it and voted to go on strike.  
 
According to Chilean law, after an offer is rejected the employer is entitled to ask 
the union for five extra days to present them with a second offer. Although the company 
lost the chance of hiring strike-breakers due an administrative mistake, the union granted 
the extra time on the grounds of ‘loyalty and responsibility’. Five days later, the union 
vehemently insisted on accepting the employer’s improved second offer, which was 
ultimately ratified by roughly 60 percent of members in a largely informal consultation.  
 
Not going on strike and the union’s very moderate position were heavily criticised, 
as it seemed to many that leaders were doing their best for members not to go on strike. 
Contrary to what the ‘loyalty and responsibility’ rhetoric may suggest, leaders defended 
their preferred course of action in terms of ‘realism’. 
 
Escondida had bargained disastrously bad and we knew their experience by heart. 
We could have gone on strike but after six months… we’d have all got sacked. 
You’ve got to preview these things. If it happens to our neighbours… Look, 
Escondida sacked all its mine operators, all of them, 86 workers. They had no 
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problem whatsoever in doing that. Chilean law is clear: they can sack you because of 
‘business needs’ right? And you get one-month salary per year compensation.  
 
Well, Escondida paid them 10 salaries per year! What were they suppose to do? Who 
were they going to complain to? If you complain, the company says ‘sue me’, goes 
by the book, and takes away the 9 extra salaries. Does the worker win or lose? So 
nobody complains, everybody’s sacked and they get rid of the union. This is the way 
we’re legally structured. (…) We knew all of these things. People who understand 
what collective bargaining is, what a union means, considered that our negotiation 
was a good one. The ones that don’t know thought it was a bad one because we 
didn’t go on strike. 
(Urzúa, 2004) 
 
Concrete results amounted to little more than ‘not losing anything’. The company 
transferred all benefits into the collective contract, modified the way the production bonus 
was calculated, and put into practice a night shift bonus. The original directorate was re-
elected for a new term in August 2002. 
 
 
Table 8.3: Sindicato Zaldívar Strategic Choices 
 Zaldívar 
  
Constituency Core – Zaldívar blue-collar workers 
Objectives Bread and butter 
Form 
-Inclusion principle 
Firm-level (Sindicato de empresa) 
-Vertical principle 
Degree of articulation at firm-level High (N/A) 
Capacity Medium 
Democracy Leadership predominance 
Activism Moderation 
Employer relations Adversarialism 
Very limited scope of engagement 
Defensive objectives 
Member relations Servicing 
Spurts of participation (CB) 
Labour movement relations  
–Degree of articulation at higher level 
CMCH 
-Medium 
State relations Outsider 
Political party relations Nonexistent 
Society relations Nonexistent 
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Since then, the union’s original strategic modes of engagement with their employer 
and members have consolidated. Employer relations have remained limited to collective 
bargaining where moderation and largely defensive objectives have prevailed. For the 
resolution of issues arising in employer relations, the union has used state agencies and 
courts of justice as channels to access and obtain improvements from the company. If 
direct negotiations with management fail, the union approaches state agencies for a ruling. 
If favourable and management do not modify their stance, the union takes the company to 
court. Since August 2002, the union has filed four lawsuits against the company. In 
addition to suing the company for anti-union practices, the union has taken the company 
to court for deliberately disclosing information necessary to calculate the production 
bonus, lack of changing facilities, and not respecting Labour Office resolutions with 
regard to acclimatisation periods.  
 
Zaldívar: union-member relations and organisational dimensions 
 
The union’s choices of constituency and form are restricted by law to workers employed 
directly by Zaldívar and firm-level unions respectively. In developing relations with 
members, union choices can be readily identified with the servicing model, where 
members as viewed as passive clients and representatives as experts. In effect, the path 
setting notion of ‘achieving results’ has progressively come to be understood as the 
leadership providing the membership with services, the definition and standard of which 
are reserved to leaders.  
 
The union’s agenda of representation is largely limited to short and long-term bread 
and butter objectives. Short-term objectives remain ‘defending workers protection from 
arbitrary management action, making the company respect labour legislation, and 
improving terms and conditions insofar as is possible’ (Sindicato Compañía Minera 
Zaldívar, 2005). Long-term services on the other hand ‘are the important ones’, the ones 
the union should focus on, despite what members may think in the short term. The long-
term agenda is concerned with industrial injuries, certifying jobs as heavy industry jobs, 
and associated early retirement schemes.  
 
In terms of organisational democracy, the principle of leadership predominance has 
prevailed over rank-and-file participation. Founding leaders have remained in power for 
almost a decade indicating both a continuity of and a tight grip on, union governance and 
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policy. In fact, several modifications intended to further centralise decision-making were 
introduced to the union’s statutes in 2004, including the extension of directorate’s office 
to three years. In contrast, rank-and-file involvement is confined to paying union dues, 
statutory internal commissions, and ordinary meetings.  
 
Zaldívar union’s degree of activism is on the moderation side, as illustrated by their 
motto insofar as is possible. Although in theory members are expected to act (‘to 
demonstrate’ and to strike if necessary’), it must not be forgot that this is exclusively in 
the context of regulated collective bargaining. 
 
 
Figure 8.5: Sindicato Zaldívar Union Density Evolution (1995-2005) 
 
 
Source: Information provided by union directors in interviews, questionnaire and website. 
 
 
As in the case of Escondida, despite the union’s strict private orientation to interest 
representation, the union has engaged in relations with Zaldívar’s contract workers. In the 
early years, the union sponsored the formation of a number of contract labour unions but 
most of them have since disappeared and the union has ceased this activity. As they 
explain,  
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Regrettably, contract workers are not legally authorised to join our union. (…) 
Originally our policy was to incentive the organisation of contract workers. We 
managed to form four unions. But three of them disappeared shortly-afterwards 
either because the officials run away with the money, or because they bargained 
immediately after their constitution…a complete failure.  
(Silva, 2004) 
 
Sindicato Zaldívar: relations beyond the level of the firm 
 
Union relations with the labour movement have been explored chiefly as a means to find 
solutions to long-term sector-wide problems, such as industrial injuries and certification of 
heavy industry jobs. With these objectives in mind, the Zaldívar union joined unions from 
Escondida, El Abra, and other transnational operators and established the Chilean 
Federation of Miners (FMC) in 2003. But the union grew quickly disillusioned with the 
Federation and, at the time of writing, the union had joined the Chilean Confederation of 
Miners (CMCH). 
 
I see (the Federation) as a passive organisation controlled by those with more 
members (Escondida). They are passive because Escondida are better off than the 
rest. (…) We started (with the Federation) in May, it is December now and we have 
not done anything at all. (…) I never expected the Federation to back us up in 
collective bargaining or in dealing with the problems we’ve got with our employer. 
That’s our job. Higher-level organisations should deal with common long-term 
problems, such as pensions, heavy industry jobs, and professional illnesses. (…) This 
matters to us, but the Federation does not represent what matters to us. 
(Urzúa, 2004) 
 
Party politics are seen as damaging for unions and directors proudly define themselves as 
‘apolitical.’ Politics, let alone establishing links with political parties, is out of the 
question and also an uncomfortable topic. As a director succinctly put it, ‘Bringing 
politics into a union is highly divisive. This Directorate has never done so and does not 
intend to do so in the future. No further comments’ (Silva, 2004). Union relations with the 
community and society more generally have remained underdeveloped. Although the 
union has occasionally recurred to the media, the Canadian embassy, and the community 
of the city of Antofagasta for support in its relations with the employer, these actions have 
been sporadic and motivated by collective bargaining, and do not express an interest in 
developing relations with any of the actors involved. Moreover, when the royalty was 
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hotly debated in Parliament, the union took no action revealing the narrow understanding 
of its position within a conception of general interest: ‘there was nothing in there for us’ 
(Silva, 2004; Urzúa, 2004). 
 
Sindicato Zaldívar: outcomes 
 
The Zaldívar union has increasingly become a stronger organisation. In terms of the 
membership dimension, members reached 490 workers in September 2005, which 
represent just about 95% of all possible members (Sindicato Compañía Minera Zaldívar, 
2005). Despite accusations of excessive moderation, and however modest they may seem 
from an outsider’s point of view, important results have been achieved relative to what 
was expected and to comparable organisations. Nevertheless, from a political and 
institutional perspective, the Zaldívar union remains largely underdeveloped. 
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While the previous two chapters dealt with workers in standard employment relationships, 
the third group of cases corresponds to workers labouring in the periphery of La Gran 
Minería. With almost no exception, contract workers, or those employed in outsourced 
employment relationships, can be described as an ever growing casual labour force facing 
harsh anti-union regimes in their relations with user and provider enterprises. 
 
What follows is a brief account of the most relevant experiences of contract labour 
organisation and collective action since the beginning of neoliberal restructuring. They 
represent distinct variations of trade unionism, all of which evolved from the pioneering 
and successful experience of the SINAMI union during the 1980s and 1990s. The cases 
are also a tale of three leaders and the way they have come to conceptualise the strategic 
problem contract workers in particular contexts. As a whole, these experiences can rightly 
be seen as the response of periphery workers to the new conditions prevailing in the 
sector. 
 
 

 265 
Case VII 
 
SINAMI 
 
 
 
 
 
SINAMI (Sindicato Interempresa Nacional de Montaje Industrial, Obras Civiles y 
Actividades Anexas) was established in Santiago on 6 October 1970 to represent welders, 
electricians, mechanics, and other high skill construction workers employed in the 
industrial assemblage sector (SINAMI, 2002c, 2008). Industrial assemblage (montaje 
industrial) refers to the construction of major infrastructure and engineering projects 
including mines, dams, power plants, oil refineries and platforms, motorways, railways, 
and pulp plants. The origins of this industry can be traced back to the laying of the 
railways in the nineteenth century, but its heyday came under import-substitution 
industrialisation when the state undertook major infrastructure projects (SINAMI, 2002c).  
 
Between 1970 and 1973, SINAMI took active part in the nationalisation of several 
companies led by the Popular Unity government and, partly as a consequence, suffered 
brutal political repression after the 1973 coup d’état. Numerous leaders and members 
were executed, disappeared, or exiled, and the union was formally outlawed in 1978 
(Comisión Nacional de Verdad y Reconciliación, 1991; González, 2004; SINAMI, 
2002c). 
 
In addition to political repression, the socio economic transformations of the late 
1970s affected montajistas greatly. The widespread imposition of neoliberal restructuring 
created incentives for large-scale outsourcing which, together with the repealing of 
protective labour legislation had a severe impact on the quality of their employment and 
working conditions. In addition, anti-union legislation made unionisation of temporary 
workers largely ineffective as it explicitly prohibited them to bargain collectively. Various 
SINAMI documents refer to the realities of montajista work in the early 1980s. In who are 
we? (2008) they describe them as follows.  
 
As the dictatorship imposed its economic model and opened the country to foreign 
investment, companies began solid outsourcing processes. Most dangerous tasks 
were contracted out to contractors and subcontractors who, making the most of the 
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dictatorship’s legislation, made thousands of workers to labour in subhuman 
conditions. At the time, lawful ‘exceptional rosters’ (jornadas especiales) were not in 
place and scores of workers had to stay away from their families for months, which 
destroyed many of them.  
 
We used to work excessive extra shifts that were paid miserably. There were no 
camps and we had to sort ourselves out to sleep and eat in crowded improvised 
hostels. If there was any safety equipment available, it had already been used by 
someone else. There were no hygienic conditions to have a decent meal, accidents 
were rampant, and of course, union activity was persecuted, with discrimination, 
repression, and blacklisting as the more common tactics to deter those suspects of 
organising workers.  
(SINAMI, 2008) 
 
SINAMI: critical juncture and founding choices (1981-1992) 
 
Meanwhile, the proscribed Communist Party (CP) decided on a strategy of destabilisation 
of the dictatorship. For the CP, the social discontent brought about by the recession 
represented an opportunity to attack the Pinochet regime. According to Danilo Jorquera 
(2004b), then SINAMI director and later leader of SITECO (see case IX), ‘the party 
considered montaje projects to have such a scale and visibility in terms of the millions 
invested and the numbers of workers employed that, if disrupted, they could become a 
source of instability for the regime’. It is also important to recall that these projects were 
often presented as evidence of the success of the Chilean economy by the regime’s 
propaganda.  
 
The CP’s decision to ‘intervene’ SINAMI meant in practice to get Miguel González 
-at the time a remarkable Communist militant and up-and-coming union leader- elected as 
president of the union in 1981. Numerous commentators (e.g. Agacino, 2004, 2007; 
Agacino et al., 1998; Echeverría, 2004; Rojas, 2004) and unionists interviewed (e.g. 
Alegría, 2004a; Alegría, 2004b, 2005; Calderón, 2004; Fuentealba, 2004; Jorquera, 2004a, 
2004b; Labraña, 2003a, 2003b) widely agree that González’s election represented a 
critical juncture for SINAMI and the labour movement in general. Although the 
Communist party’s decision to intervene SINAMI was rather ineffective in terms of 
overthrowing Pinochet, it unintentionally turned out to be a critical decision in changing 
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the labour landscape for years to come. What follows is a stylised description of the 
emergence and main features of what I call SINAMI's ‘classic strategy’. 
 
The emergence of SINAMI’s classic strategy. A conventional diagnosis of SINAMI’s 
situation in the early 1980s would have probably emphasised the insurmountable external 
obstacles facing the union -political repression, economic recession, legislation 
restrictions, and employers’ principled anti-unionism-, and concluded that the chances of 
effective collective action in such context were at best, slim, if simply non-existent. It was 
precisely the capacity to reframe such extended, hopeless, and ultimately immobilising 
diagnosis that commentators and peers alike acknowledge as one of Miguel González’s 
key contributions (Alegría, 2004a, 2004b, 2005; Jorquera, 2004a, 2004b).  
 
Although González was politically motivated, he realised very early on that 
encouraging mass political mobilisation without responding to workers’ needs in the 
sphere of employment was impracticable. In his view, a union had to be a ‘union first and 
an instrument of the party second’ (González, 2004). In other words, a union had first to 
deliver material improvements for its members. Union success or failure was in turn 
largely dependent on ‘leaders capable of designing and implementing a strategy and 
structure consistent with the nature of union membership and the realities of the labour 
market’ (González, 2004). These premises were crucial to rediscover power resources. 
 
Nature of membership. Then as now, the nature of SINAMI’s membership had a series of 
peculiar ‘objective’ characteristics (Agacino et al., 1998; González, 2004). First, 
montajistas are first and foremost temporary workers (faeneros). They labour in works 
(faenas) of limited duration, usually for less than a year or six months. Second, 
montajistas are also highly mobile workers (transhumantes). They will follow jobs 
wherever jobs go, working in several locations throughout the year. In an extensive and 
geographically contrasting country like Chile, montajistas normally work in isolated and 
remote places under harsh physical and weather conditions (‘three months in the desert, 
three months in the South Pole, three months at sea level, three months at 3000 metres, 
and so on’), and live for long periods of time in purpose-built working camps away from 
home.  
 
Third, the majority of montajistas are skilled construction workers (especializados), 
which sets them apart from ‘standard’ unskilled contract workers. Last, González refers to 
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the ‘anarchic character’ of montajistas as union members, and what this means for union 
leaders. 
 
I mean ‘anarchic’ not in an ideological sense, but in their behaviour (...). This union 
is explosive, volatile. These are tough people. You don’t mess with them. I believe 
Machiavelli’s The Prince reflects exactly what SINAMI members are like: ‘the end 
justifies the means’. All they want is to get the monies they were promised. No 
matter if there are casualties left in the way.  
 
Machiavelli also says that it is better to be feared than loved (…) Leading SINAMI is 
difficult. Today, a member may be making 1,000 in a project, but three months down 
the line, he may be making half of that amount in a different project doing exactly 
the same job. And when he makes 1,000 he loves you and when he doesn’t he calls 
you a traitor (…) You’ve got to be thick skinned otherwise they eat you alive. It is as 
if many members enjoy messing up their leaders. But you’ve got to also be aware 
that this is how they are in assembly meetings, in masse, and masses often lie. While 
in assembly they shout at you to go, they will buy you a beer as soon as the gathering 
is finished. 
(González, 2004) 
 
Reframing material circumstances. For González, leaders can view these membership 
characteristics as either facilitating or obstructing the development of effective collective 
action. In the case of SINAMI, he says,  
 
You can either get hung up on the idea that these workers are scared of losing their 
jobs, that work where nobody can see them, that they not disciplined, etc, etc. But to 
move forward you must look at (these characteristics) differently because each of 
them involve resources you must tap onto.  
(González, 2004) 
 
First of all, he argues, because montajistas are, and have always been, temporary 
workers, they do not fear to lose their jobs, at least not to the same extent that standard 
employees do, because they will be out of work at the end of every project anyway. 
Montajistas’ particular relationship with labour instability, argues González, can be seen 
as facilitating rather than obstructing collective action because the costs associated with it 
are relatively lower. Indeed, according to another long term SINAMI leader, ‘instability is 
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built into the system. Sooner or later I am going to lose my job anyway so I might as well 
do something now that I have the chance to make a difference’ (Alegría, 2004b).  
 
Second, montajista’s high geographical mobility means that ‘they are not attached 
to the place where they work (which) also make it easier to mobilise them’. The reason for 
this being that ‘it’s not the same when you go home after work and your wife starts 
questioning what you’ve been up to, that you’re getting into trouble, and so on. When you 
go back to the camp on the contrary, everybody will be encouraging one another to go for 
it’ (Alegría, 2005). 
 
Third, it has long been argued that outsourcing chains are a source of strength for 
employers as they fragment worker organisation and the prospects for effective collective 
bargaining. Nevertheless, for González, this could also be seen as a simultaneous source 
of strength for workers, particularly for high-skilled ones. Indeed, industrial assemblage 
work is usually organised sequentially, and any particular project is built around strict 
deadlines and heavy fines. ‘And because of our expertise and the sort of jobs we do, we 
happen to be the ones who give the ‘go ahead’ (‘dar los avances’) for the next stage. In 
other words, that a project or a stage of a project is completed (or not) on time depends 
mostly on us. Our win (nuestra ganá) is there’ (González, 2004).  
 
Last, the ‘anarchist character’ of montajistas can also be seen as a source of 
strength for the organisation. ‘It is true that they make your life miserable as leader, but it 
is also true that there is lots of energy there that a good leader must tap onto. (…) Our 
merit has been to canalise this energy to obtain good negotiations’ (González, 2004). 
 
Reframing the ‘realities of the labour market’. A similar capacity to reframe the union’s 
situation was evident when reframing external circumstances. As discussed above, 
SINAMI’s situation in the early 1980s was dire: political repression, economic recession, 
restructuring of production, and neoliberal labour legislation. As Alegría (2005) explains,  
 
in such circumstances you either give up and do nothing or simply forget about them 
and carry on. If the law does not allow you to negotiate with your employer, if the 
state does not support you… well, then, you must do without them but not because of 
that you’re not going to do nothing. But you’ve got a find a way to make your 
employer give in to your demands. 
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Main features of SINAMI’s classic strategy. In the absence of state or legislative support, 
union effectiveness was thus viewed as largely dependent on employers giving in to 
workers’ demands. But because of employers’ reluctance to negotiate beyond the strict 
limitations of the law, which effectively entitled them to refuse any union proposal 
without even the need to reply, SINAMI had to find a way to force employers to 
negotiate.  
 
a) Direct action and extra-legal mobilisation. By the mid-1980s, González, the rest of the 
SINAMI leadership as well as the Communist Party were in agreement that the way 
forward for the union was direct action and extra-legal mobilisation. In other words, to 
mobilise members outside legal channels in order to put direct pressure on employers to 
negotiate from a position of strength.  
 
We have worked out a strategy and given ourselves an organisational structure that 
allows us to negotiate beyond the limitations of the law. We play in the outfield of 
the law if you like, a bit inside a bit outside. You’ve got to be inside because you 
have got to elect stewards, and have certain rules, but all we can do outside the realm 
of the law, we do it. 
(González, 2004) 
 
SINAMI’s direct action strategy involved four main steps. First, SINAMI would 
elect stewards in a number of small and medium-size provider enterprises (e.g. COSAPI, 
DSD) working for a large provider enterprise (e.g. Desco), in turn providing services for a 
user enterprise (e.g. CODELCO). Second, SINAMI would present the large provider 
enterprise with a unique ‘List of Demands’ (Pliego de Peticiones or simply, Petitorio) in 
which the union and the stewards ‘in representation of all workers labouring for small and 
medium-size provider enterprises’ would demand common employment and working 
conditions including pay, bonuses, transportation, roster system, and union dues (e.g. see 
SINAMI, 2003c). SINAMI would simultaneously threaten with imminent stoppages if 
their demands were not met. While some large provider enterprises would negotiate with 
SINAMI, the great majority of them would choose to ignore the union or to argue that 
altering employment and working conditions was beyond their means.  
 
Third, large provider enterprises would not give in, SINAMI would move on to put 
direct pressure on the large provider enterprise by mobilising their members 
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simultaneously and paralysing the works at a most sensible stage. This would normally 
force employers to compromise and initiate negotiations, as user enterprises impose heavy 
fines on delayed work. Fourth, if negotiations ended in deadlock or/and when the strength 
of a particular mobilising drive was judged to be sufficient, SINAMI would not 
compromise and keep mobilisations going until getting the user enterprise involved. 
Indeed, more often than not, user enterprises would intervene behind the scenes earlier in 
the conflicts to settle the disputes and, crucially, to avoid being seen as bargaining with 
strikers. Achieving the user’s ‘mediation’ –effectively a confidential tripartite negotiation- 
would normally result in SINAMI reaching otherwise previously unthinkable collective 
agreements (e.g. SINAMI and Cosapi Chile, 2003; SINAMI and DSD Construcciones y 
Montajes S.A., 2000).  
 
 
Figure 9.1: SINAMI’s ‘Direct Action’ 
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b) Inter-firm mobilising structure and organisational choices. In order to carry out this 
strategy successfully, González argues, SINAMI had to rethink itself as organisation. 
Indeed, SINAMI’s structure and organisation were specifically redesigned to support 
direct action, facilitating membership mobilisation by lowering the costs of collective 
action and offering protection against post-conflict repression.  
 
SINAMI made an imaginative use of available institutional resources to operate 
legally. First, SINAMI organised as inter-firm union (Sindicato Interempresa). Most 
workers at the time would organise on a firm-level basis, as this union form would grant 
them collective bargaining rights. In contrast, inter-firm unions were allowed in legislation 
but had no collective bargaining rights and hence tended to operate as weak federations. 
For SINAMI however, engaging in collective bargaining was seen as the result of 
mobilising activity, and therefore the main role of the union as organisation was instead to 
provide strength, continuity, and support for its members in order to facilitate mobilisation 
and resist repression.  
 
Inter-firm organisation allowed the union to create a community of interests 
between workers labouring for different provider firms. SINAMI would speak for all 
workers in any firm were the union had a steward, regardless of the actual number of 
union members. Stewards were, of course, militant members of the union whose presence 
or absence was decided by the leadership as part of the strategy to force a particular 
employer to negotiate. Workers needed not to identify themselves as union members. As 
long as they mobilised when required, it did not matter that a particular company had not a 
single SINAMI member. As a result, SINAMI was able to speak from a position of 
strength, representing not one but tens of firms simultaneously. Once an agreement had 
been reached however, it would be extended to everybody and only then SINAMI would 
enrol and charge union dues retrospectively to all previous non-members.  
 
Second, inter-firm organisation allowed SINAMI to achieve organisational 
continuity despite the discontinuous nature of montajista work. Other temporary workers 
had to rebuild their firm-level organisations over and over again, as they would disappear 
with the provider enterprises after the completion of projects. Furthermore, SINAMI 
offered lifetime membership to its members, regardless of employment status and hence 
giving continuity and support for the unemployed and the blacklisted. Third, SINAMI 
reorganised as national union providing also for geographical continuity for its members. 
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The union opened branches in several locations where members could access the union, 
meet, and even lodge if necessary.  
 
Last, in terms of leadership and governance, SINAMI quickly became a highly 
authoritarian and centralised union. During the 1980s and 1990s, its leadership tightly 
controlled SINAMI. As González (2004) bluntly acknowledges, ‘I was SINAMI, I 
controlled everything’.  
 
c) ‘Autonomy’ in relations with other actors. Union ‘autonomy’ is the third defining 
aspect of SINAMI’s classic strategy. By this I mean to refer to the notion widely shared 
by SINAMI leaders in the early 1990s that the union was better off severing links with all 
actors other than the membership. Such bold decision emerged as a result of a series of 
critical events, but particularly the detrimental intervention of the Communist party in 
union affairs in the wake of the transition to democracy. In 1989, González stepped down 
from SINAMI to join CUT as Communist representative. To fill the vacuum left by 
González, the party ‘installed’ eight different presidents in the union between 1989 and 
1990. These were of course political appointees who had little knowledge and interest in 
the union, submerging the organisation into a severe crisis.  
 
This shows how extreme the intervention of political parties can be. This is the 
ugliest, more obscure, way in which political parties infiltrate social organisations. 
(…) This is how we began with the notion of autonomy from parties, government, 
and the CUT.  
(Alegría, 2005) 
 
Meanwhile, CUT had begun its social concertation policy in the national arena, one that 
was despised by long-term SINAMI leaders as a mere imposition of the Concertación 
upon the labour movement. 
 
We distanced ourselves from the CUT because of our critical view of its leadership 
and the role of party politics within the Central. The CUT had and has given up its 
independence and autonomy to political parties (…) The CUT is too traditional and 
too conservative to achieve anything. The ones to blame are political parties. They 
are not interested in a strong labour movement, but in maintaining their own power. 
(González, 2004) 
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Hugely disappointed with the way the Communist party was manipulating the 
union and CUT’s relations with employers and the state, SINAMI’s historical leaders left 
both organisations. Miguel Gonzalez returned and took over the union in 1991 with an 
explicit commitment to union autonomy from political parties and the state. From being 
the most remarkable Communist-led union of the 1980s, SINAMI isolated itself and went 
on to adopt the slogan: ‘our strength lies on the autonomy of our organisation’. 
 
Outcomes: The heyday of SINAMI's ‘classic’ strategy (1993-2002) 
 
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, SINAMI became one of the most successful unions in 
the country, becoming the union with the greater number of collective agreements signed. 
In terms of bargaining power and delivering working and employment conditions for 
members, SINAMI was able to consistently demand and obtain the following ‘four 
historic gains’ from employers (SINAMI, 2002c). First, a twenty-day on, ten-day off 
roster system (semana 20x10). In a context where the usual roster was thirty-day on one-
day off (30x1), the 20x10 system quickly became synonymous with quality of life.  
 
Second, a 2.5% end-of-employment bonus (bono de término de faenas). Temporary 
workers do not enjoy compensation for dismissal as workers in indefinite contracts do 
(equivalent to one month per year up to eleven years). The bonus however gave the same 
right to SINAMI workers in practice. Third, air travel for all workers who reside farther 
away than 500 kilometres from the works. Before montajistas had to rely on coaches that 
could take days to cover distances of up to 4000 kilometres, making rest periods together 
with their families impracticable. Last, SINAMI was able to negotiate and define in 
practice minimum industry wages for certain occupations (tarifados). 
 
SINAMI also became a strong union organisation. The union began to publish 
accounts and buying property across the country in the mid-1990s, as a way to make 
autonomy a reality. (‘Successful autonomy is only possible when you have your own 
patrimony (…) The CUT borrows its headquarters from the government, so what can you 
expect from them?’ (González, 2004). Today SINAMI has seven seats in seven regions 
and it is financially solvent.  
 
SINAMI has also maintained high levels of membership and vitality. ‘We have 
17,000 registered members. Between 5,000 and 8,000 pay their dues. We bargain for 
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about 40,000 workers every year and 2,500 vote in union elections’ (González, 2004). It is 
important to explain the apparent discrepancy in these figures. The first figure (17,000 
members) is greatly explained by lifetime membership. The number of due-paying 
members (5,000-8,000) refers to active members (in employment), and does not consider 
workers to whom the terms of negotiations have been extended and who are obliged to 
pay union dues. The high number of workers involved in collective bargaining  (40,000) is 
because the union bargains for the same worker on various occasions every year. The low 
number of voters (2,500) is explained by the fact that Chilean law requires inter-firm 
unions to hold ballots simultaneously. In the case of unions such SINAMI this is 
impracticable for all members. 
 
The U-turn: SINAMI’s clean-bargaining strategy (2002-present) 
 
SINAMI’s success story began to turn sour in the early 2000s. Leaders favouring a more 
democratic approach to union affairs began to systematically challenge González’s 
leadership. In their view, SINAMI had grown increasingly elitist and authoritarian, and 
González’s leadership was deemed exhausted (SINAMI, 2003b). The situation worsened 
in 2002 as González decided to put an abrupt end to the direct action strategy, and 
embraced so-called clean-bargaining instead.  
 
‘Clean bargaining’ involves approaching user employers to negotiate a framework 
agreement of employment and working conditions for montajistas before a particular 
project starts. As González (2004) explains, 
 
I talk to employers before the work starts. They tell us what they need and how much 
they are going to pay. We show them how much we want and how much more it 
would cost them to have a strike. So then we bargain (...) In this way, whenever the 
work starts everything is set and everybody knows there will be no surprises (…) 
(González, 2004) 
 
SINAMI members and non-members are expected to sign these ‘pre-bargained’ 
collective agreements upon offer of employment. Furthermore, they are expected to do so 
with an explicit commitment not to engage in conflict so that SINAMI can ensure 
industrial peace to user and provider companies for the duration of the works.  
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For González this is a win-win situation for everybody. User enterprises run less 
risk of stoppages, provider enterprises compete on equal terms, and workers get if not 
better, more stable working conditions. Furthermore, once everything is negotiated, some 
companies would ask SINAMI to provide them with workers they need effectively 
employing the union as Job Centre. 
 
Our objective is to improve workers’ conditions. I personally don’t like strikes. I’ve 
had lots of strikes but I don’t like them. Besides, the costs are too high: blacklisting, 
lay-offs, death threats for me, etc. Strikes are not easy. So we’ve come to the 
conclusion that the best way of improving conditions is by reaching agreements at no 
cost for workers or companies.  
(González, 2004) 
 
SINAMI’s legendary rhetoric of militancy and mobilisation has largely disappeared 
as a result. Take for example this extract from an internal leaflet aptly entitled ‘Changing 
Our Attitude’ (SINAMI, 2002a: 19-20). 
 
We have studied our reality and confirmed that the economic situation generated by 
free market economics do not only affect workers but employers as well. Provider 
enterprises compromise excessively with user firms, sometimes in a worrying and 
even shameful way. (…) We know of providers that are forced to tender and accept 
contracts below their real costs (...) We believe that a change in our attitude will 
benefit us helping such companies not to go bust (…) Changing our attitude will help 
us workers and employers to work together and build successfully the large 
engineering projects that are so important for the country’s economy.  
(SINAMI, 2002a: 19-20) 
 
Unsurprisingly, clean bargaining has involved a reversing of hard-won historic 
gains. This is justified, according to González, due to current economic difficulties. ‘If 
anything, members need to eat, and to eat they need jobs. For me the main thing is to get 
them jobs. Only then one should try and improve conditions if possible’ (González, 2004). 
 
González has since been accused of corruption, depicted as a puppet of CODELCO 
and transnationals, and received death threats (SINAMI, 2002b, 2003a; SINAMI Consejo 
de Delegados Sur, 2003). Furthermore, he left SINAMI for a couple of years to set up his 
own provider enterprise and, oddly enough, to teach a module on Human Resource 
Management in a private university (González, 2004). 
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Table 9.1: SINAMI Strategic Choices 
 Direct Action (1980-2002) Clean Bargaining (2002-) 
   
Constituency Periphery 
Assemblage Workers 
(Montajistas) 
Periphery 
Assemblage Workers 
(Montajistas) 
Objectives Bread and butter Bread and butter 
Form 
-Inclusion principle 
Inter-firm union 
Horizontal inclusion 
Inter-firm union 
Horizontal inclusion  
-Degree of articulation/ Labour 
movement relations 
Sectionalism 
 
Sectionalism 
IMF (2005) 
Capacity High High 
Democracy Leadership predominance 
Limited scope for members 
input 
Leadership predominance 
Largely nonexistent scope for 
members input 
Activism Militancy  
Offensive objectives 
Moderation  
Defensive objectives 
Employer relations Confrontation 
 
Co-operation and compromise 
 
Member relations Organising 
Mobilisation 
Servicing (work centre) 
Demobilisation 
State relations Autonomy Autonomy 
Political party relations Autonomy/Apoliticism (1991-) 
Incorporation (1981-88) 
Autonomy/Apoliticism 
Society relations None None 
   
 
 
For many in SINAMI this was all too much to bear. An important number of 
leaders and stewards left the union in 2003 and established SINTRAC as alternative union 
organisation (see case VIII). González, who at the time of research had once again 
returned to the union, remained unimpressed. 
 
This is the way this union is. Every four or five years there are leaders deflecting 
SINAMI to form a new union with the same characteristics of SINAMI. This has 
nothing to do with employers but with our own internal problems. But these unions 
normally last 6 or 8 months and then they disappear, people start coming back and 
apologise. There is nothing new under the sun. 
(González, 2004) 
 
Since this research was carried out, SINAMI has continued its ‘clean bargaining’ 
approach despite internal and external challenges. SINAMI is today widely seen as a 
business union solely interested in getting jobs for its members, and providing individual 
services for them (SINAMI, 2006a, 2006b). SINAMI for example was the only social 
organisation that sided with CELCO Pulp Plant when the government closed it down for 
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polluting of the Valdivia River with widespread national support. At odds with public 
opinion, González declared ‘we all like crystal clear waters, we all like green woods, but 
if we lose our jobs, we do not eat’ (Miguel González cited in Cooperativa, 2005).  
 
Furthermore, in the latest conflict involving CODELCO and its contract workers 
(see case IX), SINAMI played a ‘strike-breaker’ role when the company announced that it 
had reached an agreement with three unions including SINAMI which represented about 
half of those involved in the strike (Cooperativa, 2007a). The announcement was quickly 
dismissed as another anti-union practice by CODELCO because SINAMI members had 
never been part of the strike. Interestingly, SINAMI remained silent while ‘being used’ by 
CODELCO’s propaganda machine. While SINAMI has no relations with any national 
trade union, in 2005 joined the International Metal Workers Federation (IMF, 2005). At 
the time of writing, González is still president of the union and continues to champion 
‘clean’ negotiations with employers (La Nación, 2008). 
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Case VIII 
 
SINTRAC 
 
 
 
 
 
Discontent with the course SINAMI had taken after the year 2000, three-dozen stewards 
left the union in 2003 to establish SINTRAC (Sindicato Interempresa Nacional de 
Trabajadores Contratistas y Subcontratistas). Far from becoming another example of a 
SINAMI-like union, SINTRAC began to broaden the definition of its constituency, refine 
the direct action strategy, explore new forms of organisation, and get involved with other 
segments of the labour movement and society. Today, SINTRAC is a growing union, 
which has not only posed the first credible challenge to SINAMI’s monopoly of 
montajista representation but that has also ventured into the more general –and far more 
difficult- territory of low skill contract labour representation in other sectors. Although 
largely the product of SINAMI’s strategic u-turn, the origins of SINTRAC must be traced 
back to the internal divisions that began affecting SINAMI in the late 1990s. 
 
SINTRAC Background (1991-2002): Issues of autonomy and participation 
 
Just as SINAMI is intimately linked with Miguel González, SINTRAC identifies closely 
with former SINAMI director Sergio Alegría. Alegría joined SINAMI in the late 1980s, 
when the union was in midst of the crisis provoked by the interventionist policies of the 
Communist Party. When González regained control of SINAMI in 1991, Alegría became 
his right hand man and, together with José Pezoa, controlled SINAMI throughout the 
1990s. The three leaders left the Communist Party simultaneously and are credited with 
‘saving’ SINAMI from its 1989-90 crisis (Alegría, 2004b; González, 2004; SINAMI, 
2002c). 
 
Partly because of their bitter experience with the Communist Party, these three 
leaders found common ideological ground in the notion of union autonomy. González, 
Alegría, and Pezoa began working under the premise that a union must only be 
accountable to its membership and, in so doing, must remain independent from political 
parties, government, higher-level labour movement structures, or any other third party. 
The notion of union autonomy was certainly not new –anarchist unions have been 
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advocating autonomy since the early twentieth century- but it was somewhat unexpected 
at a time and in a context in which solidarity and the unity of the labour movement was 
seen as a crucial element for a successful transition to democracy (Campero and Cortázar, 
1985).  
 
Autonomy suited SINAMI well. After a few years the union had regained a strong 
base, achieved unprecedented achievements in collective bargaining, and built up a solid 
material base. By the late 1990s however, serious differences between González, Alegría 
and Pezoa, began to emerge about of the meaning and implications of ‘union autonomy’ 
for a ‘grown up’ SINAMI.  
 
In political terms, for example, González understood autonomy as ‘apoliticism’: 
SINAMI was first and foremost a trade union and, as such, there was no room whatsoever 
for party politics or links of any kind with political parties (González, 2004). In contrast, 
for Alegría and Pezoa, autonomy had all to do with ‘politicisation’. As the former 
explains,  
 
politicisation not in the sense of party politics, but in terms of developing basic 
degrees of political reflection in the membership, trying to integrate political 
reflection and union organisation and activity. Successful autonomy does not only 
depend on having money in the bank but also on educating the membership to make 
sound judgement calls. The nature of those judgements is, and must be, political. 
(Alegría, 2004a) 
 
In organisational terms, serious differences began to emerge in terms of the 
implications of autonomy for union governance. By the mid-1990s SINAMI had become a 
highly centralised and authoritarian union. 
 
The three of us turned into this very hermetic circle where nobody else was allowed 
in. At the beginning it was OK as we had to lift the union, but we carried on like this 
and ended up not listening, not consulting the rank-and-file. Autonomy, it seemed, 
meant autonomy from the membership. By being the three of us, and just the three of 
us, we excluded the membership from decisions. To concentrate power in two or 
three pairs of hands is not good for a union. When there is no participation you 
realise that what you have got is a bargaining machine but not a union. Assemblies 
did not exist in SINAMI. We never held one in six or seven years!  
(Alegría, 2004b) 
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By the end of 1998, differences between González and Alegría –together with Pezoa, 
began turning into two clearly demarcated political factions, which nevertheless 
complemented each other. While González’s kept advocating, and successfully applying 
the ‘authoritarian and apolitical bargaining machine’ model, Alegría and Pezoa’s faction 
began to focus on worker education and union democracy. In practical terms, worker 
education entailed training courses and discussion forums on labour law, as well as on the 
history of the montajista movement (SINAMI, 2002c, 2003b). 
 
Focusing on the law is not only appropriate because we live in a legalistic country 
but because the enemy unveils itself in the law, in the norms that regulate the day to 
day relationship between workers and employers. This is what workers should 
understand. When the dictatorship ended they made us all believe that the enemy was 
gone, but once he left we found ourselves as screwed as ever. Actually, even more 
than before. 
(Alegría, 2004b) 
 
In parallel the ‘Alegrites’ began pushing for a more democratic union. In November 2000, 
they organised SINAMI’s first ever national congress, three decades after its 
establishment on October 1970. Documents show that the congress was widely welcomed 
by stewards and the rank-and-file. ‘This is the first congress in the history of SINAMI. For 
this reason, for its participative character, for the resolutions it adopted, it is wholly 
appropriate to deem it a historical event for our union’ (SINAMI, 2000: 1, 2001).  
 
The congress resolved that efforts would be made to increase the participation of 
the rank-and-file, and that a national congress would take place every two years to become 
the union’s highest decision-making instance (SINAMI, 2000, 2001). It was also agreed 
that SINAMI would push for more and broader grievances in its relations with employers. 
There was also agreement in widening the struggle and start putting pressure on the state 
to extend SINAMI’s ‘four historic wins’ to all contract workers (SINAMI, 2000).  
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SINTRAC: Critical juncture and founding choices (2003-present) 
 
Two years later however, none of these resolutions had been implemented. The national 
congress due in 2003 was never organised and SINAMI remained as closed as ever to its 
membership and to the rest of the labour movement. As González stepped down in 2002, 
Alegría and his supporters decided to compete in the elections but were defeated in what 
they saw as a ballot plagued with irregularities (SINAMI, 2002b). The candidates 
impugned the elections and there are grounds to believe the veracity of their accusations 
(Díaz, 2004; SINAMI, 2002b). SINAMI’s new leadership –allegedly controlled by Miguel 
González- stripped rebel stewards of their representative status. But the turning point for 
Alegría and supporters came a few months later when, he accuses, González offered him 
the presidency of the union and some lucrative contracts (Alegría, 2004a).  
 
After rejecting González’s offer, Alegría and other 30 stewards left SINAMI with 
the intention of building support among the rank-and-file to take over and recreate ‘the 
SINAMI we want’ (Díaz, 2004; SINAMI, 2003a, 2003b). Leaving stewards took the 
decision to establish SINTRAC, a new, instrumental, trade union in early 2003. The union 
was originally set up to serve as temporary material base for stewards as it would allow 
them to collect dues. A few months later however, SINTRAC’s leadership decided to 
carry on with the union in its own right. For them, SINTRAC represented a great 
opportunity to continue and expand SINAMI’s strategy of direct action onto other 
constituencies, while simultaneously trying to overcome the main weaknesses they had 
long-criticised: lack of membership participation and no involvement with other segments 
of society (Alegría, 2004a).  
 
SINTRAC’s strategic approach 
 
a) ‘Direct action’ and ‘extra-legal’ mobilisation. In terms of its relations with employers 
and membership, SINTRAC has continued and refined SINAMI’s classic direct action 
strategy (see case VII). While the principles remain the same, SINTRAC has successfully 
innovated in one important respect. The union has begun putting pressure on transnational 
user and provider enterprises by contacting company headquarters abroad. This normally 
takes the form of letters to HRM directors in which the union accuses the company’s 
Chilean partners demanding immediate action or risk stoppages and bad press.  
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On some occasions this has worked very well. For example, with Balfour-Beatty-
Chile we had no relationship whatsoever but once we sent an angry letter to the 
company in London, they sent a special envoy sort of speak who didn’t stop 
apologising for what he saw. They sacked the Chilean HR managers and all demands 
were met in one hour. But of course this doesn’t happen everyday. 
(Alegría, 2005) 
 
b) Organisational choices. From its original montajista base, SINTRAC has expanded its 
constituency to include ‘all contract workers’ irrespective of industry. They argue that 
precariousness has increasingly become a far more powerful source of shared identity than 
that of occupation or industry. ‘The only characteristic these workers have in common is 
precarious employment, being “second-class workers”. These workers feel left out of 
progress, marginalised, forgotten’ (Alegría, 2004b). 
 
 
Figure 9.2: SINTRAC-CND structure compared to standard inter-firm structure 
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Building a strong organisation from the base is another key feature of SINTRAC. 
As Alegría argues, ‘there is no point in passing laws, in giving us rights, and all that, if 
you don’t have a strong organisation. Without organisation, there is no struggle and 
without struggle there is no win’ (Alegría, 2004b). In contrast to today’s SINAMI, where 
organisational strength is seen largely as the product of close relations with employers, 
centralisation and financial muscle, SINTRAC began innovating with organisational 
structures that facilitate membership internal participation. SINTRAC established the 
National Council of Stewards (Consejo Nacional de Delegados, CND), an intermediate 
structure between the national leadership and the rank-and-file. The CND includes all 
national directors and all stewards, who meet every two months to decide on all strategic 
and tactical matters (Figure 9.2). 
 
In a national inter-firm union the number of stewards is three to four times the 
number of national directors. National directors cannot be deciding what the stewards 
can or cannot do as we are far away from the specific realities they face. The 
stewards are the ones who know, so the problem becomes how to empower them to 
make the best decisions. We see the CND as doing just that; we also see it as a 
practical trade union school for future national directors. 
(Alegría, 2004b) 
 
By the end of 2006, SINTRAC changed its name to SINTRAC-CND to emphasise 
the importance of the Stewards Council in the union. Although at the time of writing the 
significance of the CND for union effectiveness is yet to be determined, it nevertheless 
represents an interesting example of democratisation of union structures. 
 
c) From autonomy to general interest. The third area of union activity where SINTRAC 
has innovated greatly has been in terms of the relations between the union and other 
actors. With regard to the union’s contribution to the labour movement, SINTRAC has not 
ceased to criticise CUT and its accommodative policies. Indeed, the union has been able 
to show that at critical points in time (i.e. ‘when the support of CUT was most needed’) 
they turned their back on anything that looked like grassroots activism, and agreed with 
employers and the state to ‘reject any type of illegal mobilisation’ (Jorge Barraza, CUT 
Regional President cited in El Mercurio de Antofagasta, 1997, 1998).  
 
SINTRAC has since put forward a proposal for the future of the labour movement 
which has been actively discussed in alternative labour circles (Cepeda and Alegría, 
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2005). SINTRAC has become a vociferous supporter of copper workers against 
CODELCO in their series of mobilisations between 2005 and 2008 (SINTRAC, 2005, 
2007d), and joined the critical debate that surrounded the promulgation of the 2006 
Outsourcing and Labour Supply Act (SINTRAC, 2006c). 
 
 
Table 9.2: SINTRAC Strategic Choices 
 Direct Action (2003-present) 
  
Constituency Periphery 
All Contract Workers 
Objectives Bread and butter 
Form 
-Inclusion principle 
Inter-firm union 
Horizontal inclusion 
-Degree of articulation/ 
Labour movement relations 
Medium 
Capacity High 
Democracy Rank-and-file predominance 
Ample scope for members 
Activism Militancy  
Offensive objectives 
Employer relations Confrontation 
Member relations Organising 
Mobilisation 
State relations Autonomy 
Political party relations Autonomy 
Society relations Involvement 
  
 
 
SINTRAC: outcomes 
 
In its short history SINTRAC has mainly represented construction workers in high-
visibility projects across the country. The union has been heavily repressed but has 
managed to obtain significant results in some emblematic projects including the 
construction of 2,000 new homes for CODELCO workers in Calama (Juzgado de Garantía 
de Calama, 2003; SINTRAC, 2004; SINTRAC and DESCO, 2003). Other projects where 
SINTRAC has been involved include the construction of 50 Santiago underground 
stations (Metro/Balfour-Beatty), Titanium La Portada skyscraper (SINTRAC, 2007e, 
2007f), Guacolda power station (Guacolda/Mitsubishi/DSD) (SINTRAC, 2007c), 
Costanera Center skyscraper (CENCOSUD) (SINTRAC, 2007a), Refinerías Aconcagua 
Coker Complex (ENAP) (SINTRAC, 2007b), Mauro Dam (Los Pelambres) (SINTRAC, 
2006d), and Minera Spence (BHP Billiton) (SINTRAC, 2006a, 2006b, 2006e). 
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It is nevertheless far too early to assess the effectiveness and long-term 
sustainability of SINTRAC’s strategic approach. Although at the time of research the 
union had 36 stewards and 2000 registered members, and had been able to regain 
SINAMI’s historic wins for an important number of workers, SINTRAC has also been 
heavily repressed. As a result, many activists have been blacklisted and the number of 
workers interested in becoming stewards has dropped considerably (Alegría, 2005).  
 
In addition, SINAMI’s ‘disloyal’ competition –offering worse jobs but jobs after 
all- may be more effective in attracting less militant montajista members. 
 
The problem of course is that blacklisting and anti-unionism is real and workers do 
need jobs. If you’ve been jobless for three months and along comes Miguel and 
offers you something you accept straightaway, even though it may mean that you 
will work for less, or in a lower category. 
(Alegría, 2004b) 
 
A union must give you security. Unions whose bargaining costs are the lay-off or 
blacklisting of its members are utter failure… The thing is clear: before asking 
members to do anything, they need to eat, and in order to eat they need a job. For me 
the main issue is to get them jobs. Only then one should try and improve their 
conditions.  
(González, 2004) 
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Case IX 
 
SITECO, the CNTCC, and the new CTC 
 
 
 
 
 
Nowhere has the levelling of traditional mining communities as a consequence of 
neoliberal restructuring been more evident than around CODELCO’s El Teniente Division 
(Klubock, 1997, 2004). Predictably, some of the earliest forms of organisation and boldest 
forms of mobilisation of non-montajista contract workers began to emerge in the 
neighbouring towns of Sewell, Machalí, and Rancagua in the mid-1980s. SITECO 
(Sindicato de Trabajadores Contratistas de CODELCO) was established in Rancagua in 
1988 as mirror image of SINAMI to represent operations and services contract workers 
employed by the state company. SITECO’s story has been one of mobilisation and 
repression, as well as one of limited achievements but more often than not, one of ‘heroic 
defeats’. 
 
CODELCO: Company background 
 
CODELCO is the mining company that employs the largest number of contract workers, 
where the differences between direct and contract labour are most pronounced, and where 
the contradictions between the state as employer and regulator have been more evident 
(Durán-Palma, 2009; Durán-Palma and López, 2009). The dictatorship’s re-regulation of 
labour in the late 1970s allowed CODELCO and other brown field copper mining 
operations to remain competitive by outsourcing substantial number of workers. Whereas 
new Greenfield operations benefited from new technologies, which required minimum 
employment, for CODELCO the challenge was ‘to get rid of the grease.’ As a result, the 
number of workers employed directly by the state company has decreased from nearly 
30,000 in 1979 to 17,936 in 2006. Conversely, the number of contract workers has 
increased from virtually none in 1979 to just under than 30,000 in 2006, two thirds of 
which are employed to perform permanent operation and service tasks (CODELCO, 
2007).  
 
Differences between direct and contract workers have been more of an issue in 
CODELCO than in any other company considered in this study. While CODELCO’s 
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direct contract workers have long been considered Chile’s ‘labour aristocracy,’ with 
employment and working conditions well above the national average, contract workers 
labouring for CODELCO have become the symbol of precariousness in the sector. Today, 
while a typical worker employed by CODELCO takes home between £900 and £1200 per 
calendar month, a standard contract worker takes home £250 per month on average, but 
many of them work for the minimum wage (Caputo and Galarce, 2007).  
 
CODELCO’s poor safety measures regarding these workers have made matters 
worse. According to union sources (Jorquera, 2004a), between 1990 and 2004, 30 contract 
workers have lost their lives in El Teniente alone but figures are likely to be higher 
because user and provider enterprises have a vested interest in concealing incidents, 
accidents, and deaths (Echeverría, 2006). Furthermore, as a substantial number of contract 
workers are former CODELCO employees, ‘these inequities have had a great deal of 
(negative) impact in relations between families and children of first, second, and third 
class workers, destroying family ties and the social fabric of mining towns and regions’ 
(Caputo and Galarce, 2007). 
 
Critical juncture and founding choices (1988-2001) 
 
Between 1987 and 1988, the number of contract workers labouring for El Teniente had 
reached 8,000, while the number of direct workers had decreased to 8,600 (SINAMI, 
1988, cited in Agacino et al., 1998: 193). At the time, the great majority of these workers 
were not organised, although a few were dispersed between various construction unions, 
and in several firm-level unions of large provider companies including Marriot and Asin 
(food and cleaning services) (Agacino et al., 1998). It did not take long however for most 
workers to try and join SINAMI, which made the union to consider establishing 
permanently in Rancagua.  
 
Instead, the SINAMI leadership decided to establish SITECO (Sindicato de 
Trabajadores Contratistas de CODELCO) in 1988, an entirely new union to respond to 
the increasing demand for union representation by non-montajista contract workers in El 
Teniente. As Danilo Jorquera, long-term SINAMI leader and SITECO’s first president, 
explains, 
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SITECO materialised as a result of SINAMI’s great success in Rancagua. Everybody 
wanted to join SINAMI but SINAMI was for specialised workers, the montajistas. 
We were also very busy, with a number of mobilisations going on at the same time 
across the country. So Miguel, I, and others felt we had to divide our labour. We 
decided that I would stay here in Rancagua, organising the “local” workers in 
SITECO, and Miguel would keep the “temporary” ones in SINAMI. 
(Jorquera, 2004b) 
 
SITECO was originally established as mirror image of SINAMI, with the difference 
that it would cater for local/permanent contract workers and not for montajistas working 
for El Teniente. Nevertheless, it soon became apparent that it was impossible to 
automatically transfer SINAMI’s strategy and structure.  
 
For a start, there are significant differences between montajistas and non-
montajistas. Non-montajistas are ‘permanently’ employed in relatively low pay low skill 
jobs ranging from mining operations to services. It does not follow however that these 
workers enjoy permanent contracts of employment. On the contrary, the great majority of 
SITECO’s unskilled membership is locked into outsourced employment relationships used 
to artificially break down the continuous nature of their work typically, but not 
exclusively, by abusing short-term contract regulations (see Chapter 6). 
 
Workers are normally hired for six, twelve, or eighteen months, but most of the time 
however they hire us for a certain number of metres of tunnel to be excavated, or 
tonnes of pipes to be connected, and so far so forth, so they can fire you anytime 
your own personal bit is finished. This is a clear violation of the law because 
providers are hired to perform a certain work (e.g. build a tunnel), and whenever 
that’s done we should all pack up and go.  
(Jorquera, 2004b) 
 
It is of little consolation for these workers to know –or hope- that after a couple of 
days they will be hired again for another six, twelve or eighteen months. Locked in rolling 
short-time contracts workers cannot enjoy the benefits normally associated with the 
continuity and/or the termination of standard employment (redundancy payments, 
seniority, annual leave, etc). SITECO accuse that ‘some members have been on the wheel 
for ten or fifteen years suffering from grave mental, physical, and familial problems’ 
(Alcaíno, 2004; Director J, 2004; Fuentealba, 2004). 
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Second, SITECO’s membership shares a unique user employer: CODELCO’s El 
Teniente Division. While SINAMI could ‘burn one’s bridges’ from time to time in their 
relations with employers –be it user or provider enterprises- SITECO ‘has to live with the 
consequences of its actions’ in a far more palpable manner. This is especially the case 
when dealing with such formidable adversary. Third, these workers are ‘local’ workers in 
the sense that they live and work in the same community. Union leaders argue that locals 
workers are far more difficult to mobilise than montajistas because CODELCO’s region-
wide blacklisting has proved a very successful counter-mobilisation tactic. As a steward 
put it, ‘we know very well that we can be easily replaced (...) as that there’s no other mine 
around here’ (Alcaíno, 2004). 
 
SITECO’s strategic approach. SITECO were thus not in a position to implement 
SINAMI’s direct action strategy or mobilising structure. The 1990s were hence a period 
of experimentation in which the union adapted SINAMI’s model strategy and structure to 
their particular circumstances. 
 
a) ‘Direct action’ at divisional level. In the main, SITECO’s version of direct action has 
concentrated against CODELCO’s El Teniente Division rather than against provider 
enterprises. The rationale behind this is that CODELCO as user enterprise is the actor that 
ultimately defines employment and working conditions of employment. When provider 
enterprises tender for contracts, they are required to conform to a series of minimum 
standards including for example, minimum wages (declaración de remuneraciones). 
 
CODELCO’s management cannot wash their hands (…) We cannot say that the ones 
to blame are provider enterprises because it is CODELCO that pays, say, 100 to the 
provider to pay 100 to the worker. Salaries are decided and imposed by El Teniente; 
they are the ones that draw the lines. 
(Union leader interviewed by El Rancagüino, cited in Agacino et al., 1998: 201) 
 
Furthermore, SITECO leaders declare that they understand the position of provider 
enterprises and state that they have good relations with several of them. 
 
When we fight against a provider and demand wage increases they tell us they 
respect what we are asking for, and that they think is valid. But they also tell us they 
cannot afford to pay more because otherwise they would not get a contract. The user 
will only give the contract to the provider that pays less. And it’s true, we believe 
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them. We would like not to believe them and fight against them rather than against 
CODELCO. It would be much easier because they are small and more accessible. 
(Fuentealba, 2004) 
 
(Foreign provider enterprises) arrive in the country to find that everything is set. 
They have to play according to the rules of the game. Soletanche-Bachy for example 
had the intention to pay wages of £600 minimum but they find that the market rate is 
£270. Obviously they will not get any contract paying that much. (…) But they have 
been good. We have always had good relations with them. After the protests, they are 
firing me because CODELCO blacklisted me. But the company are paying me all the 
monies anyway. They say that it’s only fair to do so. 
(Pérez, 2004) 
 
It is difficult to assess the ultimate veracity and motivations of some of the 
providers’ statements that I had access to. A cynic view would probably consider them 
simple rhetoric devices to displace their own responsibility (Agacino et al., 1998). Indeed, 
some interviewees acknowledged the possibility of an ‘unspoken alliance’ between 
workers and their employing provider enterprises in which the latter let the former ‘do 
against CODELCO’ insofar as they do not involve them (Alegría, 2004a; Jorquera, 
2004b). 
 
In concentrating its energies against CODELCO, SITECO has employed rhetorical 
devices and motivational frames of its own. Jorquera and colleagues for example refer to 
CODELCO El Teniente as ‘the empire’, one that is everywhere and that represses and 
corrodes everything that stands in its way (Alcaíno, 2004; Fuentealba, 2004; Jorquera, 
2004a, 2004b; Pérez, 2004). The metaphor is very rich and for reasons of space only a few 
examples can be given. CODELCO is said not to be not afraid of repressing contract 
workers to keep production running. While in the past repression involved Pinochet’s 
notorious intelligence services -‘I was tortured a couple of times. They even blew up the 
entrance to the union’s office’ (Jorquera, 2004b)- since the return of democracy, 
CODELCO has recurred to riot police to repress mass mobilisations including the 
shooting inside the mine of thirteen strikers in 2003.  
 
CODELCO is said to corrode its own workers by encouraging consumerism and 
hampering solidarity: ‘indebted as they are, even if they sympathise with us they cannot 
afford to do anything for us’ (Fuentealba, 2004). The empire is said to corrode its unions 
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by incorporating them through a partnership agreement ‘to the extent that our FTC 
colleagues, representatives of the working class, were begging CODELCO’s CEO to get 
rid of us: “get them killed Sir, that’s all you’ve got to do” (Pérez, 2004). The list of 
accusations is much longer and includes the corrosion of the local media, the Regional 
Labour Bureau, and the City Council. 
 
But in portraying CODELCO as the empire, SITECO had to face the powerful 
argument that CODELCO is, after all, property of all Chileans and most of its profits go to 
financing the government’s social budget. In addressing this argument, SITECO had to 
achieve a fragile balance, decoupling ‘our’ company from its managers, blaming the latter 
for the fortunes of the former.  
 
CODELCO is our company, and we must defend it. That is currently managed by a 
bunch of opportunistic idiots is another story. We must however be responsible on 
how we lead the struggle. We can’t just fight against CODELCO because they could 
privatise it. We should fight against all (user companies), CODELCO and the 
transnationals.  
(Jorquera, 2004b) 
 
b) Organisational choices. SITECO organised as inter-firm union and its internal structure 
resembled that of SINAMI. SITECO’s original strategy envisaged the formation of sister 
unions in all four –now five- CODELCO divisions, but these early organising drives did 
not prosper, taking over a decade to reactivate those early unions. 
 
The idea was also to expand across all CODELCO divisions. So we quickly 
established SITRACO in Andina, as well as a union in Salvador (…). In 
Chuquicamata we never did because “our enemies” -the construction unions- were 
there and we started competing for members. In the end, we decided we’d better built 
our strength in Rancagua first. 
(Jorquera, 2004b: original emphasis) 
 
SITECO tried to lead the coordination of contract labour organisations formed 
around other CODELCO divisions. For this purpose, in 1991 SITECO established the 
short-lived National Federation of Contract Workers (Federación Nacional de 
Trabajadores Contratistas) (Agacino et al., 1998). Throughout the 1990s however, most 
efforts of coordination took the form of meetings, encuentros, and congresses. In parallel, 
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SITECO began an active collaboration with Rancagua-based firm-level unions of contract 
workers of some large provider enterprises (e.g. Sodexho, Zublin, Pullman, SOGISPI, and 
ALFIN). SITECO acted as ‘advisor’ in the conflicts led by these unions against their 
employers (Agacino et al., 1998). 
 
 
Figure 9.3: SITECO affiliations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
c) Relations with other actors. Compared to SINAMI and SINTRAC’s notions of 
autonomy, SITECO leaders have conceived of the union’s role within the labour 
movement in a largely traditional way. For Jorquera, lifetime member of the Communist 
Party, SITECO has an important role to play in the wider struggle between capital and 
labour. In his view, this struggle ‘must be fought orderly, through the structures we have’ 
(Jorquera, 2004a). This is why, for example, in 1991 SITECO established another 
organisation, the Federación de Trabajadores de la Sexta Región (FETRASER), an 
instrumental union that would allow SITECO to become a member of CUT (through 
CEPCH), at a time when only Federations and Confederations could affiliate to the 
Central.  
 
CUT 
SITECO 
El Teniente Division 
FETRASER 
(28 unions) 
CEPCH 
 
UNION STRATEGIES IN THE ERA OF GLOBALISATION 
 
294 
SITECO’s participation in CUT has been also informed by a desire to ‘regain the 
Central for the working class’ or more concretely for the Communist Party. This is 
important because SITECO is the only union, of all organisations in this study, where its 
leaders openly acknowledge their political affiliation and values, as well as the 
(decreasing) influence that the CP has on union policy. While in the past the party was 
very influential, today it is perceived as distant and uninterested. 
 
SITECO’s struggle has been one of the most important episodes in the fight against 
outsourcing and precariousness. I would have expected the party to be there and 
support us… but nothing! They showed up only when we got arrested (…) Look at it 
today. Not a single one of the great labour leaders remain Communist: González, 
Ahumada, Pavez, Cabrera, all gone (…) Today the party is pure mediocrity, 
incapable of doing anything. I don’t know, I don’t think we deserve to be called 
Communists any more. 
(Jorquera, 2004b) 
 
SITECO’s active participation in the broader labour movement and party politics 
contrasts sharply with the poor relations they have with most of CODELCO’s unions and 
the FTC. ‘Only four out of 36 directors support us. Just the four Communist ones, but 
even so, support has been lukewarm at best’ (Fuentealba, 2004; Jorquera, 2004b). 
SITECO attributes this situation largely to the partnership agreement between CODELCO 
and the FTC. Indeed, they accuse that the Agreements on Contract Labour signed between 
the partners and the National Labour Bureau have served only to protect insiders and to 
alienate contract workers.  
 
It is not only that no contract labour organisation was ever consulted or signed such 
agreements but that, more fundamentally, the agreements explicitly mandate the unions to 
collaborate with CODELCO and the Bureau to control provider enterprises in observing 
the law and the interests of CODELCO (Convenio de Cooperación Técnico-Laboral, 
2002). In this semi-managerial role, SITECO argues, the FTC’s claim that the agreements 
are a reflection of solidarity and concern with their situation ‘is simply a solidarity stunt’ 
(Fuentealba, 2004). 
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Outcomes 
 
Compared to SINAMI’s, SITECO’s achievements throughout the 1990s were largely 
unsubstantial. Although after several cycles of mobilisation and repression, progress was 
made bringing CODELCO to the bargaining table, the results of such negotiations were 
nevertheless limited and not permanent. For most of the decade SITECO engaged in 
endless and ineffective ‘task forces’ with CODELCO. SITECO’s three core foundational 
demands: basic salary equivalent to three minimum wages, compensation for length of 
service, and minimum duration of outsourcing contracts (4 years for permanent services 
and operations, and 2 years for investment tasks) were never achieved (El Cacherito, 
2003). In addition, the union’s efforts at coordination with other organisations did not 
prosper as originally expected. Consequently, for Agacino et al. (1998), SITECO’s 
unionism during the 1990s could only be described as ‘weak and erratic’. 
 
Union strategy has achieved some partial results, that is to say, only at divisional 
level and not permanently, because once a contract expires, or new management 
comes in, there is a return to square one in terms of employment and working 
conditions. 
(Agacino et al., 1998: 201, my translation) 
 
 
Changing strategy: the CNTCC (2001-2005) 
 
In 2001, SITECO led the formation of yet another coordinating organisation, the National 
Union of CODELCO Contract Workers (Coordinadora Nacional de Trabajadores 
Contratistas de CODELCO, henceforth CNTCC). The CNTCC aimed at co-ordinating the 
actions of all unions of contract workers labouring across CODELCO divisions. It 
celebrated its first national congress in October 2003 in Rancagua where a common 
mobilising strategy was agreed to fight against CODELCO’s hardening stance against 
contract labour (Fuentealba, 2004).  
 
At the time, SITECO was involved in a series of mobilisations against the 
company, which resulted in CODELCO and SITECO agreeing to form a series of 
tripartite task forces that would deal with most grievances (Acta de fin de conflicto, 2003; 
Protocolo de Acuerdo, 2003a, 2003b, 2003c). A review of the minutes of these meetings 
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shows that little progress was made despite CODELCO’s assurances the company would 
keep its word (Mesa Técnica de Trabajo, 2003a, 2003b, 2003c, 2003d, 2003e, 2003f).  
 
Due to the meagre outcomes of these negotiations, between December 2003 and 
January 2004, SITECO led violent mobilisations against the company involving thousands 
of workers. Through the CNTCC, contract workers in other divisions solidarised with the 
strikers, but mobilisations concentrated in Rancagua. The government, as usual, used 
harsh repression to contain the conflict (Fiscalía Militar, 2003). The following extract 
from a SITECO letter addressed to the President of the Republic summarises the union’s 
sentiment in early 2004. 
 
It is common knowledge that we are second-class workers. Our salaries are up to 
four times lower than CODELCO workers doing the same job, with no holidays, 
illegal contracts, no seniority payments, no respect of National Labour Bureau 
resolutions, or of Employment Tribunals rulings with regard to anti-union practices. 
Add to this the day-to-day discrimination we suffer in terms of transportation, meals, 
and safety equipment.  
 
Since 2003, the National Labour Bureau explicitly stripped us of the right to 
collective bargaining, one that we had enjoyed in practice since 1989. How can that 
be possible if the government signed up to all core ILO conventions in 1998? 
 
As a result we had a series of conflict during 2003. It is true that out of desperation 
we crossed the line a little, but it is also true that CODELCO management has 
managed conflict poorly. They have established ‘tripartite task forces’ (mesas de 
diálogo tripartitas) but our problems remain the same and worse every day. (…) 
 
We consider that the repression we suffered was not proportional. We were shot at 
point blank with rubber bullets. One of our members lost an eye and another got shot 
twenty times. (…)  
(SITECO, 2004) 
 
Politicising conflict. The worsening situation of the union was extensively discussed 
during 2004, ‘a year of strategic decisions’ (Jorquera, 2004a). Fieldwork took place 
precisely at the time SITECO and the CNTCC were devising a new strategic approach, 
and agreement had been reached in the following six strategic areas. I will focus on these 
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resolutions because they are key to explain current developments in the copper sector and 
Chile’s labour movement.  
 
First, the problem continued to be defined in terms of how to force CODELCO to 
bargain with contract labour unions, but it was redefined in terms of needing to involve 
the state and the nation in the process, as opposed to sticking with CODELCO as mere 
employer. In other words, SITECO and the CNTCC decided to negotiate directly with the 
government and not with management.  
 
 
Figure 9.4: CNTCC (2001-2007) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Second, in order to involve the government, it was deemed necessary to surpass 
management by exposing its inability to contain the mobilisation of contract workers. This 
meant a fundamental shift in the type of collective action that would be attempted, the so-
called ‘ungovernability of the firm’ strategy. 
 
One element is to toughen up our stance, to keep forcing CODELCO to negotiate but 
changing the manner in which we force them. If we keep protesting, marching, and 
striking, they are going to keep repressing us: sacking us or sending us the riot 
police.  
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What we are talking about now is to creating ungovernability within the company. 
There are 8,000 contract workers in the mine who are like 8,000 moles at your 
disposal. Ungovernability means everything from working slow to sabotage, 
whatever they decide do. At this point we mustn’t rule anything out. We are not there 
yet, but we’ve started to make sure that workers understand that if they keep not 
listening to us, that’s the way forward. 
(Jorquera, 2004a) 
 
Third, for ungovernability to work, SITECO and the CNTCC agreed on forming a 
‘secret structure of militants’ to operate within the mine. 
 
So we’re giving these moles a virtual structure to operate within the mine. Such 
secret structure should replace our stewards who will always get fired and blacklisted 
after the end of their contracts (…) Most importantly, this will help us react in real 
time when things get nasty. As Communist Party, we are structured in cells (células) 
and we are thinking about a similar structure for the union in the mine. Indeed, a 
group of 8-9 small cells can easily get the job done. 
(Jorquera, 2004a) 
 
The fourth strategic element was dubbed ‘timed politicisation’. While 2004 was 
defined as strategic year, 2005 was seen as a year of action because presidential and 
parliamentary elections were to take place in December. 
 
Next year, we should not focus on attacking CODELCO but the government instead. 
It is this ‘socialist’ government that must decide if it represents, or not, the world of 
work. We are going to attack them were it hurts them, so if they don’t lend us their 
support they won’t get our votes. 
(Jorquera, 2004a) 
 
It is important to note in passing that the Communist Party share of the presidential vote 
since 1990 has remained at about 5%. The difference between the two main candidates in 
the run-off election of 2000 was 3%, and most political analysts agree that it has been the 
‘last minute’ Communist vote that has kept the Concertación in power. 
 
The fifth element involved ‘taking over’ different social actors in order to seize 
power at different levels, ‘the point being trying to influence from anywhere you can’ 
(Jorquera, 2004a). In terms of the state, SITECO’s long-term leader, Danilo Jorquera 
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stepped out to run for Rancagua city council. The strategy also involved trying to take 
over CUT. SITECO and the CNTCC put forward candidates for all regional CUT offices 
in mining regions. Likewise, leaders committed themselves to ‘re-enchanting’ the 
Communist Party as a crucial step in regaining influence in the polity. 
 
The (Communist) party was not interested in backing me up because is disintegrating 
(…) I believe however, that I am ‘doing party work’ anyway. I consider myself the 
first Communist councilor elected in this city. This is an internal problem we have in 
the party. This won’t make me leave the party… On the contrary, we must re-enchant 
and regain the party for the (working) class. 
(Jorquera, 2004a) 
 
The last strategic element SITECO and the CNTCC agreed on, was the so-called 
‘socialisation of conflict’ strategy, which essentially entailed involving the community in 
union activities and mobilisation efforts. 
 
We’ve finally come to realise that we’re not going to win this fight on our own. 
We’ve believed for far too long that trade unionism by itself could win, missing the 
fact that women, families, and entire communities used to participate in the unions. 
That’s long gone but we must reinvent it. We’ve got to get them involved again.  
 
But this is not about creating your typical union’s youth centre and stuff like that, but 
about approaching and talking directly to a wife and convince her that the 
CODELCO and the government are screwing her husband: ‘Why don’t they pay 
antisocial hours to my husband?’ It is about discussing these issues in neighbourhood 
associations, in the shanty towns. (….)  
 
But it is also about socialising conflict (mobilisation). Perhaps, next time around we 
won’t stop the buses on the road, but in the shantytowns. The women could do that. 
But for that to happen you need to get people on board, and it is very a long process. 
So, yes, ‘socialising conflict’ is trade unionism but with the participation of all. 
(Jorquera, 2004a) 
 
 
UNION STRATEGIES IN THE ERA OF GLOBALISATION 
 
300 
The new CTC 
 
Shortly after fieldwork was conducted, these new strategic guidelines began to be put into 
practice. Danilo Jorquera was elected as independent councillor for Rancagua and now 
leads the Council Commission on Education, Culture, and Human Rights. SITECO and 
the CNTCC won three out of the four regional CUT elections in mining regions.  
 
During the presidential campaign of December 2005 and January 2006, SITECO 
and the CNTCC returned to wide-ranging mobilisation blocking roads, picketing, and 
sabotaging some CODELCO areas, in a in a bid to force the government to compromise 
as electoral strategy. As the unions had hoped for, the mobilisations installed the issues of 
outsourcing and contract labour at the top of the political agenda.  
 
As discussed in Chapter 5, the strikers demanded better employment and working 
conditions but the violent character of their mobilisation, the heavy losses inflicted to the 
company, and the harsh repression they suffered, prompted the government to pass new 
legislation, and obliged CODELCO to begin addressing the ‘contract labour question’ in 
the company. CODELCO and the CNTCC established a series of new task forces to 
resolve the strikers’ grievances. At that point, it appeared that SITECO and the CNTCC 
had obtained more than what they had hoped for. 
 
Nevertheless, after more than a year of fruitless negotiations it became increasingly 
clear for the CNTCC that CODELCO’s commitment to meet their demands was not 
genuine. The CNTCC decided on a new and wider mobilising offensive that required the 
creation of a new umbrella organisation. The Confederación de Trabajadores del Cobre 
(CTC) was established on 8 June 2007 to replace the CNTCC, and represent contract 
workers throughout the mining sector, including those working for transnational private 
sector operators (CTC, 2008c).  
 
Two weeks later, on Monday 25 June, the CTC began a general strike under the 
banner of ‘Equal Pay for Equal Work’ to pressure CODELCO and the government to 
meet their demands. The strike involved 20,000 workers and extended to CODELCO’s 
five divisions with the company losing an estimated US$ 10 million a day. Protests, 
pickets, roadblocks, and confrontations with riot police began immediately. As repression 
increased, the mobilisations turned more violent, with buses set on fire and company 
lorries attacked and wrecked.  
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On 23 July, after 27 days of strike, CODELCO announced that it had reached an 
agreement with three unions representing about half of those involved in the conflict and 
paid a substantial cash bonus to all contract workers not involved in the strike 
(Cooperativa, 2007a). The CTC dismissed the validity of these agreements and rightly 
accused CODELCO of anti-union practices as one of these unions, SINAMI, has never 
been affiliated to the CTC, and the other two unions never took part in the strike (FUTC 
and ASIC).  
 
 
Table 9.3: SITECO, CNTCC, and New CTC Strategic Choices 
 SITECO (1988-)  
Divisional level 
CNTCC (2001-2005) 
Company level 
New CTC (2006-) 
Company/Sector level 
    
Constituency Periphery 
Contract Workers 
employed by El Teniente 
(except Montajistas) 
Periphery 
Contract Workers 
employed by CODELCO 
(except Montajistas) 
Periphery 
Contract Workers in the 
mining sector (public and 
private sectors) 
Objectives Bread and butter Bread and butter Bread and butter 
Form 
-Inclusion 
principle 
Inter-firm union 
Horizontal inclusion 
Confederation 
Horizontal inclusion 
 
Degree of 
articulation/ 
Labour 
movement 
relations 
High 
Fetraser; CEPCH; CUT 
High 
CUT 
CUT 
Capacity   High 
Democracy Leadership 
predominance 
Leadership 
predominance 
Leadership 
predominance 
Activism Militancy  
Offensive objectives 
Militancy  
Offensive objectives 
Militancy  
Offensive objectives 
Employer 
relations 
Confrontation 
 
Confrontation 
 
Confrontation 
 
Member 
relations 
Organising 
Mobilisation 
Organising 
Mobilisation 
Organising 
Mobilisation 
State relations   Autonomy 
Political party 
relations 
Communist Party Communist Party Communist Party 
Society 
relations 
   
    
 
 
In addition, unions at companies supposedly covered by the latter rejected the 
agreement arguing that it had been signed by leaders censored by their members -hence 
forbidden to bargain in their behalf- and that such ‘agreements’ had not been ratified by 
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the rank-and-file (Cooperativa, 2007b). The mobilisations continued for another ten days. 
On 1 August, after 37 days of strike, the CTC, CODELCO, and provider enterprises 
signed a Framework Agreement that was widely considered a victory for the strikers. 
 
The agreement focused mainly on substantive issues. The deal included overtime to 
be paid on total pay instead of on the basic wage; a bonus of 450,000 pesos (or two 
months wages, about £450) with no limit on attendance (previously bonuses had only 
been offered to workers with a 97 percent attendance record, which would have excluded 
all strikers); pay for eight of the 36 days on strike (initially no pay was offered); and no 
sacking of strikers (except those prosecuted for damage) (Stanton, 2007). 
 
But the agreement did not include key matters related to the internalisation of 
contract workers (see Chapter 5). The 2006 Outsourcing Act mandated the National 
Labour Bureau to investigate the issue of disguised employment relationships, and the 
parties agreed to wait for the Bureau’s inspection reports. Five months later, the Bureau 
ruled that CODELCO had to internalise nearly 5,000 contract workers. But in an 
unprecedented move for a state-owned company, CODELCO decided to challenge the 
Bureau’s competence in court in the same way as most private sector employers, 
questioning in this way an emblematic labour law promoted and supported by the same 
government responsible for managing the company.  
 
Meanwhile, President Bachelet - who in her campaign had lent strong support to 
contract workers - demanded the company to respect the law and internalise those 
workers. CODELCO refused and continued to delay the implementation of the 
Framework Agreement. The contradiction was evident and private sector employers felt 
immediately vindicated by CODELCO’s decision: what was not good for the public sector 
could not possibly be good for a private company. 
 
In view of CODELCO’s intransigence, in February 2008 President Bachelet herself 
instructed the company’s CEO to return to the bargaining table but by the end of March 
the CTC was ‘on state of alert’ (CTC, 2008a). Negotiations failed and, on 9 April, the 
CTC called a new general strike to force the company to deliver on the agreements signed 
the year before. On this occasion however, CODELCO simply refused to bargain with the 
strikers forcing the government to intervene. In the end, the CTC bargained directly with 
the government against the background of a strike that involved more than 25,000 
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workers, lasted 20 days, and cost millions in lost revenue. Workers only returned to work 
after securing a government-brokered agreement that included the internalisation of 
contract workers.  
 
Barely a week afterward, the Supreme Court ruled that the Labour Bureau rulings in 
respect of CODELCO were illegal and upheld the position of the company. Presuming 
that this verdict would encourage CODELCO to withdraw from the agreement just signed, 
the CTC leadership went on hunger strike immediately (CTC, 2008b). Four days later, 
Bachelet herself endorsed the accords and gave her word that CODELCO would comply 
with them ending the hunger strike (Reuters, 2008). At the time of writing, it is yet unclear 
how much of the 2006, 2007, and 2008 agreements has been materialised. 
 
Since then however, contract labour mobilisation has had wider repercussions 
within and without the sectors involved. The CTC began to expand its actions into copper 
mining’s transnational private sector and similar mobilising drives took place in the 
forestry and fruit-export sectors. A week after the conflict between CODELCO and the 
CNTCC was settled, the Catholic Church began speaking about the necessity of an 
‘ethical wage’ that should replace the minimum wage (Goic and Contreras, 2007). As the 
mood proved catching even the hitherto largely silent CUT led a national day of protest 
for ‘Equity and Social Justice’ on 28 August. By the end of 2008, Cristián Cuevas, leader 
of the CTC bid for the CUT’s presidency obtaining the second place with 35%, to become 
CUT’s director of conflict and collective bargaining.  
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THE ‘GLO BAL’ GRAN MIN ERÍA :   
THREE WO RLDS OF WO RK &   
COLLECT IV E ACT IO N 
 
 
Cross-case Pattern Search 
 
 
 
 
 
The analysis stage of case study research can be understood on the basis of two linked 
activities (Eisenhardt, 1989). While within-case analysis aims at gaining familiarity with the 
data through detailed written accounts such as the nine cases presented in the previous three 
chapters, cross-case pattern search aims to reduce the complexity resulting from a large 
number of in-depth cases to be able to better deal with the conceptual implications of the 
findings.  
 
In this chapter I present the product of the cross-case pattern search for this study in two parts. 
In Part, I introduce a within group cross-case analysis where I look for within-group 
similarities coupled with inter group differences in each of the three groups identified. Section 
10.1 centres on core workers in union-tolerant regimes, Section 10.2 focuses on core workers 
in anti-union regimes, and Section 10.3 examines periphery workers in harsh anti-union 
regimes. In Part II, I aim at providing some preliminary sector level answers to the research 
questions by means of a cross group analysis where I compare and contrast the three groups 
of cases discussed in the first part. Section 10.4 considers the issue of challenges in the 
‘global’ Gran Minería, Section 10.5 looks at the form and outcomes of union strategy in the 
sector, and Section 10.6 discusses the possible factors and dynamics that may be explaining 
them. Parts I and II look at the same evidence from complementary perspectives and 
consequently, a great deal of unavoidable overlapping between them will be apparent. 
 
 

 309 
Within Group Cross-case Analysis 
 
 
10.1 Core Workers in Union-tolerant Regimes 
 
Challenges at the union tolerant core 
 
Initial situation 
 
The first group of cases refers to unions of core workers employed by CODELCO, Sur 
Andes, and Los Pelambres (Chapter 7). These are mining companies whose initial employer 
regimes were tolerant to union presence and received union constituencies were an 
endangered labour force. By ‘initial employer regime’ I mean to refer to the earliest regime 
observable in each of the firms in this group for the period 1982-2009. For CODELCO and 
Sur Andes (then Disputada) this refers to the periods 1982-1993 and 1982-1990 respectively, 
and for Los Pelambres to the period between 1990 and 1998. Employers at CODELCO, Sur 
Andes, and Los Pelambres displayed Regulated Market regimes in their relations with core 
workers. These regimes were broadly characterised by non-exclusive and status-based 
relations, where union presence was tolerated and workers were not considered simple 
commodities (Figure 10.2 in Part II). CODELCO and Sur Andes entered the Mining Boom 
with well-established industrial relations systems in which unions had operated as legitimate 
representative of workers for several decades. Los Pelambres was set up on a regulated 
market basis when it began operations in 1990, an extension of the traditional way in which 
the Luksic Group managed industrial relations in other operations. 
 
Received union constituencies at CODELCO and Sur Andes had long been 
considered Chile’s ‘labour aristocracy,’ with employment and working conditions well above 
the national average. They are broadly seen as a privileged group, thanks to their strategic 
position in the economy, compounded in the case of FTC by their public status. Workers at 
Los Pelambres were ‘new’ to mining but indisputably perceived as some of the winners of the 
mining boom. Although the dominant mode of employment regulation at these firms was 
collective, workers’ level of employment protection varied. For workers at CODELCO and 
Sur Andes was low in comparison to the levels of protection they enjoyed before the boom 
but high relative to the low levels of security of contract workers. Core workers in union-
tolerant regimes could therefore be seen as endangered labour force occupying an 
intermediate category between ‘protected’ labour force and what I have called ‘unprotected’ 
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labour force (Figure 10.3 in Part II). The great majority of these workers were organised in 
numerous firm-level unions, which, in the case of CODELCO and Sur Andes, had been in 
existence for decades. While in the former these unions were organised under the umbrella of 
the FTC, they remained autonomous in the other two cases. Their leaderships and union 
strategy conformed to the model of Classic Copper Unionism that developed in the sector 
since the 1950s. Although this is normally taken to mean union activity by the FTC, the 
received strategic approach of unions at Sur Andes and Los Pelambres can also be described 
in these terms albeit in a more moderate (i.e. less confrontational in relation to employers) 
and limited manner (i.e. far weaker links to political parties and the state). 
 
Critical junctures and path-breaking choices 
 
An ‘objective’ account of the evolution of the context in which these unions have operated 
since 1992, would recognise the following ruptures and path-breaking union choices. Sur 
Andes and CODELCO faced critical junctures in the late 1980s and early 1990s respectively. 
In terms of economic change, they experienced neoliberal restructuring as a sudden increase 
in competition from foreign operators exploiting significantly better ores with state-of-the-art 
technology and ‘lean’ organisational structures. Increases in production would push copper 
prices down and decrease the profitability of old companies as a result of their significantly 
higher production costs. The early 1990s also coincided with Chile’s return to democracy 
after 17 years of military dictatorship. The newly elected coalition pledged to undertake a 
deep reform of the political, economic, and social policies of the military, and in particular of 
industrial relations legislation. The Concertacion, backed by the majority of the labour 
movement, also committed to promoting social dialogue between employers and organised 
labour and tri-partite agreements at national level. 
 
In this context, management at Sur Andes decided to incorporate labour in addressing 
their competitiveness issues because of the perceived high costs involved in rationalising 
without labour at a time of socio-economic uncertainty. Rather than taking the expected route 
of redundancies, they offered the unions to (indirectly) protect employment in exchange for 
committing to ‘continuous improvement’. Unions chose to get involved, leaving behind their 
traditional adversarial strategies around collective bargaining. It took both sides almost seven 
years to transfer ‘this new way of doing things’ into a written document which took the form 
of a Partnership Agreement in 1996. This agreement has been renewed ever since and 
remains in place to date. 
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Management at CODELCO took the opposite route. Management appointed by the 
new democratic government began a process of ‘authoritarian rationalisation’ in which cost 
cutting was largely seen as the result of reductions in the workforce. FTC reacted angrily as 
well as ineffectively to this threat, locked between its political support for the new 
government, and the realisation that, doing nothing in order to increase efficiency would 
leave the company vulnerable to privatisation. The FTC opposed the changes vigorously but 
ineffectively locked up in its support to the new government. In 1993 pressure mounted on 
the government to privatise the company when largely as a result of a rouge trader scandal. 
Under the circumstances, and with a presidential election in sight, the FTC dramatically 
changed its position, and proposed a broad ‘social peace’ agreement to keep the company in 
state hands. As the new government took office, CODELCO’s management offered the FTC 
a partnership agreement in which the government committed to maintaining public ownership 
in exchange for labour’s cooperation in doubling the value of the firm and observing ‘social 
peace’. Since then, the breath and depth of the Partnership Agreement has broadened and 
deepened and today remains solidly in place. 
 
Los Pelambres experienced a different set of circumstances. For a start, the company 
itself was the product of the mining boom as it was founded in 1990. It operated at a small-
scale and relative anonymity for most of the 1990s. Los Pelambres faced a critical juncture 
between 1998 and 2000 when in the absence of major changes in the economy, industrial 
relations institutions, and state strategies like the ones described for CODELCO and Sur 
Andes, Antofagasta plc decided to rebuild the company to become a major international 
copper producer. As part of this transformation process, and following on the example of Sur 
Andes, management ensured employment and adopted ‘collaborative industrial relations’ as 
best practice in the management of human resources. The unions quickly accepted 
management’s offer. 
 
The current form of union strategy at the union-tolerant core 
 
Over the past three decades, the strategic approach of unions at the union-tolerant core has 
evolved from Classic Copper Unionism (or Classic State Unionism) into a type of unionism 
better described as Company Egoism. In contrast to the adversarialism that characterised 
union-employer relations in the previous decades, they are now characterised by labour-
management cooperation in a variety of Partnership Agreements (Table 1.1). The FTC 
appears to have maintained higher levels of autonomy (union parity partnership) than unions 
at Sur Andes and Los Pelambres (employer-led partnership). Complementarily, while in the 
past union-member relations were characterised by a traditional combination of servicing and 
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mobilising activities, Company Egoism relies on servicing and demobilisation. Members are 
seen as consumers of union services and relations remain clientelist albeit in an increasingly 
‘consumerist’ rather than ‘political’ manner. Obtaining the resources to provide such services 
is seen as a result of ‘constructive’ relations with management and, other than the ritualistic 
threat of industrial action within collective bargaining, virtually nothing is expected from 
members in terms of mobilising to obtain them.  
 
While in the past unions in this group –particularly the FTC- achieved national 
prominence, they have increasingly developed a strictly private orientation to interest 
representation, speaking solely for the interests of their members. Their agenda of 
representation has broadened however, supplementing traditional bread and butter objectives 
with a qualitative agenda framed around participation and employee development thereby 
exploring ‘human capital’ and ‘consumer’ fields of interest representation. In contrast, the 
sphere of ‘worker as a citizen’ appears to be largely underdeveloped. Firm-level federations 
have become the predominant organisational form (vertical inclusion) and, partly as a result 
of increasing intra-firm articulation and centralisation, leadership predominance in union 
governance has also deepened.  
 
Unsurprisingly, relations with the labour movement at present display a high degree of 
sectionalism. Relations with higher-level organisations have grown increasingly formalistic, 
instrumental, or simply nonexistent. FTC has always been affiliated to CUT but its 
participation is irrelevant in practice. Los Pelambres overtly acknowledge they affiliated to 
CONSFETEMA because they make for sound collective bargaining advisors. Unions at Sur 
Andes remain firmly committed to staying away from ‘politicised’ higher-level organisations. 
Relations with contract workers remain nonexistent at best and negligent at worst. FTC and 
Sur Andes Federation argue they have done enough by signing up to almost identical tri-
partite agreements to co-monitor with their respective employers the degree of compliance of 
provider enterprises with health and safety regulations. None of them however has engaged 
directly with contract workers. The situation in Los Pelambres is rather exceptional in this 
regard, with the unions actively involved in sponsoring the formation of contract worker 
unions without management interference. 
 
Relations with the state, political parties and society set the FTC apart from the other 
two cases. The FTC’s insider relations with the state have deepened considerably particularly 
since the PA. For unions at Sur Andes and Los Pelambres however, influencing policy-
making is not a priority and can be rightly presented as outsiders. Likewise, party politics are 
built-in in the very fabric of FTC and their leaders make no secret of their political loyalties. 
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In contrast, leaders in the other two cases proudly described their unions as apolitical 
organisations. While these unions are quite frankly ‘detached’ from society, the FTC’s 
continuous presence in the public sphere has to be appreciated with a dose of scepticism as 
these seem to be more a by-product of dealing with the state as employer rather than the result 
of a commitment to a political project or broad conception of general interest. 
 
In sum, Company Egoism as union strategy has supplemented the traditional workplace 
bargaining power of core workers in this key strategic sector of the economy, with what we 
could call an elite type of associational power This is because labour-management 
cooperation has strengthened the role of unions, and in particular of top union leaders, as 
authoritative social partners. In this way, unions have simultaneously increased their ability to 
control and access resources and sanctions both material and ideological previously exclusive 
with management, and reduced their need to rely on internal sources of strength including the 
mobilisation of their members. 
 
 
Table 10.1: Main features of Partnership Agreements 
 CODELCO Sur Andes Los Pelambres 
    
Nature of union-employer 
relations prior to PA 
Traditional 
adversarialism 
Moderate traditional 
adversarialism 
Moderate traditional 
adversarialism 
Name of PA(s) -Strategic Alliance 
-PCE 
-Strategic Alliance III 
Strategic Alliance 
 
No formal agreement 
signed 
Date of first agreement 11 March 1994 1 January 1996* No formal agreement 
signed 
Reasons for PA -External threat 
-High costs 
-Privatisation 
-External threat 
-High costs 
-Threat of closure 
-Best practice 
Employer objectives -‘Social peace’ 
-Cost reduction 
Cost reduction -Cooperative industrial 
relations 
-Cost reduction 
-State-of-the-art mining 
operation 
Union objectives -Prevent privatisation Employment 
Employee Participation 
Cooperative industrial 
relations 
Actor that led the initiative FTC Management Management 
Nature of PA Union-parity Employer-led Employer-led 
Degree of representative 
part. 
Consultation Consultation Information 
Degree of direct 
participation 
Low High Low 
Strike action since PA Yes No No 
Employment security 
clause 
No No No 
Job losses since PA Yes Yes No 
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The outcomes of union strategy at the union-tolerant core  
 
The main achievement of Company Egoism as union strategy is to have facilitated the 
transition from Regulated Market to Micro-Concertation employer regimes. While in the 
former unions are merely tolerated and adversarial relations predominate, in the former 
unions are accepted as social partners. Employer regimes at the now union-acceptance core 
can be described in terms of a variety of micro-concertation arrangements, where labour 
inclusion and status-based relations between capital and labour predominate (Hyman, 1997a). 
There are important differences between these regimes in terms of the actual degree of 
inclusion of workers and unions. CODELCO workers appear to enjoy a relatively high degree 
of inclusion at representative level but low at direct level. Workers at Sur Andes exhibit a 
high degree of direct participation and their unions a high degree of inclusion albeit with a 
narrow scope. Workers at Los Pelambres display relatively low levels at both levels. 
Regardless of these differences, all unions in this group have significantly stabilised the 
environment for their members. Core workers in union-acceptance regimes can be described 
as a protected labour force, the result of relatively higher levels of job security and collective 
modes of employment regulation.  
 
Union effectiveness along the four dimensions of revitalisation appears patchier. 
Unions have maintained nearly universal density levels and, from this perspective, they can 
be viewed as effective in terms of the membership dimension. However, changes in 
membership numbers –another aspect of this dimension- are concealed by density statistics. 
In the most prominent of cases, the FTC has maintained universal density but suffered a 
significant reduction in union membership as a result of thousands of redundancies. 
Furthermore, the meaning of membership in these cases has to be understood in the context of 
systems in which unions do not actively recruit members, but where instead membership 
arises organically from socialisation into the company and its employment regime. Assessing 
the effectiveness of unions in this group along the economic dimension is more contentious 
but, overall, it can be said that they have achieved wage and benefit improvements. In 
contrast, the institutional dimension of union revitalisation appears to have developed 
significantly thanks to the prominence given to unions as social partners. Unions as 
organisations have become remarkably cohesive structures, despite periodic leadership 
challenges. Effectiveness along the political dimension contrasts between the FTC’s close 
relations with political parties, interest in influencing policy-making, and interaction with the 
state, and the complete lack of relations and/or interest by Sur Andes and Los Pelambres 
unions. 
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Factors and dynamics at the union-tolerant core 
 
How and why did traditionally adversarial unions engage in long-term partnership agreements 
with their employers? The current form and outcomes of union strategy at the union tolerant 
core can be seen as the result of a particular combination of opportunity, mobilising structure, 
framing processes, and repertoires of contention.  
 
As discussed above, in all cases, the unions’ structure of opportunity underwent 
significant transformation albeit in different variables and at different points in time. What 
role did changes in opportunity -economic change, industrial relations institutions, and state 
and employer strategies- play in the transformation of union strategy? It is tempting to argue 
that they had a decisive role, particularly the significant transformation observed in employer 
strategies toward labour. While management at Sur Andes incorporated labour in cost cutting, 
CODELCO did the opposite until late 1993, when in line with the second Concertacion 
government embraced social partnership in its relations with labour. Management at Los 
Pelambres revamped the company to become a major copper producer with built-in 
collaborative industrial relations as ‘best practice’ in human resources. But conceiving of 
trade unions exclusively as reactive organisations to changes occurring in their environment is 
not entirely satisfactory. Indeed, changes in opportunity structure are a necessary but not 
sufficient factor in explaining the form and outcomes of union strategy. As the social 
movement literature consistently shows, ‘no matter how momentous a change appears in 
retrospect, it only becomes an opportunity when defined as such by a group of actors 
sufficiently well organised to act on this shared definition of the situation’ (McAdam et al., 
1996: 8).  
 
The key element in linking ‘objective’ changes in ‘political opportunity’ variables 
and the transformation of union strategy was a profound change in leadership attitudes as a 
result of management’s opening. Leaders at Sur Andes and Pelambres report that it took them 
some time to overcome their ‘natural misgivings’ before perceiving management’s openings 
as real opportunities to protect their ‘endangered’ memberships from otherwise authoritarian 
modernisation processes. FTC leaders argue that, in contrast, it was their realisation that 
membership mobilisation against job cuts had failed and that a new strategy on their part was 
necessary. In either case, the ‘convincing’ processes that followed appear to have been largely 
monopolised by management. It was management that essentially re-defined the problem 
unions found themselves responding to and were crucial in identifying a solution for it, 
narrowing the scope of alternative courses of action. For leaderships marked by the threat of 
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unemployment –a hangover of the 1982 recession and transformation in Pelambres- labour-
management cooperation represented a relatively uncontroversial trade off, although the 
agreements did not job security clauses.  
 
The transition between adversarialism and cooperation involved active leadership 
efforts to demobilise their memberships. This leads us to consider the role of framing 
processes, mobilising structures, and repertoires of contention. Mobilisation theory assumes 
that once individuals belong to groups then mobilisation (or the lack of it thereof) depends on 
definition of interests, the degree of organisation and the costs and benefits of taking action 
(Kelly, 1998). In all cases, demobilisation was sought after by actively re-constructing 
workers’ interests. Union leaderships and employers actively reframed the employment 
relationship around the commonality of interests between capital and labour in the survival of 
the firm. They vehemently re-constructed the high costs of ‘not taking action’ (not engaging 
in ‘continuous improvement’ in the case of Sur Andes, ‘social partnership’ in CODELCO, 
and ‘cooperative relations’ at Pelambres) at Sur Andes) in terms of selling off, privatisation, 
and the closing down of operations respectively. Simultaneously, union leaders reframed the 
benefits of taking action in terms of (dubious) increasing levels of job security for insiders, 
and the chance to achieve ‘historical’ labour grievances such as those linked to the 
democratisation of company structures. In Los Pelambres, the transition between the first and 
second mining exercises involved significant joint union-employer efforts to inculcate worker 
commitment to corporate goals and loyalty to the supervision, in achieving ‘world class 
competitiveness’. 
 
Demobilisation was facilitated by the presence of authoritative, encompassing, and 
centralised mobilising structures: firm-level federations in the cases of FTC and Sur Andes, 
and highly coordinated firm-wide representatives in Los Pelambres. On the one hand, 
Partnership Agreements gave these highly centralised structures a prominent institutional role 
and as a result their incentive to rely on internal sources of strength diminished significantly. 
On the other hand, by virtue of their highly bureaucratic structures and leadership 
predominant approach to union governance, they were very effective in controlling and 
suffocating dissent against union-management cooperation and membership demobilisation. 
 
Last, demobilisation was aided by repertoires of contention that have long established 
the priority of ‘corporatist’ objectives and collective action aimed at safeguarding the 
privileges of insiders and the survival of their union evident in ‘modern monopolistic sector’ 
unions. In fact, and aside from the obvious differences between them, clear patterns of 
continuity can be observed between ‘classic copper unionism’ and ‘company egoism’ in 
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terms of the priority given to ‘the defence of the union’ as organisation as opposed to its 
members, clientelism, and limited relations with actors beyond the level of the firm. 
 
 
10.2 Core Workers in Anti-union Regimes 
 
Challenges at the anti-union core 
 
Initial situation 
 
The second group of cases corresponds to unions of core workers employed by mining 
companies whose initial employer regimes displayed a strong anti union animus: Escondida, 
El Abra, and Zaldívar (Chapter 8). For Escondida this refers to the period 1990-2002, for El 
Abra 1995-2004, and for Zaldívar 2000-2004. Employers at Escondida, El Abra, and Zaldívar 
set up these operations on a non-union basis with built-in personnel and industrial relations 
systems designed to remain non-union throughout the mining cycle. Soft HRM regimes relied 
on status and exclusion simultaneously, providing for good working and employment 
conditions with the explicit aim of preventing unionisation among their core workers (Figure 
10.2 in Part II).  
 
Received constituencies at these companies were made of core workers widely perceived as 
the ‘winners’ of the mining boom. After all, their jobs resulted directly from the massive 
foreign direct investment that transformed the sector. Workers at these companies enjoyed 
above-average employment and working conditions and permanent contracts gave them an 
average level of job security: high relative to contract workers but low in comparison to elite 
workers. Given individual modes of employment regulation, these workers could be seen as 
occupying an intermediate position between the ‘casual’ and ‘autonomous’ labour force 
categories, which I have labelled a flexibilised labour force (Figure 10.3 in Part II). The great 
majority of them were also described as young, inexperienced, and, given their privileged 
circumstances, their employer’s anti-union stance, and the fear inherited from the Pinochet 
dictatorship, reluctant of engaging in any manner of collective organisation and action. 
 
Critical junctures and path-breaking choices 
 
An ‘objective’ account of the evolution of these unions’ context and responses since 1990 
would recognise the following two-stage sequence of ruptures and path-breaking choices. 
UNION STRATEGIES IN THE ERA OF GLOBALISATION 
 
318 
These stages have been triggered by analogous critical junctures in all three cases but their 
length and degree of overlap between them have differed greatly (indicated in brackets).  
 
First critical juncture: the erosion of ‘sweet foreign stuff’ and the emergence of collective 
action. For most of the 1990s, workers structure of opportunity remained relatively 
unchanged in terms of economic change (the neoliberal model was firmly in place), industrial 
relations institutions (labour reform had been merely cosmetic), and state strategies (third 
administration of the labour friendly Concertacion). But at different points in time, 
management attempts at changing working and employment conditions triggered waves of 
worker discontent and organising drives in all three cases. Workers at Escondida organised as 
early as 1993 but were effectively neutralised for most of the decade. El Abra and Zaldívar 
managed to stay non-union for a few years but as the 1990s drew to a close, foreign operators 
began aggressive cost cutting programmes as a result of the 1997 Asian crisis. A first 
management reaction to these drives was to turn to sophisticated HRM techniques such as 
employee fora and communication channels, to provide for non-union representation 
structures. But in addition to these benign union-avoidance techniques, companies intensified 
of their anti-union stance by means of a whole array of coordinated practices oriented to 
repress the creation of unions and/or to make existent unions as ineffectual as possible 
including blacklisting, threat and harassment, and union-motivated dismissals. Despite these 
threats and numerous defeats, workers at El Abra (1998), and Zaldívar (2000) conducted 
successful organising campaigns. 
 
Second critical juncture: union ineffectiveness and leadership renewal. But sustaining 
effective collective action proved a far more painstaking affair than conducting successful 
organising campaigns. Disastrous results in collective bargaining and poor union management 
led to natural disaffection among members and internal infighting characterised the early 
years of these organisations. But in the early 2000s, all unions in this group began dealing 
with these difficulties by leadership renewal and union building. While directors were 
completely renewed and tumbling organisations were rebuilt in Escondida (2000) and El Abra 
(2003), in the case of Zaldívar, the cautious original directorate was able to renew itself with 
the assistance of the Escondida union (2002). New directorates have been able to rekindle 
their membership, professionalise leadership activities, and articulate with each other in a 
process which has progressively made their organisations more effective. 
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The current form of union strategy at the anti-union core 
 
Since the early 2000s, the strategic approach of unions at the anti-union core has developed 
into a clearly distinct type of unionism. I have labelled it New Adversarialism because 
important continuities are observable with Classic Copper Unionism with regard to employer 
and member relations. It is ‘new’ however because of the important discontinuities 
observable between the models in relations to other dimensions of union activity. Comparing 
Classic Copper Unionism and New Adversarialism in this way should not be taken to mean a 
direct transition from one model to another because for unions at the anti-union core New 
Adversarialism must be viewed as their ‘founding’ strategic approach. 
 
New Adversarialism can be described in terms of the following strategic choices. 
Union-employer relations can be described as adversarial. Militant employers have actively 
engaged in anti-union practices, sidelined union organisations, and limited the scope of 
relations to collective bargaining only. As a result, unions in this group have followed a 
militant wage bargaining approach to collective bargaining and, in turn, led to develop 
relations with members characterised by servicing and mobilisation in surges of participation. 
Servicing activities to individual members remain the traditional ones -from workers’ defence 
to consumer discounts- and constitute the bulk of union-worker activity outside collective 
bargaining. The form of membership mobilisation can be characterised as surges of 
participation or ‘the propensity to mobilise the total membership around key issues, 
generating critical episodes of mass mobilisation’. The great majority of these episodes have 
occurred in the context of collective bargaining as legal industrial action. Only a relatively 
strong union such as Escondida has been able to mobilise outside collective bargaining. 
 
Unions in this group display a private orientation to interest representation, speaking 
largely for the interests of core workers employed by their respective companies. Worker 
interests have been defined in narrow bread-and-butter terms venturing slightly into 
consumer fields of interest representation. All unions in this group have been established, 
structured, and governed as firm-level unions (vertical inclusion). Power within these 
organisations is highly centralised and the principle of leadership predominance has prevailed 
over membership democracy in union governance, particularly after new directorates 
successfully took over failing organisations. 
 
Relations with the labour movement can be described in terms of sector solidarity. 
After an initial period of ‘forced sectionalism’ -in which internal difficulties precluded the 
formation of, or affiliation to, high-level organisations- unions established their own inter-
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firm federation in 2004, the FMC, with the objective of representing all private sector unions 
in La Gran Minería. But neither the FMC nor any individual union in this group has 
established formal relations with national-level organisations outside copper mining. ‘Sector 
solidarity’ is also limited to private sector core workers. On the one hand, there have been 
exploratory but fruitless talks with the FTC to form a sector confederation of public and 
private sector miners. On the other hand, although all unions in this group initially actively 
supported the organising efforts of contract workers, in recent years they have withdrawn 
their assistance due to the short-lived and ineffective character of the unions formed.  
 
Last, all unions in this group have established narrow or nonexistent relations with the 
state, political parties, and society. In their relations with the state, unions can be described as 
outsiders. They have been limited to dealing with state agencies, especially the National and 
Regional Labour Bureaus, and participating in parliamentary enquiries into anti-union 
practices. No union in this group has established relations with political parties. Without 
exception, union leaders describe their organisations as apolitical and overtly despise political 
party activity at union level. No conception of general interest is observed, let alone direct 
involvement with local communities or other social movements. 
 
To conclude, New Adversarialism as union strategy is based upon the two traditional 
sources of workers’ power in strategic economic sectors. On the one hand, it relies on 
associational power, or the various forms of power that have resulted from the increasing 
strength and articulation of collective organisations at firm, inter-firm, and sector level. On 
the other hand, it has made an effective use of workplace bargaining power resulting from the 
strategic location of core workers in ‘lean’ operations with tightly integrated production 
processes, where timely and localised stoppages (mobilisation in ‘surges of participation’) can 
cause widespread disruption. 
 
The outcomes of union strategy at the anti-union core 
 
Under the constant pressure of increasingly effective unions, employers have begun to 
(grudgingly) tolerate their presence in recent years. The most evident outcome of this process 
has been the gradual transition from Soft HRM to Regulated Market employer regimes. While 
in the former unions were fought off, in the former they are tolerated albeit adversarial 
relations predominate. Labour regulation at the current union-tolerant core can be depicted as 
regulated-market, broadly contractual and inclusive in character. But this is relative to past 
anti-union regimes and should not be taken to imply genuine levels of inclusion. This is 
because widespread anti-union practices and sophisticated HRM techniques privileging non-
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union channels of worker representation continue to characterise (unofficial) employer 
strategy toward unions. Employers’ ‘grudging’ tolerance has also been evident in militant 
collective bargaining and employers contempt of labour law enforcement. Correspondingly, 
and despite progress being made in recent years, core workers in now union-tolerant regimes 
can be seen as endangered labour force. In other words, although the dominant mode of 
employment regulation is collective, their level of employment protection remains average.  
 
Union effectiveness along the four dimensions of revitalisation remains uneven. 
Whereas progress along the membership and institutional dimensions has been significant, 
advances along the economic dimension have been meagre, and null along the political 
dimension. All cases in this group have been remarkably effective in recent years along the 
membership dimension, boasting virtually universal density levels with stable membership 
numbers. Unions have also made significant progress along the institutional dimension, 
particularly in terms of union management, balancing the organisations’ books, and providing 
‘better value’ for their members’ contributions. This has been partly the result of unions 
becoming more effective along the economic dimension. Bargaining round after bargaining 
round, the unions have increased –albeit not spectacularly- their ability to achieve wage and 
benefit improvements. Increasing effectiveness along these dimensions contrasts sharply with 
the nearly null impact that the unions, individually or as FMC, have had along the political 
dimension. This is evident not only in the despised relationship between unions and political 
parties but also in their lack of interest in influencing policy-making and interacting with the 
state. 
 
Factors and dynamics at the anti-union core 
 
In explaining union strategy at the anti-union core, it is sensible to distinguish between the 
factors and dynamics that may explain the emergence of collective action from those that may 
explain the current form and outcomes of union strategy. 
 
1) Explaining the emergence of collective action at the anti-union core 
 
How were workers willing and able to construct collective organisation against their 
employers and overcome repression? The emergence of collective action can be seen as the 
result of a particular combination of opportunity, mobilising structure, framing processes, and 
repertoires of contention.  
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As discussed above, in all cases, workers and unions’ structure of opportunity remained 
relatively unchanged in terms of economic change, industrial relations institutions, and state 
strategies. In terms of employer strategies however, there was an evident shift with the 
‘erosion of sweet foreign stuff’ and the intensification of anti-union practices.  
 
At first glance then, the emergence collective action (the organising campaigns at El 
Abra and Zaldívar, and union building at Escondida) seems to result from workers ‘natural’ 
reaction to their worsening situation. Nevertheless, these external factors are but prerequisites 
for action which, let us speculate, could have been equally used to argue the ‘demise of 
emergent attempts at collective action’ had this been the case. In other words a particular 
outcomes is not necessarily what had to happen. ‘No matter how momentous a change 
appears in retrospect, it only becomes an opportunity when defined as such by a group of 
actors sufficiently well organised to act on this shared definition of the situation’ (McAdam et 
al., 1996: 8). 
 
This leads us to consider the role of leaders and framing processes in the process of 
collectivisation. Mobilisation theory argues that  
 
Collective organisation and activity ultimately stem from employer actions that generate 
amongst employees a sense of injustice or illegitimacy. Employees must also acquire a 
sense of common identity, which differentiates them from the employer; they must 
attribute the perceived injustice to the employer; and they must be willing to engage in 
some form of collective organisation and activity. This whole process of collectivisation 
is heavily dependent on the actions of small numbers of leaders and activists. 
(Kelly, 1998: 44) 
 
All cases in this group are almost textbook examples of this argument. Opportunities for 
creating collective organisation arose when dissatisfaction with worsening employment and 
working conditions generated amongst workers a generalised sense of grievance. This process 
helped to quickly ‘switch on’ previously dormant union identities in a critical number of 
activists. In all cases, these leaders and the framing processes they set in motion became the 
key element in linking ‘objective’ changes in ‘political opportunity’ and the transformation of 
union strategy. Leaders were able to actively construct and progressively undermine 
management authority by attributing injustice to ‘bad’ Chilean managers who replaced 
‘good’ foreign managers. Promoting group cohesion had to be restricted to a limited number 
of activists and committed workers who began approaching colleagues on a one-to-one basis 
to established confidential networks for mutual support.  
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Once individuals saw themselves as part of these networks of shared interests, then 
the actual organising/union building campaigns depended on the definition of those interests, 
the degree of organisation and the costs and benefits of taking action (Kelly, 1998). After 
years of repression, few workers were willing to go beyond their immediate individual 
interests. The legitimacy of collective action had to be argued on purely legal and 
instrumental terms -as an assertion of legal rights that would eventually result in concrete 
material benefits- rather than on traditional (and dangerous) class or political arguments. 
Thus, workers’ interests came to be defined in narrow but attainable bread-and-butter terms. 
In addition, organising tactics were oriented to overcoming fear and developing trust (door-
to-door visits, secret meetings at the workplace) so that cohesion eventually developed around 
the notion of establishing a ‘perfectly legal’ organisation that would be exclusively concerned 
with objectives linked to work and employment.  
 
2) Explaining ‘New Adversarialism’ 
 
How and why has the form of union strategy at the anti-union core evolved into New 
Adversarialism? Successful organising campaigns did not translate into bargaining strength 
and the unions were spectacularly defeated in all initial bargaining rounds. During the 
following five years or so, their outcomes have improved considerably. What changed the 
tide?  
 
By the early 2000s, the unions’ structure of opportunity remained practically 
unchanged in terms of economic change, industrial relations institutions, and state and 
employer strategies. As ever, the consideration of external factors alone is not sufficient to 
explain the current form and outcomes of union strategy at the anti-union core. Instead, these 
can be seen as the result of a specific combination of opportunity, mobilising structure, 
framing processes, and repertoires of contention. In all cases, unions renewed their 
leaderships as a consequence of their failure to secure better contracts. In Escondida and El 
Abra, original directors (ex-CODELCO workers with union experience) were successfully 
challenged by incumbent workers with private sector and/or contract labour backgrounds with 
no or little union experience. In Zaldívar, the latter managed to renew themselves. 
 
These new leaders set in motion framing processes that redefined the unions’ structure 
of opportunity in pragmatic and ultimately successful terms. In their view, Chile’s system of 
firm-level collective bargaining only provides opportunities for firm-level unions to pursue 
their claims during periodic bargaining rounds. It is during bargaining rounds that the 
commonality of interests among members is at its highest level (the new contract proposal), 
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the costs of collective action are perceived to be at their lowest (collective bargaining and 
strike action are lawful and participants are protected by law), and possible benefits are at 
their highest (obtaining a better contract). It therefore made no sense in their view to display a 
timid stance against recalcitrant employers. On the contrary, success or failure depended on 
raising the stakes (‘double or nothing’) by developing a militant wage bargaining approach. 
This involved conscientiously preparing for collective bargaining, active efforts to mobilise 
their memberships during negotiations, and developing various ‘safety initiatives’ to protect 
their members during negotiations (solid union management, individual debt-renegotiation, 
large strike funds, family involvement, etc).  
 
The strengthening of mobilising structures beyond the level of the firm has to be 
viewed against the same background because the increasing articulation between these unions 
under the FMC has become largely about seeking support for, during, and after collective 
bargaining. This contrasts with the unions’ limited (or nonexistent) relations with the state, 
other unions, or political parties which is unsurprising given their perceived irrelevance in 
increasing union leverage over employers. It appears that new directors have been far less 
troubled by, and more successful at, framing the legitimacy of collective action narrowly 
defined as improving conditions for members and ensuring the survival of their union, over 
any broader class and/or political project. In doing so, they seem to have relied on dormant 
modern-monopolistic repertoires of contention that have long established the priority of firm-
level action in the interests of promoting social mobility of their members. 
 
 
10.3 Periphery Workers in Harsh Anti-union Regimes 
 
Challenges at the harsh anti-union periphery 
 
Initial situation 
 
The third group of cases refers to the SINAMI, SINTRAC, SITECO, and New CNTC unions 
of contract workers employed by the countless provider enterprises that supply products and 
services to user mining companies (Chapter 9). Employers at the overwhelming majority of 
provider enterprises and user companies displayed, and have displayed ever since 1982, a 
‘harsh’ anti-union stance against unionisation and collective bargaining. The nature of their 
initial and current employer regimes in respect of contract workers can unmistakably be 
described as Bleak House, relying heavily on exclusion and (sub-standard) contract-based 
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relations, designed to thwart unionisation and cut labour costs to a minimum respectively 
(Figure 10.2 in Part II). 
 
Since 1982, two types of contract labour constituencies can be identified. On the one 
hand, Montajistas (or ‘industrial assemblage’ workers) are high skill construction workers 
employed in the building of major infrastructure and engineering projects including mines, 
dams, power plants, motorways, and railways. Because of the sporadic and geographically 
disperse nature of these activities, they work on a temporary basis and away from their 
residences for long periods. A substantial number of these workers organised in SINAMI 
since 1970 but the union suffered heavy repression by the Pinochet regime and was 
eventually outlawed in 1978. The union was re-legalised in 1982 but expectedly was in a 
sorry state. On the other hand, non-montajistas are low skill service and operations contract 
workers employed by countless enterprises providing user mining companies with a whole 
array of non-core (typically services including transportation, cleaning services, and catering) 
and core tasks (normally mine operations including tunnelling and industrial cleaning). 
Because of the permanent and geographically concentrated nature of these tasks, these 
workers are employed on an artificially short-term basis (e.g. 6-month rolling contracts) and 
tend to be local workers that live and work in the social milieu defined by the user company. 
A substantial number of non-montajistas were former core workers made redundant as a 
result of the cost cutting exercises of the 1980s and early 1990s particularly in CODELCO. 
For most of the 1980s these workers remained unorganised. Notwithstanding the differences 
between these types of worker (as well as the provider’s position in the outsourcing chain, see 
Chapter 6), the overwhelming majority of contract workers could be described as a casual 
labour force in terms of extremely low levels of job security and largely individual modes of 
employment regulation (Figure 10.3 in Part II).  
 
Critical junctures and path-breaking choices 
 
An ‘objective’ account of the evolution of these unions’ context and responses since 1990 
would recognise the following three critical junctures (Figure 10.1). 
 
First critical juncture: SINAMI’s founding choices and the emergence of collective action 
(1982). In the early 1980s, the situation faced by montajistas was dire. Neoliberal 
restructuring had brought about precious jobs as a result of the wide-ranging expansion of 
outsourcing. But the re-regulation of industrial relations institutions had repealed most 
protections for temporary workers and the material circumstances of these jobs were 
Dickensian, especially in mining. Similarly, although new regulations they re-legalised 
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SINAMI, they imposed harsh restrictions on unions of temporary workers including stripping 
them of the right to bargain collectively. State strategies toward their organisation remained 
repressive to the point that montajista leaders and activists were detained and executed by the 
military and the secret police well into the 1980s. 
 
But SINAMI was able to successfully reinvent itself by combining an authoritarian 
leadership, membership mobilisation at key stages of the labour process, and membership 
protection against repression and unemployment. In a few years, SINAMI’s ‘Direct Action’ 
strategy turned SINAMI into one of the most effective unions in the country. Throughout the 
1980s and 1990s, this meant good contracts for its members, solid membership figures, and 
strong finances. These impressive gains however did not extend beyond the union’s strictly 
delimited montajista constituency. 
 
Second critical juncture: SITECO, SINTRAC and the search for alternatives (2001). As the 
success of SINAMI began to spread, numerous non-montajista workers wanted to join the 
union. This posed a strategic problem for the leadership as the material circumstances of these 
workers differed greatly from those of montajistas, and it was decided that a separate union 
could cater better for them. SINAMI leaders established the SITECO union in Rancagua in 
1989 to represent non-montajista workers labouring for CODELCO’s El Teniente Division. 
Similar unions of contract workers were later set up in all CODELCO divisions by the 
SITECO leadership. These unions disappeared shortly afterwards and only SITECO played a 
relatively important role during the 1990s. Though very active, SITECO remained a relatively 
weak organisation for most of the 1990s and its ups and downs demonstrated the limitations 
of transferring the direct action approach to the realities of non-montajista work. SITECO 
achieved some important gains in specific conflicts but was unable to permanently influence 
the way CODELCO deals with contract labour -the union’s main stated objective- and was 
largely ineffective in coping with post-conflict repression. 
 
The early 2000s represent a critical juncture non-montajistas as SITECO leaders began 
reorganising unions across CODELCO divisions. In 2001 these unions formed the 
Coordinadora Nacional de Trabajadores Contratistas de CODELCO (CNTCC) under the 
leadership of SITECO in order to increase their leverage against the state company. The 
CNTCC led a few ‘heroic defeats’ in which the unions mobilised a great number of workers 
but with little permanent effect. This led in turn to three years of searching for alternatives but 
this time across the company. By the end of 2004, SITECO and the CNTCC agreed on 
redefining the problem as one between contract labour and the state -not CODELCO- and 
involving the state became a priority. They successfully identified the presidential elections of 
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late 2005 as an opportunity to pursue their claims. As all candidates were drawn into taking 
the strikers’ side, an unprecedented commitment on their part to enact new protective 
regulations was achieved (2006 Outsourcing Act). SITECO and the CNTCC had obtained 
significantly more than what they had bargained for. 
 
 
Figure 10.1: Emergence and development of contract labour organisations and strategic approaches 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The early 2000s also represented a critical juncture for montajistas. But in contrast to 
the increasing articulation and effectiveness of non-montajistas, SINAMI abandoned its 
classic strategy and favoured ‘behind the scenes’ co-operation with employers amidst 
widespread internal corruption and bitter infighting. SINAMI’s new ‘clean bargaining 
strategy’ led to the split of the union in 2003 when numerous stewards established the 
SINTRAC union in a bid to re-launch the ‘direct action’ strategy based on rank-and-file 
participation. 
 
Third critical juncture: the new CTC and path-breaking strategic choices (2007-present). The 
last critical juncture in the harsh anti-union periphery has been starred by the new 
Confederación de Trabajadores del Cobre (CTC), the industry wide organisation that 
replaced the CNTCC after the events of 2006. The new CTC has since led a qualitatively 
different as well as far more effective, new cycle of protest with national-level repercussions. 
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The new CTC’s industry-wide approach aims at targeting the state by involving society as a 
whole. Thus far, what I have denominated ‘Contract Labour Radicalism’ has proved highly 
effective in accessing the state as well as influencing militant union activity beyond copper 
mining (notably forestry and fisheries) and at higher-levels (CUT) to the extent that it is now 
seen as having set in motion changes for the labour movement as a whole. 
 
The current form of union strategy at the harsh anti-union periphery 
 
Union strategy at the periphery of the copper mining sector has evolved from SINAMI’s 
classic ‘Direct Action’ strategy into a variety of strategic patterns that share the imprint of 
SINAMI in employer and member relations but differ in other dimensions of union activity. I 
have labelled this model Contract Labour Radicalism because, bar SINAMI’s new ‘Clean 
Bargaining’ strategy, the key common strategic choice is militant direct action by contract 
workers against recalcitrant employers. 
 
Contract Labour Radicalism can be described in terms of the following strategic 
choices. Union-employer relations can be described as militant direct action against user 
employers. Putting pressure on user employers through wide stoppages is seen as condition 
sine qua non for entering negotiations with employers ‘from a position of strength’. By this, 
the unions mean forcing employers to enter tri-partite negotiations among users, providers 
and unions, where users are expected to put pressure on providers to give in to unions’ 
offensive demands (or most commonly, to settle the disputes by themselves by ‘subsidising’ 
providers in improving working and employment conditions). Complementarily, union-
member relations are characterised by a broadly defined organising approach in which active 
member mobilisation is, in turn, viewed as sine qua non element for the success of direct 
action. 
 
Contract labour unions in this group show a public orientation to interest 
representation, speaking for the interests of all contract workers employed by a particular user 
company regardless of actual membership. Worker interests have thus been defined in narrow 
but attainable bread-and-butter terms. All unions in this group have been established, 
structured, and governed as inter-firm unions (horizontal inclusion), an organisational form 
with which employers are not obliged to bargain, but that has nevertheless provided for an 
effective mobilising structure to force them to do so. Although SINTRAC and SITECO have 
undertaken democratising reforms in recent years, power within contract labour organisations 
remains highly centralised and the principle of leadership predominance continues to prevail 
over membership democracy in union governance. 
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Differences among contract labour unions are evident with regard to relations with the 
labour movement, political parties, and society more generally. While neither SINAMI nor 
SINTRAC have relations with higher-level organisations, the new CNTC has established 
formal relations with CUT and its leader, Cristián Cuevas today leads an important section 
within the central. Relations with the state are nonexistent in the cases of polity outsiders 
SINAMI and SINTRAC, but extensive albeit not of an insider nature in the case of the new 
CNTC, whose successful use of presidential campaigns has helped setting the country’s 
industrial relations agenda. Complementarily, SINAMI and SINTRAC have maintained their 
autonomy from political parties but the new CNTC has deepened its links with the 
Communist Party. Last, whereas SINAMI shows no involvement with local communities or 
other social movements, SINTRAC and the new CNTC have made use of inclusive rhetoric 
turning them into a reference point for ‘second class workers’ across the country. 
Undoubtedly, the differences discussed are the result of SINTRAC and the new CNTC main 
‘theatre of operations’: state-owned CODELCO. 
 
 In sum, Contract Labour Radicalism as union strategy has tapped onto three main 
sources of workers’ power. First, it has developed a great deal of associational power by 
refining and strengthening the inter-firm model of union organisation in a manner unfeasible 
for firm-level unions. Second, Contract Labour Radicalism has made effective use of 
workplace bargaining power -a source of power traditionally seen as exclusive to core 
workers in strategic sectors- resulting from the increasing reliance of user mining companies 
on periphery workers in their tightly integrated production processes. Last, the new CNTC 
has supplemented the latter source of structural power with what we could call a mass type of 
associational power, in which a wide array of tactics –from sabotage to civil disobedience- 
have been very effective in putting pressure on a hands-off state, clientelist political parties, 
and (hitherto marginalised) community organisations.  
 
The outcomes of union strategy at the harsh anti-union periphery 
 
Despite the harsh conditions in which they operate, Contract Labour Radicalism has been able 
to overcome some of the legal limitations that impede contract workers to organise and 
bargain with the employer they actually work for. But this has not translated in long-term 
changes in employer regimes regulating contract labour. Indeed, Bleak House regimes 
broadly characterised by exclusion and contract-based relations (Hyman, 1997) have 
remained the norm since 1982. This is not to say that within a broadly defined bleak house 
category there is no variation in the way user mining companies deal with contract labour. 
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The findings of this study suggest that while CODELCO’s approach is characterised by poor 
employment and working conditions as well as by active repression of contract workers’ 
organisations, contract workers at Los Pelambres enjoy better conditions, and their unions, 
albeit excluded, are largely tolerated. Employer regimes at Sur Andes, Escondida, El Abra, 
and Zaldívar appear to lie along a continuum determined by these two extreme cases. 
 
Notwithstanding these differences, as well as those emanating from the type of contract 
worker and the provider’s position in the outsourcing chain (high-skill montajistas employed 
by large providers as opposed to low-skill non-montajistas labouring for small ‘sub-sub’ 
contractors), the overwhelming majority of contract workers remains a casual labour force in 
terms of extremely low levels of job security and largely individual modes of employment 
regulation.  
 
Union effectiveness along the four dimensions of revitalisation is hard to appreciate but 
progress seems intermittent and uneven. Effectiveness along the membership dimension is not 
only difficult to assess but, in a sense, largely irrelevant in the case of periphery unions. 
Consider union density. These unions always bargain for all contract workers regardless of 
actual membership in order to protect them against dismissal. The collective agreements 
resulting from these negotiations cover all workers labouring for a particular employer but 
Chilean legislation requires non-union members covered by these agreements to pay union 
dues. Union density measured as percentage of due paying members could theoretically jump 
from zero percent before negotiations to one hundred percent after signing a contract. A more 
revealing indicator perhaps, although by its very nature difficult to observe, are the tens of 
anonymous actions leading to crippling stoppages of user companies activities. In all cases, 
this indicates continues effectiveness along the membership dimension. Bar SINAMI, unions 
have made significant progress along the institutional dimension, particularly in terms of 
democratising union governance (SINTRAC) and transforming union structures (SITECO 
and new CNTC). Effectiveness along the economic dimension has been erratic with legendary 
‘good’ contracts (typically SINAMI’s during the 1990s) looming constantly over today’s 
rather meagre agreements signed regularly by SINTRAC and SITECO, and the occasional 
exceptional contracts agreed by the new CNTC. It is also clear that the new CNTC is the only 
contract union which has effectively made progress along the political dimension. Since 2005, 
the new CNTC has influenced the policy-making process by interacting at all levels of 
government and in all three main areas of activity: elections (Bachelet), legislation 
(Outsourcing Act), and implementation (of the latter, sidelining with the National Labour 
Bureau) (Durán-Palma and López, 2009). 
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Factors and dynamics at the harsh anti-union periphery 
 
Just like with the previous group of cases, in explaining the emergence, form, and outcomes 
of union strategy at the harsh anti-union periphery, it is reasonable to distinguish between 
factors and dynamics that may explain the emergence of collective action and those that may 
be explaining its current form and outcomes. For reasons of space, I have restricted the 
former to examining the emergence of SINAMI’s classic direct action strategy, and the latter 
to what appears to be explaining the success of the new CTC as opposed to the decades-long 
frustrations of SITECO. 
 
1) Explaining the emergence of collective action at the harsh anti-union periphery  
 
How and why were heavily repressed ‘second class’ contract workers able to construct 
successful collective action in the midst of a bloody dictatorship? As aver, the emergence of 
collective action can be seen as the result of a particular combination of opportunity, 
mobilising structure, framing processes, and repertoires of contention.  
 
As previously argued, in the early 1980s, the structure of opportunity faced by 
montajistas was dreadful. An explanation of the emergence of contract labour collective 
action at the time may argue that it was simply a natural and somewhat spontaneous reaction 
to their exploitation and repression, or the worsening of their structure of opportunity. But 
such argument could also be used to explain the exact opposite (workers’ permanent demise), 
as indeed it was used for many years until the unexpected re-surfacing of SINAMI. This 
shows once again that external factors are but prerequisites for action, and that for change to 
become an opportunity (or threat) it ought to be defined as such by a group of sufficiently 
organised actors.  
 
Rather than a spontaneous reaction against these challenges, the recreation of SINAMI 
and the emergence of its ‘classic’ strategy resulted from a specific strategic decision of the 
Communist Party. In the midst of the severe recession of the early 1980s the few economic 
successes that the Pinochet regime could show were the large infrastructure and mining 
projects under construction. For the Communists, crippling these projects had the potential to 
politically undermine the regime. The party took over a tumbling SINAMI by providing it 
with human and material resources. But the key element in linking this change in political 
opportunity (i.e. ‘takeover’ by the Communist Party) and the transformation of union strategy 
was the leadership of Miguel Gonzalez. His authoritarian leadership and the solid political 
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party structure that backed it up is crucial to understanding the successful process of 
collectivisation to which it gave rise.  
 
Gonzalez was capable of significantly reframing opportunity, liberating montajistas 
from a hopeless diagnosis of structural weakness and perennial job insecurity. He rightly 
diagnosed and successfully reframed outsourcing chains as a source of vulnerability for 
employers particularly for those outsourcing a significant proportion of their core functions. 
Second, his leadership was able to reframe, and tap onto, the precarious material 
circumstances of contract workers by demonstrating to members that, given that job 
insecurity was built into ‘being contract labour’, losing one’s job was by definition inevitable 
and hence ultimately irrelevant. Thus, the ultimate cost of collective action –being fired- 
became far less costly, to the extent that it turned into a source of strength in itself (‘we will 
be jobless in two weeks anyway so we might as well do something now that can make a 
difference’). Third, leaders managed to turn montajistas notorious ‘angry identity and 
“anarchist” behaviour’ into co-ordinated illegal mobilisation across firms. Last, they 
successfully demonstrated the illegitimacy of dictatorial institutions and state and employer 
strategies, legitimising in turn their own illegal struggle.  
 
Gonzalez leadership also recreated SINAMI’s inter-firm mobilising structure 
increasing the union’s mobilising capacity and reduced the perceived costs of collective 
action. SINAMI reorganised as ‘national’ union providing support to members across the 
country, offered lifetime membership regardless of employment status, assured anonymity 
before, during, and after negotiations, and supported against blacklisting and other post-
conflict repression. All in all, SINAMI was able to rediscover and tap onto latent anarchist 
repertoires of contention, tamed since the 1940s. Anarcho-Syndicalists never identified with 
the ‘regulated’ orientation of the Marxist labour movement, encouraging instead volatile 
modes of organisation, illegal mobilisation, and autonomy from political parties and the state. 
 
2) Explaining ‘Contract Labour Radicalism’ 
 
How and why Direct Action evolved into Contract Labour Radicalism? For unions of non-
montajistas in roll-on contracts labouring for a single user (e.g. SITECO), SINAMI’s strategy 
never worked quite well because unions were unable to cope with the consequences of post 
negotiations repression. What happened that began changing the story? Or rather, what did 
workers and their organisations do that began changing their fate? 
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Just like in the case of SINAMI, it could be argued that external factors played a 
decisive role in the events that changed the tide in the fate of the non-montajista labour 
movement formed around CODELCO. It could be argued for example, that the 2005 
presidential elections set in motion processes that undermined the legitimacy and 
changeability of the system, with the two main presidential candidates agreeing on the 
appalling situation of these workers. It could also be argued that although limited, a shift left 
occurred at the level of government, facilitating the passing of the 2006 Outsourcing Act 
which, again, further legitimised and motivated workers to continue their struggle. 
 
But external factors alone cannot account for the emergence and type of the changes. 
Indeed, what these accounts miss is that abovementioned openings in political opportunities 
have been in themselves the product of collective action first by SITECO and then by the 
CNTCC, and that these have been in turn the product of careful strategy making. In 
explaining non-montajistas’ new cycle of protest, attention must therefore be given to a 
comprehensive and carefully designed strategic shift oriented to involving the state in their 
struggle which involved major changes in mobilising structure, leadership, and framing 
processes. 
 
SITECO began a two-level renewal of its mobilising structure in 2004. At plant level, 
the new strategy aimed at triggering ‘ungovernability in the firm’, largely based on actions 
short of sabotage. This required a secret cellular structure of militants willing to undertake 
action at short notice (the so-called ‘mine moles’). At higher level, the new strategy entailed 
to ‘politicise and socialise conflict’, targeting the government and involving the nation in the 
process. Here the great shift came in 2007 with the restructuring of the Coordinadora 
(CNTCC) into a Confederation (new CTC), allowing for rather more centralised top decision-
making.  
 
A third element that appears to explain the change in fortunes of non-montajistas is a 
timely renewal of leadership. With the historic SITECO leadership vetoed by the government 
the great shift came with the election of Communist leader Cristián Cuevas as leader of the 
new CTC. His leadership has been very wary of the use of symbolical language in their 
motivational framing efforts. This is evident from the name chosen for their organisation –bar 
the ‘national’ the Confederación de Trabajadores del Cobre is the same as the historic 
CNTC-, the place of its establishment –Machalí in 1953 and 2007-, and their nationalistic and 
industry-wide rhetoric. Cuevas’ leadership has been an extremely media savvy one. While 
previous leaderships had been happy to sign confidential agreements, Cuevas has only signed 
agreements in front of television cameras. Last, Cuevas’ leadership has also demonstrated a 
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high degree of intelligence. Through political connections, the new CTC has enlisted 
prominent advisors including former CODELCO CEO Orlando Caputo and former 
CODELCO HR Director Carlos Tomic. 
 
 335 
Cross-Group Analysis 
 
 
10.4 Challenges in the ‘Global’ Gran Miner ía  
 
The evolution of opportunity at national and sector level 
 
The Global Gran Minería has entailed a profound reconfiguration of the strategic problem 
workers and their organisations found themselves responding to. But before analysing the 
specific nature of this reconfiguration for distinct types of workers, it is necessary to briefly 
review the political economy transformations that led to the Global Gran Minería in the first 
place. A way of exploring the extent to which socio-economic change, industrial relations 
institutions, and employer and state strategies may have facilitated or constrain the 
development of collective action, is by examining the historical development of industrial 
relations institutions (Howell, 2005) and national and sector level. 
 
Chile’s traditional industrial relations institutions during the ‘short twentieth century’ 
rested upon ISI’s inward-oriented pattern of economic growth (ISI). It is widely agreed that 
ISI facilitated the development of collective action and provided fertile ground for the 
development of Chile’s labour movement because the political, economic, and social 
transformations associated with this mode accumulation revolved around labour as much as 
they did around capital.23 The progressive breakdown of ISI since the 1960s led to political 
polarisation and the surge of rightist, centrist, and leftist ‘radical’ alternatives. Allende’s 
(1970-1973) ‘Chilean Road to Socialism’ represented the more radical of all such 
alternatives, reorganising the economy into ‘social’ (state-owned), ‘mixed’ and ‘private’ 
economic areas. Because the transition from one pattern of economic growth to another shifts 
the balance of class power and the economic interests of class actors, it is unsurprising that 
social conflict escalated rapidly, triggering the crisis of industrial relations institutions. This 
encouraged the search for new regulatory mechanisms but Socialist efforts in this regard were 
cut short by the coup d’etat of 1973.  
 
After two years of harsh repression and policy indecision, the Pinochet regime (1973-
1989) imposed neoliberal structural adjustment programme which eventually transformed the 
economy into an open one based on agro-extractive exports (Silva, 1993). The state’s 
discursive and institutional capacities were bluntly displayed along the process particularly 
with regard to industrial relations and mining. The reconstruction of industrial relations 
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institutions involved the creation of entirely new institutions that would blend the political 
(repression) and economic (free market) objectives of the dictatorship. Individual legislation 
was revamped in 1978 when the regime imposed a neo-liberal model of labour market 
flexibility and a market containment strategy for union control. Similarly, the regime found a 
way around the constitutional public ownership of copper deposits and its neoliberal ideology 
with the introduction of ‘full mining concessions’ in 1982. This legal figure brought in 
massive amounts of foreign direct investment and a reconfiguration of the sector’s ownership 
structure. There is, of course, widespread agreement that political repression, repressive 
legislation, and economic transformation, dramatically constrained the development of 
collective action. 
 
As Chile returned to democracy in 1990, the newly elected Concertacion pledged to 
undertake a deep reform of the political, economic, and social policies of the military. But the 
coalition stop short of any major reform and limited itself to cushion the model’s worst 
effects on the poor. On the one hand, the opening and exploitation of the copper sector has 
nothing but accelerated under the democratic governments. On the other hand, while a timid 
process of labour reform has achieved some progress in a number of protective areas, the 
enjoyment of labour rights typically associated with ‘mature’ industrial relations systems 
remains limited. In sum, despite democratic consolidation, market-oriented industrial 
relations institutions continue to constrain the development of collective action. 
 
The reconfiguration of opportunity and responses at firm level  
 
Structural reconfiguration (or the cases’ ‘initial situation’) 
 
The above political economy transformations have affected workers and unions in La Gran 
Minería through changes in the employer regimes in which they operate and the type of 
labour force or union constituency to which they give rise. By employer regime I mean to 
refer to the crosscutting of two main dimensions of employer strategy toward labour: 
inclusion/exclusion of unions, and contract/status of labour (Hyman, 1997a). In the context of 
this study, I likened these dimensions to continuums between repression and acceptance of 
unions, and between core and periphery workers. Crosscutting these dimensions allows us to 
identify up to six regimes, three of which were evident as ‘initial employer regimes’ in La 
Gran Minería, or the earliest regime observable in each of the cases studied for the period 
1982-2009 (in brackets) (Figure 10.2). 
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Figure 10.2: Initial employer regimes in the Global Gran Minería  
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Figure 10.3: Initial modes of employment regulation and job security in the Global Gran Minería 
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Employers at CODELCO (1982-93), Sur Andes (1982-90), and Los Pelambres (1990-
2000) displayed Regulated Market regimes in their relations with core workers. These 
regimes were broadly characterised by non-exclusive and status-based relations, where union 
presence was tolerated and workers were not considered simple commodities. Employers at 
Escondida (1990-2002), El Abra (1996-2004), and Zaldívar (1995-2004) set up operations on 
a non-union basis with built-in personnel and industrial relations systems designed to remain 
non-union throughout the mining cycle. Soft HRM regimes relied on status and exclusion 
simultaneously, providing for good working and employment conditions with the explicit aim 
of preventing unionisation among their core workers. User and provider employer regimes in 
respect of contract workers organised with SINAMI (since 1982), SITECO (1989), 
SINTRAC (2003), and the new CTC (2007) can unmistakably be described as Bleak House, 
relying heavily on exclusion and (sub-standard) contract-based relations, designed to thwart 
unionisation and keep labour costs to a minimum respectively. 
 
Initial employer regimes entailed different modes of employment regulation (individual 
or collective) and job security (high, standard, low) reconfiguring the nature of their labour 
forces as a result (Figure 10.3). From the perspective of organised labour, this meant the 
nature of their constituencies and a great deal of their internal challenges. Core workers in 
union tolerant regimes at CODELCO, Sur Andes, and Los Pelambres could be seen as 
endangered labour force because their dominant mode of employment regulation was 
collective and level of employment protection was standard. Core workers employed in anti-
union regimes at Escondida, El Abra, and Zaldívar also had an average level of job security: 
but their dominant modes of employment regulation were individual. As a result, these 
workers could be described as flexibilised labour force, occupying an intermediate position 
between the ‘casual’ and ‘autonomous’ categories. Notwithstanding the differences between 
types of contract workers and their employers’ position in the outsourcing chain, the 
overwhelming majority of contract workers could be described as a casual labour force in 
terms of extremely low levels of job security and individual modes of employment regulation. 
 
Critical junctures (or the cases’ ‘contingent situation’) and path breaking choices 
 
Regardless of the commonality of national and sector level challenges, each group of cases 
faced different critical junctures within the boundaries of their specific structural situation. An 
‘objective’ account of these junctures since 1982 would recognise similarities and differences 
in their number, timing, nature, and triggers. Correspondingly, an objective account of union 
responses to these junctures shows that in all cases they were matched by path-breaking 
choices that reflected the particularities of each case’s initial situation. 
THREE WORLDS OF WORK AND COLLECTIVE ACTION 
339 
 
Unions of core workers in union tolerant regimes have faced one main critical juncture 
at different points in time: Sur Andes and CODELCO in the late 1980s and early 1990s 
respectively, and Los Pelambres between 1998 and 2000. While the former experienced 
neoliberal restructuring as a sudden increase in competition, the latter’s management rebuilt 
the company to become a major international copper producer. In all cases however, and 
following different paths, management decided to incorporate labour in addressing their 
defensive or offensive competitive objectives. The unions chose to get involved engaging in 
labour-management cooperation and leaving behind their traditional adversarial strategies 
around collective bargaining. In doing so, they broadened the scope of relations with 
employers, incorporating collective bargaining but going beyond it to include different 
degrees of direct and representative participation. 
 
Core workers in anti-union regimes have faced a sequence of two critical junctures 
since Escondida began production in 1990. These junctures have been triggered by analogous 
factors in all three cases but their length and degree of overlap have differed greatly. The first 
critical juncture was caused by the erosion of ‘sweet foreign stuff’ or management attempts at 
changing hitherto widely considered superior working and employment conditions. This 
triggered waves of worker discontent and organising drives in all three cases. Workers at 
Escondida responded by organising as early as 1993 but were effectively neutralised for most 
of the decade. El Abra and Zaldívar managed to stay non-union for a few years but as the 
1990s drew to a close, workers at these operations conducted successful organising 
campaigns in 1998 and 2000 respectively. But sustaining effective collective action proved a 
far more painstaking affair than conducting successful organising campaigns. The second 
critical juncture was internal, caused by union ineffectiveness in terms of disastrous results in 
collective bargaining and poor union management. Workers responded by renewing their 
leaderships and these, in turn, by rebuilding their organisations. Successful union building 
began in Escondida in 2000, followed by Zaldívar in 2002 and El Abra in 2003. New 
directorates have been able to rekindle their membership, professionalise leadership activities, 
and articulate with each other through the FMC. 
 
Periphery workers in harsh anti-union regimes have faced a three-fold sequence of 
critical junctures. Unlike the previous group of cases, not all cases have faced analogous 
junctures. But as I will elaborate further below, it is helpful to conceive of the experiences of 
these unions as shared occurrences in the development of a broader ‘contract labour 
movement’. The first critical juncture faced by periphery workers resulted directly from the 
harsh material circumstances in which they found themselves in as a result of the imposition 
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of neoliberal restructuring by the Pinochet dictatorship. In this context, SINAMI was able to 
successfully reinvent itself in the mid-1980s by combining an authoritarian leadership, 
membership mobilisation at key stages of the labour process, and membership protection 
against repression and unemployment. In a few years, SINAMI’s ‘Direct Action’ strategy 
turned it into one of the most effective unions in the country. The nature of the second critical 
juncture was internal, caused by union ineffectiveness in terms of disastrous results in 
collective bargaining in the case of SITECO, and by poor (corrupt) union management in the 
case of SINAMI. Non-montajistas responded by forming the SITECO led Coordinadora 
Nacional de Trabajadores Contratistas de CODELCO (CNTCC) in 2001, and undertaking a 
painstaking process of strategic renewal. This culminated with the successful involvement of 
the state in their struggle in the run up to the 2005 presidential elections which led in turn to 
the enactment of new protective regulations (2006 Outsourcing Act). Meanwhile, the 
abandonment of the direct action strategy and the bitter infighting that followed led to the 
split of SINAMI in 2003, when numerous stewards established SINTRAC in a bid to re-
launch a new, democratic, ‘SINAMI’ based on rank-and-file participation. The third and last 
critical juncture was prompted by employers’ refusal to comply with the 2006 Outsourcing 
Act and by the perceived ineffectiveness of the state’s enforcement agencies. The CNTCC 
responded by reorganising itself into the new Confederación de Trabajadores del Cobre 
(CTC) in 2007, an industry wide organisation aiming at representing all contract workers in 
the copper sector. The new CTC has since led a qualitatively different and far more effective 
cycle of protest with national-level repercussions.  
 
 
10.5 Strategies and outcomes in the ‘Global’ Gran Miner ía  
 
The current form of union strategy in the ‘Global’ Gran Minería 
 
Over the past three decades, the responses of the three groups of workers defined by 
crosscutting industrial relations institutions and employer strategies toward unions have 
evolved into three well-defined ‘types’ of unionism (Table 10.2). The strategic approach of 
unions at the union-tolerant core has evolved from ‘Classic Copper Unionism’ (or ‘Classic 
State Unionism’ in Agacino et al.’s account) into a type of unionism better described as 
Company Egoism; unions at the anti-union core have built onto their ‘Weak Unionism’ 
beginnings (Agacino et al., 1998) to develop a model of unionism that I have labelled New 
Adversarialism; and the strategic approach of unions at the periphery of the sector has 
evolved from SINAMI’s classic ‘direct action’ strategy, through ‘Emerging’ and ‘Weak and 
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Fluctuating’ unionisms (Agacino et al., 1998), into a variety of patterns that continue to share 
this imprint and which I have called Contract Labour Radicalism.  
 
Current types of unionism emphasise distinct relational dimensions as their ‘critical 
means’. Company Egoism and New Adversarialism depend on the quality of relations 
established with employers and union members and can therefore be described as industrial 
types of unionism. But the nature of these relationships varies greatly between them. In the 
case of Company Egoism, these can be characterised as defensive because unions have given 
up offensive grievances and observed industrial peace in exchange for an increased status as 
‘social partners’ in a variety of Partnership Agreements. This has led them to actively seek the 
demobilisation of their members and to limit union-member relations to servicing activities at 
best, and clientelism at worst. In contrast, New Adversarialism can be viewed as offensive as 
it relies on militant wage bargaining and the mobilisation of members, albeit in surges of 
participation. This is because union effectiveness is largely understood as ‘signing a better 
contract than the last one’ which requires developing bargaining strength through organising.  
 
Contract Labour Radicalism can be described in terms of a blend of offensive industrial 
and political strategies. It has remained offensive and industrial because of its emphasis on 
‘direct action’ or militant relations with user employers based on the mobilisation of members 
and non-members alike at critical points of the production process. It has become offensive 
and political, particularly the new CNTC, due to its increasingly close relations with the 
Communist Party, active participation in CUT, and activism at community level, as a means 
to engaging the state in their struggle, both as employer and legislator.  
 
In contrast, Company Egoism and New Adversarialism present low, albeit different, 
levels of engagement with actors beyond the level of the firm. On the one hand, Company 
Egoism is characterised by a high degree of sectionalism in state, labour movement, political 
party, and society relations, with unions as polity outsiders, sectionalist, apolitical, and 
detached respectively. The FTC stands out as an exception in all four but this appears to be in 
name only, the result of the state being their employer rather than a consequence of a 
commitment to a political project or broad conception of general interest. On the other hand, 
New Adversarialism’s relations with the state, political parties, and society are minimal as 
Company Egoism’s, but labour movement relations have become an important area of union 
activity albeit restricted to ‘sector solidarity’. By this I mean the increasing inter-union 
relations between private sector unions in the form of the FMC. 
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With regard to organisational dimensions, while Company Egoism and New 
Adversarialism rely on a strictly private orientation to interest representation. Contract labour 
Radicalism displays a public orientation, speaking for the interests of all contract workers 
employed by a particular user company regardless of actual membership. Worker interests in 
all three cases have been defined in narrow but attainable bread-and-butter terms, although 
Company Egoism unions have broadened their objectives with a qualitative agenda framed 
around participation and employee development. The type of inclusion and predominant 
organisational form also vary. Company Egoism and New Adversarialism unions are 
vertically inclusive and organised in firm-level federations and firm-level unions respectively. 
Contract Labour unions are horizontally inclusive and have been structured as inter-firm 
unions. In all cases however, power within these organisations has remained highly 
centralised and the principle of leadership predominance has prevailed over membership 
democracy in union governance. 
 
In sum, these three types of unionism have come to rely on distinct patterns of ‘critical, 
deliberate, and emergent decisions about increasing the ability of trade unions to control and 
access resources and sanctions both material and ideological’. Company Egoism has 
supplemented the traditional workplace bargaining power of core workers in this key strategic 
sector of the economy, with an elite type of associational power, reflected in the strengthened 
role of unions, and top union leaders, as authoritative social partners. In this way, unions have 
simultaneously increased their ability to control and access resources and sanctions hitherto 
exclusive to management, and reduced their need to rely on internal sources of strength 
including the mobilisation of their members. New Adversarialism has also made an effective 
use of workplace bargaining power resulting from the strategic location of their members, but 
has done so by exploring rather more traditional forms of associational power, or the various 
forms of power resulting from membership mobilisation in surges of participation, and the 
increasing articulation of collective organisations at firm and sector level.  
 
Contract Labour Radicalism has also tapped onto these sources of worker power. But 
while Company Egoism and New Adversarialism have tapped onto resources ‘given’ by their 
strategic position and institutions regulating firm-level industrial relations, Contract Labour 
unions have done so despite these resources being purposely taken away from them, and 
should be considered an achievement in itself. First, they have developed a great deal of 
associational power by refining and strengthening the purposely-designed weak and rights-
stripped models of inter-firm union organisation and unregulated collective bargaining. 
Second, they have made effective use of workplace bargaining power, despite being 
employed by tens of different provider companies. Last, in recent years the new CNTC has 
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explored a mass type of associational power, in which a wide array of mass tactics –from 
sabotage to civil disobedience- have rediscovered, and accessed the resources of, activists, 
political parties, and community organisations.  
 
 
Table 10.2: Types of Unionism in Today’s Gran Minería 
 Company Egoism New Adversarialism Contract Labour 
Radicalism 
    
Organisational    
Constituency Core Core Periphery 
Objectives Bread and butter Bread and butter Bread and butter 
Legal framework 
Form 
 
Firm-level unions  
Firm-level federations 
Firm-level union Inter-firm union 
Capacity High Medium Medium/High 
Democracy Leadership 
predominance 
Leadership 
predominance 
Leadership 
predominance 
Activism Moderation Militant bargaining Militant direct action 
    
Relational     
Employer relations Partnership 
 
Adversarialism 
 
Militancy 
Member relations Servicing 
Demobilisation 
Servicing 
Spurts of mobilisation 
Organising 
Mobilisation 
Labour movement 
relations  
Sectionalism Affiliated to FMC (or 
CMCH) 
CUT 
 
State relations Insider/Outsider Outsider Outsider 
Political party relations Political (SP) / Apolitical Apolitical Political (CP) 
Society relations Inexistent Inexistent Broad 
    
Evolved from…    
Agacino et al. (1998) ‘Classic State Unionism’ ‘Weak Unionism’ ‘Emerging Unionism’ + 
‘Fluctuating Unionism’ 
    
Cases     
 CODELCO (since 1993) Escondida (since-2000) SINTRAC (since 2003) 
 Disputada (since 1990) El Abra (since1998) SITECO (since 2005) 
 Pelambres (since 2000) Zaldívar (since 2000) New CTC (since 2005) 
    
 
 
The outcomes of union strategy in the ‘Global’ Gran Minería 
 
Current types of unionism have varied in their degree of effectiveness and potential 
contribution to the revitalisation of the Chilean labour movement. In the accounts presented in 
the first three sections of this chapter, we employed two ways of assessing union 
effectiveness. One as ‘delivery of the deal’ and the other as ‘effectiveness along the four 
dimensions of revitalisation’. Both show that it is not possible to determine which type of 
unionism has been the more effective (as Agacino et al., 1998 imply it can be done), but 
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provide instead for a more nuanced assessment of variation in which by some measures some 
unionisms can be viewed as more effective than others and vice versa. 
 
On the one hand, union effectiveness can be assessed in terms of the degree to which 
unions ‘deliver the deal’ to their memberships. In all cases, the ‘deal’ means the improvement 
of working and employment conditions evident, in our view, in the nature of employer 
regimes and the type of labour force to which they give rise (Figures 10.4 and 10.5 
respectively). From this perspective, Company Egoism and New Adversarialism have been 
effective because both have achieved a significant change in both variables relative to their 
initial regimes. While Company Egoism now operates in ‘micro concertation’ regimes with 
‘protected’ memberships, New Adversarialism today functions in ‘union tolerant’ regimes 
with ‘endangered’ members. On the contrary, Contract Labour Radicalism can only be 
assessed as ineffective because despite sporadic gains, employer regimes regulating contract 
labour remain stubbornly ‘bleak house’ and their memberships a ‘casual labour force’. 
 
On the other hand, union effectiveness along the four ‘dimensions of revitalisation’ 
identified by Behrens et al. (2004). All three types of unionism have been effective along the 
membership dimension, albeit density statistics alone remain unreliable as exclusive measures 
of effectiveness. Company Egoism unions have maintained nearly universal density levels but 
decreasing absolute memberships; New Adversarialism unions have achieved nearly 
universal density levels with stable memberships; and Contract Labour unions have tapped 
onto workers’ ‘willingness to act’ as opposed to their ‘willingness to pay’. In the absence of 
hard quantitative data, assessing the effectiveness of unions along the economic dimension is 
far more contentious but overall, it can be said that they have achieved wage and benefit 
improvements. Taking the long view however, the degree of improvement has varied, as they 
can be described as steady and significant in the case of Company Egoism, intermittent and 
insufficient for New Adversarialism unions, and largely meagre as well as sporadic for 
Contract Labour Unions. All unions in the sector have also made significant progress along 
the institutional dimension but, again, in different ways. Company Egoism unions have 
developed significantly as organisations thanks to the prominence given to them by 
Partnership Agreements, New Adversarial unions have made inroads in terms of union 
management, and Contract Labour unions have successfully explored new structural forms.  
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Figure 10.4: Employer regimes in today’s Global Gran Minería  
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Figure 10.5: Dominant modes of employment regulation and job security in today’s Gran Minería 
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Effectiveness along the political dimension sets the FTC apart from all other core 
worker unions. Indeed, both Company Egoism (bar FTC) and New Adversarialism are united 
in their loath of political parties but also in their lack of interest in influencing policy-making 
and interacting with the state. Contract Labour unions also wary of close relations with 
political parties and the state but since the rise of the new CNTC, closer relations have been 
sought for and, in this respect, their achievements in influencing elections, policy-making and 
enforcement can only be assessed as effective. 
 
This discussion demonstrates why assessments of effectiveness must be complemented 
by assessments of the possible contribution of current types of unionism to the revitalisation 
of the Chilean labour movement. To furthering revitalisation, union strategies and types must 
also offer a significant contribution to overall situation of the labour movement. I therefore 
employ union revitalisation in a highly subjective manner, to refer both to an ongoing process 
as well as to an assessment of a desired outcome, one that involves issues of solidarity and 
sustainability in a broader ‘labour movement’ sense.  
 
From this perspective, Company Egoism appears to have made only a modest 
contribution to the revitalisation of the labour movement. Its main achievement –micro 
concertation- has come at the heavy price of sectionalism and lack of solidarity. More 
concretely, despite significant differences between them, all Partnership Agreements struggle 
to meet Fichter and Greer’s (2004: 72-73, 88) criteria for social partnership to further union 
revitalisation. ‘(A)bsent a solid anchor of supportive institutions and union strategies and a 
link to broader social initiatives, social partnerships usually strengthen the interdependence 
between unions and specific firms, thus remaining particularistic, thwarting the 
embeddedness of partnership in a broader social environment. (…) Unfortunately, the vast 
majority of partnerships lack those qualities and tend to feed into the process of union 
decline’. In contrast, New Adversarialism has made a constrained, but nonetheless important 
contribution to union revitalisation. Its main achievement –organising the anti-union core- has 
been nothing short than impressive. The Economist, has referred to it as ‘a worrying 
precedent’ (2006) not only because of their improving results in collective bargaining but due 
to the potency of its nationwide demonstrative effect. 
 
Despite making headway in all four dimensions of union revitalisation, Contract 
Labour Radicalism these have failed to translate in permanent changes to employer regimes 
and as a whole contract labour remains a casual labour force employed in bleak house 
regimes. unable to change the Bleak House regime in which most periphery workers continue 
to work in. However, it could be argued that Contract Labour Radicalism represents a 
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potentially significant contribution to union revitalisation. Recent episodes of contract labour 
mobilisation suggest a promising reconstruction of union organisations as effective social 
actors mobilising outside the realm of the law to obtain what legislation does not provide for. 
But caution must be exercised here and hence the ‘potential’ caveat. A fundamental issue, 
amongst various others, relates to the notion of ‘precariousness’, or the key shared interest 
that gives these unions their identity. But precariousness involves a major paradox because it 
is simultaneously what unites but also what is being denounced and rejected (Abarzúa, 2008). 
Contract workers’ main ambition is not to improve their working and employment conditions 
per se but to be hired by the user enterprise that they work for, effectively leave behind their 
‘second class’ status (López, 2007). This paradox is evident in the extinction of successful 
contract labour action once the objective has been obtained. Though promising then, whether 
mass mobilisation is sustainable in the long-term and a viable alternative for the revitalisation 
of Chile’s labour movement remains an open question. 
 
 
10.6 Factors and dynamics in the ‘Global’ Gran Miner ía  
 
Significant changes in opportunity structure are a necessary but not sufficient condition in 
explaining the form and outcomes of union strategy. As the social movement literature 
consistently shows, changes in opportunity will only become an opportunity when defined as 
such by actors sufficiently well organised to act on a shared definition of the situation 
(McAdam et al., 1996). In all cases in this study, the key factor in linking ‘objective’ changes 
in opportunity and the transformation of union strategy has been union leaders and the 
framing processes they set in motion to mobilise (or demobilise) their memberships, 
redesigning their organisations’ mobilising structures and reinterpreting received repertoires 
of contention. In other words, the current form and outcomes of union strategy in the Global 
Gran Minería can be viewed as a consequence of the evolution of three specific combinations 
of opportunity, mobilising structure, framing processes, and repertoires of contention.  
 
Trade unionism at the union tolerant core has evolved into ‘Company Egoism’ as a 
result of a particular combination of opportunity, mobilising structure, framing processes, and 
repertoires of contention. The key element in linking ‘objective’ changes in ‘political 
opportunity’ variables and the transformation of union strategy was a profound change in 
leadership attitudes as a result of management’s opening. It was management that essentially 
re-defined the problem unions found themselves responding to and were crucial in identifying 
a solution for it, narrowing the scope of alternative courses of action. The transition between 
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adversarialism and cooperation involved active leadership efforts to demobilise their 
memberships. In all cases, demobilisation was sought after by actively re-constructing 
workers’ interests. Union leaderships and employers actively reframed the employment 
relationship around the commonality of interests between capital and labour in the survival of 
the firm, and involved significant joint union-employer efforts to inculcate worker 
commitment to corporate goals and loyalty to the supervision. Demobilisation was facilitated 
by mobilising structures which, given a new prominent institutional role, have had little 
incentive to rely on internal sources of strength, and have been highly effective in controlling 
and suffocating dissent. Demobilisation was also aided by ‘modern monopolistic’ repertoires 
of contention that have long established the priority of ‘corporatist’ objectives and collective 
action aimed at safeguarding the privileges of insiders and the survival of their union. 
 
In explaining union strategy at the anti-union core, it is sensible to distinguish between 
factors and dynamics explaining the emergence of collective action from those explaining the 
current form and outcomes of union strategy. First, the emergence of collective action by core 
workers at the anti-union core can be seen as the result of a particular combination of 
opportunity, mobilising structure, framing processes, and repertoires of contention. 
Opportunities for creating collective organisation arose when dissatisfaction with worsening 
employment and working conditions generated amongst workers a generalised sense of 
grievance. This process helped to quickly ‘switch on’ previously dormant union identities in a 
critical number of activists. In all cases, these leaders and the framing processes they set in 
motion became the key element in linking ‘objective’ changes in ‘political opportunity’ and 
the transformation of union strategy. Leaders were able to actively construct and 
progressively undermine management authority by attributing injustice to ‘bad’ Chilean 
managers who replaced ‘good’ foreign managers. Promoting group cohesion was restricted to 
a limited number of activists who approached colleagues on a one-to-one basis and 
established confidential mobilising structures for mutual support. Once individuals saw 
themselves as part of these networks, collective action then depended on the definition of 
interests, the degree of organisation and the costs and benefits of taking action (Kelly, 1998). 
While organising tactics were oriented to overcoming fear and developing trust, the 
legitimacy of collective action was argued on purely legal and instrumental terms rather than 
on traditional class or political arguments, as an assertion of legal rights that would eventually 
result in concrete material benefits. 
 
Second, trade unionism at the anti-union core has evolved into ‘New Adversarialism’ 
as a result of a particular combination of opportunity, mobilising structure, framing processes, 
and repertoires of contention. In the absence of major changes in external opportunity in 
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terms of economic change, industrial relations institutions, and state and employer strategies, 
it is necessary to look at (the failure) of union strategy as main trigger. Successful organising 
campaigns had not translated into bargaining strength, let alone into securing satisfactory 
contracts. As a result, all unions renewed their leaderships. New leaders set in motion framing 
processes that redefined the unions’ structure of opportunity in pragmatic and ultimately 
successful terms. In their view, Chile’s system of firm-level collective bargaining only 
provides opportunities for firm-level unions to pursue their claims during periodic bargaining 
rounds. It is during bargaining rounds that the commonality of interests among members is at 
its highest level (the new contract proposal), the costs of collective action are perceived to be 
at their lowest (collective bargaining and strike action are lawful and participants are 
protected by law), and possible benefits are at their highest (obtaining a better contract). It 
therefore made no sense for them to display a timid stance against recalcitrant employers. On 
the contrary, success or failure depended on raising the stakes (‘double or nothing’) by 
developing a militant wage bargaining approach. New leaders have strengthened mobilising 
structures to raise their leverage over employers before, during, and after collective 
bargaining by increasing union membership at firm level and growing articulation at sector 
level through the FMC. In doing so, new directors appear to have been far less troubled by 
prioritising collective action in terms of promoting the social mobility of their members over 
any broader class and/or political project, and have framed such perspective around the 
modern-monopolistic repertoires of contention that have historically characterised the sector. 
 
Just like with the previous group of cases, in explaining the emergence, form, and 
outcomes of union strategy at the harsh anti-union periphery, it is reasonable to distinguish 
between factors and dynamics that may explain the emergence of collective action and those 
that may be explaining its current form and outcomes. First, rather than a natural spontaneous 
reaction against their oppression, the recreation of SINAMI and the emergence of its ‘classic’ 
strategy resulted from a specific strategic decision of the Communist Party oriented to 
destabilise the Pinochet regime by promoting industrial unrest in flagship economic sectors. 
But the key element in linking the ‘takeover’ of SINAMI by Communists and the 
transformation of union strategy was the leadership of Miguel Gonzalez. Gonzalez was 
capable of significantly reframing opportunity, liberating montajistas from a hopeless 
diagnosis of structural weakness and perennial job insecurity, turning their anger and 
‘anarchist’ behaviour’ into a source of strength, and demonstrating the illegitimacy of 
dictatorial institutions and legitimising in turn the union’s illegal struggle. Gonzalez also 
recreated SINAMI’s inter-firm mobilising structure increasing the union’s mobilising 
capacity and reduced the perceived costs of collective action. Last, SINAMI was able to 
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rediscover and tap onto Anarchist repertoires of contention latent among construction and 
industrial assemblage workers (Figure 10.6). 
 
Second, trade unionism at the harsh anti-union periphery has evolved into ‘Contract 
Labour Radicalism’ as a result of a particular combination of opportunity, mobilising 
structure, framing processes, and repertoires of contention. In particular, attention must be 
given to the comprehensive and carefully designed strategic shift in order to involving the 
state which entailed major changes in mobilising structure, leadership, and framing processes. 
This changes, in turn, created significant openings in political opportunities from which the 
unions have benefited ever since. SITECO began a two-level redesign of its mobilising 
structure with the introduction of a secret cellular structure of militants at firm level for 
sabotaging activities (‘mine moles’) and the restructuring of the Coordinadora (CNTCC) into 
a Confederation (new CTC), allowing for rather more centralised top decision-making. Last 
but not least, a crucial element in explaining the change in fortunes of non-montajistas is a 
timely renewal of leadership. With the historic SITECO leadership vetoed by the government 
the great shift came with the election of Communist leader Cristián Cuevas as leader of the 
new CTC. Cuevas’ leadership has demonstrated a high degree of intelligence in designing 
innovative tactics, identifying targets, and in using symbolical language in their motivational 
framing efforts.  
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Figure 10.6: Historical and political influences in today’s Gran Minería  
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Closure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In this thesis I have tried to contribute to the literature on union strategy. In contrast to 
most studies however, this study has explored the struggles of workers and their collective 
organisations at the periphery of the international, now ‘global’, capitalist economy. The 
thesis has focused on Chile’s large-scale copper mining sector broadening the scope of 
research by focusing on a showcase of what I have called the new fault zones of the 
international economy, incorporating and going beyond national and firm levels of 
analysis, and by examining the accounts of well-established union organisations as well as 
those of non-organised or poorly organised workers in the ‘rough end’ of the labour 
market. But have these choices paid off in increasing our understanding of union strategy 
in the era of globalisation? In what follows I aim to show how this study may be 
contributing to fill some of the theoretical, empirical, and analytical gaps found in the 
literature. By this I mean to refer to gaps found in the literature on union strategies of 
globalisation, union strategy in Chile’s large-scale mining sector, and frameworks of 
analysis respectively. 
 
I have organised this brief concluding chapter in three sections. Each sections 
centres on a research question. Section 11.1 discusses the issue of union challenges in the 
era of globalisation, Section 11.2 examines union strategies and outcomes, and Section 
11.3 explores factors and dynamics. Each of these sections has a similar structure. I first 
introduce the research question and then I review the main gaps encountered in the 
literature and discuss how the findings of this study may be contributing to fill some of 
them. 
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11.1 Challenges in the era of globalisation 
 
The first question of this study was related to identifying the key challenges facing 
workers and trade unions in the era of ‘globalisation’. This is important because in the 
academic and popular literature, it has become increasingly familiar to attribute ‘union 
decline’ to the workings of the ill-defined notion of ‘globalisation’ and therefore there is a 
need for a more precise understanding of the ‘context’ in terms of what specific factors 
constitute the strategic problem unions are responding to, and how these factors constrain 
and enable union action.  
 
Theoretical gaps and contribution 
 
Three main theoretical gaps with reference to union decline were identified in the 
literature of union challenges in the era of globalisation. First, establishing union decline 
is far from straightforward. Union decline refers to the general erosion of trade union 
power and influence observed across the world since the 1970s. Union decline is usually 
discussed with reference to questionable proxy measures of union power such as union 
density, bargaining coverage, and strike frequency (Kelly, 1998). Furthermore, decline 
trends are not universal, uniform or unilinear, but greatly uneven both between and within 
countries. More fundamentally, general decline trends do not necessarily mean equivalent 
loss of union power as the relative importance of proxy measures varies across countries. 
This is why authors such as Frege and Kelly (2003) argue that from a comparative 
perspective is preferable to simply speak of problems rather than decline. But while 
speaking of problems may enlighten the nature and extent of challenges in individual 
cases, it appears less successful at explaining and interpreting the broad similarities 
observable across them. Second, given that social phenomena rarely have just one cause, 
it is unsurprising that the literature on union decline has identified, analysed, and widely 
debated numerous potential factors when exploring the causes of union decline. But again, 
while a highly specific and accurate constellation of factors may help explain individual 
cases, problems of generalisation and simplification remain. Last, interpreting the extent 
and meaning of union decline for the future of trade unionism continues to be a hotly 
debated issue. One way of examining alternative interpretations is by referring to the 
notion of globalisation about which I distinguished two opposite views. From a 
globalisation-centred perspective globalisation is largely perceived as an unprecedented 
established fact which challenges lie beyond the control of workers and their 
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organisations. In contrast, a union-centred view is critical of the globalisation discourse. 
Rather than a predetermined process driven by diffuse market forces, this perspective 
largely views new regulatory and production regimes as contradictory and contested by 
labour (Fairbrother and Griffin, 2002). This perspective argues that rather than structural 
determinism, historical and comparative research suggests scope for choice, and 
consequently conceives of workers and unions as social actors having some discretion in 
how to react to their changing environments. Which view is more accurate? 
 
This study has confirmed that speaking of problems (or challenges) rather than of 
decline can be valuable. It suggests that the nature of the specific challenge facing workers 
and trade union can be determined by deconstructing their structure of opportunity at 
different levels of analysis. First, at national and sector level the structure of opportunity 
of copper unions has expanded and contracted permanently since the beginning of the 
twentieth century. By looking at the evolution of socio-economic change, state and 
employer strategies, and industrial relations institutions at national and sector level I 
distinguished three successive socio-economic milieus: laissez-faire outward-oriented 
development, ISI inward-oriented development, and neoliberal outward-oriented 
development in a sequence that has mirrored the transformations of the international 
economy: from the laissez-faire ethos that led to the Great Depression, through the 
Keynesian arrangements that characterised the ‘short’ twentieth century in North America, 
Western Europe, and Latin America, to the era of ‘globalisation’ or the onslaught of 
neoliberalism on a global scale. The dynamics of economic change and development of 
industrial relations institutions that have characterised these periods in Chile –and 
determined labour’s external structure of opportunity at national, sector, and firm-level in 
each of them- have had a marked tendency towards déjà vu. One, of course, is the 
swinging orientation of the economy (outward, inward, and outward again) and the role of 
the state (hands-off, interventionist, and hands-off again). Another has been the cyclical 
manner in which the state and employers conceive of labour (from an undesirable 
nuisance to capital accumulation, to partner in socio-economic development, back to 
socio-economic pariah). Yet another is the corresponding oscillating nature of industrial 
relations institutions (repressive, tolerant but restrictive, and repressive again). The 
evolution of the structure of opportunity at sector level has mirrored the dynamics 
observed at higher levels, expanding and contracting accordingly. Thus, the findings of 
this study suggests that ‘era of globalisation’ represents no more than the latest transition 
between cycles, one which has generally contracted copper unions’ structure of 
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opportunity by state and employer counter mobilisation, and the imposition of market-
oriented industrial relations. This is likely to remain the case for as long as the neoliberal 
pattern of accumulation remains in place because highly flexible labour with few rights to 
collective action are critical to the model, and thus far has proved central to the recovery 
and expansion of Chilean capitalism (Taylor, 2004). 
 
Second, the nature of the specific challenge facing workers and unions at firm-level 
in highly decentralised systems such as the Chilean one appears to be greatly determined 
by the type of employer regime and the type of labour force (or union constituency) to 
which it gives rise. In this study, this has been evident in the manner in which employers 
have deployed their workforce(s) (core and periphery) and their approach to trade unions 
(suppression, tolerance, and acceptance). That employer strategy emerges as main factor 
should not be taken as evidence of the withdrawal of the state from industrial relations as 
a result of globalisation. Quite the opposite. Indeed, the current relevance of employer 
strategy is a consequence of state re-regulation of industrial relations institutions 
according to market power (Hyman, 2001). In other words, that employers have become 
the driving force in industrial relations is the result of institutions that have allowed them 
greater room of manoeuvre in the deployment of their labour force. But this should not be 
taken to mean that employers are merely reacting to state action. One should not lose sight 
of the fact that in most cases states are equally driven by capital accumulation, and that the 
latest re-regulation of industrial relations institutions required, particularly in the Chilean 
case, substantial amounts of state power (repression) in coalition with capital interests. 
 
Third, in addition to changes at national, sector, and firm levels, the nature of the 
specific challenge facing workers and unions depends on distinct contingent factors. I 
have referred to these as critical junctures, triggered by a powerful change that 
demonstrates that established routines and presuppositions are no longer viable (Hyman, 
2004). Triggers are not only external, but also internal. In this study, while the great 
majority of triggers that caused the first critical junctures came from employers, unions 
themselves have triggered subsequent critical junctures. 
 
Conceiving of the problem faced by workers and trade unions in this three-fold 
manner goes a long way from uncritical references to ‘globalisation’ as main union 
challenge. It is evident from the findings of this study that a union-centred view is rather 
more accurate than a simple ‘globalisation’ perspective. But this is not to dismiss the 
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‘globalising’ literature. Indeed, if properly framed, the concept of globalisation can point 
to important changes in opportunity. Indeed, general -‘globalising’- trends can be 
observed, particularly in terms of the ‘bunching’ of political economies characterised by 
worsening opportunities for subordinate actors to pursue their claims as a result of 
declining associational and bargaining power (structural and workplace). These have 
resulted from dominant patterns of labour regulation becoming increasingly sensitive to 
the prevailing balance of economic and political power (Contu and Murray, 2005; 
Western, 1998). But what framework can incorporate authentic globalising trends and the 
specific problems faced by individual groups of workers and their organisations? An 
alternative has been suggested by Giles (2000) who argues that the field of industrial 
relations could benefit greatly by adopting an international political economy (IPE) 
approach to understanding globalisation. Understanding globalisation in this way can 
illuminate, rather than obscure, possibilities for collective action. In his words: 
 
IPE is socially constructed, the result of deliberate action by individuals and groups. 
Action means, in most instances, collective action rooted in material interests. It 
follows that globalisation is neither permanent nor immutable. Rather than being fait 
accompli, it is an open-ended process of searching, struggle and uncertainty. (…) 
Thus, globalisation signifies a process of conflict over the organisation of capitalist 
production at the world level. 
 
(…) In this way, and rather than seeing globalisation as an abstract, expression of 
global forces, an IPE approach ‘encourages an effort to understand the social and 
material constitutions of the vectors of globalisation’. Second, it suggests that 
globalisation cannot be seen as occurring separately from outside or from above 
national economies or polities, but instead as expressing simultaneous changes on 
both levels. Globalisation, in other words, is as much about the policies pursued by 
nation states and other national actors as it is about the international. 
(Giles, 2000: 184-185) 
 
 
Empirical gaps and contribution 
 
The main empirical problem identified in the literature on union challenges in La Gran 
Minería was related to Agacino et al. (1998) identification of two key dimensions in 
trying to spell out the specific challenge facing copper workers. One is the distinction 
between direct and contract workers; and the other the result of the opening of the sector 
to foreign investment: the distinction between state-owned and multinational enterprises. 
Crosscutting these dimensions allowed them to identify four different groups of workers. 
CODELCO core workers, core workers employed by transnational corporations, contract 
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workers labouring for CODELCO, and contract workers labouring for transnational 
corporations. They argued that with the exception of core workers employed by 
CODELCO, all three other groups of workers faced anti-union regimes. 
 
The findings of this study differ from those of Agacino et al. (1998). First, in 
relation to core workers this thesis has shown that regimes characterised by union-
management cooperation are not exclusive of state-owned CODELCO. Two 
transnationals -one foreign and one domestic- operate under such regimes and, 
furthermore, one of them preceded CODELCO’s partnership by nearly four years. It 
follows that characterising all transnational regimes as ‘anti-union’ is simply inaccurate. 
Second, with regard to contact workers, the present study has confirmed early findings 
that the great majority of these workers labour in anti-union regimes. But this thesis has 
also shown that these regimes are remarkably similar across the sector, regardless of who 
they ultimately work for, be it CODELCO or transnationals, and therefore a distinction 
based ownership appears somewhat unnecessary. If anything, differences among contract 
workers stem from their type of work (montajistas or non-montajistas), and their relative 
position in the ‘outsourcing chain’. In sum, this study has found no evidence to sustain the 
relationship between ownership and management strategy toward labour suggested by 
Agacino et al. (1998). 
 
Analytical gaps and contribution 
 
Analytically, the literature on union decline showed that union decline is not only 
methodologically hard to define, measure and explain from a comparative perspective, but 
rather more fundamental. As Kelly (1998) has argued that this is largely due to the 
underdevelopment of the concept of power itself in the field of industrial relations. ‘There 
is no consensus on how the concept of power should be defined or measured; there is no 
agreed theoretical framework for studying its determinants; and consequently there is no 
consensus about precisely what has happened to union power (…) beyond the obvious 
general fact that it has declined’ (Kelly, 1998: 13). 
 
In this study I aimed at contributing to fill these gaps. I adopted Hyman and Fryer’s 
(1975: 26, 160) definition of union power as ‘the ability of trade unions to control their 
physical and social environment as well as to influence the decisions which are and are 
not taken by others, as a consequence of reduced trade union control over and access to 
resources and sanctions both material and ideological’. In order to explore the possible 
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determinants of union power I constructed a simple model based on the explanations 
available in the literature by distinguish between structural and agency factors on the one 
hand, and external and internal factors on the other. Cross-cutting the two dimensions 
suggested by these distinctions, results in decline explanations falling into four different 
types. In most cases, union decline could be explained as a result of the interplay of these 
four sets of factors which allowed me to reconceptualise these four factors as sources of 
union challenge. But identifying disparate factors without establishing meaningful 
relationships between them is likely to remain a futile exercise. This is why I explored a 
particular way of conceiving of external challenges in terms of ‘structure of opportunity’ 
(McAdam et al., 2001) by focusing on the historical development of industrial relations 
institutions (Howell, 2005). A second aspect referred to rethinking trade unions’ ‘internal 
factors’ and for this I drew on the social movement concepts of mobilising structures, 
framing processes, and repertoires of contention. Last, a satisfactory account of the 
evolution and current nature of union challenges had to recognise the increasingly multi-
layered nature of industrial relations. Accepting a plurality of levels required to 
empirically deconstruct the nature of opportunity and institutional development (Regalia, 
2007).  
 
 
11.2 Strategies and outcomes in the era of globalisation 
 
The second set of questions of this study was twofold. What are workers and trade unions 
doing to deal with current difficulties? And, how successful have these strategies been? At 
one level this relates to strategies narrowly conceived of as ‘tactics’, and the extent to 
which they have been more or less effective. On closer examination however, the problem 
becomes not strategies per se but the types of trade unionism that may be emerging after 
three decades of global restructuring and their contribution to advancing the revitalisation 
of the labour movement. 
 
Theoretical gaps and contribution 
 
Three central theoretical gaps were identified in the literature on union strategy and 
outcomes. The first two are linked to the two broad approaches to the study of union 
strategies of revitalisation. On the one hand, empirical studies focus on examining actual 
union action at different levels of analysis and can be seen as ‘assessments of what has 
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been’ (Clawson, 2005: 732). This type of research explicitly aims at understanding and 
promoting new proactive strategies in a belief that unions can effectively influence 
contemporary developments (Turner, 2004). In a nutshell, the great majority of debates in 
this area tend to be reminiscent of the ‘best practice’ or ‘best fit’ controversy. Does 
partnership represent a more promising approach than organising? Does mobilisation 
entail better prospects than institutionalisation? Union restructuring instead of inertia? Or 
are unions that better fit their strategic approach to their ‘contexts’, however defined, in a 
better position that those that do not?  
 
This study has shown significant variation in the form and outcomes of union 
strategies to question ‘best-practice’ recipes for union revitalisation. While core workers 
increasingly rely on industrial strategy (Company Egoism and New Adversarialism), 
contract workers have come to rely on a blend of industrial and political strategy (Contract 
Labour’s Radicalism). These differences in form reflect distinct ways of working through 
the union-employer and union-member nexus. In other words, the mobilisation or 
demobilisation of power resources along these two dimensions appear to be the most 
relevant aspect of union strategy in all cases. This confirms Boxall and Haynes (1997: 
585) argument that ‘in neo-liberal environments, it is industrial rather than political 
strategy that is crucial for unions: strategic choices in relation to workers and employers 
determine effectiveness’. Complementarily, and regardless of the specific nature of the 
nexus, differences in effectiveness have to do with the degree of success or failure in 
shifting employer behaviour. ‘It is plainly true that a union can satisfy worker needs in a 
neo-liberal environment only through a successful engagement with employers. Putting 
the point negatively, a union that understands worker needs, but can’t shift employer 
behaviour is ineffective’ (1997: 571). This also applies to contract workers use of political 
strategy. The cases of SITECO and the new CTC show that a great deal of their political 
strategy is due to the simple fact that their employer is the state. But I disagree with 
Boxall and Haynes (1997) when they conclude that the mode of engagement with 
employers’ is the primary or critical means of a union. This is because shifting employer 
behaviour cannot be accomplished without altering union-member relations.  
 
On the other hand, prescriptive models of revitalisation are concerned with 
suggesting how the labour movement must change if it is to survive (Heery et al., 2004). 
Heery et al. (2004: 3) have identified four distinct ‘models’ of union revitalisation. 
Societal models hold that unions must adapt to long-run changes in society and economy, 
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which require a ‘new unionism’, matched to the interests of a changing workforce’. 
Institutional models, in contrast, suggest that the task of revitalisation is to adjust union 
activity to the structure of opportunity provided by industrial relations institutions. With 
organisational models, the task of revitalisation is internalised and is dependent upon 
changes in union government to allow more effective management, greater democratic 
participation or the expression of diverse interests’. Finally, ‘actor-centred models 
emphasise the need to renew the population of leaders and activists occupying 
representative positions in unions, the underpinning belief being that unions can exercise 
strategic choice and that different choices will be made by representatives with different 
characteristics’. The findings of this study confirm that the models of revitalisation 
identified by Heery et al. (2004) do not contradict one another. On the contrary, they 
overlap with the four areas of challenges identified in the previous section (organisational 
models can be seen as responding to internal/structural challenges; actor-centred to 
internal/strategic; institutional to external/structural; and more controversially, societal to 
external/strategic) as well as with the relational and organisational dimensions with which 
I have analysed the form of union strategy.  
 
A third theoretical gap had to do with the somewhat depressive conclusion that, 
while available evidence suggests that union strategies do make a difference in certain 
dimensions of union activity (Frege and Kelly, 2003, 2004b), research to date indicates 
that this has not been reflected in broader union revitalisation (Clawson, 2005; Hyman, 
2004; Kuruvilla et al., 2002). The findings of this study demonstrate that union 
effectiveness is a necessary but not sufficient condition to further union revitalisation. 
This is because the effectiveness of unions as sources and mediums of power for 
subordinate actors can be conceived of as the degree of success and failure in working 
through relational and organisational dimensions. It does not follow however that 
‘strategic success’ in the latter sense (e.g. successful organising campaign) will 
necessarily reflect on union effectiveness in terms of ‘the delivery of the deal’ (e.g. 
modifying employer’s regime), let alone in broader solidarity and revitalisation (e.g. 
increasing articulation). 
 
Empirical gaps and contribution 
 
Empirical gaps in relation to union strategy and outcomes in La Gran Minería, relate to 
Agacino et al.’s (1998) rather vague analysis in this regard. They described union strategy 
by CODELCO core workers in terms of Classic State Unionism because the FTC has 
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always demonstrated a high level of commitment to the state, first as intermediary and 
later as employer, which has resulted in ‘a type of corporatist union action, chiefly 
oriented to preserve the privileges of a public enterprise’ (Agacino et al., 1998: 189) but 
failed to give any indication of its level of effectiveness. The PET study labelled union 
strategy by core workers in transnationals according to their perceived outcomes as Weak 
Unionism but failed to give any details about their strategic approach other than their 
‘exclusive focus on economic grievances’. Similarly, they described union strategy by 
contract workers labouring for CODELCO as Weak and Fluctuating Unionism. But again, 
the authors do not provide any further information about what this type of action actually 
entails in strategic terms other than illustrating it with the example of SITECO. Last, they 
refer to union strategy by contract workers operating in multinational corporations as 
Emerging Unionism. They discussed SINAMI as prime example of this type of unionism, 
but in doing so conflated montajistas and non-montajistas. 
 
Analytical gaps and contribution 
 
The review of the literature indicated three major analytical gaps. First, there is no agreed 
definition of trade union strategy. Second, there is no consensual model to examine its 
form and studies tend to concentrate in ‘known strategies’ (e.g. organising, social 
partnership, etc) rather than on the union strategic process itself. Third, there is no agreed 
way to assess union success or failure. Current assessments are far from conclusive, partly 
a reflection of the continuous problems of definition, measurement, and determinants of 
union power (Kelly, 1998), but also the result of conflating assessments of effectiveness 
with those of revitalisation. 
 
In this study I tried to overcome some of these analytical gaps in the following three 
ways. I proposed a definition of union strategy firmly rooted in a conception of union 
power. Drawing on the work of Boxall and Haynes (1997) and Hyman and Fryer (1975), I 
defined union strategy as a ‘pattern of critical, deliberate, and emergent decisions about 
increasing trade union power, or the ability of trade unions to control and access resources 
and sanctions both material and ideological’. I also suggested a multi-dimensional 
approach for analysing the form of union strategy differentiating between organisational 
and relational dimensions. While the former refer to dimensions which specify the range 
of choices available to trade unions as organisations (e.g. Hyman’s (1997) who, what, and 
how of trade unionism); the latter involve choices in relations unions establish with other 
actors, typically employers, members, and the state. Conceiving of trade union strategic 
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choice as multi-dimensional, and integrating relational and organisational dimensions 
encourages a more nuanced analysis of variation than received approaches. It allows us to 
make a distinction between decisions in relevant dimensions (union strategies), and their 
combination (models of trade unionism), permitting the comparative study of union 
strategy across cases as well as its evolution over time. Furthermore, it offers a way to 
adapt assessments of union effectiveness to the particularities of each case, decoupling 
them from assessments of union revitalisation. Thus, in this study, I defined an individual 
strategy or configuration of strategies as effective when satisfying at least one of the four 
dimensions of revitalisation identified by Behrens et al. (2004). But to furthering 
revitalisation, they must also offer a significant difference over the overall situation of 
particular unions and that of the labour movement more generally. I admittedly employ 
union revitalisation in a rather ‘subjective’ way, to refer both to an ongoing process as 
well as to an assessment of a desired outcome, one that involves issues of solidarity and 
sustainability in a broader ‘labour movement’ sense. 
 
 
11.3 Factors and dynamics in the era of globalisation 
 
The last set of questions that I aimed to answer in this study was mainly exploratory. What 
are the key determinants and dynamics that may be explaining the adoption of particular 
strategies and their differential outcomes? I was particularly interested in the analyses 
made by union leaders, and in the decisions and actions following these analyses. But it 
has not been until very recently that the union revitalisation literature has begun trying to 
understand the determining factors and dynamics explaining union strategic choice. 
Agacino et al. (1998), for example, do not refer to these issues at all. Unsurprisingly, there 
is no agreed model to analyse and/or explain union strategy and its outcomes. It is 
therefore not possible to offer a clear distinction between theoretical, empirical, and 
analytical gaps for this last research question.  
 
Suffice it to say that the great majority of frameworks available are essentially 
descriptive or, at best, try to explain union strategy in an ad hoc basis. They tend to focus 
on the relatively well-established labour movements found in advanced industrialised 
economies rather than on the far weaker forms of organisation prevalent in the rest of the 
world. Several commentators have thus called for the development a comparative 
framework for the analysis and explanation of changing union strategies (Beaupain, 1998; 
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Boxall and Haynes, 1997; Cornfield and McCammon, 2003; Frank, V., 2002; Frege and 
Kelly, 2003; Leisink et al., 1996; Lévesque and Murray, 2002; Murray et al., 2000). A 
preliminary, but nonetheless comprehensive approach to the study of the determinants of 
union strategic choice has been provided by Frege and Kelly (2003, 2004b). I argued 
however that this model is not entirely successful in capturing the richness of the social 
movement literature on which is based, particularly in terms of integrating structural 
determinants (socio-economic change, institutional context, and differences in employer 
and state strategies) with purposeful agency (union structures and framing processes). 
 
 I proposed a way of examining the determinants and dynamics of union strategy 
by elaborating on Frege and Kelly’s (2003) model. I reorganised the factors identified by 
these authors in four sets: the structure of political opportunities and constraints 
confronting the movement, mobilising structures, leadership and framing processes, and 
repertoires of contention (McAdam et al., 2001). I also revisited the notion of 
mobilisation, largely implicit in their model, as the dynamic element explaining the 
interactions between these sets of factors. 
 
 The findings of this study confirm that conceiving of trade unions exclusively as 
reactive organisations to changes occurring in their environment is not sufficient to 
explain the emergence, direction, and outcomes of union strategy. Changes in opportunity 
structure (see Section 11.1) can be seen as a necessary but not sufficient condition to 
explain the courses of action unions have followed. As I have argued on various occasions 
throughout this thesis, the social movement literature consistently shows that ‘no matter 
how momentous a change appears in retrospect, it only becomes an opportunity when 
defined as such by a group of actors sufficiently well organised to act on this shared 
definition of the situation’ (McAdam et al., 1996: 8). Expanding (or contracting) political 
opportunities derive their causal force from the interaction between structural changes and 
the perceptual changes they set in motion (McAdam et al., 1996). Indeed, one should not 
forget that, regardless of the differences in the nature of challenges faced, what all triggers 
have in common by definition is that they demonstrate that established routines and 
presuppositions are no longer viable (Hyman, 2004). Unsurprisingly, the role of union 
leaders and the perceptual changes they set in motion appear critical in all cases in this 
study.  
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This should not be taken to mean however that the content and outcomes of union 
strategic choice faithfully reflect the preferences of union leaders. Indeed, more often than 
not, ‘rationally chosen’ courses of action are the outcome of uneasy compromises between 
competing factors. The choices made by union leaders reflect the situation they are in, and 
the relative costs and benefits of alternative courses of action.  
 
In addition to the external factors previously discussed, this study has shown the 
value of the notions of mobilising structures and repertoires of contention as prime 
constraints (or facilitators) of union action. In other words, union leaders operate within 
the constraints of their organisations and are a reflection of their organisations’ ‘traditions 
of association’ and it is primarily within these parameters that their strategic choices are 
shaped. There is however, nothing determined in this regard. Take for example the case of 
SINAMI, an undemocratic union par excellence. SINAMI confirms previous research that 
shows that ‘undemocratic institutions can have democratic impacts (and) democratic 
unions may undermine democracy by allowing internal divisions to sap the power of 
labour (…). Tight organisation and centralised finance allowed (certain) unions to 
mobilise and to target the resources needed to overcome powerful employers. They 
brought grievance procedures, better working conditions, shorter work weeks, higher 
wages, (bringing) greater respect to workers’ (Friedman, 2004: 366). 
 
Union strategies and outcomes can therefore be seen as the result of a specific 
combination of opportunity, mobilising structure, framing processes, and repertoires of 
contention. By specific combination I mean to allude to a synergetic amalgamation that is 
more than the sum of its constituent parts. This is because the effects of these variables are 
interactive rather than independent. Thus, for example, what matters in analysing the 
relation between framing processes and opportunity is not the objective changes of the 
latter or the subjective character of the former, but their dynamic interaction. For example, 
social movement theorists have long argued that is pointless to discuss whether a 
revolution is the result of objective cracks in a political system or due to the perception of 
vulnerability of that system by revolutionaries (McAdam et al., 1996). Furthermore, while 
at the onset of a movement opportunities and constrains are independent of the actions of 
movement organisations, over time the structure of political opportunities becomes ‘more 
a product of the interaction of the movement with its environment than a simple reflection 
of changes occurring elsewhere’ (McAdam et al., 1996: 13). 
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But this of course assumes a sufficient internal organisational capacity. It is widely 
held that the relation between mobilising structures and framing processes is ‘both more 
likely and of far greater consequence under conditions of strong rather than weak 
organisation’ (McAdam et al., 1996: 9) and similar relations can be made between 
organisational capacity and opportunity and repertoires of contention. In sum, given that 
external factors are harder to put under control, a permanent task of any union 
organisation should be to build a degree of organisational capacity sufficient, at least, to 
questioning established routines and presuppositions as a regular element of their activity. 
 
To conclude, I would like to reiterate once more the importance of the notion of 
mobilisation for analysing and explaining union strategy. Collective action can be 
conceived of as exercise of power and any framework for the study of union strategy 
should therefore examine mobilisation, or the social processes by which a group acquires 
collective control over the power resources needed for action (Tilly, 1978: 7, cited in 
Kelly, 1998: 25). Although Kelly’s (1998) strong case for adopting ‘mobilisation theory’ 
as a new paradigm for industrial relation has been criticised by a number of commentators 
(Ackers, 2002; Edwards, 2003; Martin, 1999) for a variety of reasons -they tend to point 
at the incomplete layout of the theory, or that it is too restricted to become a new 
paradigm for industrial relations as a field- none of these authors question the value of the 
theory –or of the social movement literature more generally- for explaining the 
development of union strategy and collective action. Quite the contrary, as Martin (1999) 
explains. 
 
First, (mobilisation theory) it generates researchable propositions about the structural 
conditions under which collective organisations might be expected to develop, while 
at the same time recognising the central importance of agency. Second, it focuses 
upon power, and responses to the differential distribution of power, as the central 
dynamic of industrial relations. Third, it recognises the importance of political, 
social, and economics factors in the development of collective action, relating them 
to each other in a systematic manner. Fourth, it provides an open-ended approach to 
the future of trade unionism.  
(Martin, 1999: 1208) 
 
Conceived of in this way, the notion of mobilisation is crucial to analyse and explain 
union strategy, and it is my belief that drawing on some of the insights of the social 
movement literature can only prove rewarding for debates about the future of trade 
unionism. 
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1  Visser (2006), for example, reports that union density rates in 2002 or 2003 were lower than 
in 1970 in all but four cases of the 24 countries he studied (Finland, Sweden, Denmark, and 
Belgium). The countries studied were United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, 
Japan, Republic of Korea, Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Slovak Republic, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. Similarly, Kuruvilla et al. (2002) found that 
all of the seven Asian countries they examined (China, India, Japan, Korea, Singapore, 
Taiwan and the Philippines), had experienced a decline in union density during the 1990s. A 
remarkable similar picture can be drawn from research in Central and Eastern Europe, Latin 
America, and other parts of the developing world (Ost and Crowley, 2001; Patroni and 
Poitras, 2002; Veltmeyer, 1997a, 1997b; Zapata, 2004). 
2  Unless specified otherwise, all data in this paragraph refers to adjusted density statistics 
measured against the size of the employed wage and salary earners as calculated by Visser 
(2006). 
3  Howell’s account provides for another useful corrective to excessive focus on the firm as 
main socio-economic actor in the varieties of capitalism and globalisation literatures. 
Although the traditionally dominant position of the state in the economy has been contested 
in the era of globalisation, states retain distinctive capacities as economic actors and 
regulators (Crouch, 1993). On the one hand, the role of the state in managing overall 
economic strategy and leading economic restructuring remains extensive. Even ‘globalising’ 
perspectives sustain that state capacities for domestic transformative strategies provide a 
‘competitive advantage’ (Weiss, 1998). State capacity in this context ‘refers to the ability of 
policy-making authorities to pursue domestic adjustment strategies that, in cooperation with 
organised economic groups, upgrade or transform the industrial economy. Such strategies 
encompass both structural shifts: from declining to expanding sectors, as well as 
technological diffusion and innovation; and the creation of new industries, products and 
processes’ (Weiss, 1998: 5). 
4  There are three main sources of technological and product differences among mining 
companies: extraction methods, production processes, and final products.  
 (1) Extraction (open pit or underground mining). Copper can be extracted from open pit or 
underground mines. There are obvious differences between them but as first stage in the 
mining process they are essentially very similar. As one of my interviewees remarked ‘up to 
this stage, the principle is exactly the same: get material from the earth… either using 
dynamite and trucks, or diggers and trains’. Cases selected include both types of extraction 
method and their presence is not correlated to age or type or origin of ownership.  
 (2) Production (hydro or pyrometallurgy). Copper is usually found associated to sulphide 
minerals, but also to oxide minerals. These two types of minerals require different 
productive processes. Oxide minerals require hydrometallurgy. The processing involves 
submitting the material to a leaching solution, which will produce solutions of copper 
sulphate, which enter a process of solvent extraction followed by electrowinning, which 
final result is a copper cathode 99.99% pure. Sulphide minerals are processed by means of 
pyrometallurgy. The material goes first through crushing and milling, followed by a 
classification process to obtain copper concentrate. Later purification stages are carried out 
in furnaces that generate blister or anode copper 99% pure. Finally, electrorefining 
transforms the anodes into 99.99% pure cathodes. The operation of oxide minerals  through 
hydrometallurgy is a more cost-efficient and simpler process than pyrometallurgy. Cases 
selected include both types of production processes, and again their presence is not 
correlated to age or type or origin of ownership.  
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 (3) Final products. Both productive processes may result in copper cathodes as their final 
product. However, copper concentrate –the result of the earlier stages of both processes- 
represents the final product of many companies. Producing copper cathodes (99% pure 
copper) is obviously the result of a process that adds more value than producing copper 
concentrate (30% pure copper). Cases selected include mining companies which produce 
either or both types of products. 
5  Early legislation included: 1906 Labour Housing Act No. 1838 (Habitaciones Obreras); 
1907 Sunday Rest Act Law No. 1940 (Descanso Dominical) later replaced by Law 3321 
(1917); 1915 ‘Chair’ Act No. 2951 (“Ley de la Silla”); 1916 Accidents at Work Act No. 
3170 (Accidentes del Trabajo); 1917 Nurseries Act No. 3138 (Salas Cuna); 1918 Chilean 
Rail Pension Fund Act No. 3379 (Caja de Retiro y Prevision Social de los Ferrocarriles del 
Estado) (Walker, 2002). 
6  The 1974 Foreign Investment Act (Decree Law 600) prohibits discrimination against 
foreign investment, despite specifying that access to domestic credit can be restricted if 
necessary. DL 600 also guarantees the free repatriation of capital and profits, together with a 
total income tax burden of 42% for ten years, applicable to investments of over US$ 5 
million. Stability in taxes levied on sales and services, and in the tariff regime, is also 
guaranteed throughout the investment period. In the case of investments of at least US$ 50 
million, the duration of tax stability with a maximum tax burden of 42% is extended to 20 
years. Stability in tax rules and export regulations is also guaranteed, as is free access to the 
foreign-exchange market to pay authorised liabilities (Sánchez Albavera et al., 2001). 
7 For Piñera’s own account of the process and content of each of these reforms see Piñera 
(1990, 1991, 2002). 
8  The 1994 Code specified that dismissal could occur only for a just cause but at the same 
time it established provisions that left the law unchanged in practice. In fact, an employer 
can terminate a contract of work using as a cause the necessities of the firm, establishment, 
or service; such as those deriving from rationalisation, modernisation, falls in productivity, 
changes in market conditions or in the economy which make it necessary to dismiss one or 
more workers, and the technical or working unsuitability of the worker’ (adapted from 
Haagh, 2002: 100). The 2001 reforms eliminated the final part of the sentence regarding a 
worker’s lack of technical ability in order to ‘encourage training programmes’ (Acevedo, 
2001), but left the rest intact. Likewise, although the levels of severance payments and fines 
for unfair dismissal have been significantly increased, the provisions mentioned above have 
reduced their effectiveness in practice. 
9  Despite the fact that, as part of the process of pacted transition, a package of more than 50 
constitutional reforms was negotiated and ratified later in a plebiscite in 1989, several 
‘authoritarian enclaves’ remained in place. The most relevant of these enclaves were a 
binominal electoral system that has over-represented the right, while de facto excluding the 
Communist Party and other leftist forces outside the Concertación and the (later eliminated) 
regime’s right to designate nine senators (one-fifth of the Senate). The most important of 
these reforms eliminated the constitutional proscription of Marxist parties, allowed union 
members to hold party affiliations, and prevented the President from dissolving the lower 
house of Congress (Roberts, 1998; Wilde, 1999). 
10  Since 2008, Chile’s National Labour Bureau recommends the use of this form of 
measurement as opposed to the more familiar based on the total employed labour force. The 
Bureau argues that the latter is misleading in the Chilean context because its calculation 
includes people not susceptible to unionise. But the trend is certainly the same. Union 
density as percentage of the employed labour force has declined from 15.1% in 1991 to 11% 
in 2007 (Dirección del Trabajo, 2008a: 7). 
11  According to Chilean legislation, a union can be valid or dissolved. Being ‘valid’ means that 
a union has legal existence but this can be ‘active’ or ‘in recess’. A valid and active 
organisation has a registered membership and directorate whilst a union in recess lacks both 
(Montero et al., 2000). 
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12  This paragraph draws on several ILO works concerned with changing nature of the 
employment relationship, which include reports of the Conference Committee on Contract 
Labour (ILO, 1997b), and reports prepared by the Office to serve as a basis for these 
discussions (ILO, 1997a, 1998). They also include the series of country studies written for 
the Meeting of Experts on Workers in Situations Needing Protection (ILO, 2000), and the 
documents prepared for the 2003 general discussion on the scope of the employment 
relationship (ILO, 2003), which served as a base for the Employment Relationship 
Recommendation (No. 198) adopted in 2006 (ILO, 2006). 
13  Although some providers enjoy long-term contracts with large user enterprises, most must 
periodically compete to renew or win a contract. Contracts are generally non-negotiable for 
providers, and unilateral changes as well as the termination of contracts with 30 days notice 
without expression of cause are common practice. Furthermore, it is not unusual for 
managers at user enterprises to resign only to set up their own contractor firms and provide 
services to their former employers in nearly exclusive fashion. Most providers are thus 
economically dependent and hierarchically subordinated to user enterprises. 
14  A labour reform Bill that President Lagos (2000-2005) introduced in Congress in 2001 
included norms regulating outsourcing and the supply of labour. The Bill faced such strong 
opposition that, in order to pass the points where compromise had been reached, the 
government offered to remove the norms on outsourcing and supply of labour and discuss 
them later as a separate Bill. The opposition accepted but the prospective law remained 
dormant in Congress for the next four years. 
15  In line with the ILO (2006), the Act distinguishes between two types of outsourcing 
regimes: ‘outsourcing’ or the performance of work and services (subcontratación) on the 
one hand, and the ‘supply of labour’ under commercial contracts (suministro de 
trabajadores) on the other. 
16  Copper is the world’s third most widely used metal, after iron and aluminium. It is mainly 
used in highly cyclical industries such as construction and industrial machinery 
manufacturing. Profitable extraction of the metal depends on cost-efficient high-volume 
mining techniques. Ore grade is a measure that describes the concentration of a valuable 
natural material (metal or mineral) in its surrounding ore. Low-grade describes low 
concentration and high-grade high concentration. The cost of extracting a natural material 
from its ore is directly related to its concentration, and the cost of extraction must be less 
than the market value of the material being mined for the operation to be economically 
feasible. Copper market participants across the board use COMEX Division high-grade 
copper futures and options to mitigate price risk, and copper contracts are also used as 
investment vehicles. 
17  Although thinking in terms of ‘Classic Copper Unionism’ provides a useful starting point of 
analysis, it inevitably glosses over the myriad of circumstances that characterised the 
realities of La Gran Minería between its beginnings as American-owned enclave to its full 
nationalisation in 1971. It is therefore important not to lose sight of the fact that Classic 
Copper Unionism represents an idealised type of unionism largely based on the actions of 
the industry-wide CNTC.  
18  The following extract from Gedicks (1973: 13-15) is illustrative. ‘Kennecott asked for, and 
received, $ 81.6 million for 51% of Braden Copper Co., an operation whose book value was 
only $ 65.7 million in 1963. (…) Moreover, Kennecott's share of the expansion program 
was financed by the receipts from Chile's payments for 51% of the stock of Braden and the 
tax rates were cut so drastically (from 86% to 44%) that Kennecott's share as a 49% owner 
was greater than its share as a 100% owner. Since the absolute share of profits rose 
substantially as a result of the expansion, this meant that Kennecott's earnings from Chile 
increased for virtually no cash outlay on its part. (…) Under the Chilenisation program and 
the rise in copper prices during the Vietnam War the profits of Anaconda and Kennecott 
rose to unprecedented heights. Kennecott, who in 1965 made $ 8 million dollars, withdrew $ 
48 millions from Chile in 1969. Anaconda increased its income from $ 187 million in the 
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triennium 1965-67 to $ 239 in the period 1967-70. Meanwhile, by 1970, production figures 
were still at their 1964 level and the refining program had only reached 360.000 tons or 
about 50% of what had been called for.’ 
19  See Note 4. 
20  Some of Disputada’s awards include the Chilean Industrial Relations Association Award 
2001 (Chilean charter of the IRRA); National Environmental Award 1999; CORFO’s 
National Quality Award 1997; the Ministry of Mining’s Raúl Sáez Quality Award; 
SONAMI’s Quality Award; National Safety Council Award; and the ALASEHT Award 
(Compañía Minera Disputada de Las Condes, 2000). 
21  One consortium comprises Nippon Mining and Metals Co. Ltd (15%), Marubeni Corp. 
(8.75%) and Mitsui & Co. Ltd (1.25%). The other includes Mitsubishi Materials Corp. 
(10%) and Mitsubishi Corp. (5%). Nippon Mining & Metals and Mitsubishi Materials take 
delivery of about half the concentrate output. 
22 Other Pelambres’ awards include the Chilean Industrial Relations Association Award 
(Chilean charter of the IRRA); Serneageomin’s Health and Safety Award; the Asociación 
Chilena de Seguridad (AChS) John Ryan Award; and CORFO’s National Quality Award. 
23 Although this description may be a valid one –especially in relation to the previous outward-
oriented cycle and its reliance on ubiquitous state and employer repression- it brushes off 
the significant differences in the meaning of challenges for different types of workers (see 
Chapter 5). Whereas Socialists and Communists adapted well to their new ‘regulated’ 
condition, for Anarchists ‘regulated collective bargaining’ represented an insurmountable 
challenge. Furthermore, the diverse material circumstances and bargaining power of 
workers that resulted from a segmented labour market (blue- and white-collar workers) and 
economic structure (‘modern monopolistic’ and ‘SMEs’ sectors) led to significant 
differences in union strategy and effectiveness among ‘regulated’ groups of workers 
(Campero and Cortázar, 1985; Roddick, 1989). 
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